Results
2019-09-01: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 737-100, -200, -200C, -300, -400, and -500 series airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports indicating that the pitot heat switch is not always set to ON, which could result in misleading air data. This AD requires replacement of pitot anti-icing system components, installation of \n\n((Page 23459)) \n\na junction box and wiring provisions, repetitive testing of the anti- icing system, and applicable on-condition actions. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
98-16-11: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Airbus Model A300, A310, and A300-600 series airplanes, that requires repetitive detailed visual inspections to detect cracks in the pylon thrust and sideload fitting of the wing, and replacement of any cracked pylon thrust and sideload fitting with a new fitting. This amendment is prompted by issuance of mandatory continuing airworthiness information by a foreign civil airworthiness authority. The actions specified by this AD are intended to detect and correct cracks in the pylon thrust and sideload fitting of the wing, which could result in reduced structural integrity of the airplane.
84-16-01: 84-16-01 MESSERSCHMITT-BOLKOW-BLOHM: Letter issued August 7, 1984. Applies to MBB Model BO 105 series helicopters certificated in all categories that are equipped with the following tail rotor blades: 105-31743 Serial Nos.: 115, 118, 219, 224, 387, 395, 581, 608, 615, 650. 105-31744 (Modification of 105-31742) Serial Nos.: 64, 86, 124, 127, 130, 131, 143, 147, 152, 158, 179, 180, 210, 211, 216, 217, 219, 220, 240, 246, 256, 262, 265, 266, 267, 269, 295, 342, 344, 372, 383, 390, 394, 414, 425, 433, 437, 438, 442, 444, 461, 467, 489, 491, 495, 499, 504, 506, 514, 516, 517, 528, 538, 543, 552, 556, 588, 591, 596, 601, 603, 607, 846, 936, 1065, 1174, 1175, 1199, 1234, 1235, 1237, 1270, 1300. Compliance required as indicated. (A) Before further flight, perform a visual check of each tail rotor blade tip area (approximately 100MM (4 inches) from end cap inward) for cracks. (B) Repeat the check of Paragraph (A) before each subsequent flight until the affected blades are replaced. (C) Replace cracked tail rotor blades with serviceable blades before further flight. (D) The check required by Paragraph (A) of this AD is not considered to be maintenance or preventive maintenance, and may be performed by the pilot, however, the person performing this check shall make an entry in the aircraft maintenance records containing the following information: The name of the person who performed the check, the date the check was accomplished, the signature, certificate number, and kind of certificate held by the person performing the check. (E) An equivalent method of compliance with this AD may be used when approved by the Manager, Aircraft Certification Division, FAA, Southwest Region, P.O. Box 1689, Fort Worth, Texas 76101. NOTE: MBB Alert Bulletin No. 23 applies to this inspection. This airworthiness directive becomes effective upon receipt.
2000-15-18: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 737-100 and -200 series airplanes, that currently requires inspections to detect cracking of the support fittings of the Krueger flap actuator; and, if necessary, replacement of existing fittings with new steel fittings and modification of the aft attachment of the actuator. That AD also provides for an optional terminating modification that constitutes terminating action for the repetitive inspections. This amendment requires accomplishment of the previously optional terminating action. This amendment is prompted by reports of cracking due to fatigue and stress corrosion of the support fittings of the Krueger flap actuator. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent such cracking, which could result in fracturing of the actuator attach lugs, separation of the actuator from the support fitting, severing of the hydraulic lines, and resultant loss of hydraulic fluids. These conditions, if not corrected, could result in possible failure of one or more hydraulic systems, and consequent reduced controllability of the airplane.
