Results
97-25-02: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to all Mitsubishi Heavy Industry (Mitsubishi) MU-2B series airplanes. This AD requires amending the Limitations Section of the airplane flight manual (AFM) to prohibit the positioning of the power levers below the flight idle stop while the airplane is in flight. This AFM amendment will include a statement of consequences if the limitation is not followed. This AD results from numerous incidents and five documented accidents involving airplanes equipped with turboprop engines where the propeller beta was improperly utilized during flight. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent loss of airplane control or engine overspeed with consequent loss of engine power caused by the power levers being positioned below the flight idle stop while the airplane is in flight.
97-25-03: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to all Raytheon Aircraft Company (Raytheon) 65, 90, 99, 100, 200, 300, 1900, and 2000 series airplanes. This AD requires amending the Limitations Section of the airplane flight manual (AFM) to prohibit lifting or positioning the power levers below the flight idle stop while the airplane is in flight. This AFM amendment will include a statement of consequences if the limitation is not followed. This AD results from numerous incidents and five documented accidents involving airplanes equipped with turboprop engines where the propeller beta was improperly utilized during flight. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent nose down pitch and a descent rate leading to aircraft damage and injury to personnel caused by the power levers being positioned below the flight idle stop or the power levers being lifted while the airplane is in flight.
60-13-03: 60-13-03 LOCKHEED: Amdt. 176 Part 507 Federal Register June 24, 1960. Applies to All 188 Airplanes Not Equipped With Fuel Tank Pressure Relief Overflow Valves. Compliance required as indicated. Service experience indicates that a check of the fueling system valves at a high fuel level point should be made when filling tanks to capacity. This check is necessary to determine that the system is functioning properly since failure of a fueling valve to close fully may subject the tank to high fuel pressure which could cause not only tank rupture but structural damage. To prevent possible fuel tank overpressurizing, the following actions are required commencing not later than 10 days after publication of this airworthiness directive in the Federal Register. (a) Conduct a check of the fueling system at the start of each fueling operation in accordance with the placard located on the fueling panel. (b) (1) On all outboard tanks and on extended inboard tanks, when installed,conduct a second check of the primary and secondary controls between 8,000 and 10,000 pounds fuel per item 2 on the placard. (2) When standard inboard tanks are installed, conduct a second check of the primary and secondary controls between 4,500 and 6,500 pounds fuel. (c) Any malfunctions indicated by the checks required by items (a) and (b) of this airworthiness directive must be corrected prior to continuance of pressure fueling to that tank. (d) The fueling panel will be monitored during the entire fueling operation. This supersedes paragraph (d) of AD 60-09-03.
97-25-01: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to all Raytheon Aircraft Company (Raytheon) 58, 60, 90, 100, 200, and 300 series and Model 2000 airplanes (formerly referred to as Beech 58, 60, 90, 100, 200, and 300 series and Beech Models 65-90 and 2000 airplanes). This AD requires replacing certain AlliedSignal Aerospace outflow/safety valves in the pressurization system with new or serviceable valves. The AD results from a report of cracking and consequent failure of the affected outflow safety valves in the pressurization system. Investigation has revealed problems during the manufacturing process of certain Allied Signal outflow/safety valves. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent outflow/safety valve cracking and consequent failure, which could result in rapid decompression of the airplane.
64-20-02: 64-20-02 SUD AVIATION: Amdt. 800 Part 507 Federal Register August 22, 1964. Applies to Caravelle Models III and VIR Aircraft. Compliance required as indicated. As a result of a landing gear malfunction which resulted in landing gear interference with the aluminum fuel lines and electric wiring in the wheel wells, accomplish the following modifications: (a) Within 300 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, install 3 fusible plugs in each main landing gear wheel hub on all Model III aircraft except aircraft with Serial Numbers 170, 177, and higher as provided for in Hispano Suiza Aero Service Bulletin 111, Section 1, No. 46, dated December 2, 1963. (b) Within 6,000 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, remove existing aluminum alloy fuel lines in the main landing gear wheel well and replace them with stainless steel tubing in all Models III and VIR aircraft except aircraft with Serial Numbers 136, 160, 171, and higher, as provided for in Sud Service Bulletin 28-31 dated February 12, 1964, or FAA approved equivalent. (c) Within 6,000 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, install protective shrouds over electric wiring and fuel lines in the main landing gear wheel wells on all Model III aircraft except aircraft with Serial Numbers 172 and higher as provided for in Sud Service Bulletin 53-35 dated May 4, 1964, or FAA approved equivalent. (Sud Service Bulletins 28-31 dated February 12, 1964, 53-35 Revision 1 dated May 4, 1964, and Hispano Suiza Service Bulletin 111, Sections 1, No. 46 dated December 2, 1963, pertain to this same subject.) This directive effective September 21, 1964.
