Results
97-06-07 R1: 97-06-07 R1 DORNIER: Amendment 39-10178. Docket 97-NM-84-AD. Revises AD 97-06-07, Amendment 39-9964. Applicability: Model 328-100 series airplanes equipped with Burns Aerospace Corporation commuter seat models JB6.8-1-22 and JB6.8-2-42 passenger seats having serial numbers up to and including 384616; certificated in any category. NOTE 1: This AD applies to each airplane identified in the preceding applicability provision, regardless of whether it has been otherwise modified, altered, or repaired in the area subject to the requirements of this AD. For airplanes that have been modified, altered, or repaired so that the performance of the requirements of this AD is affected, the owner/operator must request approval for an alternative method of compliance in accordance with paragraph (b) of this AD. The request should include an assessment of the effect of the modification, alteration, or repair on the unsafe condition addressed by this AD; and, if the unsafe conditionhas not been eliminated, the request should include specific proposed actions to address it. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. To prevent failure of the anchor point fasteners on the seat restraining system, which could result in release of the seat restraint and consequent injury to passengers, accomplish the following: (a) Within 60 days after April 18, 1997 (the effective date of AD 97-06-07, amendment 39-9964), replace each anchor point fastener on the restraining system of each seat with a fastener of improved design, in accordance with Dornier Service Bulletin SB-328-25-114, dated July 10, 1995, or Revision 1, dated April 17, 1997. NOTE 2: The referenced Dornier service bulletin refers to Burns Aerospace Corporation Service Bulletin 25-20-989, Revision B, dated June 14, 1995, or Revision D, dated August 25, 1995, as an additional source of service information for identifying the affected seats and replacing the anchor point fasteners on their restraining systems. (b) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113. NOTE 3: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Standardization Branch, ANM-113. (c) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with sections 21.197 and 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. (d) The replacement shall be done in accordance with Dornier Service Bulletin SB-328-25-114, dated July 10, 1995, or Dornier Service Bulletin SB-328-25-114, Revision 1, dated April 17, 1997. (1) The incorporation by reference of Dornier Service Bulletin SB-328-25-114, Revision 1, dated April 17, 1997, is approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. (2) The incorporation by reference of Dornier Service Bulletin SB-328-25-114, dated July 10, 1995, was approved previously by the Director of the Federal Register as of April 18, 1997 (62 FR 12081, March 14, 1997). (3) Copies may be obtained from Dornier Luftfahrt GmbH, P.O. Box 1103, D-82230 Wessling, Germany. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC. NOTE 4: The subject of this AD is addressed in German airworthiness directive 95-240/2, dated August 10, 1995. (e) This amendment becomes effective on November 13, 1997.
77-15-01: 77-15-01 MESSERSCHMITT-BOLKOW-BLOHM (MBB): Amendment 39-2970. Applies to Model BO-105A and BO-105C Helicopters, certificated in all categories, except those incorporating tail-rotor shaft bearing bracket, P/N 105-30251.40. Compliance is required as indicated. To prevent possible failure of the tail-rotor drive system, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 5 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, remove the tail-rotor shaft fairings and visually inspect the tail boom skin for cracks in the vicinity of the three bearing brackets, P/N 105-30251.17, .18, and .19. (b) If no crack is found during the inspection required by paragraph (a) of this AD, repeat the inspection at intervals not to exceed 50 hours time in service since the last inspection. (c) If during any inspection required by this AD, one or more skin cracks at any of the three bearing brackets are found, comply with paragraphs (1) or (2) of this paragraph, as appropriate: (1) If not more than one crack is found at any bracket and no crack is found to exceed 10 mm (0.4 in.) in length, stop-drill the cracks with a 4 mm diameter drill, and repeat the inspections specified in paragraph (a) of this AD at intervals not to exceed 10 hours time in service since the last inspection. If during any inspection required by this AD, any crack is found to have propagated beyond the stop-drill hole or to exceed 10 mm (0.4 in) in length, comply with paragraph (2) of this paragraph, prior to further flight, except as provided in paragraph (d) of this AD. (2) If more than one crack is found at any bracket, prior to further flight, accomplish Subparagraph 2B2 of MBB Alert Service Bulletin No. 15, dated November 12, 1976, or an FAA-approved equivalent, and repeat the inspections specified in paragraph (a) of this AD at intervals not to exceed 10 hours time in service since the last inspection. (d) The helicopter may be flown under the provisions of FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to abase where the repair can be performed, subject to the following conditions: (1) Not more than one crack may exist at any bracket. (2) The crack length at any one bracket may not exceed 50 mm (2 in.). (3) Cracks may not exist on more than two brackets. This amendment becomes effective July 28, 1977.
