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80-13-13: 80-13-13 DEHAVILLAND: Amendment 39-3816. Applies to all DHC-6 model airplanes equipped with floats, certificated in all categories. To prevent spreader strut lug failure and interference between float fitting and front strut, accomplish the following: (a) On aircraft Serial Numbers 1 thru 611 incorporating S.0.0. 6002 and 6082 float and chassis installation, within 100 hours in service or one month, whichever occurs first, after the effective date of this AD, unless previously accomplished, incorporate modifications in accordance with DeHavilland Service Bulletin 6/330, Revision "C", dated February 29, 1980, or approved equivalent modification. (b) On all aircraft with front spreader struts P/N C6UF1014-1, within 200 hours in service or two months, whichever occurs first, after the effective date of this AD, unless previously accomplished, incorporate modification in accordance with DeHavilland Service Bulletin 6/357, Revision "C", dated February 29, 1980, or approved equivalent modification. (c) Equivalent modifications must be approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Eastern Region. (d) Compliance times may be increased by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Eastern Region, upon receipt of substantiating data submitted through an FAA Maintenance Inspector. This amendment is effective July 1, 1980.
2003-19-14 R2: The FAA is revising Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2003-19-14 R1, which applies to certain BURKHART GROB LUFT--UND RAUMFAHRT GmbH & CO KG (GROB) Models G103 TWIN ASTIR, G103A TWIN II ACRO, and G103C TWIN III ACRO sailplanes. AD 2003-19-14 R1 requires you to modify the airspeed indicators, install flight speed reduction and aerobatic maneuver restrictions placards (as applicable), and revise the flight and maintenance manuals. AD 2003-19-14 R1 approves simple aerobatic maneuvers for Model G103A TWIN II ACRO sailplanes and provides an option for modifying the rear fuselage for Models G103A TWIN II ACRO and G103C TWIN III ACRO sailplanes to terminate the flight limitation restrictions for aerobatic maneuvers. This AD retains all the actions from AD 2003-19-14 R1 for Models G103A TWIN II ACRO and G103C TWIN III ACRO and reinstates certain operating limits for Model G103 TWIN ASTIR sailplanes. We are issuing this AD to prevent damage to the fuselage during limit load flight, which could result in reduced structural integrity. This condition could lead to loss of control of the sailplane. \n\n\nDATES: This AD becomes effective on November 30, 2005. \n\n\tOn August 12, 2004 (69 FR 34258, June 21, 2004) the Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference GROB Service Bulletin No. MSB315-65, dated September 15, 2003; GROB Service Bulletin No. OSB 315-66, dated October 16, 2003; and GROB Work Instruction for OSB 315-66, dated October 16, 2003. \n\n\tAs of November 30, 2005, the Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of GROB Service Bulletin No. MSB315-64/3, dated September 14, 2004.
82-18-07: 82-18-07 CANADAIR: Amendment 39-4446. Applies to Canadair Model CL-600-1A11 airplanes, serial numbers 1005 through 1007, 1010 through 1014, and 1016 through 1023, certificated in all categories. Compliance is required as indicated to prevent possible temporary interruption of the stall protection system stick pusher capability. Accomplish the following unless already accomplished: 1. Within the next 25 hours time in service, modify the stall protection system in accordance with instructions contained in Canadair Alert Service Bulletin A600-0090, Revision 1, dated October 28, 1981. 2. Alternate means of compliance which provide an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Area Aircraft Certification Office, FAA Northwest Mountain Region. 3. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of inspections and/or modifications required by this AD. The manufacturer's specifications and procedures identified and described in this directive are incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1). This amendment becomes effective September 7, 1982.
69-16-01: 69-16-01\tBOEING: Amdt. 39-838. Applies to Boeing Model 727, 727C, and 727-200 Series Airplanes. \n\tCompliance required within 300 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD as indicated, unless already accomplished. \n\tTo provide the flight crew with more complete procedures to be followed if all generators are lost change the Airplane Flight Manual to read the following, or make an equivalent change approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. \n\t(a)\tBoeing 727 series (except 727-31, -31C, and 231), Airplane Flight Manual, Emergency Procedures Section, Loss of All Generators paragraph, must be revised to read: \n\tLOSS OF ALL GENERATORS \n\tPhase I \n\tEssential power selector - STANDBY \n\tBattery Switch - Check ON \n\tPHASE II \n\tAny generator field relay - CLOSE \n\tRepeat if necessary until voltage and frequency of a generator are normal. \n\tWhen voltage and frequency are normal switch essential power selector to operating generator. \n\tNOTE: If a differential fault is indicated in any generator system, an automatic lockout feature prevents closing of the field relay. This lockout feature can be bypassed by momentarily moving the battery switch to OFF, then back ON, or by manually tripping and resetting the associated generator DC control circuit breaker. \n\tPhase III \n\tRestore system to normal if desired. \n\tNOTE: Leave generator supplying essential power isolated until system integrity is verified. \n\tRemove heavy electrical loads (galleys, air conditioning pack fans, etc.) or \n\tOpen bus tie breakers (if closed) before closing Generator Control Breakers. \n\tFor further information, see electrical systems operation, Normal Procedures - Section III. \n\t(b)\tBoeing 727 series 727-31, -31C, and 231, Airplane Flight Manual, Emergency Procedures Section, Loss of All Generators paragraph, must be revised to read: \n\tLOSS OF ALL GENERATORS \n\tPhase I \n\tEmergency Power Switch - ON \n\tBattery Switch - Check ON \n\tPhase IIAny generator field relay - CLOSE \n\tRepeat if necessary until voltage and frequency of a generator are normal. \n\tWhen voltage and frequency are normal switch essential power selector to operating generator. \n\tNOTE: If a differential fault is indicated in any generator system, an automatic lockout feature prevents closing of the field relay. This lockout feature can be bypassed by momentarily moving the battery switch to OFF, then back ON, or by manually tripping and resetting the associated generator DC control circuit breaker. \n\tPhase III \n\tRestore system to normal if desired. \n\tNOTE: Leave generator supplying essential power isolated until system integrity is verified. \n\tRemove heavy electrical loads (galleys, air conditioning pack fans, etc.) or \n\tOpen bus tie breakers (if closed) before closing Generator Control Breakers. \n\tFor further information, see electrical system operation, Normal Procedures - Section III. \n\tThe effective date of amendment 39-810 is revised to"August 15, 1969." \n\tEffective August 15, 1969. \n\tRevised September 12, 1969.
