Results
2007-05-18: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as the finding of an improper geometry of some pulley brackets, which can offset the cable in the sheave. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2021-14-04: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Dassault Aviation Model FALCON 7X airplanes and Model FALCON 2000EX airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report that non-certified ANCRA seat tracks were installed on some airplanes and that those seat tracks might not sustain required loads during an emergency landing. This AD requires replacement of certain ANCRA seat tracks with certified (Brownline) seat tracks, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2007-05-10: The FAA adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Cessna Aircraft Company (Cessna) Models 172R, 172S, 182S, 182T, T182T, 206H, and T206H airplanes. This AD requires you to install Modification Kit MK172-25-10C or a steel lock rod/bar on both crew seat back cylinder lock assemblies. If a steel lock rod/bar has already been installed on the crew seat back cylinder lock assembly, no further action is required. If you have already installed Modification Kit MK172-25-10A or MK172-25-10B, this AD requires you to do an installation inspection and correct any discrepancies found. This AD results from reports of the crew seat back cylinder lock assembly failing at the aft end and other cylinder lock assemblies found cracked. We are issuing this AD to prevent the crew seat back cylinder lock assembly from bending, cracking, or failing. This failure could cause uncontrolled movement of the seat back, resulting in possible backward collapse during flight. Backward collapse ofeither crew seat back could result in an abrupt pitch-up if the affected crew member continues to hold on to the control yoke during this failure and could cause difficulty in exiting the airplane from an aft passenger seat after landing.
2021-13-20: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus Canada Limited Partnership Model BD-500-1A10 and BD-500- 1A11 airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of corrosion on the waste box, waste access doubler, and waste service door of the rear fuselage due to contamination from waste valve leakage. This AD requires an inspection for corrosion of the waste box, waste access doubler, and waste service door, and corrective actions if necessary, as specified in a Transport Canada Civil Aviation (TCCA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
89-08-03 R1: 89-08-03 R1 BOEING: Amendment 39-6183 as revised by Amendment 39-6389. Docket No. 89-NM-104-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: Model 747 series airplanes, listed in Boeing Service Bulletin 747-53-2297, dated June 30, 1988, certificated in any category, except line number 001 through 065. \n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent depressurization as a result of failure of the crease beam and resultant adjacent frame failure, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tFor airplanes not modified in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 747-53-2297, dated June 30, 1988, or Boeing Service Bulletin 747-53-2244, dated September 20, 1985. \n\n\t\t1.\tPerform detailed visual and dye penetrant inspections of the body crown crease beam for cracks, from BS 940 to BS 1000 and from stringers S-8L to S-8R, at the times specified in the table below, in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 747-53-2297, dated June 30, 1988. In addition, perform a detailed visual inspection for cracks in all adjacent intercostals, skins (internal and external), and stringers in the same area, in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 747-53-2297, dated June 30, 1988. \n\n\t\n\nFor Unmodified Airplanes: \n\nAccumulated landings as of effective date of AD\nInitial Compliance Period for Paragraph A. of this AD\n13,000 or more\t\nWithin 1,000 landings after the effective date of this AD.\nBetween 7,500 and 13,000\nWithin 2,500 landings after the effective date of this AD, but not to exceed 14,000 total landings on the airplane. \n7,500 or less\nPrior to accumulation of 10,000 landings. \n\n\t\t2.\tIf no cracks are found, repeat the detailed visual and penetrant inspections required by paragraph A.1., above, at intervals not to exceed 6,000 landings. \n\n\t\t3.\tIf cracks are found, repair in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 747-53-2297, dated June 30, 1988, prior to further flight, except as noted in paragraph A.4, below. \n\n\t\t4.\tRepair of cracks less than 1.5 inches:If there are no more than three cracks in the web and no more than three cracks in any one flange of the outer tee chord, repair of the crease beam crack may be deferred for up to 1,500 landings by stop-drilling crack ends in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 747-53-2297, dated June 30, 1988, and repeating the detailed visual and penetrant inspection required by paragraph A.1., above, at intervals not to exceed 250 landings until repair in accordance with paragraph A.3., above, is accomplished. \n\n\t\t5.\tPrior to the accumulation of 6,000 landings after a repair and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 6,000 landings, perform the detailed visual and penetrant inspections for cracks required by paragraph A., above, including any crease beam area where cracks were found. Before further flight, repair any additional cracks found, in accordance with a method approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tB.\tFor airplanes thathave been modified in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 747-53-2297, dated June 30, 1988, or Boeing Service Bulletin 747-53-2244, dated September 20, 1985: Prior to the accumulation of 10,000 landings after the modification, or within the next 500 landings after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 6,000 landings, perform the body crown crease beam detailed visual and penetrant inspections for cracks as required by paragraph A., above. If cracks are found, prior to further flight, repair in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 747-53-2297, dated June 30, 1988. \n\n\tC.\tAn alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tNOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI), who may add any commentsand then send it to the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office. \n\n\tD.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Boeing Commercial Airplanes, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or the Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. \n\n\tThis AD revises AD 89-08-03 (Amendment 39-6183) which became effective on May 8, 1989. \n\n\tThis amendment (39-6389, AD 89-08-03 R1) becomes effective on November 3, 1989.