2010-17-08: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Due to high fuel pressure, caused by exceeding pressure in front of the mechanical fuel pump (e.g. due to an electrical fuel pump), in limited cases a deviation in the fuel supply could occur. This can result in exceeding of the fuel pressure and might cause engine malfunction and/or massive fuel leakage. We are issuing this AD to prevent the pump from causing excessive fuel pressure, which could result in engine malfunction or a massive fuel leak. These conditions could cause loss of control of the airplane or a fire. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
71-24-08: 71-24-08 FAIRCHILD HILLER AIRCRAFT: Amdt. 39-1343. Applies to FH1100 Type Helicopters certificated in all categories. Compliance required as indicated. To preclude failure of the landing gear torque tube P/N 24-43041 at the skid support attachments accomplish the following: a. Within the next 50 hours in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished within the last 50 hours in service, inspect, and replace if necessary, torque tube P/N 24-43041 in accordance with Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Fairchild Hiller Service Letter No. SL FH1100-43-1 dated 5 October 1971 or later FAA approved Revision, or an alternate method approved by the Chief, Engineering & Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Eastern Region. b. Within 100 hours in service after the inspection required by Paragraph a and every 100 hours in service thereafter, inspect and replace if necessary torque tube P/N 24-43041 in accordance with Paragraph 2 of Fairchild Hiller Service Letter SL FH1100-43-1 dated 5 October 1971 or later FAA-approved Revision, or an alternate method approved by the Chief, Engineering & Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Eastern Region. This amendment is effective November 30, 1971.
90-20-10: 90-20-10 BOEING: Amendment 39-6737. Docket No. 89-NM-75-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: Model 747 series airplanes, listed in Boeing Service Bulletin 747-57- 2187, Revision 2, dated December 15, 1982, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. \n\tTo prevent failure of the trailing edge flap track fail-safe straps, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tWithin 4 years from the effective date of this AD, replace old design trailing edge flap track fail-safe straps, if installed, with improved fail-safe straps, and replace bolts having a grip length which is too short with bolts having the correct grip length, as applicable, in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 747-57-2187, Revision 2, dated December 15, 1982. \n\n\tB.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tC.\tAn alternate means of compliance or adjustmentof the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. \n\n\tNOTE: The request should be submitted directly to the Manager, Seattle ACO, and a copy sent to the cognizant FAA Principal Inspector (PI). The PI will then forward comments or concurrence to the Seattle ACO. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 1601 Lind Avenue SW, Renton, Washington. \n\n\tThis amendment (39-6737, AD 90-20-10) becomes effective on October 22, 1990.
2008-17-01: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD), which applies to all AvCraft Dornier Model 328-100 airplanes. That AD currently requires modifying the electrical wiring of the fuel pumps; installing insulation at the hand flow control and shut-off valves, and other components of the environmental control system; and installing markings at fuel wiring harnesses. The existing AD also requires revising the Airworthiness Limitations section of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness to incorporate new inspections of the fuel tank system. This new AD replaces the flight-hour-based threshold for conducting certain initial inspections, with an 8-year threshold. This AD results from fuel system reviews conducted by the manufacturer. We are issuing this AD to reduce the potential of ignition sources inside fuel tanks, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in fuel tank explosions and consequent loss of the airplane. DATES: This AD becomes effective September 17, 2008. The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the AD as of September 17, 2008. On July 29, 2005 (70 FR 36470, June 24, 2005), the Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of AvCraft Service Bulletin SB-328-00-445, including Price Information Sheet, dated August 23, 2004; and Dornier Temporary Revision ALD-080, dated October 15, 2003.
47-25-03: 47-25-03 CULVER: (Was Mandatory Note 5 of AD-778-2.) Applies Only to Serial Numbers V-1 to V-130, Inclusive. Compliance required prior to August 15, 1947. Inspect the nose gear drag link for the type of connection used to attach the aft fitting. The 3/4-inch diameter tube must butt the aft fitting. If otherwise, replace the link or rework accordingly. (Culver Service Bulletin No. 1 covers this same subject.)
