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2010-07-04: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: It has been determined that due to an intermittent communication between AMS [Air Management System] controller cards and both Secondary Power Distribution Assemblies (SPDAs) the message "RECIRC SMK DET FAIL'' is displayed in the Engine Indication and Crew Alerting System (EICAS). This communication failure could result in loss of automatic activation of engine inlet ice protection system when in ice condition. In this situation the caution messages "A-I Eng 1 Fail'' and "A-I Eng 2 Fail'' will be displayed and if the flight crews do not follow the associated procedures ice may accrete in the engines inlet and cause a dual engine shut down. * * * * * This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.
84-15-03: 84-15-03 BOEING VERTOL COMPANY: Amendment 39-4892. Applies to Boeing Vertol Model 234 helicopters certified in all categories. Compliance is required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To prevent bypassing of the lower boost dual actuating cylinder(s) and to prevent fatigue failures of NAS 1351-3H10P cap screws on lower boost dual actuating cylinders in the flight control system, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 25 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, revise Boeing Vertol Rotorcraft Model 234 Flight Manual by inserting Revision 13 dated May 9, 1984. (b) Within the next 25 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished within the last 25 hours time in service, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 300 hours time in service from the last inspection, inspect for water and total chlorine of the aircraft hydraulic system fluid in accordance with the contamination level test procedure specified in Boeing Process Specification BAC 5820, Revision A, as amended by Process Specification Department Number 8-2. An alternate inspection (including intervals between inspections) may be approved by the Manager, New York Aircraft Certification Office, 181 South Franklin Avenue, Valley Stream, New York 11581. For aircraft exceeding allowable contamination levels, flush the hydraulic system in accordance with the procedure specified in Boeing Vertol telex No. 8-1420-3-5459 dated May 25, 1984, or an equivalent approved by the Manager, New York Aircraft Certification Office, 181 South Franklin Avenue, Valley Stream, New York 11581. Sample to insure acceptability following flushing. Repeat the contamination level test procedure at intervals not to exceed 300 hours time in service, except that an alternate interval approved by the Manager, New York Aircraft Certification Office, 181 South Franklin Avenue, Valley Stream, New York 11581, may besubstituted. (c) Within the next 200 hours time in service from the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished within the last 25 hours time in service, and subsequent to accomplishing the work of paragraph (b), remove all lower boost dual actuating cylinders Part Numbers (P/N) 234HS560-1 and -2 and inspect the shutoff valve spools for any visual signs of staining or pitting on the spool lands (shiny, lapped, interface surface). Replace the actuator with a serviceable part if staining or pitting is found, except for staining between lands in the machined clearance areas if no scaling rust or corrosive debris is present. A follow-on spool inspection is not required unless the repetitive fluid contamination level test cited in paragraph (b) shows an increase in chlorine contamination levels. Prior to returning the actuator to service, replace shutoff valve lap assembly P/N 1303-084, Rev. C, with shutoff valve lap assembly P/N 1303-084, Rev. D. (d) Within the next 25 hours time in service from the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished within the last 575 hours time in service, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 600 hours time in service, replace the six NAS 1351-3H1OP cap screws that attach the gland retainers, P/N 1303-044, to the actuator manifold assembly, P/N 1303-010, on all four lower boost dual actuating cylinders, P/N's 234HS560-1 and -2, with zero time screws. Torque the new screws to a value of 30- to 35-inch-pounds (wet). (e) Within the next 25 hours time in service from the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished within the last 25 hours time in service, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 25 hours time in service, conduct the inspections, jam indicator button checks, leakage checks, and safety wire replacement contained in paragraphs 3A, 3B, 3C, 3D, and 3E of Boeing Vertol telex No. 8-1420-3-5455 dated May 25, 1984, or an equivalent approved by the Manager, New York Aircraft Certification Office, 181 South Franklin Avenue, Valley Stream, New York 11581. (f) Upon submission of substantiating data by an owner or operator through an FAA Maintenance Inspector, the Manager, New York Aircraft Certification Office, New England Region, may adjust the compliance times specified in this AD. This amendment becomes effective August 3, 1984.
