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2012-15-16: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Bombardier, Inc. Model DHC-8 series airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports that various pushrods had been manufactured with tubes having the incorrect heat treatment. This AD requires replacing the affected pushrod assembly. We are issuing this AD to prevent loss of rudder control, reduced directional control of the airplane on the ground, or a jammed nose landing gear (NLG) door that could prevent the NLG from retracting or extending.
92-18-02: 92-18-02 BRITISH AEROSPACE: Amendment 39-8346. Docket No. 92-NM-49-AD. Applicability: Model ATP series airplanes; serial numbers 2001 through 2045, inclusive; certificated in any category. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. To prevent loss (shut-down) of electronic flight instruments system (EFIS) displays, accomplish the following: (a) Within 180 days after the effective date of this AD, install fixed fittings, Modification 10248C, and filter units, Modification 10248A, in the electrical power supplies to the main and side windscreen heater system at the rear of the EFIS control panel, in accordance with British Aerospace Service Bulletin ATP-30-20-10248A/-10248C, Revision 1, dated February 17, 1992. (b) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Standardization Branch. NOTE: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Standardization Branch. (c) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. (d) The installation shall be done in accordance with British Aerospace Service Bulletin ATP-30-20-10248A/-10248C, Revision 1, dated February 17, 1992, which contains the following list of effective pages: Page Number Revision Level Date 1-27, 1 February 17, 1992 Odd pages 29 to 97, 99-103 Even pages 28 to 98 (Not used) This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C.552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from British Aerospace, PLC, Librarian for Service Bulletins, P.O. Box 17414, Dulles International Airport, Washington, DC. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC. (e) This amendment becomes effective on November 20, 1992.
98-06-27: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Fokker Model F28 Mark 0100 series airplanes, that requires installation of additional "EXIT" signs at the overwing emergency exits. This amendment is prompted by a report indicating that the "EXIT" signs for the overwing emergency exits, as currently installed, would not be visible to passengers during an emergency evacuation when the emergency exit doors are open. The actions specified by this AD are intended to ensure the "EXIT" signs for overwing emergency exits are clearly visible during an evacuation.
82-15-05: 82-15-05 LOCKHEED-CALIFORNIA COMPANY: Amendment 39-4420. Applies to Lockheed-California Company Model L-1011 Series airplanes, certificated in all categories. Compliance required within six months from the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished for items B and C, and within twelve months for item A. To prevent APU electrical power supply cable arcing resulting from chafing or abrasion, accomplish the following: A. Install wire harness shield per Part 2 of Lockheed-California Company L-1011 Service Bulletin 093-25-254 dated October 25, 1976, or later revisions approved by the Chief, Los Angeles Area Aircraft Certification Office, FAA Northwest Mountain Region. B. Perform a one-time inspection of the APU feeder cable harness J130 for clearance from stringer No. 42, and install a cable harness support if found necessary in accordance with Part 2 of Lockheed-California Company L-1011 Service Bulletin 093-53-182 dated June 18, 1980, or later revisions approved by the Chief, Los Angeles Area Aircraft Certification Office, FAA Northwest Mountain Region. C. Perform a one-time inspection of each APU feeder cable harness No. J130 and harness No. X043, and install wire harness support(s) if found necessary in accordance with Part 2 of Lockheed-California Company L-1011 Service Bulletin 093-24-097 dated November 20, 1980, or revision 1 dated July 31, 1981, or later revisions approved by the Chief, Los Angeles Area Aircraft Certification Office, FAA Northwest Mountain Region. D. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. E. Alternate means of compliance which provide an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Chief, Los Angeles Area Aircraft Certification Office, FAA Northwest Mountain Region. The manufacturer's specifications and procedures identified and described in this directive areincorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1). All persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Lockheed-California Company, P.O. Box 551, Burbank, California 91520, Attention: Commercial Support Contracts, Dept. 63-11, U-33, B-1. These documents also may be examined at FAA Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, C-68966, Seattle, Washington 98168; or Los Angeles Area Aircraft Certification Office, 4344 Donald Douglas Drive, Long Beach, California 90808. This amendment becomes effective August 27, 1982.
