Results
99-23-03: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to Bell Helicopter Textron Canada (BHTC) Model 430 helicopters. This action requires verifying the torque on each vertical fin attachment bolt (bolt); modifying the vertical fin and tailboom and replacing the attachment hardware; and re-verifying the torque on the bolts after inspecting the fittings. This amendment is prompted by a report of a loose vertical fin, which was discovered during a post-flight inspection. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent loss of torque of the bolts, which could lead to fracture of the bolts, separation of the vertical fin from the helicopter, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
90-11-05: 90-11-05 AIRBUS INDUSTRIE: Amendment 39-6603. Docket No. 89-NM-223-AD. Applicability: Model A300 series airplanes, as listed in Airbus Industrie Service Bulletin A300-57-142, dated December 17, 1986, certificated in any category. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. To prevent failure of the outer shroud box aft hinge brackets, accomplish the following: A. Prior to the accumulation of 5,000 landings, or within the next 300 landings after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later, perform a detailed visual inspection to detect cracks in the outer shroud box aft hinge brackets, in accordance with Airbus Industrie Service Bulletin A300-57-142, dated December 17, 1986. B. If no cracks are found, repeat the inspection required by paragraph A., above, at intervals not to exceed 1,000 landings. C. If cracks are found, prior to further flight, perform a detailed visual inspection to detect cracks or damage in the remaining supports (shroud box forward hinge brackets, inner shroud box forward attachments, and the attachment brackets at the inboard end of the inner box shroud box), in the inner and outer shroud box structure in the vicinity of the failed bracket, and the top skin of the inboard flap, in accordance with the Airbus Industrie Service Bulletin A300-57- 142, dated December 17, 1986. 1. If cracks or damage is found in the remaining supports, the inner and outer shroud box structure, or top skin of the inboard flap, repair prior to further flight in a manner approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. 2. If any bracket is found to be cracked, damaged, or otherwise failed, replace the bracket with a serviceable part prior to further flight. a. If the bracket is replaced with an improved steel bracket (Modification 6661H1033), in accordance with Airbus Industrie Service Bulletin A300-57-142, dated December 17, 1986, or AirbusIndustrie Service Bulletin A300-57-143, Revision 2, dated July 10, 1989, the repetitive inspection of that bracket, as required by paragraph A., above, may be terminated. b. If the bracket is replaced with other than an improved steel bracket, repeat the inspection required by paragraph A. above, prior to the accumulation of 5,000 landings on the new bracket, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 1,000 landings. D. An alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. NOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI), who will either concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113. E. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with therequirements of this AD. All persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Airbus Industrie, Airbus Support Division, Avenue Didier Daurat, 31700 Blagnac, France. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or the Standardization Branch, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. This amendment (39-6603, AD 90-11-05) becomes effective on June 19, 1990.
99-23-09: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Airbus Model A319, A320, and A321 series airplanes, that requires modification of the electro-distributor for the nose wheel steering servo-control. This amendment is prompted by issuance of mandatory continuing airworthiness information by a foreign civil airworthiness authority. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent uncommanded nose landing gear wheel rotation, due to defective seals in the wheel steering selector valve of the hydraulic control unit for the nose landing gear, which could result in reduced controllability of the airplane.
93-05-01: 93-05-01 BELL HELICOPTER TEXTRON, INC. (BHTI): Amendment 39-8507. Docket Number 92-ASW-13. Applicability: BHTI Model 212 helicopters, certificated in any category. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. To prevent possible fatigue failure of the main rotor yoke assembly, accomplish the following: (a) For main rotor hub assemblies with main rotor yokes, part number (P/N) 204- 011-102 (all dash numbers), having 1,100 or more hours time in service since new or the last overhaul on the effective date of this AD, perform the following within the next 100 hours time in service, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 1,200 hours time in service: (1) Remove the main rotor yoke from the hub assembly. Visually inspect the pillow block bushing holes for corrosion and mechanical damage. Inspect the yoke for cracks using the magnetic particle method as specified in the BHTI component repair and overhaul manual. (2) If cracks are found, or if corrosion or mechanical damage is present that cannot be removed within the rework limits of the BHTI component repair and overhaul manual, replace the main rotor yoke with an airworthy part. (b) For main rotor hub assemblies with main rotor yokes, P/N 204-011-102 (all dash numbers), having less than 1,100 hours time in service since new or the last overhaul on the effective date of this AD, comply with paragraphs (a)(1) and (2) of this AD prior to attaining 1,200 hours time in service, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 1,200 hours time in service from the last inspection. (c) If no cracks are found and the yoke is airworthy, reinstall it in accordance with the BHTI component repair and overhaul manual. (d) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Rotorcraft Certification Office, ASW-170, FAA, 4400 Blue Mound Road, Fort Worth, Texas 76106. Operators shall submit their requests through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Rotorcraft Certification Office. NOTE: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Manager, Rotorcraft Certification Office. (e) The visual and magnetic particle inspection specified in BHTI, Alert Service Bulletin 212-90-60, Part III, dated March 23, 1990, is an equivalent means of compliance with this AD. (f) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the helicopter to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. (g) This amendment becomes effective on April 19, 1993.
2013-21-05R1: We are revising Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2013-21-05 for Eurocopter Deutschland GmbH (now Airbus Helicopters Deutschland GmbH) (Airbus Helicopters) Model EC135 P1, P2, P2+, T1, T2, and T2+ helicopters. AD 2013-21-05 required an initial and repetitive inspections of certain bearings and modifying the floor and a rod. Since we issued AD 2013-21-05, we have determined that modifying the floor and rod removes the unsafe condition. This AD retains the requirements of AD 2013-21-05 but removes the repetitive inspections. The actions of this AD are intended to prevent an unsafe condition on these products.