88-21-02: 88-21-02 BEECH: Amendment 39-6028. Applies to the Beech airplanes listed below, certificated in any category: TABLE 1 MODEL SERIAL NUMBER COMPLIANCE PARAGRAPH F33A CE-621 through CE-1024 (b) F33C CJ-112 through CJ-155 (b) V35B D-9830 through D-10403 (b) A36 E-632 through E-789 E-790 through E-1945 E-1947 through E-2103 E-2105 through E-2110 (a) (a)(b) (a)(b) (a)(b) A36TC, B36TC EA-2 through EA-319 EA-321 through EA-388 (a)(b) (a)(b) 95-B55, 95-B55A TC-1918 through TC-2456 (b) E-55, E-55A TE-1071 through TE-1201 (b) 58, 58A TH-579 through TH-702 TH-703 through TH-1388 TH-1390 through TH-1395 (a) (a)(b) (a)(b) 58P, 58PA TJ-12 through TJ-27 TJ-28 through TJ-435 TJ-437 through TJ-443 (a) (a)(b) (a)(b) 58TC, 58TCA TK-1, TK-2 TK-3 through TK-146 TK-148 through TK-150 (a) (a)(b) (a)(b) Compliance: Required within the next 100 hours time-in-service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished.To prevent failure of the pilots and copilots seat attachment during an emergency landing condition, accomplish the following: (a) For the airplanes identified in Table 1 as requiring Compliance Paragraph (a): Fill the three aft seat positioning holes in the center seat tracks of the pilot and copilot seats in accordance with Beech Service Bulletin Number 2010, Revision 1, dated May 1988. The seat track reinforcement provided in Beech Service Bulletin Number 2233, dated April 1988, may be installed in lieu of filling these holes. (b) For the airplanes identified in Table 1 as requiring Compliance Paragraph (b): (1) Inspect the aft bolts on the two aft feet on both the pilot and copilot seat frame assemblies to insure that a AN960-10 washer has been installed under the nut. If a washer has been installed and the provisions of paragraph (a) have been completed, if applicable, the airplane may be returned to service. (2) If no washer is found per paragraph (b)(1) above, prior to further flight install an AN960-10 washer under the nut, on the lower aft bolt as shown in Service Bulletin No. 2010, Revision 1, dated May 1988. This applies to both the left and right hand sides of the pilot and copilot seat frame assemblies. (c) Airplanes may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a location where this AD may be accomplished. (d) An equivalent means of compliance with this AD may be used if approved by the Manager, FAA, Wichita Aircraft Certification Office, 1801 Airport Road, Rm 100, Mid-Continent Airport, Wichita, Kansas 67209; Telephone (316) 946-4400. All persons affected by this directive may obtain copies of the documents referred to herein upon request to Beech Aircraft Corporation, Commercial Service, Dept. 52, P.O. Box 85, Wichita, Kansas 67201-0085; or may examine the documents referred to herein at the FAA, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel, Room 1558, 601 East 12th Street, Kansas City, Missouri 64106. Thisamendment, 39-6028, becomes effective on October 31, 1988.
90-02-01: 90-02-01 BRITISH AEROSPACE: Amendment 39-6460. Docket No. 89-NM-255-AD. Applicability: Model BAe-146 series airplanes, Serial Numbers up to and including E3125, equipped with a rear left modular toilet (BAe Modifications HCM00344A and HCM30102C), certificated in any category. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. To prevent damage to or jamming of the flight controls, accomplish the following: A. Within 14 days after the effective date of this AD, perform an inspection of the elevator control cables and the water pipe assembly in the vicinity of Frames 42 and 44, in accordance with British Aerospace Service Bulletin 27-A105, dated November 7, 1989. 1. If chafing or damage is found, repair and modify prior to further flight, in accordance with the service bulletin. 2. If the clearance between the water pipe assembly and the elevator control cable is not greater than 0.25 inch, modify within 60 days after the effective date of this AD, in accordance with the service bulletin. B. Repeat the procedures required by paragraph A., above, whenever a rear left-hand modular toilet is removed and reinstalled. C. An alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. NOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI), who will either concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113. D. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. All persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service information from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to British Aerospace, PLC, Librarian for ServiceBulletins, P.O. Box 17414, Dulles International Airport, Washington, D.C. 20041. This information may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or the Standardization Branch, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. This amendment (39-6460, AD 90-02-01) becomes effective on January 22, 1990.
