Results
98-18-04: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all Aerospatiale Model SN-601 (Corvette) series airplanes, that requires repetitive inspections to detect corrosion, cracking, or rupture of the support arms of the aileron balance weights; and repair, if necessary. Accomplishment of the repair terminates the repetitive inspection requirement of this AD. This amendment is prompted by issuance of mandatory continuing airworthiness information by a foreign civil airworthiness authority. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent corrosion, cracking, or rupture of the support arms of the aileron balance weights, which may cause reduced flutter damping or jamming of the aileron, and consequent reduced controllability of the airplane.
95-19-08 R1: This amendment revises an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 727-100 and -200 series airplanes, that currently requires replacing the attaching nutplates on certain engine nose cowls with washers and self-locking nuts. This amendment changes the responsible office for approval of an alternative method of compliance. This amendment is prompted by the transfer of the supplemental type certificate. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent the attach bolts from becoming loose, which could result in subsequent separation of the nose cowl from the engine.
83-23-01: 83-23-01 PILATUS BRITTEN-NORMAN LTD: Amendment 39-4764. Applies to Models BN-2, BN-2A and BN-2B Islander Series Airplanes equipped with wing tip tanks (Mod NB/M/364) certificated in any category except BN-2A MKIII Series Trislander Airplanes. Compliance: Required within 100 hours time-in-service after the effective date of this AD, but no later than December 31, 1983, unless already accomplished. To preclude fuel mismanagement and possible fuel starvation, accomplish the following: a) Modify the wing tip tank fuel management system in accordance with steps 1. through 12. of the ACTION section of Pilatus Britten-Norman Ltd. Service Bulletin No. BN- 2/SB.157, dated March 14, 1983. 1) Upon completion of the modification described in paragraph a) update and annotate the appropriate airplane flight manual as follows: i) BN-2A-3 Model: insert Issue 4 of Supplement No. 8 to Section 7 of Flight Manual FM/10 dated March 4, 1983; ii) BN-2A-9 Model: insert Issue 2 of Supplement No. 16 to Section 7 of Flight Manual FM/2 dated March 4, 1983; iii) BN-2A-21 Model: insert Issue 4 of Supplement No. 8 to Section 7 of Flight Manual FM/10 dated March 4, 1983; iv) BN-2A-27 Model: insert Issue 2 of Supplement No. 1 to Section 7 of Flight Manual FM/20 dated March 4, 1983; v) BN-2B-21 Model: insert Issue 3 of Supplement No. 1 to Section 7 of Flight Manual FM/43 dated March 4, 1983; vi) BN-2B-27 Model: insert Issue 5 of Supplement No. 1 to Section 7 of Flight Manual FM/42 dated March 4, 1983. NOTE: The requirement for insertion of specific revisions in the affected Airplane Flight Manuals does not prohibit incorporation of later revisions containing the same information. 2) The requirement of paragraph a)1) of this AD may be accomplished by the holder of a pilot certificate issued under Part 61 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) on any airplane owned or operated by him. The person accomplishing this action must make the appropriate aircraft maintenance record entry as prescribed by FAR 91.173. b) Aircraft may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a location where this AD can be accomplished. c) An equivalent method of compliance with this AD, if used, must be approved by the Manager, Aircraft Certification Staff, AEU-100, Europe, Africa and Middle East Office, FAA, c/o American Embassy, 1000 Brussels, Belgium. This amendment becomes effective on December 8, 1983.
2015-19-12: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 767 airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports that six fasteners may not have been installed in the left and right stringer 37 (S-37) between body stations (BS) 428 and 431 lap splices on certain airplanes. This AD requires a general visual inspection of S-37 lap splices for missing fasteners, and all applicable related investigative and corrective actions. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct missing fasteners, which could result in cracks in the fuselage skin that could adversely affect the structural integrity of the airplane.
