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60-05-02: 60-05-02 LOCKHEED: Amdt. 110 Part 507 Federal Register March 4, 1960. Applies to All Models 1049C, D, E, G and H Airplanes. Compliance required by August 1, 1961, for items (a)(1) or (a)(2); July 1, 1961, for item (a)(3); and by September 30, 1960, for item (b). An accident occurred in which fire originating in the engine section burned underneath the nacelle and entered the wheel well area rupturing flammable fluid lines and causing extensive damage. An incident also occurred in which fire originating in the power section blistered the paint on the landing gear wheel well doors. An examination of the burn pattern on the landing gear doors indicated that the circumstances surrounding this incident were quite similar to those of the accident but with less severity due to the lower exposure time. To correct fire protection deficiencies in the wheel well area, the following modifications are considered necessary: (a) To prevent fire from entering the wheel well area, accomplish one of the following: (1) Replace the present aluminum skin on the forward landing gear doors with fireproof material. (2) Cover the present aluminum skin on the forward landing gear doors with fireproof material. (3) Coat both inside and outside of the present aluminum skin on the forward landing gear doors with a material that will withstand a flame of 2,000 degrees F. for 15 minutes. Product Techniques Inc. Coating PT-209, 0.015-inch thick on each side of the door is considered satisfactory when applied in accordance with PTI Process Specifications PTP 40-22. (b) Install fire sleeves over all flammable fluid-carrying flexible hose lines in zones 3 and 3A in the inboard engine nacelles. Revised May 4, 1960. Revised July 29, 1960. Revised September 10, 1960.
2020-18-08: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2019-12-18 for Robinson Helicopter Company (Robinson) Model R44 II helicopters. AD 2019-12-18 required inspecting certain engine air induction hoses (hoses) and replacing any hose that was not airworthy. AD 2019-12-18 also prohibited the installation of certain hoses. This AD continues to require inspecting those previously affected hoses and amends the applicability, clarifies an inspection requirement, adds a requirement to repeat the inspection, and expands the installation prohibition. This AD was prompted by an additional report of separation between the outer and inner hose layers. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2003-19-11: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Learjet Model 60 airplanes, that currently requires inspection to detect bends in or damage to the fuel crossflow tube; inspection to determine clearance between the fuel crossflow tube and the flight control cables; and replacement or repair of the tube, if necessary. This amendment requires a review of airplane maintenance records or an inspection to determine if a fuel crossflow tube having a certain part number is installed; and follow-on/corrective actions, as applicable. This amendment also expands the applicability of the existing AD to include additional airplanes. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent chafing and consequent failure of the fuel crossflow tube due to inadequate clearance between the tube and the flight control cables, which could result in loss of fuel from one fuel tank during normal operating conditions or loss of fuel from both main fuel tanksduring fuel cross-feeding operations. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
83-12-04: 83-12-04 PARTENAVIA S.p.A.: Amendment 39-4666. Applies to Models P68, P68B, P68C, P68C-TC, and P68 Observer (Serial Numbers 1 through 277) airplanes certificated in any category. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To prevent failure of the flap bellcrank attachment mounting brackets, accomplish the following: a) Within the next 100 hours time-in-service from the effective date of this AD, or upon the accumulation of 500 hours time-in-service, whichever occurs later, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 100 hours time-in-service from the last inspection, visually inspect the flap bellcrank attachment mounting brackets (P/N 68-1.5035-1 and 68-1.5035-2) on both wings as described in Partenavia Service Bulletin (SB) No. 56, dated October 7, 1982 (herein referred to as the SB). Inspect for cracks in the area surrounding the pivot bolt hole by looking through the inspection door on the inboard side of the engine nacelles and by using a mirror to look at the upper bracket. b) If any cracks are found, prior to further flight stop drill the crack and install reinforcement kit (P/N 025) in accordance with Drawing R-0059 of the SB. c) Within the next 100 hours time-in-service from the effective date of this AD or upon accumulating 1,000 hours time-in-service whichever occurs later unless already accomplished per paragraph b) of this AD, install the reinforcement kit (P/N 025) in accordance with Drawing R-0059 of the SB. d) The repetitive inspections of paragraph a) of this AD are no longer required when the reinforcement kit (P/N 025) is installed. e) The intervals between the repetitive inspections required by this AD may be adjusted up to 10 percent of the specified interval to allow accomplishing these inspections concurrent with other scheduled maintenance of the airplane. f) Aircraft may be flown in accordance with Federal Aviation Regulation 21.197 to a location where this AD can be accomplished. g) An equivalent method of compliance with this AD, if used, must be approved by the Manager, Aircraft Certification Staff, AEU-100, Europe, Africa and Middle East Office, FAA, c/o American Embassy, 1000 Brussels, Belgium. This amendment becomes effective on June 23, 1983.
