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85-26-06: 85-26-06 BELL HELICOPTER TEXTRON, INC.: Amendment 39-5193. Applies to Model 206A, 206A-1, 206B, 206B-1, 206L, 206L-1, and 206L-3 helicopters certificated in any category. (Airworthiness Docket No. 83-ASW-53.) \n\n\tCompliance is required as indicated (unless already accomplished). \n\n\tTo prevent possible loss of the tail rotor tip block and resulting tail rotor imbalance which could lead to tail rotor gearbox and stud failure and subsequent separation of the tail rotor gearbox from the helicopter tailboom, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tWithin the next 7 days after the effective date of this AD, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 7 days, check tail rotor blades, Part Numbers (P/N) 206-016-201-001, - 103, and -107, for serviceability with special emphasis on the tip block area as follows (see Figure 1): \n\n\t\t(1)\tVisually check for corroded or missing rivet heads. \n\n\t\t(2)\tVisually check for rivet heads that have pulled through the skin shell in the tip block area.(3)\tVisually check for voids or separations between the skin shell and tip block. \n\n\t\t(4)\tCheck for any movement or displacement of the tip block outboard of the tip of the skin shell. \n\n\t(b)\tThe check required by paragraph (a) of this AD is not considered to be maintenance or preventive maintenance. However, the person performing this check shall make an entry in the aircraft's maintenance records containing the following information: \n\n\t\t(1)\tIf no discrepancies are noted, make an entry referencing the check required by paragraph (a) of this AD, the name of the person who performed the check, the date the check was accomplished, the signature, certificate number, and kind of certificate held by the person performing the check. \n\n\t\t(2)\tIf any discrepancies are noted, make an entry referencing the check as required in paragraph (a) of this AD, the name of the person who performed the check, the date the check was accomplished, and the nature of the discrepancy. In addition tothis entry, the inspection required by paragraph (d) of this AD must be performed before further flight. \n\n\t(c)\tThe checks required by paragraph (a) of this AD may be performed by the pilot provided his logbook is endorsed by an appropriately rated mechanic stating that the pilot has been properly trained to conduct the check. \n\n\t(d)\tWithin the next 100 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 100 hours time in service, inspect tail rotor blades, P/N's 206-016-201-001, -103, and -107 for serviceability with special emphasis on the tip block area as follows (see Figure 1): \n\n\t\t(1)\tVisually inspect for corroded rivets and/or missing rivet heads. \n\n\t\t(2)\tReplace corroded or missing rivets per instructions in paragraph (e) of this AD before further flight. \n\n\t\t(3)\tVisually inspect for rivet heads that have pulled through the skin shell in the tip block area. \n\n\tNOTE: A rivet head that has pulled through the skin will require replacement of the blade before further flight. \n\n\t\t(4)\tVisually inspect for voids or gaps between the shell and the tip block. Limits for voids or gaps between the shell and the tip block are as follows: \n\n\t\t\t(i)\tA void (or gap) no wider than 0.25 inch (chordwise) at the leading edge is acceptable but must be sealed (see Figure 1). Seal with EC-2216 or EA934 in accordance with the appropriate Model 206 maintenance manual or FAA-approved equivalent. \n\n\t\t\t(ii)\tA void (or gap) no wider than 0.12 inch (chordwise) between the shell and the aft end of the tip block is acceptable but must be sealed (see Figure 1). Seal with EC-2216 or EA934 in accordance with the appropriate Model 206 maintenance manual or FAA- approved equivalent. \n\n\t\t\t(iii)\tWith the exception of paragraphs (d)(4)(i) and (d)(4)(ii) of this AD, voids between the shell and the tip block that are visible at the top are unacceptable. \n\n\t\t\t(iv)\tReplace any blade with voids in excess of these limitations before further flight. \n\n\t\t\t(v)\tAny movement or displacement of the tip block outboard of the tip of the skin shell shall require replacement of the blade before further flight. \n\n\t(e)\tWithin the next 30 days after the effective date of this AD, replace the five aluminum rivets in the tail rotor tip block area with five titanium brazier head rivets, P/N CSR903B4-14, and special washers, P/N 206-016-213-101, in accordance with Part II of Bell Alert Service Bulletin 206-85-28, Rev. "B," dated June 21, 1985, or 206L-85-34, Rev. "B," dated June 21, 1985, whichever applies. \n\n\tNOTE: Tail rotor blades modified in accordance with Part II of the Bell Alert Service Bulletin 206L-85-34, Rev. "A," dated April 2, 1985, or Bell Alert Service Bulletin 