2010-20-10: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD), which applies to all Model 750 airplanes. That AD currently requires inspecting the inboard-hinge brackets of the left and right elevators for cracking and doing related investigative and corrective actions if necessary. For certain airplanes, this new AD requires inspecting for cracks of the bracket of the inboard horizontal stabilizer and measuring the lug thickness of the horizontal stabilizer hinges; doing corrective actions if necessary; and modifying the left and right elevators and left and right horizontal stabilizer. For all airplanes, this new AD requires replacing the existing elevator assemblies with new elevator assemblies, which terminates the requirements of the existing AD. This new AD also revises the applicability to remove certain airplanes. This AD results from a report of cracking found on the elevator inboard-hinge brackets and the horizontal stabilizer hinges. We are issuing this AD to prevent such cracking of the elevator inboard-hinge brackets and the horizontal stabilizer hinges, which could result in structural failure of the elevators and consequent loss of control of the airplane.
2015-19-13: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Bombardier, Inc. Model DHC-8-400 series airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of inadvertent deployment of a single outboard spoiler during flight. This AD requires replacement of the power control units (PCUs) for the outboard spoilers with upgraded PCUs. We are issuing this AD to prevent leakage of the piston head seal and piston rod seals of the outboard spoiler PCUs, which could result in inadvertent spoiler deployment and reduced controllability of the airplane.
2010-19-01: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for RRC AE 3007A series turbofan engines. That AD currently requires performing an eddy current inspection (ECI) or surface wave ultrasonic test (SWUT) inspection on each affected high-pressure turbine (HPT) wheel. This AD requires removing or performing initial and repetitive ECIs or SWUT inspections on HPT stage 2 wheels for cracks. This AD also reduces the approved life limits of certain HPT stage 2 wheels. This AD results from reports of cracked HPT stage 2 wheels. We are issuing this AD to prevent uncontained failure of the HPT stage 2 wheel and damage to the airplane.
2000-15-02: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to certain Boeing Model 747-400 series airplanes. This action requires a one-time inspection to determine if certain wire bundles are routed incorrectly and to detect damage, and corrective actions, if necessary. This action is necessary to prevent damage of certain wire bundles routed to the fuel tank transfer pumps in the horizontal stabilizer, which could result in electrical arcing and a possible fire adjacent to the fuel tank. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
2000-14-14: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to certain BFGoodrich main brake assemblies as installed on Airbus Model A319 and A320 series airplanes. This action requires repetitive inspections to determine the length of the wear indicator pins of the main brake assemblies of the main landing gear (MLG); follow-on inspections; and corrective actions, if necessary. This amendment is prompted by reports from several operators that severe oxidation was found on the rotor disk assemblies of the main brake assemblies. This action is necessary to detect and correct thermal oxidation of the main brake assemblies, which could result in deterioration of the MLG brakes, and consequent reduced braking performance.
2015-19-09: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all The Boeing Company Model 787-8 airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of a potential latent failure of the fuel shutoff valve actuator circuitry, which was not identified during actuator development. This AD requires replacing certain engine and auxiliary power unit (APU) fuel shutoff valve actuators with new actuators, and also requires revising the maintenance or inspection program to include a new airworthiness limitation into the Airworthiness Limitations Section (ALS) of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness (ICA). We are issuing this AD to detect and correct latent failures of the fuel shutoff valve to the engine and auxiliary power unit (APU), which could result in the inability to shut off fuel to the engine and APU and, in case of certain fires, an uncontrollable fire that could lead to structural failure.
2015-19-06: We are superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2012-24-10 for certain The Boeing Company Model 747-400 and -400F series airplanes. AD 2012-24-10 required installing new software, replacing the duct assembly with a new duct assembly, making wiring changes, and routing certain wire bundles. This new AD retains the requirements of AD 2012- 24-10 and requires installing a new or serviceable pressure switch bracket and altitude pressure switch. This new AD also adds an airplane to the applicability. This AD was prompted by reports of intermittent or blank displays of a certain integrated display unit (IDU) that were due to an intermittent false electrical ground that was not addressed by the software installation or wiring changes required by AD 2012-24- 10. We are issuing this AD to prevent IDU malfunctions, which could affect the ability of the flightcrew to read primary displays for airplane attitude, altitude, or airspeed, and consequently reduce the ability of the flightcrewto maintain control of the airplane.