99-19-36: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Dornier Model 328-100 series airplanes, that requires a one-time inspection to measure the offset of the de-icing tubing adjacent to the refueling panel on the right-hand wing, and replacement with new improved tubing, if necessary. This amendment is prompted by issuance of mandatory continuing airworthiness information by a foreign civil airworthiness authority. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent a blockage in the de-icing tubing which could result in a malfunction of the de-icing boot. This malfunction would be unknown to the flight crew, and could lead to reduced controllability of the airplane during flight in icing conditions.
2006-03-03: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Rolls-Royce plc (RR) RB211 Trent 553-61, 553A2-61, 556-61, 556A2-61, 556B-61, 556B2-61, 560-61, and 560A2-61 turbofan engines. This AD requires initial and repetitive borescope inspections for missing HPT rear seal plate locking plugs and damaged locking plug retaining wires, and removal of the engine from service if necessary, based on inspection results. This AD results from two reports of missing HPT rear seal plate locking plugs, damage to the HPT disc, and damage to the remaining locking plug retaining wires. We are issuing this AD to prevent uncontained release of the HPT rear side plate and HPT disc, resulting in damage to the airplane.
86-15-10 R1: 86-15-10 R1 SOCIETE NATIONALE INDUSTRIELLE AEROSPATIALE (SNIAS): Amendment 39-5517 as revised by Amendment 39-6514. Docket No. 86-ASW-22. Applicability: Aerospatiale Model AS 350 and AS 355 series helicopters, certificated in any category. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To prevent the failure of the main rotor head star arms and the main gearbox suspension bars, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 10 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD: (1) For Model AS 350 series helicopters, inspect the main rotor head components, the main gearbox suspension bars (struts), and the landing gear ground resonance prevention components (aft spring blades and hydraulic shock absorbers) in accordance with Service Bulletin (SB) 01.17a, paragraph CC.3. (2) For Model AS 355 series helicopters, inspect the main rotor head components, the main gearbox suspension bars (struts), and the landing gear ground resonance prevention components (aft spring blades and hydraulic shock absorbers) in accordance with SB 01.14a, paragraph CC.3. (b) Rework or replace damaged components in accordance with SB 01.17a or 01.14a (as applicable). (c) Repeat the inspections and rework of paragraphs (a) and (b) in intervals not to exceed 400 hours' time in service. (d) In the event the helicopter is subjected to a hard landing or to high surface winds, when parked without effective tiedown straps installed, repeat the inspections of paragraph (a) for the main rotor head star arms and the main gearbox suspension bars before further flight. (e) In the event of a landing which exhibits abnormal self-sustained dynamic vibrations (ground resonance type vibrations) repeat all the inspections of paragraph (a). (f) An alternate method of compliance with this AD, which provides an equivalent level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Aircraft Certification Division, Federal Aviation Administration, Fort Worth, Texas 76193-0100, or by the Manager, Aircraft Certification Office, AEU-100, FAA, Europe, Africa, and Middle East Office, c/o American Embassy, Brussels, Belgium. (g) In accordance with Sections 21.197 and 21.199, flight is permitted to a base where the inspections required by this AD may be accomplished. The manufacturer's specifications and procedures shall be done in accordance with Aerospatiale SB 01.17a or 01.14a (as applicable). The incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1). Copies may be obtained from Aerospatiale Helicopter Corporation, 2701 Forum Drive, Grand Prairie, Texas 75051, Attention: Customer Support. These documents may be examined in the Rules Docket at the Office of the Regional Counsel, Southwest Region, Federal Aviation Administration, Room 156, Building 3B, 4400 Blue Mound Road, Fort Worth, Texas 76106 or at the Office of the Federal Register, 1100 L Street, NW., Room 8401, Washington, D.C. This AD revises AD 86-15-10, Amendment 39-5517 (52 FR 13233; April 22, 1987), which became effective on April 22, 1987, as to all persons except those persons to whom it was made immediately effective by priority letter AD 86-15-10, issued July 30, 1986, which contained this amendment. This amendment (39-6514, AD 86-15-10 R1) becomes effective on March 22, 1990.
2018-23-09: We are superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2016-13-16, which applied to all The Boeing Company Model 737-600, -700, -700C, - 800, -900, and -900ER series airplanes. AD 2016-13-16 required an inspection or records check to determine if affected horizontal stabilizers are installed, related investigative actions, and, for affected horizontal stabilizers, repetitive inspections for any crack of the horizontal stabilizer rear spar upper chord, and corrective action if necessary. This AD requires retaining the requirements of AD 2016-13-16, with revised service information that clarifies the inspection areas and serial number information of the horizontal stabilizer. This AD was prompted by reports of a manufacturing oversight, in which a supplier omitted the required protective finish on certain bushings installed in the rear spar upper chord on horizontal stabilizers, which could lead to galvanic corrosion and consequent cracking of the rear spar upper chord. We are issuingthis AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2018-23-03: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus SAS Model A318 and A319 series airplanes; Model A320-211, -212, -214, -231, -232, and -233 airplanes; and Model A321-111, -112, -131, - 211, -212, -213, -231, and -232 airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of false resolution advisories (RAs) from certain traffic collision avoidance systems (TCASs). This AD requires modification or replacement of certain TCAS processors. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.