2008-17-15: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Boeing Model 737-600, -700, -800, and -900 series airplanes. This AD requires installing hot short protector (HSP) support brackets and equipment for the fuel quantity indicating system (FQIS) fuel densitometer and other specified actions as applicable. This AD also requires revising the Airworthiness Limitations (AWLs) section of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness to incorporate AWL No. 28-AWL- 07. This AD results from fuel system reviews conducted by the manufacturer. We are issuing this AD to prevent the center tank fuel densitometer from overheating and becoming a potential ignition source inside the center fuel tank, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in a center fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.
71-23-01: 71-23-01 PILATUS AIRCRAFT: Amdt. 39-1326. Applies to Pilatus Model PC-6 (Heli-Porter) airplanes manufactured by Fairchild Hiller. Compliance is required as indicated. (a) Before further flight, unless already accomplished, inspect the aileron control cable turnbuckles for safety wires that meet the size and corrosion resistance specifications and the method of safetying specifications of Military Standard 20995C47 and Military Standard 33591, respectively, or FAA-approved equivalents. (b) Within the next 50 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD or before November 15, 1971, whichever occurs sooner, inspect the rudder, elevator, and flap control cables turnbuckles for safety wires that meet the size and corrosion resistance specifications of Military Standard 20995C47 and Military Standard 33591, respectively, or FAA-approved equivalent. (c) If turnbuckle safety wires are found that do not meet the size or corrosion resistance specificationsor the method of safetying specifications of Military Standard 20995C47 and Military Standard 33591, respectively, or FAA-approved equivalents, during an inspection required by paragraph (a) or (b), before further flight, except that the airplane may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a base where the repairs can be performed, replace affected turnbuckle safety wires with safety wires that meet those specifications or FAA-approved equivalents. (d) Within the next 50 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD or before November 15, 1971, whichever occurs sooner, inspect the rudder and elevator trim cable turnbuckles for safety wires that meet the size and corrosion resistance specifications and the method of safetying specifications of Military Standard 20995C32 and Military Standard 33591, respectively, or FAA-approved equivalents. (e) If turnbuckle safety wires are found that do not meet the size or corrosion resistance specifications or the method ofsafetying specifications of Military Standard 20995C32 and Military Standard 33591, respectively, or FAA-approved equivalents, during an inspection required by paragraph (d), before further flight, except that the airplane may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a base where the repairs can be performed, replace affected turnbuckle safety wires with safety wires that meet those specifications or FAA-approved equivalents. (Fairchild Hiller Service Letter PC-6-27-2, dated July 20, 1971, refers to this subject). This amendment is effective upon publication in the Federal Register as to all persons except those persons to whom it was made effective immediately upon receipt of the airmail letter dated October 9, 1971, which contained this amendment.
90-23-08: 90-23-08 MESSERSCHMITT-BOLKOW-BLOHM (MBB): Amendment 39-6778. Docket No. 89-ASW-68. Applicability: All MBB Model BO105C and BO105S series helicopters, certified in any category, that operate in snow conditions. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To prevent engine flameout resulting from ingestion of layers of wet snow in engine inlets, accomplish the following: (a) Install a continuous ignition system in accordance with MBB Service Bulletin, SB-BO 105-80-108, "Optional Equipment-Retrofit of Continuous Ignition System," dated May 11, 1990. (b) Incorporate into the applicable Rotorcraft Flight Manual (RFM) the FAA- approved flight manual Revision No. 2/16, dated October 1, 1989, which includes the following paragraphs 2.8.2.4 and 2.8.2.5: 2.8.2.4 Snow Conditions Operation in snow is prohibited, except when the Continuous Ignition System) OPT 19 is installed and switched on. Prior to takeoff, snow and ice must be removed, particularly from the following areas: - cabin roof - transmission cowling interior in front of engine air intakes - transmission compartment interior - engine inlet deflector shield. NOTE: After engine operation in snow make an entry in the logbook. Maintenance action is required in accordance with the Allison Operation and Maintenance Manual. 2.8.2.5 Engine Inlet Deflector Shield The engine inlet deflector shield must be installed at all times. The procedures shall be done in accordance with MBB Service Bulletin SB-BO 105-80- 108, which incorporates the following pages: 1, 2, and 8, Rev. 1, dated May 11, 1990; 3-7 and 9, Original, dated June 12, 1989. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from MBB Helicopter Corporation, 900 Airport Road, P.O. Box 2345, West Chester, PA 19380. Copies may be inspected at the Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel, FAA, 4400 Blue Mound Road, Fort Worth, Texas, or at the Office of the Federal Register, 1100 L Street, NW., Room 8301, Washington, DC. This amendment (39-6778, AD 90-23-08) becomes effective on December 3, 1990.