2007-05-06: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain McDonnell Douglas Model 717-200 airplanes. This AD requires replacing certain attaching hardware of the bulkhead nipple assemblies of the left and right wing vent boxes with new electrical bonding attaching hardware, doing resistance testing of the new electrical bonds, and doing fuel leakage testing of the reworked nipple assemblies. This AD results from fuel system reviews conducted by the manufacturer. We are issuing this AD to provide a conductive path, from the bulkhead nipple assemblies of the left and right wing vent boxes to the airframe structure inside the wing fuel tanks, to dissipate high- amperage lightning-induced currents, which might otherwise create an ignition source for fuel vapors inside the wing vent boxes and lead to an explosion of the fuel tanks.
2021-13-14: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus Helicopters Deutschland GmbH (AHD) Model BO-105A, BO- 105C, BO-105S, and BO-105LS A-3 helicopters. This AD was prompted by an uncommanded activation of the hoist cable cutter function on an MBB- BK117 C-1 helicopter, which prompted a design review of the BO105 hoist control grip with coiled cable. This AD requires inspections of the hoist control grip with coiled cable and deactivation of the hoist cutter function, as specified in a European Aviation Safety Agency (now European Union Aviation Safety Agency) (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2007-05-03: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: An occurrence of inadvertent manipulation of the fuel shut-off control has been reported. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2021-14-06: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2019-21-11 and AD 2020-07-02. AD 2019-21-11 applied to all Pratt & Whitney (PW) PW1519G, PW1521G, PW1521G-3, PW1521GA, PW1524G, PW1524G-3, PW1525G, PW1525G-3, PW1919G, PW1921G, PW1922G, PW1923G, and PW1923G-A model turbofan engines. AD 2020-07-02 applied to all PW PW1519G, PW1521G, PW1521G-3, PW1521GA, PW1524G, PW1524G-3, PW1525G, and PW1525G-3 model turbofan engines. AD 2019-21-11 required initial and repetitive borescope inspections (BSIs) of the low-pressure compressor (LPC) rotor 1 (R1) and, depending on the results of the inspections, replacement of the LPC. AD 2020-07-02 required the removal from service of certain electronic engine control (EEC) full authority digital electronic control (FADEC) software and the installation of a software version eligible for installation. This AD continues to require repetitive BSIs of certain LPC R1s until replacement of EEC FADEC software with the updated software. This AD also requires a BSI after installation of the updated EEC FADEC software if certain Onboard Maintenance Message fault codes are displayed and meet specified criteria. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2021-13-05: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Airbus Helicopters Deutschland GmbH (Airbus Helicopters) Model EC135P1, EC135P2, EC135P2+, EC135P3, EC135T1, EC135T2, EC135T2+, and EC135T3 helicopters. This AD requires modifying the tail rotor (T/R) control installation, a functional test, and corrective actions as necessary. This AD was prompted by cases of insufficient clearance between a certain T/R control bearing connection and the helicopter structure, which were detected on the production line. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.