2020-17-04: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2019-03- 06, which applied to certain The Boeing Company Model 737-300, -400, and -500 series airplanes. AD 2019-03-06 required installing lanyard assemblies on the passenger service units (PSUs) and, for certain airplanes, on the life vest panels. This AD was prompted by a report indicating that the PSUs became separated from their attachments during several survivable accident sequences, and by the determination that additional actions are necessary for five airplanes. This AD retains the requirements of AD 2019-03-06 and also requires installation of lanyard assemblies on the life vest panels on those five airplanes. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
83-03-05: 83-03-05 BRITTEN-NORMAN LTD: Amendment 39-4565. Applies to Model BN-2A MK III Trislander (all serial numbers) airplanes certificated in any category. COMPLIANCE: Required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To prevent the main undercarriage shock absorber support ring from separating from the inside of the undercarriage extension tube, accomplish the following: a) Within the next 50 landings on airplanes which have accumulated 3,000 landings or more on the effective date of this AD, or prior to the accumulation of 3,050 landings on airplanes that have less than 3,000 landings on the effective date of this AD, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 1,000 landings: 1) Visually inspect the rivets retaining the main undercarriage shock absorber internal support ring to the main undercarriage leg extension tube in accordance with Steps 1 through 4 of the "Inspection" Section of Britten-Norman Service Bulletin BN-2/SB.139, Issue 1, dated January 29, 1980 (hereinafter referred to as the Service Bulletin). 2) If one or more loose rivets are found during the above inspection, before further flight, replace all three rivets in accordance with Steps 1 through 3 of the "Rectification" Section of the Service Bulletin. b) Within the next 50 landings on airplanes which have accumulated 15,000 landings or more on the effective date of this AD or prior to the accumulation of 15,050 landings on airplanes which have less than 15,000 landings on the effective date of this AD, replace all three rivets in accordance with Steps 1 through 3 of the "Rectification" Section of the Service Bulletin. c) In the event that landings have not been recorded, 1,000 hours time-in-service may be used in place of 3,000 landings for purposes of complying with this AD. d) The airplane may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a location where this AD may be accomplished. e) An equivalent means of compliance with this AD may be used if approved by the Manager, Aircraft Certification Staff, AEU-100, Europe, Africa, and Middle East Office, FAA, c/o American Embassy, Brussels, Belgium. This amendment becomes effective on February 22, 1983.
2003-19-12: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Eurocopter France (Eurocopter) Model EC 155B helicopters. This action requires, before further flight, determining whether the engine "GOV" warning light caution advisory display (display) panel illuminates the "GOV" warning lights when appropriate. If not, this AD requires replacing the front panel of the display panel with an airworthy display panel before further flight. This amendment is prompted by the discovery of some operating anomalies affecting the red "GOV" warning light due to wiring errors that occurred after modifying the electrical power systems. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent failure of the display to warn of an engine governor failure, resulting in an engine over speed, loss of an engine, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
74-24-12: 74-24-12 PIPER: Amendment 39-2023. Applies to Model PA-28-151 airplanes serial numbers 28-7415001 through 28-7515228 certificated in all categories. Compliance required before further flight, unless already accomplished, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed ten hours time in service from the last inspection until the aileron centering assembly is rebuilt in accordance with Piper Kit 760847V or an equivalent approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Southern Region. To detect possible problems with the aileron centering assembly accomplish the following: a. Gain visible access to right hand control wheel sprocket assembly area and check the aileron centering system for the following: 1. Cable fraying. 2. Spring integrity (Piper P/N 587340V). 3. Set screw security (Piper P/N 419974V). (The set screw should not allow any relative cable movement.) b. If the checks in a. reveal any of the unsatisfactory conditions noted, replace cable and/or spring as necessary and adjust set screw as required before further flight, except that the airplane may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a base where the repair can be performed provided the spring and/or cable is secured or removed so as not to interfere with the aileron system. c. If the checks in a. do not reveal noted unsatisfactory conditions, no further action is necessary until next required inspection. The pilot may perform only the checks required by paragraph a. Note: For the requirements regarding the listing of compliance and method of compliance with this AD in the airplane's permanent record, see FAR 91.173. Piper Service Bulletin No. 435 pertains to this subject. This amendment becomes effective December 2, 1974.