2000-14-12: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11 series airplanes, that requires replacement of the upper and lower reading lights in the forward crew rest area with a redesigned light fixture. This amendment is prompted by reports of burning and smoldering blankets in the forward crew rest area due to a reading light fixture that came into contact with the blankets after the light was inadvertently left on. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent a possible flammable condition, which could result in smoke and fire in the forward crew rest area.
86-09-04: 86-09-04 BRITISH AEROSPACE AIRCRAFT GROUP: Amendment 39-5290. Applies to Model HS 748, constructor numbers 1793, 1794, and 1795 (Mod 402); and 1796 (Mod 400); and to any other airplanes which incorporate Modification 6953, certificated in any category. Compliance is required within 60 days after the effective date of this AD. To prevent the accidental disarming of the emergency lighting system, accomplish the following, unless previously accomplished: 1. Modify the emergency lighting system in accordance with BAe HS 748 Service Bulletin 33/29, dated April 2, 1984. 2. An alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. 3. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of inspections and/or modifications required by this AD. All persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service document from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to British Aerospace, Inc., Librarian, Box 17414, Dulles International Airport, Washington, D.C. 20041. This document may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or the Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. This amendment becomes effective May 26, 1986.
81-26-06: 81-26-06 LOCKHEED-CALIFORNIA COMPANY: Amendment 39-4283. Applies to Lockheed Model L-1011 series airplanes, Serial Numbers as listed below, certificated in all categories. Compliance required within 30 days after the effective date of this AD, unless previously accomplished: A. To prevent an unnecessary shutdown of the number 2 engine due to false Airborne Vibration Monitor System indications, incorporate electrical system modifications in accordance with Part 2, Accomplishment Instructions, of Lockheed-California Company L-1011 Service Bulletin 093-23-083 dated October 13, 1981, for the following 42 aircraft: S/N 1083-1090 S/N 1117-1119 S/N 1134-1136 S/N 1092-1097 S/N 1121-1123 S/N 1139 S/N 1099-1103 S/N 1126-1129 S/N 1141 S/N 1105-1106 S/N 1132 S/N 1145-1147 S/N 1112-1113 B. Alternative means of compliance providing an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Chief, Los Angeles Area Aircraft Certification Office, FAA Northwest Mountain Region. C. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. The manufacturer's specifications and procedures identified and described in this directive are incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1). All persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Lockheed-California Company, P.O. Box 551, Burbank, California 91520, Attention: Commercial Support Contracts, Dept. 63-11, U-33, B-1. These documents also may be examined at FAA Northwest Mountain Region, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington 98108; or the Los Angeles Area Aircraft Certification Office, 4344 Donald Douglas Drive, Long Beach, California 90808. This Amendment becomes effective December 31, 1981.
2015-19-08: We are superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2011-19-04, for all Airbus Model A318, A319, A320, and A321 series airplanes. AD 2011-19-04 required repetitive inspections for cracking of the left- hand and right-hand inboard and outboard elevator servo-control rod eye-ends, and corrective actions if necessary. This new AD requires an inspection to determine if certain elevator servo-control parts are installed, and replacement if necessary. This AD was prompted by a determination that certain elevator servo-control parts that do not conform to the approved type design have been installed and may have the potential of cracks in the rod eye-end. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct rod eye-end cracking, which could result in uncontrolled elevator surface and consequent reduced control of the airplane.
