Results
2009-09-07: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Boeing Model 737-100, -200, -200C, -300, -400, and -500 series airplanes. For all airplanes, this AD requires repetitive overhaul of the retract actuator beam of the main landing gear (MLG). For certain airplanes, this AD requires repetitive inspections for damage of the retract actuator beam, and related investigative and corrective actions if necessary. This AD results from reports of broken retract actuator beams of the MLG and the subsequent failure of the MLG to fully retract. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct broken retract actuator beams of the MLG, which could cause damage to the beam arm, hydraulic tubing, and flight control cables. Damage to the flight control cables could result in loss of control of the airplane.
64-06-04: 64-06-04 HUGHES: Amdt. 706 Part 507 Federal Register March 18, 1964. Applies to Model 269A Helicopters, Serial Numbers 0011 to 0314 Inclusive, Model 269A-1 Helicopters, Serial Numbers 0001 to 0007 Inclusive, and Model 269B Helicopters, Serial Numbers 0001 to 0079 Inclusive. Compliance required as indicated. As a result of several recent failures of the lower coupling drive shaft (Hughes P/N 269A5504) accomplish the following: (a) Within 25 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished within the last 75 hours' time in service, and every 100 hours' time in service thereafter from the last inspection until accomplishment of (b), remove the lower coupling drive shaft and conduct a dye penetrant or magnetic particle inspection of the shaft. Pay particular attention to the radii at the end splines, alinement collar and boot mounting collar. Replace any shaft exhibiting evidence of cracking before further flight. (b) Within500 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD but not to exceed 1,500 hours total time in service on the part, replace the lower coupling drive shaft P/N 269A5504, with a shaft P/N 269A5504-3. (Hughes Service Information Notices Nos. 2A-33(269A), 2A-1-01(269A-1) and 2B- 01(269B), all dated February 18, 1964, cover this same subject.) This directive effective March 18, 1964.
2009-08-11: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: This Airworthiness Directive (AD) is prompted by some occurrences where the Deice Pressure Regulator has vented too much hot air into the forward compartment damaging the oxygen cylinder ON/OFF cable, the Ram-Air Scoop cable and the Environmental Control System (ECS) firewall shut-off valve cable. If incorrectly adjusted, or defective, the Deice Pressure Regulator can vent hot air into the forward compartment. This situation can cause overheating and failures of components located inside the forward compartment, which could result in potential loss of several functions essential for safe flight. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct theunsafe condition on these products.
46-06-04: 46-06-04 CONVAIR: (Was Service Note 3 of AD-2-571-2.) Applies Only to BT-13 Series Airplanes Equipped With a Propeller Spinner. Inspect the propeller spinner attaching lugs after each 25 hours of operation for cracks or signs of impending failure. If cracks are found, the lugs should be reinforced or the spinner should be removed entirely.
80-21-12 R1: 80-21-12 R1 GREAT LAKES AIRCRAFT CORPORATION: Amendment 39-3940 as amended by Amendment 39-4625. Applies to Models 2T-1A-1 and 2T-1A-2 (Serial Numbers 501 through 828) airplanes with Lycoming I0-360 or AEIO-360 engines installed, certificated in any category. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To prevent engine oil inlet temperatures from exceeding acceptable limits within the next 50 hours time- in-service after the effective date of this AD, accomplish either paragraph (a) or (b) below: (a) Remove Cowl Face P/N 50106-2 and Belly Cowl P/N 50105-2 and modify in accordance with Great Lakes Service Bulletin No. 11, dated September 1, 1980, and incorporate Great Lakes Parts Kit SPK 101. Perform engine run-up and inspect oil system for leaks; or (b) Fabricate and install a louver plate (P/N 50105-33) and louver backing plate (P/N 50105-32) on the side of the belly cowling in accordance with Great Lakes Drawing Number 50105, Sheet 3 of4, Revision C. (c) The airplane may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a location where this AD may be accomplished. (d) An equivalent method of compliance may be approved by the Manager, Atlanta Aircraft Certification Office, FAA Central Region, 1075 Inner Loop Road, College Park, Georgia 30337. Drawing 50105, Sheet 3 of 4, Revision C, and Great Lakes Service Bulletin No. 11, dated September 1, 1980, pertinent to this AD, may be obtained from Great Lakes Aircraft Company, Drawer A, Eastman, Georgia 31023; telephone (912) 374-5535. This Amendment 39-4625 revises Amendment 39-3940 (45 FR 67646), AD 80-21-12 in its entirety. Amendment 39-3940 became effective October 17, 1980. This Amendment 39-4625 becomes effective April 14, 1983.