80-11-10: 80-11-10 GOVERNMENT AIRCRAFT FACTORIES (GAF): Amendment 39-3781. Applies to Models N22B and N24A airplanes, certificated in all categories. Unless already accomplished, compliance is required within 25 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD. However, airplanes may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to a base where the work can be performed. (1) Applies to all Model N22B airplanes S/N 5 and up and all Model N24A airplanes S/N 42 and up, delivered or in operation prior to, or on, June 22, 1978. To prevent leakage of hot air check valve, P/N I/N-74-334, which could damage surrounding components, inspect, and repair as necessary, hot air check valve P/N I/N-74-334, in accordance with Accomplishment Instructions of GAF Alert Service Bulletin AN 22-74-1, Revision 1, dated June 30, 1978, or an FAA-approved equivalent. (2) Applies to all Model N22B airplanes S/N 5 and up, and all Model N24A airplanes, S/N 42 and up, which have not incorporated Nomad modification N301. To prevent possible disconnection or jamming of pilots' or copilots' control wheel assembly, which could result in loss of control of the airplane, remove control wheel retaining pin and replace with a new bolt in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of GAF Alert Service Bulletin AN 22-27-8, Revision 1, dated June 30, 1978, or an FAA-approved equivalent. (3) Applies to all Model N22B airplanes S/N 5 and up, and Model N24A airplanes S/N 42 and up, delivered from the factory prior to July 4, 1978. To prevent possible dislodging of structural bolts securing the wing center section spar support brackets to the fuselage, which could result in loss of structural integrity of the airplane, inspect wing center section spar support bracket for loose attachments, and replace loose nuts, in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of GAF Alert Service Bulletin ANMD-53-2, Revision 1, dated July 5, 1978, or an FAA-approved equivalent. (4)Applies to all Model N22B airplanes S/N 5 and up, and all Model N24A airplanes S/N 42 and up, which have not incorporated Nomad modification N290. To prevent possible interference and jamming of the rudder pedals with the pedal guards, which could impair control of the airplane, remove and repair rudder pedal guards in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of GAF Alert Service Bulletin ANMD-53-3, dated July 10, 1978, or an FAA- approved equivalent. (5) Applies to Model N22B airplanes S/N 6, 7, 11, 12, 13, 15, and 16. To prevent reduction of the flutter speed reserves as a result of excessive wear and backlash in the rudder tab operating system, which could result in loss of control of the airplane, remove rudder assembly, install steel mass balance arm and rework rudder and trim tab in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of GAF Alert Service Bulletin NMD-27-3, Revision 1, dated June 8, 1979, or an FAA-approved equivalent. (6) Applies to all Model N22B airplanes S/N 5 and up, and all Model N24A airplanes S/N 42 and up. To prevent excessive vibration of the horizontal stabilizer trim tab and prevent subsequent structural damage to the empennage, which could result in loss of control of the airplane, inspect the horizontal stabilizer trim tab, and empennage, and modify stub fin in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of GAF Alert Service Bulletin ANMD-55-5, Revision 2, dated September 3, 1979, or an FAA-approved equivalent. (7) Applies to all Model N22B airplanes S/N 5 and up, and all Model N24A airplanes, S/N 42 and up. To detect possible damage to the horizontal stabilizer control rod, visually inspect components in the horizontal stabilizer control system for wind gust damage, and replace as necessary, in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of GAF Alert Service Bulletin ANMD-27-12, Revision 1, dated October 30, 1979, or an FAA-approved equivalent. For the purposes of this amendment, the FAA-approvedequivalent specified in paragraphs (1) through (7) of this AD must be approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing District Office, FAA, Pacific-Asia Region, Honolulu, Hawaii. All persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer, may obtain copies upon request to the Government Aircraft Factories, 226 Lorimer Street, Port Melbourne 3207 vic., Australia. These documents may also be examined at the FAA, Pacific-Asia Region, 300 Ala Moana Blvd., Room 7321, Honolulu, Hawaii 96850, and at FAA Headquarters, 800 Independence Ave., S.W.., Washington, D.C. 20591. A historical file on this AD which includes the incorporated material in full is maintained by the FAA at its Headquarters in Washington, D.C., and at the Pacific-Asia Region in Honolulu, Hawaii. This amendment becomes effective June 5, 1980.
2020-17-08: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Pacific Aerospace Limited Model 750XL airplanes with wing lightning protection panels installed. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as insufficient electrical bonding of the wing lightning protection panels. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.