2019-08-07: We are superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2014-20-04, which applied to all Airbus SAS Model A318 and A319 series airplanes; Airbus SAS Model A320-111, -211, -212, -214, -231, -232, and -233 airplanes; and Airbus SAS Model A321-111, -112, -131, -211, -212, -213, -231, and -232 airplanes. AD 2014-20-04 required repetitive inspections of the titanium angles between the belly fairing and the keel beam side panel, an inspection of the open holes of cracked titanium angles, and corrective action if necessary. This AD continues to require those actions, adds Model A320-216 airplanes, and requires a detailed inspection for, and replacement of, certain rivets, and corrective actions if necessary. This AD was prompted by reports of cracks at the lower riveting of the four titanium angles that connect the belly fairing to the keel beam side [[Page 23462]] panels. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2000-15-17 R1: This document corrects a typographical error that appeared in airworthiness directive (AD) 2000-15-17 that was published in the Federal Register on August 8, 2000 (65 FR 48368). The typographical error resulted in the omission of an airplane model from paragraph (c) of the AD. This AD is applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9-81 (MD-81), DC-9-82 (MD-82), DC-9-83 (MD-83), and DC-9-87 (MD-87); Model MD-88 airplanes; and Model MD-90-30 series airplanes. This AD requires installation of a pipe support and clamps on the hydraulic lines in the aft fuselage; replacement of the hydraulic pipe assembly in the aft fuselage with a new pipe assembly; and installation of drain tube assemblies and diverter assemblies in the area of the auxiliary power unit inlet; as applicable.
52-02-02: 52-02-02 ERCO: Applies to All Model 415 Series and Models E and G Aircraft. Compliance required as indicated. As a result of several Ercoupe accidents, the following precautionary measures should be taken: 1. Before the next flight and at each 25-hour inspection: (a) Inspect the aileron balance assembly (Erco P/N 415-16009) and ailerons for cracks in support structure and skin, respectively. Repair or replace defective parts. (b) Inspect the four No. 6-32 screws which attach the balance weight support to the aileron for looseness and damage. Replace defective screws with AN 526-632 screws, taking care not to overstress during tightening. 2. Before next flight and at each 100-hour inspection, thereafter, inspect the aileron hinges and aileron control system for excessive looseness or wear in hinge pins or bearings. If, with one aileron blocked in the neutral position, the total play of the other aileron, measured at the trailing edge, exceeds 7/16-inch, allthe joints and bearing should be checked and those which are loose should be tightened or replaced. 3. If the aileron balance weights have been removed in accordance with Erco Service Bulletin No. 57, item 1 above and AD 47-20-06 do not apply. However, any previous cracks in the aileron skin or beam which occurred prior to removal of the aileron balance weights must be repaired or the parts replaced. The free play referred to in item 2 above must be reduced to 5/16-inch. 4. Before the next flight, determine that the air speed instrument is distinctly marked in accordance with the operating limitations. (Engineering and Research Corp. Service Memorandum No. 56 covers this same subject.) This supersedes AD 49-02-02; the new material is contained in item 3.
2000-15-16: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD); applicable to certain Boeing Model 737, 757, 767, and 777 series airplanes; that requires a one-time general visual inspection to determine the vendor and manufacturing date of all oxygen masks in the passenger cabin; and corrective action, if necessary. This amendment is prompted by a report that passengers were unable to activate supplemental oxygen generators during an in-flight decompression due to stress corrosion cracking of the crimped copper alloy ferrules used to secure loops on the lanyard ends. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent failure of the supplemental oxygen system to deliver oxygen to the passengers and flight attendants in the event of decompression, which could result in injury to passengers and flight attendants.
2019-09-02: We are superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2018-17-01 for Bell Model 212, 412, 412CF, and 412EP helicopters. AD 2018-17-01 required replacing certain oil and fuel check valves and prohibited installing these valves on any helicopter. This AD retains the requirements of AD 2018-17-01 but expands those requirements for all model helicopters. This AD was prompted by the discovery that we omitted a helicopter model from one of the required actions. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
97-15-13 R1: This amendment revises Airworthiness Directive (AD) 97-15-13, which currently requires installing lubrication fittings in the airstair door handle and latch housing mechanisms on certain Raytheon Aircraft Company (Raytheon) Models 1900, 1900C, and 1900D airplanes (formerly referred to as Beech Models 1900, 1900C, and 1900D airplanes). Certain Model 1900C serial number airplanes were incorrectly referenced as Model 1900D airplanes in the Applicability section of AD 97-15-13. This AD maintains the requirements of AD 97-15-13, and corrects the model and serial number reference as described above. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent moisture from accumulating and freezing in the airstair door handle and latch housing, which could result in the door freezing shut and passengers not being able to evacuate the airplane in an emergency situation.