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78-08-08: 78-08-08 BELL: Amendment 39-3189. Applies to Bell Models 214B and 214B-1 helicopters, S/N 28001 through 28024 and S/N 28032 through 28036, certificated in all categories. Compliance required as indicated. To detect possible cracks in the tail fin forward spar, to improve the strength and fatigue resistance of the tail fin and boom and to preclude possible failure of the fin, accomplish the following repetitive inspection and modification. (a) Before the first flight of each day after the effective date of this AD, conduct the following inspection of the tail fin forward spar, left side cap angle, and the spar web until the modification in paragraph (b) is accomplished: (1) Remove the 42 degree gear box cover from the tail boom. (2) Remove the paint finish and clean the spar left side cap angle and left forward side of the spar web in the area surrounding the rivets where the fin intersects the tail boom, using a cloth and methyl-ethyl ketone or equivalent.(3) Inspect the cap angle and web in the clear area of the spar for cracks using a three-power or higher magnifying glass and a light, or a dye penetrant or equivalent inspection method. (4) If no cracks are found, install the gear box cover. (5) If cracks are found, remove the tail boom before further flight and replace with a tail boom and fin modified in accordance with the data specified in paragraph (b) of this AD. (b) On or before July 30, 1978, modify the tail boom and fin in accordance with Bell Helicopter Textron Drawing No. 214-961-151 or in accordance with an equivalent means approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, Federal Aviation Administration, Southwest Region. (c) The manufacturer's instructions identified and described in this directive are incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1). All persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to the Service Manager, Bell Helicopter Textron, P.O. Box 482, Fort Worth, Texas 76101. These documents may also be examined at the Office of the Regional Counsel, Southwest Region, FAA, 4400 Blue Mound Road, Fort Worth, Texas, and at FAA Headquarters, 800 Independence Avenue, S.W., Washington, D.C. A historical file on this AD which includes the incorporated material in full is maintained by the FAA at its headquarters in Washington, D.C., and at the Southwest Regional Office in Fort Worth, Texas. (Bell Helicopter Textron Service Bulletin No. 214-77-8 pertains to inspections and Service Bulletin No. 214-78-1 pertains to modifications.) This amendment becomes effective April 21, 1978.
64-10-03: 64-10-03 DAVIS AIRCRAFT PRODUCTS: Amdt. 39-856. Applies to All Aircraft Equipped With Davis Aircraft P/N FDC-2700 Series Safety Belts Manufactured Prior to September 1, 1963. Compliance required within 125 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD. As the result of the investigation of reports of the failure of Davis Aircraft P/N FDC-2700 Series safety belts to latch properly, it has been determined that binding of the latching mechanism has resulted from the loss of lubricant during belt cleaning processes and also from certain manufacturing and assembly errors. (a) Inspect each belt assembly as follows: (1) Determine whether the buckle cover P/N FD-2674 is fully closed. If the buckle cover is fully opened and does not automatically snap back into the completely closed position when released, it may be assumed that the spring is damaged. (2) Slowly raise the buckle cover taking careful note of any tendency of binding of the latching mechanism components. The buckle cover P/N FD-2674 and release latch P/N FD-2668 must be free to snap into the fully closed position when the buckle cover is opened and released. (b) If any of the deficiencies specified in (a) are found, disassemble and further inspect the components to determine whether they meet the following requirements: (1) The tangs or straight ends of the coil spring P/N FD-3007 shall be 9/32 plus 0- 1/16 inch and be straight throughout this length. (A bent tang will result in binding of the latching mechanism.) (2) The release latch P/N FD-2668, shall be counterbored in one end to receive spring P/N FD-3007. The counterbored depth shall be 15/32 plus or minus 1/32 inch. (c) Replace any components found to be defective under the inspection required in paragraph (b). (d) Clean latch components and relubricate hexagonal headed hinge bolt and spring of the latching mechanism as required using Alemite No. 33 lubricant or equivalent.(e) After reassembly inspect the spring to determine that it is seated in the release latch retaining groove and apply spring tension by rotating the hexagonal headed hinge bolt from the unloaded position through two to three flats of the hexagonal head. Secure the hinge bolt in the hexagonal cutout in the buckle frame. Effective June 5, 1964. Revised October 8, 1969.
2012-06-20: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Fokker Services B.V. Model F.28 Mark 0070 and 0100 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report that the fuel crossfeed valves cannot be controlled when only emergency electrical power is available, that an unwanted configuration of the indication logic for the fuel fire shutoff valve was introduced during production, and that current fuel crossfeed indications are based on selection by the flightcrew instead of actual position of the crossfeed valve actuators. This AD requires modifying the crossfeed valve control and power supply, the crossfeed indication logic and power supply, and the indication logic for the fuel fire shutoff valve; modifying the overhead panel; and for certain airplanes, modifying the transfer logic of the center wing fuel tank. We are issuing this AD to prevent failure of an in-flight engine re- light following a double engine flame-out event, which could result in loss of the airplane.