61-08-03: 61-08-03 VICKERS: Amdt. 274 Part 507 Federal Register April 8, 1961. Applies to Viscount Models 744 and 745D Series Airplanes. Compliance required as indicated, unless already accomplished. As a result of reported failures of the bolt, P/N 80216-627, forming the forward attachment of the outboard diagonal strut on the inboard engine nacelle structure the following must be accomplished on the structure of both inboard engine nacelles. (a) Bolts P/N 80216-627 or bolts P/N 70116-9*, as applicable, having 4,000 or more hours' time in service must be removed not later than the next 600 landings and inspected for cracks by magnetic particle inspection or FAA approved equivalent method. Particular attention should be given to the area at the junction of the head and shank and also to the thread undercut. (b) Bolts found cracked must be replaced prior to further flight. (c) Compliance with "The Action" paragraphs of British Aircraft Corporation (Operating) Limited, Preliminary Technical Leaflet (PTL 228), Issue 2 (700 Series) is required when accomplishing the inspection of paragraph (a). (d) After compliance with (a), (b), and (c) no further inspection is necessary. (e) For the purpose of complying with this AD, subject to acceptance by the assigned FAA maintenance inspector, the number of landings may be determined by dividing each aircraft's hours' time in service by the operator's fleet average time from takeoff to landing for the aircraft type. Model 745D operators who have kept a record of flights prior to the effective date of this AD may account for them in complying with this AD by counting each flight as one landing. (British Aircraft Corporation (Operating) Limited, PTL No.228, Issue 2, (700 Series) covers this subject. This directive effective May 9, 1961. Revised September 28, 1965. *Bolts P/N 80216-627 were incorporated by Mod. 1306 and on later production aircraft. Pre-mod. standard bolts P/N70116-9 are identical except 1/32-inch less in diameter.
64-03-04: 64-03-04 PIAGGIO: Amdt. 675 Part 507 Federal Register January 21, 1964. Applies to All Model P.166 Aircraft Equipped With Magnaghi Modification 22027 or Modification 2-22027 Shock Absorbers. Compliance required within the next 50 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD. Fatigue cracks have developed inservice on nose landing gear steering control unit P/N's 4105.26 and 4105.31. To correct this condition, replace flanges in nose undercarriage unit as follows: (a) On aircraft equipped with Modification 2-22027 shock absorber, replace old flange P/N 4105.26 with new flange P/N 4105.26A. (b) On aircraft equipped with Modification 22027 shock absorber, replace old flange P/N 4105.31 with new flange P/N 4105.31A. (c) Accomplish replacement as provided for in Piaggio Service Bulletin No. 166-35 dated July 8, 1963. (Piaggio Service Bulletin No. 166-35 dated July 8, 1963, covers the same subject.) This directive effective February 20,1964.
2005-17-19: The FAA adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Cirrus Design Corporation (CDC) Models SR20 and SR22 airplanes. This AD requires you to measure and adjust the crew seat break-over bolts and to replace the crew seat recline locks on both crew seats. This AD results from CDC discovering that the crew seats, under emergency landing dynamic loads, may fold forward at less than the 26 g required by the regulations. We are issuing this AD to prevent the crew seats from folding forward during emergency landing dynamic loads with consequent occupant injury.
2016-25-04: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Fokker Services B.V. Model F28 Mark 0070 and 0100 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report of cracking in a certain section of the secondary structure of the wing. This AD requires a one-time inspection of the trailing edge rib, and corrective action if necessary. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2016-24-09: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all The Boeing Company Model 787-8 and 787-9 airplanes. This AD requires repetitive cycling of either the airplane electrical power or the power to the three flight control modules (FCMs). This AD was prompted by a report indicating that all three FCMs might simultaneously reset if continuously powered on for 22 days. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.