Aircraft-logs.com

Results
90-15-03: 90-15-03 BOEING: Amendment 39-6650. Docket No. 89-NM-248-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: Model 737-300 and 737-400 series airplanes, listed in Boeing Service Bulletin 737-28-1084, dated September 14, 1989, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required within three months after the effective date of this AD, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent a fire hazard associated with a fuel leak, due to the fuel tube assembly chafing against the adjacent wing/strut structural brace, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tAccomplish one of the following: \n\n\t\t1.\tInspect the left engine fuel feed tube assembly for proper clearance and chafing in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 737-28-1055 Revision 1, dated October 27, 1988. If inadequate clearance is found, prior to further flight, replace the fuel tube with a serviceable fuel tube, in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 737-28-1084, dated September 14, 1989, and verify minimum clearance between support structure and fuel tube, in accordance with the above Service Bulletin 737-28-1055, Revision 1, dated October 27, 1988. \n\n\t\t2.\tReplace the left engine fuel feed tube in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 737-28-1084, dated September 14, 1989, and verify minimum clearance between support structure and fuel tube in accordance with Service Bulletin 737-28-1055, Revision 1, dated October 27, 1988. \n\n\tB.\tAn alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. \n\n\tNOTE: The request should be submitted directly to the Manager, Seattle ACO, and a copy sent to the cognizant FAA Principal Inspector (PI). The PI will then forward comments or concurrence to the Seattle ACO. \n\n\tC.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Boeing Commercial Airplanes, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. \n\n\tThis amendment (39-6650, AD 90-15-03) becomes effective on August 14, 1990.
90-13-07: 90-13-07 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-6616. Docket No. 90-NM-21-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: Model DC-10-10, -10F, -15, -30, -30F, -40, -40F, and KC-10A (Military) series airplanes, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent total loss of aircraft hydraulic power and flight control systems, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tFor model DC-10-10 and -10F series airplanes: \n\n\t\t1.\tWithin 6 months after the effective date of this AD, accomplish either subparagraph a. or b., below: \n\n\t\t\ta.\tModify the Number 3 hydraulic system by installing flow rate sensing hydraulic fuses and check valves in accordance with paragraph 2, Accomplishment Instructions, of McDonnell Douglas DC-10 Service Bulletin 29-129, dated February 14, 1990; or \n\n\t\t\tb.\tInstall an electrically operated hydraulic system shutoff valve and return line check valve in the Number 3 hydraulic system. The shutoff valve must be activated by a hydraulic fluid level sensor in the Number 3 hydraulic system reservoir and annunciated in the cockpit. The installation must be made in a manner which is approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, or in accordance with McDonnell Douglas DC-10 Service Bulletin 29-128, dated February 22, 1990. \n\n\t\t2.\tFor those airplanes modified in accordance with paragraph A.1.a., above, within 1 year after the effective date of this AD, install an electrically operated hydraulic system shutoff valve and return line check valve in the Number 3 hydraulic system. The shutoff valve must be activated by a hydraulic fluid level sensor in the Number 3 hydraulic system reservoir and annunciated in the cockpit. The installation must be made in a manner which is approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, or in accordance with McDonnell Douglas DC-10 Service Bulletin 29-128, dated February 22, 1990. The modification required by paragraph A.1.a., above, may be removed after accomplishment of this subparagraph. \n\n\tB.\tFor Model DC-10-15, -30, -30F, -40, -40F, and KC-10A (Military) series airplanes, within one year after the effective date of this AD, install an electrically operated hydraulic system shutoff valve and return line check valve in the Number 3 hydraulic system. The shutoff valve must be activated by a hydraulic fluid level sensor in the Number 3 hydraulic system reservoir and annunciated in the cockpit. The installation must be made in a manner which is approved by Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, or in accordance with McDonnell Douglas DC-10 Service Bulletin 29-128, dated February 22, 1990 \n\n\tC.\tAn alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tNOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI), who will either concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tD.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Douglas Aircraft Company, P. O. Box 1771, Long Beach, California 90801, ATTN: Manager, Service Change, Mail 73-30. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or the Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 3229 East Spring Street, Long Beach, California. \n\n\tThis amendment (39-6616, AD 90-13-07) becomes effective on July 20, 1990.