2000-14-11: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 747 series airplanes equipped with General Electric Model CF6-45 or -50 series engines, that requires repetitive inspections and tests of the thrust reverser control and indication system, and corrective actions, if necessary. This amendment also requires installation of a thrust reverser actuation system (TRAS) lock, repetitive functional tests of that installation, and repair, if necessary. Installation of the TRAS lock terminates the repetitive inspections and certain tests. This amendment is prompted by the results of a safety review, which revealed that in-flight deployment of a thrust reverser could result in a significant reduction in airplane controllability. The actions specified by this AD are intended to ensure the integrity of the fail-safe features of the thrust reverser system by preventing possible failure modes, which could result in inadvertent deployment of a thrust reverser during flight, and consequent reduced controllability of the airplane.
82-26-07 R1: 82-26-07 R1 BELL HELICOPTER TEXTRON, INC.: Amendment 39-4512 as amended by Amendment 39-4884. Applies to Model 214ST helicopters certificated in all categories which have upper left tailboom attach longeron part number (P/N) 214-031-431-1 01 installed. Compliance is required as indicated unless already accomplished. To prevent possible separation of the tailboom from the fuselage due to failure of the upper left tailboom attach longeron, accomplish the following: (a) Before the first flight of each day on those helicopters that have not had the longeron modification described in paragraph (d) below, inspect the aft portion of the upper left longeron, P/N 214-031-431-101, that is visible inside the oil cooler compartment and the portion visible inside the aft left electrical compartment for cracks. (b) Within the next 5 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished within the last 20 hours time in service, and thereafterat intervals not to exceed 25 hours time in service, perform the following inspection on those helicopters that have not had the longeron modification installed: (1) Remove forward fairing assembly, P/N 214-061-866-113, and LH and RH fairing assemblies, P/N's 214-061-866-115 and -117. (2) Visually inspect the aft end of the upper left longeron, P/N 214-031-431- 101, immediately adjacent to and inboard of the pin, P/N 100-048-5-4, just aft of the fairing attach bracket, P/N 214-021-700-129. Inspect for a crack that may extend from the pin hole in the longeron across the longeron and forward. (c) If the longeron is found to be cracked during the inspections of paragraphs (a) and (b) of this AD, replace it with a serviceable part and install the modification described in paragraph (d) below before further flight. (d) Within the next 25 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD or before the accumulation of 100 hours total time in service, whichever occurs later, install a reinforcement modification to the longeron, P/N 214-031-431-101, installation. This reinforcement consists of the addition of a new support, P/N 214-031-454-101, and the replacement of a doubler, P/N 214-031-702-131, with a new doubler, P/N 214-031-643-101. Remove the attaching pin, P/N 100-048-5-4, that is installed in the most aft hole in the longeron outboard flange and plug the remaining hole with adhesive. Accomplish the reinforcement in accordance with Bell Helicopter Textron (BHT) Alert Service Bulletin No. 214ST-82-3, dated 10/25/82 or other FAA approved data. (e) After installation of the longeron modification, conduct the following inspection at intervals not to exceed 250 hours time in service: (1) Remove forward fairing assembly, P/N 214-061-866-113, and LH and RH fairing assemblies, P/N's 214-061-866-115 and -117. (2) Visually inspect the aft end of the longeron, P/N 214-031-431-101, immediately adjacent to and inboard of the service deck, P/N 214-031-702-101, for cracks. Also, inspect that portion of the longeron adjacent to the newly installed support that is visible inside the aft left electrical compartment and that portion of the longeron that is visible inside the oil cooler compartment for cracks. (f) Replace any cracked parts found during the inspections of paragraph (e) with serviceable parts. (g) Any equivalent method of compliance with this AD must be approved by the Manager, Aircraft Certification Division, Federal Aviation Administration, 4400 Blue Mound Road, Fort Worth, Texas 76106. (h) In accordance with FAR 21.197, flight is permitted to a base where the inspection required by this AD may be accomplished. Amendment 39-4512 became effective December 23, 1982. This Amendment 39-4884 becomes effective August 17, 1984.
