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99-21-18: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 767 series airplanes, that requires repetitive inspections to detect certain discrepancies of the cables, fittings, and pulleys of the engine thrust control cables; and repair, if necessary. For certain airplanes, this amendment also requires replacement of certain pulleys with new pulleys, and re-rigging of the engine thrust control cable. This amendment is prompted by reports of engine thrust control cable failures. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent such failures, which could result in a severe asymmetric thrust condition during landing, and consequent reduced controllability of the airplane.
82-04-06: 82-04-06 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-4320. Applies to McDonnell Douglas Model DC-10-40 airplanes equipped with Pratt and Whitney JT9D-20 series engines, certificated in all categories. Compliance required within twelve (12) calendar months from the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. \n\n\tTo minimize the possibility of separation of the nose cowl from the aircraft in the event of fan blade failure, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tReplace the nose cowl attaching bolts and nuts on engines 1 and 3 as outlined in the Accomplishment Instructions and Material Information in McDonnell Douglas DC-10 Service Bulletin 71-123 dated June 23, 1981, or later revisions approved by the Chief, Los Angeles Area Aircraft Certification Office, FAA Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tB.\tAlternate means of compliance with this AD which provide an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Chief, Los Angeles Area Aircraft Certification Office, FAA Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tThe manufacturer's specifications and procedures identified and described in this directive are incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1). \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to: McDonnell Douglas Corporation, 3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846, Attention: Director, Publications and Training, C1-750 (54-60). These documents also may be examined at the FAA Northwest Mountain Region, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington 98108, or 4344 Donald Douglas Drive, Long Beach, California 90808. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective March 4, 1982.
2010-10-07: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: It has been found the occurrence of outboard slat skew sensor failure in open or closed position. The combination of an outboard slat skew sensor failed closed, an outboard slat actuator structural failure (rupture) and its adjacent actuator torque limiter failing high (allows higher loads to the panel structure) occurring in the same slat surface, under normal flight loads, may lead [the] slat surface to detach from the wing with the possibility of hitting and damaging the horizontal stabilizer and elevator, which may affect the airplane controllability. * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2010-03-09: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Cracks have been detected on the upper flange (cap) of several "0'' pressure bulkheads on the production line; none of the cracks had spread across the thickness of material. Investigation revealed that all "0'' pressure bulkheads installed on aircraft from MSN 1106 up to 1189 could have the same cracks. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
65-19-05: 65-19-05 VICKERS: Amdt. 39-127 Part 39 Federal Register August 26, 1965. Applies to Viscount Models 744 and 745D Series Airplanes Equipped with Main Landing Gear Top Yokes of DTD 683 Aluminum Alloy. Compliance required as indicated. To prevent further failures of the main landing gear top yokes, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 25 landings after the effective date of this AD, visually inspect the top yoke for cracks in accordance with British Aircraft Corporation (BAC) Ltd. Preliminary Technical Leaflet (PTL) No. 255 (700 Series) or later ARB-approved issue and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 25 landings from the last inspection until modified in accordance with (d) of this AD. (b) If cracks are found, within the next five landings (1) Repair the yoke in accordance with Modification D.3154, part (b) or (d) as applicable or an equivalent approved by the Chief, Aircraft Certification Staff, European Region, and reinspect at intervals not to exceed 100 landings in accordance with PTL No. 255 or later ARB-approved issue until modified in accordance with (d) of this AD; or (2) Replace the yoke. (c) Replace within the next five landings any yoke found with a propagating crack during the inspection required by (b)(1). (d) The repetitive inspections required by (a) and (b)(1) may be discontinued after installation of BAC Modification D.3154 part (a) or (c), as applicable, a replacement yoke of L.65 material in accordance with BAC Modification D.1468, or an equivalent approved by the Chief, Aircraft Certification Staff, European Region. (e) For the purpose of complying with this AD, subject to acceptance by the assigned FAA maintenance inspector, the number of landings may be determined by dividing each airplane's hours' time in service by the operator's fleet average time from takeoff to landing for the airplane type. This directive effective September 5, 1965.