47-35-02: 47-35-02\tSIKORSKY: (Was Mandatory Note 2 of AD-7L-1.) Applies to Model R-4B AAF Helicopter Serial Numbers 43-46500 and 43-46504 to 43-46567 Inclusive. \n\nCompliance required prior to November 15, 1947. \n\nTo compensate for an increased overhang of the tail rotor gearbox, a diagonal brace that changes the aft boom load distribution shall be installed in accordance with the following instructions: \n\n(a)\tFit the two tube brace assemblies, Sikorsky P/N S38566 and S38567, in telescopic position, to lower right longeron and upper left longeron. (See Figures 2 and 3.) \n\n\nAD 47-35-02 \n\n(1)\tInsert bolts, P/N AN 4-13, into halves of clamp of each section of brace; attach washers, P/N AN 960-416, and nuts, P/N AN 310-4. \n\n(2)\tLocate brace so that its center and that of vertical tube, P/N S38505-23, forward of it, are a maximum of 1 1/8 inches apart. (See Figure 2.) \n\n(3)\tTighten securely four bolts, P/N AN 4-13, which hold subject brace in position. \n\n(4)\tSecure nuts, P/N AN 310-4, with cotter pins. \n\n(b)\tMark with a pencil the overlap of tube brace assembly, P/N S38566, on assembly P/N S38567. (See Figure 3.) \n\n\n\nAD 47-35-02 \n\n(c)\tFashion a wedge, using a piece of wood 1 x 3 x 14 inches, and "V" notch both ends. (See Figure 4.) \n\n(d)\tInsert wedge approximately parallel to telescopic brace. \n\n(1)\tTap alternately the ends of wedge forcing the subject assembly to extend 1/16 inch beyond the pencil line requested in paragraph (b). (Extra extension of 1/16 inch permits brace to assume the desired stress load.) \n\n(2)\tWrap longerons with friction tape at point of wedge contact, or insert cardboard or any suitable material at ends of wood wedge to prevent paint abrasion. \n\n(e)\tWith wedge securely in position, using drill No. 40 (0.098-inch), drill two holes through brace at 90 degrees to each other. (See Figure 3.) \n\n(1)\tEnlarge holes, using drill No. C (0.242 inch) and ream to 0.250 inch. \n\n(f)\tBolt two sections of brace together with bolts, P/N AN 24-17, nuts, P/N AN 320- 4, and secure with cotter pins. \n\n(g)\tRemove the wood wedge. \n\n(h)\tIf paint on longerons of tail fuselage has been damaged, touch up with paint. \n\n(Sikorsky Service Bulletin R-4B No. 8 and Army Technical Order 01-230HA-11 also cover this same alteration.)
2009-18-12: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Four aircraft have experienced a dual AC [alternating current] generator shutdown, caused by a broken propeller de-ice bus bar which short-circuited with the backplate assembly.* * * A short circuit can cause a dual AC generator shutdown that, particularly in conjunction with an engine failure in icing conditions, could result in reduced controllability of the aircraft. * * * * * Reduced controllability of the airplane in certain operating conditions affects continued safe flight and landing. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
70-16-04: 70-16-04\tBOEING: Amdt. 39-1052. Applies to Boeing Model 707/720 Series Airplanes. (Effectivity listed on Boeing Service Bulletin No. 2986 dated May 15, 1970, or later FAA approved revisions). \n\n\tCompliance required within 100 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD unless already accomplished.\n \n\tTo prevent fire caused by failure of the Main Cabin Cove Light Ballast Capacitors deactivate the main cabin cove light circuits until one of the following items has been accomplished: \n\n\t(1)\tRelocate all main cabin ballast capacitors to the inboard side of the cove light race way as described in Boeing Service Bulletin No. 2986 dated May 15, 1970, or later FAA approved revisions. \n\n\t(2)\tPerform an equivalent modification approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. \n\n\tThis Amendment becomes effective on August 1, 1970.