2009-08-04: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Hawker Beechcraft Corporation Model BH.125 series 600A airplanes and Model HS.125 series 700A airplanes. This AD requires inspecting the wiring diagrams containing the cockpit blowers and comparing with the current airplane configuration, and reworking the wiring if necessary. This AD results from a report indicating that a blower motor of the cockpit ventilation and avionics cooling system seized up and gave off smoke. We are issuing this AD to prevent smoke and fumes in the cockpit in the event that a blower motor seizes and overheats due to excessive current draw.
80-08-14: 80-08-14 PURE-AIR, INC.: Amendment 39-3745. Applies to all aircraft using the Pure-Air, Inc. carburetor air inlet filter installed per STC SA69NW. Compliance is required as indicated. A. Within 60 days from the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. 1. Remove Pure-Air filter foam elements which have been installed for more than 100 hours time in service or one year, whichever occurs first, and install screen (PN M-117 Large or PN M-118 Small) on the downstream inside surface of the filter box (PN M-102 Large or PN M-101 Small) by means of the filter attach bolts. 2. Replace each Pure-Air filter element which has accumulated either 100 hours or one year in service with a new filter element. B. Replace the foam filter element: 1. Every 100 hours time in service or 12 calendar months, whichever comes first. 2. Any time the filter element becomes 50% covered with any foreign material. C. Install the new Pure-Air supplies decal, which reflects the above replacement times, in plain view on the upper right hand outside surface of the filter box. This amendment becomes effective April 22, 1980.
2009-06-18: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Following in-flight test deployments on CL-600-2B19 aircraft, several Air-Driven generators (ADGs) failed to come on-line. Investigation revealed that, as a result of a wiring anomaly that had not been detected during ADG manufacture, a short circuit was possible between certain internal wires and their metallic over- braided shields, which could result in the ADG not providing power when deployed. The unsafe condition is that failure of the ADG could lead to loss of several functions essential for safe flight. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
86-23-05: 86-23-05 CONSOLIDATED AERONAUTICS INCORPORATED: Amendment 39-5461. Applies to Consolidated Aeronautics Incorporated, Lake Model 250 Airplanes, Serial Numbers 2 through 17, equipped with fuel shutoff valve mounting plate part number 3-6572-17, certificated in any category. Compliance: Required within the next 100 hours time-in-service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. To prevent the possible contact of the fuel shutoff valve handle hardware and the cabin rear upholstery panel, accomplish the following: (a) Modify the fuel shutoff valve mounting plate in accordance with instructions in Lake Aircraft Division Consolidated Aeronautics Incorporated Service Bulletin No. B-66 dated May 31, 1985. (b) Airplanes may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a location where this AD can be accomplished. (c) An equivalent means of compliance with this AD may be used if approved by the Manager, Federal Aviation Administration, Boston Aircraft Certification Office, ANE-150, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, Massachusetts 01803. All persons affected by this directive may obtain copies of the documents referred to herein upon request to Lake Aircraft, Laconia Airport, Laconia, New Hampshire 03646; or Federal Aviation Administration, Office of the Regional Counsel, Room 158, 601 East 12th Street, Kansas City, Missouri 64106. This amendment becomes effective on December 17, 1986.
2009-06-19: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Boeing Model 767-200 and 767-300 series airplanes. This AD requires detailed inspections of the aft pressure bulkhead for damage, mid- frequency eddy current (MFEC) and low frequency eddy current (LFEC) inspections of radial web lap splices, tear strap splices, and super tear strap splices for cracking, and corrective actions if necessary. This AD results from analysis that indicates fatigue cracks of the web lap splice, tear strap splice, or super tear strap splice of the aft bulkhead are expected to occur on certain Boeing Model 767-200 and 767- 300 series airplanes. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct fatigue cracks of the aft pressure bulkhead, which could result in rapid decompression of the passenger compartment and possible damage or interference with airplane control systems that penetrate the bulkhead, and consequent loss of controllability of the airplane.