2021-26-13: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Rolls-Royce Deutschland Ltd & Co KG (RRD) Trent 1000-A2, Trent 1000- AE2, Trent 1000-C2, Trent 1000-CE2, Trent 1000-D2, Trent 1000-E2, Trent 1000-G2, Trent 1000-H2, Trent 1000-J2, Trent 1000-K2, and Trent 1000-L2 model turbofan engines. This AD was prompted by the manufacturer revising the engine Time Limits Manual (TLM) life limits of certain critical rotating parts, updating direct accumulation counting (DAC) data files, and updating certain maintenance tasks. This AD requires revision of the engine TLM life limits of certain critical rotating parts and DAC data files, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2021-26-07: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2020-11- 05, which applied to all Airbus Helicopters Model EC120B helicopters. AD 2020-11-05 required repetitive inspections of the tail rotor (TR) hub body for cracks and applicable corrective actions if necessary, and repetitive replacement of the attachment bolts, washers, and nuts of the TR hub body. This AD was prompted by a report of recurrent loss of tightening torque on several attachment bolts on the TR hub body. This AD retains certain requirements of AD 2020-11-05, adds repetitive inspections, requires additional corrective actions, and updates applicable service information. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
88-13-03 R1: 88-13-03 R1 CESSNA: Amendment 39-5946 as amended by Amendment 39-6135. Applicability: Model S550 series airplanes, Serial Numbers S550-0001 through S550-0158, certificated in any category. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. To prevent loss of control of the airplane during landing or takeoff due to failure of the cotter pins securing the main landing gear torque link connections, accomplish the following: A. Within 48 hours after the effective date of this AD, incorporate the following into the Limitations Section of the FAA-approved Airplane Flight Manual (AFM). This may be accomplished by including a copy of this AD in the AFM: "Prior to the first flight of each day, verify that the cotter pins securing the left and right main landing gear torque link connections are installed. If either cotter pin is broken, missing, or exhibits any evidence of being cut or sheared by the nut, prior to further flight, accomplish paragraph B. of this AD." B. If either cotter pin is broken, missing, or exhibits any evidence of being cut or sheared by the nut, the nut must be retorqued to 630 inch-pounds, then tightened to align the cotter pin(s) hole, up to a maximum torque of 810 inch-pounds, and a new cotter pin(s), P/N MS24665-287, installed. This must be accomplished in accordance with Cessna S550 Maintenance Manual Section 32-11-01, pages 403, 404, and 405. C. Modification of the main landing gear torque link assemblies in accordance with Cessna Service Bulletin SBS550-32-5, dated August 26, 1988, constitutes terminating action for the requirements of paragraphs A. and B., above. D. An alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Wichita Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Central Region. All persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Cessna Aircraft Company, Citation Marketing Division, P.O. Box 7706, Wichita, Kansas 67277. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or FAA, Central Region, Wichita Aircraft Certification Office, 1801 Airport Road, Room 100, Mid-Continent Airport, Wichita, Kansas. Airworthiness directive 88-13-03 (Amendment 39-5946) which was effective June 20, 1988, superseded AD 86-01-02 (Amendment 39-5237) which was effective March 7, 1986, to all persons except those to whom it was made immediately effective by Priority Letter AD 86-01-02 dated January 6, 1986. This amendment (39-6135, AD 88-13-03 R1) becomes effective March 15, 1989.
47-21-10: 47-21-10 NAVION: (Was Mandatory Note 9 of AD-782-3.) Applies to Serial Numbers NAV-4-2 Through HAV-4-1010 Which Incorporate Hartzell HC-12X20-1 Propellers. To be accomplished not later than September 1, 1947. The propeller control piston guide pins, Hartzell P/N A-11, require additional safetying in order to prevent loosening and subsequent loss of engine oil. This is accomplished by the installation of a 3/32-inch steel dowel through the guide pin. (NAA Field Service Bulletin No. 30 covers this rework.)