206-85-28, Rev. "A," dated April 2, 1985, have been determined to be in compliance with the requirements of this AD and the weekly check required in paragraph (a) of this AD is no longer in effect for modified blades. However, the 100-hour repetitive inspection described in paragraph (d) of this AD remains in effect. \n\n\t(f)\tUpon compliance with paragraph (e) of this AD, the weekly check as described in paragraph (a) of this AD is no longer in effect. However, the 100-hour repetitive inspection described in paragraph (d) of this AD remains in effect. \n\n\t(g)\tIn accordance with FAR Sections 21.197 and 21.199, the helicopter may be flown to a base where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. \n\n\t(h)\tAny alternative method of compliance which provides an equivalent level of safety with this AD may be used when approved by the Manager, Helicopter Certification Branch, Southwest Region, Federal Aviation Administration. \n\n\tThe manufacturer's specifications and procedures identified and described in this directive are incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1). All persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer may obtain copiesupon request to Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., P.O. Box 482, Fort Worth, Texas 76101. The documents also may be examined in Room 158, Building 3B, Office of the Regional Counsel, FAA, Southwest Region, 4400 Blue Mound Road, Fort Worth, Texas 76106, between 8 a.m. and 4 p.m., weekdays, except Federal holidays. \n\n\tThis AD supersedes AD 82-17-04, Amendment 39-4819 as amended by Amendment 39- 4890. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective January 31, 1986. \n\n\n\n\n\t\t\t\t\tFIGURE 1\tAD 85-26-06
91-14-03: 91-14-03 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-7045. Docket No. 91-NM-119-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: Model MD-11 and MD-11F series airplanes, with manufacturer's fuselage numbers 447 through 449, 451 through 461, and 463, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent fuel leakage from the tail tank fuel distribution pipe assembly shroud coupling when the shroud system contains fuel, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tWithin 30 flight hours after the effective date of this AD, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 100 flight hours, visually inspect the tail tank fuel distribution pipe assembly located in the left main landing gear wheel well for correct pipe flange position, in accordance with the accomplishment instructions of McDonnell Douglas MD-11 Alert Service Bulletin A28-14, dated April 11, 1991 (hereinafter referred to as SB A28-14). \n\n\t\t(1)\tIf the pipe flange measurement is within the dimensions specified in SB A28-14, no action is required. \n\n\t\t(2)\tIf the pipe flange measurement is not within the dimensions specified in SB A28-14, prior to further flight, accomplish either subparagraph (a)(2)(i) or (a)(2)(ii) of this AD: \n\n\t\t\t(i)\tReposition the pipe assembly in accordance with the accomplishment instructions of SB A28-14 and continue inspections at intervals not to exceed 100 flight hours; or \n\n\t\t\t(ii)\tInstall a fuel pipe assembly shroud support bracket in accordance with the accomplishment instructions of McDonnell Douglas MD-11 Service Bulletin 28-14, dated May 17, 1991. \n\n\t(b)\tInstallation of a fuel pipe assembly shroud support bracket in accordance with the accomplishment instructions of McDonnell Douglas Service Bulletin 28-14, dated May 17, 1991, constitutes terminating action for the requirements of paragraph (a) of this AD. \n\n\t(c)\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used whenapproved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (AC0), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. \n\n\tNOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI), who may concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Los Angeles ACO. \n\n\t(d)\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\t(e)\tThe inspection, repositioning, and installation requirements shall be done in accordance with McDonnell Douglas MD-11 Service Bulletin A28-14, dated April 11, 1991; and Service Bulletin 28-14, dated May 17, 1991. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from McDonnell Douglas Corporation, 3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846, Attention: DC-10 Technical Publications, Technical AdministrativeSupport, C1-L5B. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue S.W., Renton, Washington; or at the Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 3229 East Spring Street, Long Beach, California; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 1100 L Street N.W., Room 8401, Washington, D.C. \n\n\tThis amendment (39-7045, AD 91-14-03) becomes effective on July 5, 1991.