84-11-04: 84-11-04 McDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-4879. Applies to McDonnell Douglas Model DC-10-10, -10F, -15, -30, -30F, -40, and KC-10A (Military) series airplanes, certificated in all categories. Compliance required as indicated in the body of this AD unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo preclude the potential of dual hydraulic system failure as a consequence of loose or broken inboard aileron actuator cylinder tie bolts, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tOn inboard aileron actuator control assemblies, Parker Bertea Part Numbers 200900-5007, -5009, -5011, and -5013, and 217300-5005: \n\n\t\t1.\tPrior to the accumulation of 5,000 flight hours since new or overhauled or within the next 1,000 flight-hours whichever occurs later, after the effective date of this AD; and at 1,000 flight-hour intervals thereafter, until the accomplishment of paragraph A.2., below, perform the inspection outlined in the Accomplishment Instructions, Phase I, of McDonnell Douglas DC-10 Service Bulletin A27-196, dated December 7, 1983, and Parker Bertea Service Bulletin 200900/217300-27-102, dated November 15, 1983, or later revisions approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\t\t2.\tWithin the next 7,500 flight-hours after the effective date of this AD, perform the torque check outlined in the Accomplishment Instructions, Phase II, of McDonnell Douglas DC-10 Service Bulletin A27-196, dated December 7, 1983, and Parker Bertea Service Bulletin 200900/217300-27-102, dated November 15, 1983, or later revisions approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tB.\tAlternate means of compliance which provide an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tNOTE: Aircraft which have been inspected in accordance with the procedures specified in paragraph A.1., above, or according to equivalent inspection procedures approved by the FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI) since March 1, 1983, are considered to have complied with the initial inspection requirements of this AD. \n\n\tC.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to McDonnell Douglas Corporation, 3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846, Attention: Director, Publications and Training, C1-750 (54-60). These documents also may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or the Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 4344 Donald Douglas Drive, Long Beach, California. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective July 16, 1984.
88-02-03: 88-02-03 BELL HELICOPTER TEXTRON, INC. (BHTI): Amendment 39-6379. Final Rule of Priority Letter AD. Docket No. 88-ASW-1. \n\n\tApplicability: All BHTI Model 222, 222B, and 222U helicopters certificated in any category, with main rotor (M/R) yoke, part number (P/N 222-011-102-101, installed. \n\n\tCompliance: Required prior to further flight after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent failure of the M/R yoke which could result in loss of a M/R blade and subsequent loss of the helicopter, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tVisually inspect before the first flight of each day, the main rotor yoke for crack indications in the four (4) areas around the Flapping Bearing attachment bushings as shown in Figure 1. If a crack is detected, replace the M/R yoke prior to further flight. \n\n\tNOTE: BHTI Service Bulletin Numbers 222U-88-20 or 222-88-46, dated January 14, 1988, pertain to these inspections. \n\n\t(b)\tAn alternate method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an equivalent level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Rotorcraft Certification Office, ASW-170, FAA, 4400 Blue Mound Road, Fort Worth, Texas 76193-0170. \n\n\t(c)\tIn accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199, the helicopter may be flown to a base where the inspection may be accomplished. \n\n\tThis amendment (39-6379, AD 88-02-03) becomes effective on November 28, 1989, as to all persons except those persons to whom it was made immediately effective by Priority Letter AD 88-02-03, issued on January 21, 1988, which contained this amendment.
79-11-02: 79-11-02 BOEING: Amendment 39-3482. Applies to the Model 727 airplanes that have the following serial numbers: \n\t\nGroup I: These airplanes were delivered with auto-speedbrakes operative: \n\n\n727-2F2\t\t\n21603 \n727-222\t\t \n21398 through 21425 \n21557 through 21574\n727-225\t\t\n21449 through 21453 \n21578 through 21581 \n727-2R1\n21636 \n727-2A1\n21341 through 21344 \n727-2F9\t\t\t\t\t\n21426 and 21427 \n727-287\n21688 and 21689 \n727-290\t\t \t\t \n21510 and 21511\n727-243\t\n21661 through 21664 \n727-256\n21609 through 21611\n727-2K3\t\n21494 and 21495\n727-2L5\t\n\t\t\t\n21332 and 21333 \n21539 and 21540 \n727-2J4\t\n21676 \n727-281\n21455 through 21456 \n21474 \n727-251 \n21503 through 21506 \n727-2P1\n21595\n727-2M7\t\n21457 and 21502 \n21655 \n727-212\n21347 through 21349 \n21458 through 21460 \n\n\t\nGroup II: These airplanes were delivered without auto-speedbrakes: \n\n\n\n727-277\t\t\n\t\t\t\n21480 and 21647 \n727-227\n21363 through 21366 \n21394 and 21395 \n21461 through 21466 \n21488 through 21493 \n21529 through 21531 \n727-232\t\t\n21303 through 21315 \n21430 through 21433 \n21469 through 21472 \n21582 and 21583\n727-230\t\t\n21442 \n21618 through 21623\n727-264\t\t\n\t\t\t \n21577 and 21617 \n21637 \n727-276\n21479 and 21646\n727-2H3\t \t\t\t \n21318 through 21320\n727-247\n21329 through 21331 \n21392 and 21393 \n21481 through 21485\n727-243\t\t \n21320\n\t\nGroup III: These airplanes were delivered with auto-speedbrakes deactivated: \n\n\n\n727-214\t\n21512 and 21513\n727-2Q8\n21608\n\n\n\tCompliance required as indicated: \n\tA.