78-01-17: 78-01-17 KAWASAKI HEAVY INDUSTRIES, LTD: Amendment 39-3122. Applies to models KV-107-II and KV-107-IIA helicopters certificated in all categories. Compliance is required as indicated. 1. To prevent fatigue cracks on the forward and aft rotor drive shafts, accomplish the following: Within the next 25 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, replace the forward transmission rotor shaft, P/N 107D1259, and aft rotor shaft extension, P/N 107D3147, in accordance with Kawasaki Service Bulletin No. KSB107-2 dated September 30, 1977, or an FAA-approved equivalent. Prior to the accumulation of the hours specified in KSB107-2 Section l.d., retire from service all rotor drive shafts. Compliance with Boeing-Vertol Service Bulletin No. 107-3(R-3) dated March 20, 1963, is considered an FAA-approved equivalent. 2. To prevent fatigue failure of the aft rotor transmission quill shaft, P/N 107D2067-1, accomplish the following:Within the next 25 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 120 hours time in service from the last inspection, remove the aft transmission assembly, inspect the mix box and aft transmission assemblies and replace parts in accordance with Kawasaki Service Bulletin No. KSB107-55 dated September 30, 1977, or an FAA-approved equivalent. Prior to installation on certificated aircraft inspect spare mix box and spare aft transmission assemblies. Compliance with Boeing-Vertol Service Bulletins No. 107-113 dated October 28, 1963, No. 107-113A dated November 22, 1963, and No. 107-182 dated October 7, 1964, is considered an FAA-approved equivalent. 3. To prevent cracking in the synchronizing shaft splined adapter, accomplish the following: Within the next 25 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 120 hourstime in service from the last inspection, inspect synch shaft splined adapter P/N 107D3154-2 in accordance with Kawasaki Service Bulletin No. KSB107-56 (R-1) dated September 30, 1977, or an FAA- approved equivalent. Prior to the accumulation of 500 hours of operation retire from service the adapter. Adapter which is modified in accordance with KSB107-56 (R-1) may continue to remain in service for up to 2500 hours of operation. Compliance with Boeing-Vertol Service Bulletin No. 107-116(R-1) dated April 6, 1965, is considered an FAA-approved equivalent. 4. To prevent fatigue failure of the rotor pitch housing, accomplish the following: Within the next 25 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 25 hours time in service from the last inspection, inspect the rotor pitch housing, P/N 107R2553, and blade root sockets, P/N 42R1043, in accordance with Kawasaki Service Bulletin No. KSB107-4(R-1)dated September 30, 1977, or an FAA-approved equivalent. Prior to the accumulation of the hours stated in KSB107-4(R-1) retire from service the rotor pitch housing and blade root sockets. Compliance with Boeing-Vertol Service Bulletin No. 107-19 dated November 6, 1962, is considered an FAA-approved equivalent. 5. To prevent simultaneous engine false fire warnings caused by electrical wiring system malfunction, accomplish the following: Within the next 25 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, remove the engine fire detector test switch, P/N BAC-S30-AZ-3- IN5 (JANCO No. 1-1919-1N5) or P/N 1-1917-2N5, and install test switch, P/N BAC-S30AZ-3- 2N5 (JANCO No. 1-1919-2N5), and modify the wiring arrangements in accordance with Kawasaki Service Bulletin No. KSB107-137 dated September 30, 1977, or an FAA-approved equivalent. Compliance with Boeing-Vertol Service Bulletin No. 107-219 dated September 20, 1965, and No. 107-219A dated October 22, 1965, is considered an FAA-approved equivalent. 6. To prevent failure of the aft transmission collector gear and separation of the aft transmission planetary carrier retention nut either of which may cause dephasing of the main rotors, accomplish the following: Within the next 25 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, inspect for cracks and modify the aft transmission collector gear, P/N 107D2066-10, -12, -14, -16, and -18, in accordance with Kawasaki Service Bulletin No. KSB-V107-336, dated September 25, 1972, or an FAA-approved equivalent. Additionally, torque and install lock pins in the aft transmission planetary carrier retention nut, P/N BAC-N10GR39, P/N VS10304-39 or P/N 107D1276-7, in accordance with Kawasaki Service Bulletin KSB-V107- 332 dated January 26, 1972, or an FAA-approved equivalent. Compliance with Boeing-Vertol Service Bulletin No. A107-318(R-1) dated June 19, 1972, is considered an FAA-approvedequivalent. 