2010-09-02: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: BAE Systems have received three reports of uncommanded flap extensions affecting different Jetstream 31 aeroplanes. In one instance, the aeroplane exceeded the airspeed limit allowed for the uncommanded flap configuration, resulting in damage to the wing trailing edge. Following investigation, it was considered that a loss of electrical signal to the `up' solenoid of the flap selector valve had occurred and, combined with the normal internal leakage in the hydraulic system, resulted in hydraulic pressure being supplied to the `down' side of the flap hydraulic jack. The loss of signal could have been intermittent, and the evidence strongly implicated oxide debris contamination of the flap selector switch contacts. This condition, if not corrected, could lead to further cases of damage to the aeroplane due to airspeed limit exceedance, possibly resulting in asymmetric flap deployment, which could lead to loss of control of the aeroplane. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
97-25-05: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to Robinson Helicopter Company (Robinson) Model R22 helicopters with a Lycoming 0-360-J2A engine installation. This AD requires replacing the carburetor and carburetor air temperature (CAT) gage with an improved carburetor that does not require manual leaning of the fuel/air mixture during flight, and a remarked CAT gage; and revising the Rotorcraft Flight Manual to remove the reference to leaning the engine. This amendment is prompted by a report from the Civil Aviation Authority of Great Britain that cautioned that the mixture control could inadvertently be placed in the idle cutoff position during in-flight manual leaning of the fuel/air mixture in the carburetor of the Lycoming 0-360-J2A engine. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent inadvertent placement of the mixture control to the idle cutoff position during in-flight leaning of the engine, which could result in an engine shutdown and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
86-05-08: 86-05-08 FOKKER B.V.: Amendment 39-5243. Applies to Model F28 airplanes, certificated in any category. 11003 to 11189 inclusive 11190 to 11192 inclusive (RH side only) Serial Numbers: 11991 and 11992 To prevent failures of the wing center section, accomplish the following, unless already accomplished, within the next 60 days after the effective date of this AD, or before the airplane reaches six years of age (from date of delivery), whichever occurs later: A. Inspect the center wing rear spar end fittings, and repair if cracks are found, in accordance with Fokker Service Bulletin F28/57-73, dated June 18, 1984. B. Repeat the inspection and repairs required by paragraph A., above, at intervals not to exceed one year. C. Alternate means of compliance which provide an acceptable level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. D. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of inspections and/or modifications required by this AD. All persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service document from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to the Manager, Maintenance and Engineering, Fokker B.V., Product Support, P.O. Box 7600, 11172J Schiphol Oost, The Netherlands. This document may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or the Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. This amendment becomes effective April 7, 1986.
2021-13-06: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus SAS Model A350-941 and -1041 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a determination that new or more restrictive airworthiness limitations are necessary. This AD requires revising the existing maintenance or inspection program, as applicable, to incorporate new or more restrictive airworthiness limitations, as specified in two European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) ADs, which are incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2012-06-15: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for DG Flugzeugbau GmbH Models DG-500 Elan Orion, DG-500 Elan Trainer, DG-500/ 20 Elan, and DG-500/22 Elan sailplanes and Models DG-500M and DG-500MB powered sailplanes. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as incorrect re-installation of the rear cockpit securing rope for the headrest of the rear seat during maintenance, which could cause the rear seat to interfere with the control stick of the sailplane. We are issuing this AD to require actions to address the unsafe condition on these products.
97-25-04: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to all Cessna Aircraft Company (Cessna) Models 208, 208A, 208B, 425, and 441 airplanes. This AD requires amending the Limitations Section of the airplane flight manual (AFM) to prohibit the positioning of the power levers below the flight idle stop while the airplane is in flight. This AFM amendment will include a statement of consequences if the limitation is not followed. This AD results from numerous incidents and five documented accidents involving airplanes equipped with turboprop engines where the propeller beta was improperly utilized during flight. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent loss of airplane control or engine overspeed with consequent loss of engine power caused by the power levers being positioned below the flight idle stop while the airplane is in flight.
2012-07-07: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all The Boeing Company Model 747 airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of fractured latch pins found in service; investigation revealed that the cracking and subsequent fracture were initiated by fatigue and propagated by a combination of fatigue and stress corrosion. This AD requires repetitive general visual inspections for broken or missing latch pins of the lower sills of the forward and aft lower lobe cargo doors; repetitive detailed inspections for cracking of the latch pins; and corrective actions if necessary. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct fractured or broken latch pins, which could result in a forward or aft lower lobe cargo door opening and detaching during flight, and consequent rapid decompression of the airplane.