2017-15-14: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Bombardier, Inc., Model CL-215-6B11 (CL-415 Variant) airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report indicating that an oxygen bottle was found loose while the clamp strap was in the locked position. This AD requires modification of the clamp strap and installation of additional shims, as applicable, to the flight crew's oxygen bottles' retaining structures. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2005-20-37: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all EMBRAER Model EMB-135 airplanes and Model EMB-145, -145ER, -145MR, - 145LR, -145XR, -145MP, and -145EP airplanes. This AD requires repetitive detailed inspections for surface bruising of the main landing gear (MLG) trailing arms and integrity of the MLG pivot axle sealant, and corrective actions if necessary. This AD also provides for optional terminating action for the repetitive detailed inspections. This AD results from a report of a fractured axle of the trailing arm of the MLG due to corrosion of the axle. We are issuing this AD to prevent a broken trailing arm and consequent failure of the MLG, which could lead to loss of control and damage to the airplane during takeoff or landing.
2017-15-15: We are superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2002-19-01 for SOCATA Model TBM 700 airplanes. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as the flight control wheel traveling beyond normal roll control limits and jamming in a position that could cause loss of control. We are issuing this AD to require actions to address the unsafe condition on these products.
79-13-08: 79-13-08 AIRBORNE MANUFACTURING COMPANY: Amendment 39-3507. Applies to the below listed part number Dry Air Pumps installed on piston engine aircraft certificated in all categories. AIRBORNE PART NUMBER SERIAL NUMBERS 211 CC 5E9318 thru 5E9347 5E9407 thru 5E11419 211 CC-9 5E616 thru 5E715 211 CC TR 5E1264 thru 5E1406 212 CW 5E3403 thru 5E4197 5E9129E thru 5E9131E 212 CW-6 5E9 thru 5E25 242 CW-4 5E8 thru 5E11 441 CC 5E332 thru 5E401 5E450 thru 5E483 441 CC-7 5E911 thru 5E981 441 CC-9 5E75 thru 5E80 441 CC-11 5E4 441 CC-13 5E7 thru 5E12 441 CC-17 5E106 thru 5E116 442 CW 5E926 thru 5E1023 442 CW-4 5E137 thru 5E149 442 CW-6 5E765 thru 5E785 442 CW-8 5E114 442 CW-12 5E431 thru 5E435 These pumps were not available for installation before May 15, 1979, therefore, dry air pumps installed previous to that date are exempt from this AD. Compliance is required prior to next flight. To prevent catastrophic failure of the pump and subsequent loss of the vacuum system remove above listed dry air pumps from service and replace with an airworthy pump of the same part number. An airworthy pump is one which has a serial number not listed above or if listed above also has an "A" or "2" ink stamped by the manufacturer with black ink on the periphery of the body near the mounting flange. The aircraft may be flown under day VFR conditions in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a base where the corrective action can be performed. Additional information concerning disposition of the affected pumps is contained in Airborne Manufacturing Company, Aviation Products Group, Service Letter Number 22A, dated June 5, 1979. This amendment becomes effective upon publication in the Federal Register, as to all persons except those to whom it was made immediately effective by the airmail letter dated June 7, 1979, which contained this amendment.
2005-20-28: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus airplane models, as specified above. This AD requires modifying the floor proximity emergency escape path marking system. This AD results from information that the existing system design for interconnection of the emergency power supply units of the floor proximity emergency escape path marking system does not provide adequate floor path lighting and marking for safe evacuation of the airplane in the event of an emergency. We are issuing this AD to prevent inadequate lighting and marking of the escape path, which could delay or impede the flightcrew and passengers when exiting the airplane during an emergency landing.
98-12-13: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to certain Industrie Aeronautiche e Meccaniche (I.A.M.) Model Piaggio P-180 airplanes. This AD requires modifying the low pitch stop switch support. This AD is the result of mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the airworthiness authority for Italy. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent low pitch stop switch support displacement, which could result in an improper cockpit indication that the propeller is in the Beta range and cause loss of control of the airplane.