7. To prevent failure of the aft transmission quill shaft, P/N 107D2067, due to surface defects, accomplish the following: Within the next 25 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, inspect the quill shaft in accordance with Kawasaki Service Bulletin No. KSB-V107-370B dated September 30, 1977, or an FAA-approved equivalent. Compliance with Boeing-Vertol Service Bulletins No. A107-320 dated April 30, 1973, No. 107-320A dated December 21, 1973, No. A107-320B dated February 25, 1974, and No. 107-320C dated September 25, 1974, is considered an FAA-approved equivalent. 8. To prevent failure of the rotor blade, P/N 107R1202, due to undetected cracks in the spar, accomplish the following: Within the next 25 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, modify the rotor blades and install the Integral Spar Inspection System (ISIS) in accordance with Kawasaki SB No. KSB-V107-478 dated September 30, 1977, or an FAA-approved equivalent. Additionally, operate, inspect, and maintain the ISIS rotor blades in accordance with Kawasaki Service Bulletin No. KSB-V107-495 dated September 30, 1977, or an FAA-approved equivalent. The visual checks of the rotor blade ISIS indicator may be performed by the pilot. Compliance with Boeing-Vertol Service Bulletins No. 107-319 dated November 12, 1973, No. 107-326 dated May 20, 1974, and No. 107-329 dated June 7, 1974 is considered an FAA-approved equivalent. NOTE: Installation of the rotor blade leading edge protective strip, P/N WR1017-1, is not mandatory. 9. To prevent cracking of the main rotor blade spars due to corrosion, accomplish the following: Within the next 25 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 36 months, inspect for corrosion and alter, as necessary, in accordance with Kawasaki SB KSB-V107-547 dated September 30, 1977, or an FAA-approved equivalent. Compliance with Boeing-Vertol Service Bulletin No. 107-334 dated October 29, 1976, is considered an FAA-approved equivalent. 10. To prevent fatigue cracks on the forward transmission rotor shaft and carrier, and aft transmission planetary carrier, accomplish the following: Within 25 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, replace or modify forward transmission rotor shaft and carrier, P/N AO2D1259 or P/N A07D1269, in accordance with the retirement times specified in Kawasaki SB No. KSB- V107-558 dated September 30, 1977, or an FAA-approved equivalent. Additionally, replace aft rotor transmission planetary carrier with parts of the same design, P/N 107D2419-1, prior to the accumulation of 10,000 hours of operation. Compliance with Boeing-Vertol Service Bulletin No. 107-335 dated May 15, 1977, is considered an FAA-approved equivalent. 11. The equivalent means of compliance specified in paragraphs 1 through 10 of this AD must be approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing District Office, FAA, Pacific-Asia Region, Honolulu, Hawaii. This amendment becomes effective January 23, 1978.
84-03-09: 84-03-09 SUNDSTRAND DATA CONTROL, INC.: Amendment 39-4809. Applies to Sundstrand Model 573A, Digital Flight Data Recorder (DFDR) Part Numbers 981-6009-001/010/011/012/013/014. To prevent loss of recorded data, accomplish the following within the next 2,000 hours time in service or 1 year after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later, unless already accomplished: A. Inspect the DFDR to determine modification status. For DFDR's which have Mod 8 accomplished, but not Mod 15, accomplish Sundstrand Service Bulletin No. 23, (Document No. 012-0118-123), (Mod 15), dated August 2, 1982, or later FAA approved revisions. B. Alternate means of compliance which provide an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. This amendment becomes effective March 19, 1984.
2010-16-07: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Wear, beyond Engine Manual limits, has been identified on the abutment faces of the splines on the Trent 900 Intermediate Pressure (IP) shaft rigid coupling on several engines during strip. The shaft to coupling spline interface provides the means of controlling the turbine axial setting and wear through of the splines would permit the IP turbine to move rearwards. Rearward movement of the IP turbine would enable contact with static turbine components and would result in loss of engine performance with potential for in-flight shut down, oil migration and oil fire below the LP turbine discs prior to sufficient indication resulting in loss of LP turbine disc integrity. We are issuing this AD to detect rearward movement of the IP turbine, which could result in loss of disc integrity, an uncontained failure of the engine, and damage to the airplane.