2012-15-17: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus Model A300 B4-603, B4-605R, and B4-622R airplanes; Model A300 C4-605R Variant F airplanes; and Model A300 F4-600R series airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report that chafing was detected between the autopilot electrical wiring conduit and the wing bottom skin. This AD requires modifying the wiring installation on the right-hand wing. We are issuing this AD to prevent sparking due to electrical chafing when flammable vapors are present in the area, which could cause an uncontrolled fire. [[Page 47274]]
2009-04-09: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: There have been reports of inter-rivet cracking on several wing front spar adapter assemblies (P/N C6WM1027-1) on the horizontal and vertical flanges. It was determined that the cracking was caused by stress corrosion in the short transverse grain initiated by local riveting induced stresses. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
98-06-39: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to Eurocopter France Model AS 332C, L, L1, and L2 helicopters. This action requires determining the thickness of the shim washers, inspecting certain cockpit door hinge tenons (hinge tenons) for cracks, and if a crack is found, replacing the hinge tenon with an airworthy hinge tenon. This amendment is prompted by several reports of cracked hinge tenons due to improper shimming. The actions specified in this AD are intended to detect cracks in the hinge tenons due to unintended loading of the improperly shimmed tenons caused by closing the door, which may lead to separation of the door from the helicopter, impact with the main rotor or tail rotor system, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
78-11-06: 78-11-06 BEECH: Amendment 39-3226. Applies to Model 65-A90, B90 and C90 (Serial Numbers LJ-114 through LJ-705), and Model E90 (Serial Numbers LW-1 through LW-141) airplanes incorporating Beechcraft H-14 autopilot installations with a 13.5 inch diameter elevator servo bellcrank. To preclude possible failure of the elevator control cable, unless already accomplished. A) Before the next flight, except for those airplanes previously modified in accordance with Beech Modification Kit Number 90-9067-1S, open the aft fuselage belly access door and locate the autopilot elevator servo bellcrank at F.S. 319.00, located to the left of centerline. Measure the bellcrank and if it measures 10 inches or less no further action is required. If the bellcrank measures 13.5 inches or larger (groove to groove), visually inspect the primary elevator control cable, the pulley bracket at F.S. 340.00, the autopilot servo cable, and autopilot bellcrank in accordance with Beech Service Instructions No. 0988, or later approved revisions. If there is no evidence of cable rubbing or damage to the airplane, no further immediate action is required. 1. If rubbing of the elevator cable is noted, but no damage has occurred. a. Disconnect and remove the autopilot servo cable from the airplane. b. Install a locally fabricated placard in plain view of the pilot indicating "AUTOPILOT INOPERATIVE". 2. If fraying of the elevator cable or other damage is noted: a. Replace the elevator cable and repair or replace any other damaged parts. b. Accomplish paragraphs A)1.a. and 1.b. B) If not previously accomplished, on or before September 1, 1978, modify the servo mount of any Beechcraft H-14 elevator autopilot servo having a 13.5 inch diameter or larger bellcrank in accordance with Beech Modification Kit Number 90-9067-1S, or later approved revisions. Upon the completion of this modification any autopilot made inoperative under paragraphs A)1. orA)2. of this AD may be returned to service and the "AUTOPILOT INOPERATIVE" placard removed. C) Aircraft may be flown in accordance with 21.197 to a base where the inspection required by this AD can be accomplished, after coordination with the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Central Region. D) Any equivalent method of compliance with this AD must be approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Central Region. This amendment becomes effective June 8, 1978, to all persons except those to whom it has already been made effective by air mail letter from the FAA dated May 4, 1978.
2011-19-01 R1: We are revising an existing airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to all Airbus Model A318, A319, A320, and A321 series airplanes. The existing AD currently requires revising the airplane flight manual (AFM) to include a procedure intended to address the unsafe condition, an inspection of the firewall connector for signs of arcing if an integrated drive generator (IDG) (or generator (GEN)) was shut down in-flight automatically or using the AFM procedure, and corrective action if necessary; and provides an optional terminating action for certain AFM revision and inspections. This AD was prompted by the potential for an inadvertent error by flightcrew to use the IDG switch instead of the GEN switch when doing the AFM display unit failure procedure required by the existing AD. This AD retains the actions required by the existing AD and clarifies certain terminology. We are issuing this AD to prevent transient loss of certain systems, which could result in the reduced abilityof the flightcrew to cope with adverse flight conditions.
2006-23-05: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Cessna Model 750 airplanes. This AD requires inspecting the inboard- hinge brackets of the left and right elevators for cracking, and doing related investigative and corrective actions if necessary. This AD results from a report of cracking found on the elevator inboard-hinge brackets. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct cracking of the elevator inboard-hinge brackets, which could result in structural failure of the elevators and consequent loss of control of the airplane.