74-15-03: 74-15-03 BOEING: Amendment 39-1897 as amended by Amendment 39-2550. Applies to all Boeing 707-300, -300B/C, -400 series airplanes listed in Boeing Service Bulletin 3168 with more than 5000 flights which have not accomplished Boeing Service Bulletin 2607 or 2427 part X(a). \n\tFor purposes of this AD, one flight is defined as one takeoff and landing. Compliance required as indicated. \n\tTo detect cracking in the upper wing skin under the external rib chord at WBL 59.24, on airplanes with more than 5000 flights, or more than 5000 flights since incorporation of Service Bulletin 2626, accomplish the inspections of (1) at the times specified in (2). Repetitive inspections are noted in paragraph (3) and terminating action is noted in paragraph (4). \n\t(1)\tInspect the wing skins for cracks around the 4 critical fasteners as defined in Boeing Service Bulletin 3168 by use of the procedures specified in (a) or (b) below. Wing skins found cracked are to be repaired prior to further flight inaccordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 3168 or 2607 or in a manner approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Northwest Region. \n\t\t(a)\tEddy current procedures as specified in Boeing Service Bulletin 3168. \n\t\t(b)\tUltrasonic inspection procedures as specified in Boeing Service Bulletin 3168. Reinspection of the wing skin is required at intervals not to exceed 200 flights until an eddy current inspection of (a) above has been accomplished, or the wing skin has been modified in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 2607 or a method approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Northwest Region. \n\t(2)\tAfter the effective date of this AD, aircraft with more than 10,000 flights, are to be inspected within the next 100 flights; airplanes with more than 7500 flights, within the next 200 flights; airplanes with more than 5000 flights, within the next 300 flights. \n\t(3)\tRepetitive inspections are to be accomplished at the times specified in (a) or(b) below, in accordance with the eddy current inspection procedures of Boeing Service Bulletin No. 3168, or in a manner approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Northwest Region. Wing skins found cracked are to be repaired prior to further flight in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin No. 3168 or in a manner approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Northwest Region. Thereafter reinspect at intervals not to exceed those specified in (a) below. \n\t\t(a)\tFor airplanes which have been modified in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin No. 2626, following the inspection required by paragraph (1)(a), reinspect at intervals not to exceed 2,000 flights. \n\t\t(b)\tFor airplanes which have not been modified in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin No. 2626, inspect within 5,000 flights after accomplishment of the hole oversizing and eddy current inspections required by paragraph (1)(a) and at intervals thereafter not to exceed 2,000 flights.(4)\tReplacement of the upper wing skin in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin No. 2607, or incorporation of Boeing Service Bulletin No. 2427 Part Xa, or modifications approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Northwest Region constitutes terminating action for this AD. \n\tThe manufacturer's specifications and procedures identified and described in this directive are incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1). \n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Boeing Commercial Airplane Company, P. O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. The documents may be examined at FAA Northwest Region, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. \n\n\tAmendment 39-1897 became effective on July 16, 1974. \n\tThis amendment 39-2550 becomes effective April 21, 1976.
69-20-06: 69-20-06\tBOEING: Amdt. 39-854. Applies to Model 707, 720, 727 and 737 series airplanes. \n\n\tCompliance required within the next 1500 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent hazardous conditions resulting from electrical overloads of circuits using Wood Electric Corporation three-phase circuit breakers (Boeing P/N BAC-C18L( )) accomplish the following: Replace all Wood Electric Corp. three-phase circuit breakers (Boeing P/N BAC- C18L( )) in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin No. 2897, dated May 21, 1969, and No. 2898, dated May 1, 1969, (707 and 720 airplanes) or later FAA approved revisions; Service Bulletin No. 24-48, dated May 21, 1969, (727 airplanes), or later FAA approved revisions; and Service Bulletin No. 24-1011, dated May 21, 1969 (737 airplanes), or later FAA approved revisions, or an equivalent replacement approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective October 30, 1969.