2015-19-03: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all The Boeing Company Model 737-600, -700, -700C, -800, -900, and -900ER series airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of latently failed fuel shutoff valves discovered during fuel filter replacement. This AD requires revising the maintenance or inspection program to include new airworthiness limitations. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct latent failures of the fuel shutoff valve to the engine, which \n\n((Page 55528)) \n\ncould result in the inability to shut off fuel to the engine and, in case of certain engine fires, an uncontrollable fire that could lead to wing failure.
2015-19-01: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 777 airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of latently failed fuel shutoff valves discovered during fuel filter replacement. This AD requires revising the maintenance or inspection program to include a new airworthiness limitation. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct latent failures of the \n\n((Page 55522)) \n\nfuel shutoff valve to the engine, which could result in the inability to shut off fuel to the engine and, in case of certain engine fires, an uncontrollable fire that could lead to wing failure.
2015-17-24: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 787-8 airplanes. This AD was prompted by numerous reports of failures of the proximity sensor within the slat skew detection mechanism assembly (DMA) leading to slats up landing events. This AD requires replacing the slat skew DMAs with new slat skew DMAs, and marking the existing identification plates on the slat with the new part number. We are issuing this AD to prevent failure of the proximity sensor, which could result in the slats being shut down and a slats up high speed landing. This condition, in combination with abnormal landing conditions such as a short runway or adverse weather conditions, could result in a runway excursion.
2000-14-10: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model DC-10 series airplanes and KC-10A (military) airplanes, that currently requires repetitive inspections to detect failure of the attachment fasteners located in the banjo No. 4 fitting of the vertical stabilizer. That AD also requires a one-time inspection to detect cracking of the flanges and bolt holes of the banjo No. 4 fitting, and repair or replacement of the attachment fasteners with new, improved fasteners. This amendment adds a new one-time inspection to determine whether certain fasteners are installed in the banjo No. 4 fitting of the vertical stabilizer, and follow-on actions, if necessary. This amendment is prompted by reports of failure of certain fasteners installed in the banjo No. 4 fitting of the vertical stabilizer. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent cracking of the attachment fasteners of the vertical stabilizer, which could result in loss of fail-safe capability of the vertical stabilizer and reduced controllability of the airplane. \n\n\tThe incorporation by reference of McDonnell Douglas Service Bulletin DC10-55-023, Revision 02, dated October 30, 1996; and McDonnell Douglas Service Bulletin DC10-55-023, Revision 03, dated March 25, 1998; as listed in the regulations, is approved by the Director of the Federal Register as of August 23, 2000.\n\n\tThe incorporation by reference of McDonnell Douglas DC-10 Service Bulletin 55-23, dated December 17, 1992; and McDonnell Douglas DC-10 Service Bulletin 55-23, Revision 1, dated December 17, 1993; as listed in the regulations, was approved previously by the Director of the Federal Register as of April 24, 1997 (61 FR 12015, March 25, 1996).
2000-14-01: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 747 series airplanes, that requires replacement of any brake system accumulator that has aluminum end caps with an accumulator that has stainless steel end caps. This amendment is prompted by reports of fractures of aluminum end caps on brake system accumulators. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent high-velocity separation of a brake system accumulator barrel, piston, or end cap, which could result in injury to personnel in the wheel well area, loss of cabin pressurization, loss of certain hydraulic systems, or damage to the fuel line of the auxiliary power unit.
2000-14-13: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 737-200, -300, -400, and -500 series airplanes, that requires replacement of existing door handle mounting hub assemblies with new, improved hub assemblies. This amendment is prompted by reports of cracked or broken mounting hub assemblies for the interior door handles on the cabin doors. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent cracking or breaking of the door handle mounting hub, which could result in the interior door handle breaking off while the door is being opened. In an emergency situation, this could impede evacuation of the airplane.