2009-04-11: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: The heating capability of several Angle Of Attack (AOA) transducer heating elements removed from in-service aircraft have been found to be below the minimum requirement. Also, it was discovered that a large number of AOA transducers repaired in an approved maintenance facility were not calibrated accurately. Inaccurate calibration of the AOA transducer and/or degraded AOA transducer heating elements can result in early or late activation of the stall warning, stick shaker and stick pusher by the Stall Protection Computer (SPC). * * * * * The unsafe condition is reduced controllability of the airplane. This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.
52-11-01: 52-11-01 EMIGH: Applies to All Trojan A-2 Model Aircraft. \n\n\tCompliance required by August 1, 1952. \n\n\tAs the result of a reported failure of the welded joint in the elevator control tube socket, the following, or equivalent, should be accomplished, to preclude the possibility of recurrence of this type failure: \n\n\t(a)\tInstall a 1/4-inch AN steel bolt through the elevator control tube socket as shown in Figure 1 and secure with an elastic stop nut. Two installations will be necessary, one on the pilot's side and one on the passenger's. \n\n\t(b)\tDue to the limited amount of clearance, it is recommended that the bolts be installed in the direction and location as shown. Ascertain that adequate clearance is provided when the control stick is operated throughout its full range. \n\n\n\n\n\nFIGURE 1
90-01-01: 90-01-01 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-6431. Docket No. 89-NM-108-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: Model DC-10-30, -30F, -40, and KC-10A (Military) series airplanes, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent the loss of main landing gear brake effectiveness, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tWithin 90 days after October 14, 1988 (effective date of Amendment 39-6034), replace all Aircraft Braking Systems (formerly Loral Systems, formerly Goodyear) brakes, part numbers 5000758-2, -3, and -5 with Aircraft Braking Systems brakes, part numbers 5000758-4, -6, and -10. The maximum wear limit is 0.75 inch. \n\n\tB.\tWithin 90 days after October 14, 1988 (effective date of Amendment 39-6034), inspect the brakes for wear. Any brake that is worn more than 0.75 inch must be replaced, prior to further flight, with one within this limit. These limits must be maintained until the requirements of paragraphs D. and E., or F. andG., below are accomplished. \n\n\tC.\tWithin 90 days after October 14, 1988 (effective date of Amendment 39-6034), incorporate the 0.75 inch brake wear limit into the FAA-approved maintenance inspection program. \n\n\tD.\tWithin 30 days after the effective date of this amendment, inspect all Aircraft Braking Systems (formerly Loral Systems, formerly Goodyear) brakes, part numbers 5000758-4, -6, and -10, for wear. Any brake worn more than 0.50 inch must be replaced, prior to further flight, with one within this limit. \n\n\tE.\tWithin 30 days after the effective date of this amendment, incorporate the 0.50 inch brake wear limit into the FAA-approved maintenance inspection program for all Aircraft Braking Systems (formerly Loral Systems, formerly Goodyear) brakes, part numbers 5000758-4, -6, and -10. \n\n\tF.\tWithin 180 days after the effective date of this amendment, modify and replace all Aircraft Braking Systems (formerly Loral Systems, formerly Goodyear) brakes, part numbers 5000758-4, -6,and -10, or any brake modified in accordance with AD 88-16-02 R1, Amendment 39-6034, paragraphs C.2. or D.2., with new extra-long piston sleeves and dust seal boots, and reidentify them as -4R, -6R, and -10R brake assemblies, respectively, in accordance with Douglas Aircraft Company DC-10 Service Bulletin Number 32-218, dated March 17, 1989. For Aircraft Braking Systems (formerly Loral Systems, formerly Goodyear) brakes, part numbers 5000758-4R, -6R, and -10R, the maximum wear limit is 0.90 inch. \n\n\tG.\tWhen the modifications required by paragraph F., above, are accomplished, incorporate the 0.90 inch brake wear limit in the FAA-approved maintenance inspection program. \n\n\tH.\tAn alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tNOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI), who will either concur or comment, and then send it to the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tI.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Douglas Aircraft Company, P.O. Box 1771, Long Beach, California 90801, ATTN: Manager, Service Changes, Mail Code 73-30. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 3229 East Spring Street, Long Beach, California. \n\n\tThis AD supersedes AD 88-16-02 R1, Amendment 39-6034. \n\n\tThis amendment (39-6431, AD 90-01-01) becomes effective on January 31, 1990.