\tWithin 50 hours time-in-service after the effective date of this AD, unless Service Bulletin 727-31-A44, revision 1, or later FAA approved revisions, have already been accomplished, accomplish the following: \n\t\tFor Group I airplanes delivered with the auto-speedbrake system operative: Prior to conducting operations when the outside air temperature is below 25 degrees F the auto- speedbrake system must be deactivated by pulling and collaring the circuit breakers and placarding handle inoperative and the crew advised that the takeoff warning system may not function. \n\t\tFor Group II airplanes delivered without the auto-speedbrake system, and for Group III airplanes that were delivered with the auto-speedbrake system deactivated: Prior to conducting operations when the outside air temperature is below 25 degrees F advise the flight crew that the takeoff warning system may not function. \n\tB.\tWithin 1,000 hours time-in-service or 6 months after the effective date of this AD, whichever comes first, and unless already accomplished, perform a one-time check of the throttle lever auto-speedbrake/takeoff warning switch setting and adjust these switches, if necessary, in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 727-31-A44, Revision 1, or later FAA-approved revisions. \n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer, may obtain copies upon request to Boeing Commercial Airplane Company, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. These documents may also be examined at FAA Northwest Region, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington 98108. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective June 11, 1979.
60-23-01: 60-23-01\tBOEING: Amdt. 216 Part 507 Federal Register November 4, 1960. Applies to the following 707-100 Series aircraft: Serial Numbers 17586 through 17591, 17628 through 17651, 17658 through 17672, 17696 through 17702, and 17925 through 17927. \n\n\tCompliance required within 2,500 hours' time in service after effective date.\n \n\tIncidents have occurred of the engine start lever slipping toward the "OFF" position causing engine flame-out. One such incident occurred during takeoff. These incidents were caused by insecure placement of the start lever in the "idle" position. In addition, inspections have disclosed the presence of incorrect parts and improper installations on some airplanes.\n \n\tAlso, in the present starting ignition system, on some airplanes, the igniter plug fires during initial engine rotation. This has caused combustion chamber explosions when fuel vapors were present. \n\n\tTo correct the above unsatisfactory conditions, the following modifications or FAA approved equivalents and inspections are required: \n\n\tI.\tModify and inspect the start lever system as follows: \n\n\t\ta.\tMachine an additional slot at the start position of the start lever latch in each of the start lever guides as shown in Fig. 1 of Boeing Service Bulletin 369 dated April 15, 1959. \n\n\t\tb.\tAscertain that the control stand start lever spacers, P/N 66-19067-1 and -2, and lever guide fillers P/N 66-9256-3, are correctly installed as follows:\n\n\t\t\t(1)\tThe two outboard spacers must be P/N 66-19067-1 and -2 and installed in accordance with Boeing Drawing 65-1795. (Boeing 707 Parts Catalog Fig. 25-2-11 is in error in calling for P/N 66-9256-1 and -2 for Items 28 and 33. Correct P/N's are 19067-1 and -2 as indicated above.)\n\n\t\t\t(2)\tThe middle lever guide filler, P/N 66-9256-3, must be installed with the wide section at the top and not at the bottom. (Item 17 in Fig. 75-2-11 of Boeing 707 Parts Catalog is incorrect in that it shows the wide section at the bottom.)\n \n\t\tc.Ascertain that the start lever detents have a minimum distance of 0.53 inch between the stop strap and the idle detents in accordance with Bulletin 369.\n \n\t\td.\tAfter reinstallation of the start levers, ascertain that the start lever system is properly rigged as covered in Chapter 76 Boeing 707-100 Series Maintenance Manual. This applies only to airplanes which require removal of the start lever detents for machining the slot. \n\n\tII.\tModify the starting ignition system as follows: \n\n\t\ta.\tRemove the jumper wire between the "COMMON" terminal and "NO" terminal of each engine start lever switch (S192, S193, S194, S195).\n \n\t\tb.\tInstall a wire from the "ON" contact flight start and control switches (S188, S189, S190 and S191) on the pilot's overhead panel to the corresponding engine ignition circuit breaker bus on the P6 circuit breaker panel. Remove the No. 18 jumper wire between the flight start and ground start terminals of the engine start and control switch. Boeing Service Bulletin No. 195 (R-1) dated July 8, 1959, and Supplement No. 195 (R-1)A dated August 4, 1959, covers these changes.\n \n\tThis directive shall become effective December 6, 1960.