2010-04-08: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: During routine inspection procedures on the wing assembly line it was identified the possibility of cracks and deformation developing during assembly on the internal wing spars and rib flanges, causing a safe[ty] margin reduction. * * * * * The unsafe condition is cracking and deformation of wing spar and rib flanges, which could result in loss of structural integrity of the wing. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
91-22-06: 91-22-06 PARTENAVIA: Amendment 39-8066. Docket No.91-CE-75-AD. Applicability: P-68 Series (not applicable to AP-68TP Series) airplanes (serial numbers 1 through 327), certificated in any category. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To prevent horizontal stabilator failure, which could result in loss of control of the airplane, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 10 hours time-in-service (TIS) after the effective date of this AD, accomplish the following: (1) Change the airspeed limitations in Section 2 OPERATING LIMITATIONS of the Partenavia P-68 Flight Manual to correspond with Part A of Partenavia Service Bulletin (SB) No. 85, dated July 16, 1991, and operate the airplane accordingly. (2) Install the Operating Limitation Placard that is included with Partenavia SB No. 85, dated July 16, 1991, on the airplane instrument panel within the pilot's clear view and operate the airplane accordingly. (b) Withinthe next 500 hours TIS after the effective date of this AD, install a reinforcement strip on the lower side of the horizontal tailplane in accordance with the instructions in paragraphs 1 through 5 of Part B of Partenavia SB No. 85, dated July 16, 1991. (c) After compliance with paragraph (b) of this AD, paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) of this AD no longer apply and the Operating Limitation Placard may be removed and the flight manual limitations may be restored to their original measurements. (d) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. (e) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance times that provides an equivalent level of safety, may be approved by the Manager, Brussels Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Europe, Africa, and Middle East Office, c/o American Embassy, B-1000 Brussels, Belgium. The request should be forwarded through an appropriate FAA Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Brussels Aircraft Certification Office. (f) The modifications and installations required by this AD shall be done in accordance with Partenavia Service Bulletin No. 85, dated July 16, 1991. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from Partenavia, Costruzioni Aeronautiche S.p.A., Via G. Pascoli n. 7, 80026 Casoria (NA), Italy. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Central Region, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel, Room 1558, 601 E. 12th Street, Kansas City, Missouri, or at the Office of the Federal Register, 1100 L Street, NW; Room 8401, Washington, DC. This amendment (39-8066, AD 91-22-06) becomes effective on November 12, 1991.
2010-16-09: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: The operation of the airbrake lever in the "airbrakes out'' to "lift spoiler'' range has been the subject of two occurrence reports. The lift spoilers on the BAe 146 and Avro 146-RJ aeroplanes have been designed to deploy on landing to provide aerodynamic braking and to dump lift to ensure that the wheel brakes can provide the necessary speed reduction. * * * * * The effects of deceleration and landing inertia loads can cause uncommanded movement of the airbrake selector lever from the "lift spoiler'' position to the "airbrakes out'' position, causing the lift spoilers to retract during the landing roll. This condition, if not corrected, would increase the landing distance, possibly resulting in a runway overrun and consequent injury to aeroplane occupants. * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
46-13-01: 46-13-01 LOCKHEED: (Was Service Note 2 of AD-723-2.) Applies to All Model 18 Aircraft. When replacing the landing gear actuating cylinder flexible hose, P/N 55252-3, the length of ferrules should be compared. If longer ferrules are found on the new hoses, an elbow should be inserted between the hose and the cylinder aft port, to prevent possible damage to the hose by the landing gear scissors. (Lockheed Service Letter No. 18-28, dated June 15, 1945, revised December 10, 1945, covers this same subject.)
47-10-07: 47-10-07 LOCKHEED: (Was Mandatory Note 8 of AD-763-3.) Applies Only to Model 49 Serial Numbers 2021 to 2088, Inclusive. Compliance required prior to April 1, 1947. Replace the existing restrictor valve (P/N 66404) in each main landing gear down line with a winterized type restrictor valve (LAC P/N 667489.) (LAC Service Instruction 049/SI-75, covers this same subject.)