51-09-02: 51-09-02 DOUGLAS: Applies to All Models DC-4 and C54-DC Series Aircraft. \n\n\tCompliance required as indicated. \n\n\tA.\tTo be accomplished at intervals not to exceed 2,000 hours of flight time. Torque check all empennage control surface hinge bolts by first making a visual check of the slippage stripe across the nut and the adjacent area for signs of any relative motion and then applying a tightening force to the nut equal to the minimum torque specified in the Douglas Maintenance Manual for the nut and bolt combination. If the nut does not move with the application of this force and the condition of the stripe indicates no previous movement, the assembly may be left intact. When any looseness is found, the assembly should be removed and thoroughly inspected. \n\n\tB.\tTo be accomplished at each major overhaul period. In addition to the control surface hinge bolts mentioned in part A remove the nuts from all rudder and elevator bracket attaching bolts and rudder and elevator hinge eyebolts. All nuts, bolt or stud threads, and mating surfaces must be cleaned of dirt, grease, oil or dye and thoroughly dried. All parts should be checked for wear and replaced as necessary. Upon reassembly, all nuts should be torqued to the recommended values specified in the Douglas Maintenance Manual for the particular model airplane. All torqued or retorqued bolts should be identified by a narrow painted line across the nut and adjacent surface so any movement of the nut will be readily discernible. This marking should be done as soon as possible after torquing. Bolt heads should not be torqued or retorqued unless it is impossible to reach the nut because of inaccessibility. If it should be necessary to torque or retorque the bolt head, it should be marked in the same manner as described for the nut. \n\n\tC.\tAirline operators with FAA-accepted maintenance inspection programs need only torque check 15 percent of fleet or minimum of two airplanes, whichever is greater, at each 2,000-hour period or in multiples of major inspection closest to 2,000 hours. This period may be increased in 1,000-hour steps until the major aircraft overhaul period is reached provided no defects are found. Thereafter, the torque check shall be accomplished on each aircraft at the aircraft major overhaul period. Where the FAA-accepted maintenance inspection program includes procedures equivalent to this Airworthiness Directive and above deviation, the FAA-accepted maintenance program may be followed in lieu of this Airworthiness Directive. \n\n\tThis supersedes AD 47-27-03.
87-21-04: 87-21-04 McDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-5737. Applies to McDonnell Douglas Model DC-10 and KC-10A series airplanes, certificated in any category. Compliance required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent failure of the inboard slat drive arm due to fatigue, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tPrior to the accumulation of 10,000 landings, or within 15 days after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later, unless previously accomplished within the last 90 days, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 2,000 landings, inspect the inboard slat drive arm in accordance with the expanded magnetic particle, ultrasonic, or eddy current inspection (Option 2) procedures in the Accomplishment Instructions in McDonnell Douglas Service Bulletin A27-203, Revision 1, dated July 9, 1987, or later FAA-approved revision. \n\n\t\t1.\tIf crack(s) are found that are beyond the reworkable limits defined by McDonnell Douglas Service Bulletin A27-203, Revision 1, dated July9, 1987, or later FAA-approved revision, before further flight, replace the cracked arm in accordance with that Service Bulletin. \n\n\t\t2.\tIf crack(s) are found that are within the reworkable limits defined by McDonnell Douglas Service Bulletin A27-203, Revision 1, dated July 9, 1987, or later FAA-approved revision, before further flight, rework or replace the arm in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions in that Service Bulletin. \n\n\tB.\tAlternate means of compliance which provide an acceptable level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tC.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service information from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to McDonnell Douglas Corporation, 3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846, Attention: Director of Publication, C1-L00 (54-60). This information may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or the Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 4344 Donald Douglas Drive, Long Beach, California. \n\n\tThis Amendment becomes effective October 30, 1987.