63-16-01: 63-16-01 BOEING: Amdt. 596 Part 507 Federal Register August 3, 1963. Applies to All Models 707 and 720 Series Aircraft Equipped with Pratt & Whitney JT3D-1 or -3 engines. \n\n\tCompliance required as indicated. \n\n\tTo prevent inadvertent aft thrust reverser sleeve actuation, compliance with the following is required: \n\n\t(a) Within 300 hours' time in service after the effective date of this airworthiness directive, unless already accomplished within the last 200 hours' time in service, and within each 500 hours' time in service thereafter until compliance with (d), inspect the upper latch lock hook for evidence of interference with the latch roller support structure. This inspection shall be done as follows or in accordance with an FAA-approved equivalent procedure: \n\n\t\t(1) Remove the access panel in the aft reverser sleeve to gain access to the upper latch lock (P/N 65-10567). \n\n\t\t(2) Disengage the upper and lower latch locks and move the sleeve 5 inches aft from the fullyclosed position. \n\n\t\t(3) Force the aft end of the upper latch lock horizontally to the limit of its travel and hold it in that position. \n\n\t\t(4) Move the sleeve forward and determine by using a feeler gauge, if the hook end of the latch clears the roller support structure by 0.05 inch minimum while the hook is in position (3). \n\n\t\t(5) Repeat (3) and (4) with the hook displaced to its limit in the opposite direction. \n\n\t\t(6) If the hook end of the latch clears the roller support structure on either side by less than 0.05 inch the latch installation must be reworked in accordance with (b) before further flight. \n\n\t(b) Rework the latch installation by replacing the latch pivot bearing with a new bearing, BAC-B10A-649 or BAC-B10A-649A, roller swaged in place per BAC Process Specification 5435 or secured by an FAA approved equivalent means, or by replacing the latch assembly, P/N 65-10567, with a new or reworked assembly. When replacing the latch bearing or latch assembly install an AN 960C616L washer on each side of the latch pivot bearing to provide additional support. After rework, the latch hook must clear the roller support structure by 0.05 inch minimum. \n\n\t(c) Unless already accomplished, within 500 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, provide an indexing stripe in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin No. 1799, or equivalent, to the inboard surface of the strut and sleeve to give visual indication of the aft reverser sleeve position both on the ground and inflight. To insure alignment of the stripe following replacement, removal, or rework of either the aft sleeve or strut, remove the old stripe and apply a new one in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin No. 1799, or equivalent. Approval of any equivalent means shall be processed through Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Western Region, Los Angeles, California. \n\n\t(d) Within 2,400 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, accomplish the following: \n\n\t\t(1) Install a new latch pivot bearing (BAC-B10A-649A) in the upper latch assembly in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin No. 1787, or replace the latch assembly with a new or reworked assembly (P/N 65-10567-A) which incorporates the new bearing (BAC- B10A-649A). \n\n\t\t(2) Provide a means of preventing the upper latch hook from jamming into the latch roller support structure in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin No. 1809 or equivalent. Approval of any equivalent means shall be processed through Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, Western Region, Los Angeles, California. \n\n\t(e) At each engine replacement after incorporation of (d)(1) and (2), determine if the upper latch lock pivot bearing is in serviceable condition and if it is properly retained in its housing. If necessary, rework the upper latch assembly as required to return it to a serviceable condition in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin No. 1787. \n\n\t(f) Upon request of the operator, an FAA maintenance inspector, subject to prior approval of the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Western Region, may adjust the repetitive inspection intervals specified in this AD to permit compliance at an established inspection period of the operator if the request contains substantiating data to justify the increase for such operator. \n\n\t(g) The aft thrust reverser position indicating switch may be relocated in accordance approved equivalent. Approval of any equivalent means shall be processed through the Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, Western Region, Los Angeles, California. When the approved switch relocation is incorporated, compliance with the provisions of paragraphs (a) through (e) of this AD is no longer required. (Boeing Service Bulletin No. 1896 pertains to this subject.) \n\n\t(Boeing Service Bulletin Nos. 1787, 1799 and 1809 pertain to this subject.) \n\n\tThis directive effective September 6, 1963. \n\n\tRevised March4, 1964.