78-23-07: 78-23-07 HILLER HELICOPTERS: Amendment 39-3344. Applies to Hiller Model UH-12D, UH-12E and UH-12E (4 Place) helicopters certificated in all categories, including Military Models UH-23D, OH-23G, H-23F and turbine-powered models, equipped with the finite life components listed below: PART NO. NOMENCLATURE REPLACEMENT PERIOD APPLICABILITY 63192-7, -11 Snubber Assy., engine, longitudinal 4,650 hrs Note A 63192-5, -9 Snubber Assy., engine, lateral 4,650 hrs All 63197 Bracket, engine snubber 6,160 hrs All 63197-5 Bracket, engine snubber 9,850 hrs All 31197-3 Flyweight collective pitch ballast 2,500 hrs All 31318 Bellcrank, collective control 15,000 hrs Note B 31319-3 Tube, collective control 23,500 hrs Note B 31321 Shaft, dual collective control 10,400 hrs Note B 31344, -3, -5, or -9 Block Assy., collective stick 6,400 hrs Note B 31403 Arm Assy., collective and throttle controls 21,500 hrs E (4 place) 34141, -5 Scissor, cyclic control, lower 275 hrs All AN3-7A Attaching bolts, engine snubber (used to attach P/N 63197 bracket to deck and lord mount) 600 hrs All Note A - All models except turbine-powered. Note B - All models except UH-12D and UH-23D. To prevent failure of the above listed finite life components accomplish the following: (a) Within fifty (50) hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, inspect the service history of each of the finite life components listed in this AD for adequacy of documentation. NOTE: The finite life components may be documented by serial number, part nomenclature, part number or any combination. (b) For those finite life components listed in this AD for which service history can be documented, no further action is required by this AD. (c) For any finite life component listed in this AD for which service history cannot be documented: (1) Prior to further flight, remove and replace those finitelife components whose replacement period is less than helicopter total time in service. (2) Within five hundred (500) hours time in service from the effective date of this AD, remove and replace those components whose replacement period is greater than helicopter total time in service. NOTE: The Criteria in (c), (1) and (2) applies to aircraft in service. Finite life criteria for aircraft submitted for original airworthiness certification are contained in AC-21-13. (d) Only finite life components for which prior service history or representation as new can be documented may be used as replacement parts. Equivalent inspection procedures may be used when approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. This amendment becomes effective December 14, 1978.
90-13-13: 90-13-13 GENERAL DYNAMICS (CONVAIR): Amendment 39-6638. Docket No. 89-NM-235-AD. Applicability: Models 340, 440, and C-131, B, C, D, E, F, and G (Military) series airplanes, including all airplanes converted to turbopropeller power, certificated in any category. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. To prevent progressive damage to the airframe, accomplish the following: A. Perform a visual inspection of the fuselage frames in accordance with General Dynamics, Convair Division, Service Bulletin 640 (340D) 53-15, Revision 1, dated December 1, 1989, in accordance with the schedule below. Any drilled holes found which do not conform to the limitations specified in the service bulletin, or any holes found which are cracked, must be repaired prior to further flight, in accordance with the service bulletin. Any holes specifically used for attaching an FAA-approved interior, or original Convair manufacturing holes, may be disregarded ifthey are not degraded or cracked, and if they meet the criteria specified in the service bulletin. 1. Within 1,650 hours time-in-service or 18 months after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs first, accomplish the inspections specified in Part I of the service bulletin. 2. Within 2,300 hours time-in-service or 24 months after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs first, accomplish the inspections specified in Part II of the service bulletin. B. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. C. An alternate means of compliance or adjustment of compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. NOTE: The request should be submitted directly to the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office,and a copy sent to the cognizant FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI). The PMI will then forward comments or concurrence to the Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office. All persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to the General Dynamics, Convair Division, P. O. Box 85377, San Diego, California 92138, Attn: Chief, Aircraft Logistical Support, Mail Zone 92-2920. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 17900 Pacific Highway South Office, 3229 East Spring Street, Long Beach, California. This amendment (39-6638, AD 90-13-13) becomes effective on July 30, 1990.