91-02-11: 91-02-11 AIRBUS INDUSTRIE: Amendment 39-6860. Docket No. 90-NM-66-AD. Applicability: All Model A320-111, -211, and -231 series airplanes, certificated in any category. Compliance: Required within 45 days after the effective date of this AD, unless previously accomplished. To prevent failure of the landing gear to retract following takeoff, accomplish the following: A. Install wiring and electronic components in relay 48GA's energization system, in accordance with Airbus Industrie Service Bulletin A320-32-1035, Revision 2, dated December 18, 1989; or Airbus Industrie Service Bulletin A320-32-1048, Revision 1, dated July 10, 1990. B. An alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. NOTE: The request should be submitted directly to the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113, and a copy sent to the cognizant FAA Principal Inspector (PI). The PI will then forward comments or concurrence to the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113. C. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. All persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Airbus Industrie, Airbus Support Division, Avenue Didier Daurat, 31700 Blagnac, France. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue S.W., Renton, Washington. This amendment (39-6860, AD 91-02-11) becomes effective on February 25, 1991.
2010-14-19: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: * * * [P]artial blockage of the water absorbing filter element P/N (part number) QA06123 was observed several times. The blockage was created by carbon debris from the cartridge and from the burst disc of the Halon bottle. This water absorbing filter element is part of Halon Dual-Filter Assembly installed also in the Flow Metering System (FMS) of the cargo compartment Fire Extinguishing System used in the A330 and A340 aeroplanes. Blockage of the water absorbing filter element could lead to reduction of Halon outflow, leading to incapacity to maintain fire extinguishing agent concentration. Combined with fire, this could result in an uncontrolled fire in the affected compartment, which would constitute an unsafe condition. * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
78-25-04: 78-25-04 HUGHES HELICOPTERS: Amendment 39-3364. Applies to Hughes Model 269A, TH-55A, 269A-1, 269B and 269C helicopters equipped with part number 269A5103-9 pinion assemblies, Hughes Tool Company, Serial Nos. 001 through 5101, certificated in all categories. Compliance required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To detect and prevent fatigue crack propagation that could cause failure of the main transmission input pinion assembly, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 50 hours additional time in service or 60 calendar days, whichever occurs first after the effective date of this AD, perform a magnetic particle inspection of all input pinions Part No. 269A5103-9, serial nos. listed in Table A, for cracks in accordance with the instructions of paragraph (d), Hughes Service Information Notice N-151.2, dated November 7, 1978. Reinspect these input pinions in accordance with paragraph (d) of the S.I.N. between 450 and 500 total hours time in service, if,at the time of the initial inspection, the assembly had less than 250 hours total time in service. TABLE A 269A5103-9 Pinion Assembly Serial Nos. Affected by Paragraph (a) 164783 254498 164784 254500 164786 254501 164787 254502 164789 254504 164790 254506 164791 254508 164792 254509 164794 254510 164795 254511 164796 254512 164798 254513 164800 254514 164801 254515 164802 254516 164803 254517 164805 254518 164806 254519 164807 254520 164809 254521 164811 254522 164813 254524 164814 254525 164815 254526 164816 254527 164817 254528 164818 254529 164819 254532 254533 254534 254535 254536 254537 (b) Within 100 hours additional time in service after the effective date of this AD, perform a magnetic particle inspection of all other input pinions, Part No. 269A5103-9, for cracks, in accordance with the instructions of paragraph (d), Hughes Service Information Notice N-151.2, dated November 7, 1978. (c) Prior to the installation of pinion assembly Part No. 269A5103-9 on any helicopter listed in this AD inspect per paragraph (d) of Hughes Service Information Notice No. N-151.2. Pinion assemblies of serial numbers listed in table A of paragraph (a) of this AD, which have less than 250 hours total time in service at time of inspection, must be reinspected per paragraph (d) of the above referenced S.I.N. after accumulating a total of 450 hours time in service and before accumulating 500 hours total time in service. (d) Any assembly exhibiting crack indications as a result of those inspections performed in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c), above, must be removed from service and marked in a conspicuous manner to prevent inadvertent return to service. NOTE 1: The agency recommends that all unserviceable pinion assemblies be returned to Hughes Helicopters Warranty and Repair Department. Reference: Paragraph d.2, Hughes Service InformationNotice No. N-151.2. NOTE 2: Hughes Service Information Notice N-151.2, dated November 7, 1978, is the only version of the notice suitable for compliance with this AD. (e) Equivalent inspection procedures and repairs may be used when approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. (f) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR's 21.197 and 21.199 to operate aircraft to a base for the accomplishment of inspections required by this AD. This amendment becomes effective December 18, 1978.