2010-12-10: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for General Electric Company (GE) CF6-45 and CF6-50 series turbofan engines with certain low-pressure turbine (LPT) rotor stage 3 disks installed. That AD required initial and repetitive borescope inspections of the high-pressure turbine (HPT) rotor stage 1 and stage 2 blades for wear and damage, including excessive airfoil material loss. That AD also required fluorescent penetrant inspection (FPI) of the LPT rotor stage 3 disk under certain conditions and removal of the disk from service before further flight if found cracked. This ad requires the same inspections at reduced intervals and additional borescope inspections. This AD also requires repetitive exhaust gas temperature (EGT) system checks. This AD results from reports received of two additional LPT rotor stage 3 disk events. We are issuing this AD to prevent critical life-limited rotating engine part failure, which could result in an uncontained engine failure and damage to the airplane.
2010-12-06: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: During final Acceptance Test Procedure (ATP), a small oil leak was discovered on the Spoiler Unload Valve and Rudder Shutoff Valve bodies. Investigation revealed that a number of valves were manufactured with an incorrect wall thickness. This thin wall condition caused cracking, subsequent external weeping and pressure loss from the subject valves. This condition, if not corrected, will cause a loss of hydraulic fluid and subsequent loss of spoiler and/or rudder control. * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2010-12-08: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: During a maintenance check performed by an A310 operator, the recommended modification of the lower attachment beam of rack 101VU by accomplishment of Airbus Service Bulletin (SB) A310-53-2076 was embodied on the aeroplane, leading the operator to find three cracks on the FR15A crossbeam above the NLG [nose landing gear] box at the splicing with rack 107VU fitting. This condition, if not detected and corrected, could degrade the structural integrity of the crossbeam on NLG FR15A Web attachment fitting of rack 107VU. Rack 107VU contains major airworthiness system components whose functioning could be adversely affected by the loss of the attachment fitting. As the A300 and A300-600 aeroplanes share this design feature, they are also affected. * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
69-19-02: 69-19-02 VICKERS: Amdt. 39-823. Applies to Viscount Models 744 and 745D Series Airplanes equipped with aluminum heavy duty cable lugs connected to the engine starter selector relay. Compliance: Required within the next 1,500 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. To prevent the overheating of the aluminum heavy duty cable lugs during engine starting replace the existing engine starting selector relay locking nut, bolt, and washers with a captive locking nut P/N 80236 Sht. 893, revised securing bolt P/N 72436-2749 and washers 74736-287, in accordance with British Aircraft Corp. Viscount Modification Bulletin No. D.3219 Issue 1, dated September 9, 1968, or later ARB-approved issue or an FAA-approved equivalent. The aluminum cable lug connections to engine starter selector relays are located in the main landing gear wheel bay at Nose Rib Station 131, LH and RH wings. This amendment becomes effective September 20, 1969.
2006-09-11: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus Model A319-100, A320-200, A321-100, and A321-200 series airplanes. This AD requires repetitive inspections for corrosion in the inside and outside lower walls of each type A, D, E, and F lavatory wall that has at least one wall-mounted cabin attendant seat, and related investigative and corrective actions if necessary. The repetitive inspections may be terminated by repairing the wall with composite material, or replacing the entire wall with a new wall made of composite material. This AD results from reports of corrosion in the lower part of the lavatory walls due to water ingress. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct corrosion and damage on the lower part of the lavatory walls, which could compromise the structural integrity of the cabin attendant seat attachments, and cause injury to the cabin attendants during a crash landing.
2007-19-09R1: We are revising an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Since the issuance of AD 2007-0126 Turbomeca has released modification TU157 which consists in modifying the pressure relief valve of the HMU by introducing a damping device into the valve. Introduction of this device has demonstrated to decrease the pressure fluctuations in the system, therefore reducing significantly the risk of wear of the delta-P diaphragm fabric. This will delete the need for a periodical replacement of the delta-P diaphragm before overhaul of the HMU. The modification TU157 is therefore considered as the terminating action for this AD. We are issuing this AD to prevent the loss of automatic control mode coupled with the deteriorated performance of the backup mode, which can lead to the inability to continue safe flight, forced autorotation landing, or an accident.