90-05-06 R1: 90-05-06 R1 FAIRCHILD (SWEARINGEN): Amendment 39-6519 as revised by Amendment 39-6668. Docket No. 89-CE-32-AD. Applicability: Models SA226-T (Serial Numbers (S/N) T201 through T275, and T277 through T291), SA226-T(B) (S/N T(B)276 and T(B)292 through T(B)417), SA226-AT (S/N AT001 through AT074), SA226-TC (S/N TC201 through TC419), SA227-TT (S/N TT421 through TT541), SA227-AT (S/N AT423 through and AT695), SA227-AC (S/N AC406, AC415, AC416, and AC420 through AC729) airplanes certificated in any category. Compliance: Required within the next 250 hours time-in-service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished per AD 90-05-06. To prevent the main landing gear doors from jamming against the nacelle skin and preventing the extension of the landing gear, accomplish the following: (a) Visually inspect the gap between the main landing gear doors and the adjacent nacelle skins to insure a clearance of 0.38 plus/minus .03 inches in accordance withthe instructions specified in Fairchild Service Bulletin (S/B) SA226-32-055 and (S/B) SA227-32-027, both dated December 8, 1988, as applicable. If rework of the door(s) is required to obtain the specified clearance, prior to further flight, accomplish the task in accordance with the instructions in the above applicable S/B. (b) Airplanes may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a location where this AD may be accomplished. (c) An alternate method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time which provides an equivalent level of safety may be approved by the Manager, Airplane Certification Office, Federal Aviation Administration, Department of Transportation, Fort Worth, Texas 76193-0150. Note: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Fort Worth Airplane Certification Office. All persons affected by this directive may obtain copies of the documents referred to herein uponrequest to the Fairchild Aircraft Corporation, P.O. Box 790490, San Antonio, Texas 78279-0490, or may examine these documents at the FAA, Central Region, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel, Room 1558, 601 East 12th St., Kansas City, Missouri 64106. This AD amends AD 90-05-06, Amendment 39-6519. This amendment (39-6668, AD 90-05-06 R1) becomes effective on August 13, 1990.
97-03-09: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Fokker Model F28 Mark 0100 series airplanes, that requires repetitive checks to detect backlash in the elevator mechanical control system, and various follow-on actions. This amendment also provides for an optional terminating action for the repetitive check requirements. This amendment is prompted by a report indicating that corrosion was found on the pivot bolts and bushings of the backlash remover lever mechanism on the elevator booster control unit (BCU) of a Model F28 Mark 0100 series airplane. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent such corrosion, which could result in backlash in the elevator controls and reduced elevator control authority in the manual mode.
2011-03-16: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD requires an inspection to determine the serial numbers of the auxiliary power unit (APU) generator and the left and right engine direct current (DC) generators, and corrective actions if necessary. This AD also requires revising the airplane flight manual. This AD was prompted by a report of a DC generator overvoltage event which caused smoke in the cockpit and damage to numerous avionics and electrical components. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct an overvoltage condition on the DC electrical busses caused by exciter stator winding failures, and subsequent failure of the generator control unit (GCU) overvoltage protection circuitry, which could result in damage to critical electrical and avionics components.
96-08-04: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to Eurocopter Deutschland GmbH (ECD) (Eurocopter) Model BO-105, BO-105A, BO-105C, BO-105S, and BO-105LS A-1 helicopters, that requires a ground test and inspection of the tandem hydraulic switch-over system (switch-over system) for component wear and parts replacement, if necessary. This amendment is prompted by incidents involving Model BO-105 series helicopters in which, during the switch-over from Hydraulic System 1 to Hydraulic System 2, a 3-inch drop in the collective occurred, caused by component wear in the switch-over system. The actions specified by this AD are intended to detect switch-over system component wear, which could result in a sudden drop in the collective and a sudden loss of altitude.
96-07-13: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all Lockheed Model L-1011-385 series airplanes, that currently requires inspections to detect cracking of certain areas of the rear spar caps, web, skin, and certain fastener holes; and repair or modification, if necessary. That AD was prompted by reports of fatigue cracks in the caps, web, and skin of the wing rear spar inboard of inner wing station 346. The actions specified by that AD are intended to prevent rupture of the rear spar, which could result in extensive damage to the wing and fuel spillage. This amendment adds various improved inspections and follow-on actions, and requires that the initial inspections be accomplished at reduced thresholds.
55-24-01: 55-24-01 LUSCOMBE: Published in 21 FR 9540 on December 4, 1956, and as amended in 22 FR 2416 on April 11, 1957, is further amended by Amendment 39-1565 and 39-1640. Applies to All 8 Series Aircraft Except Model 8-F with Serial Numbers S-1 and Up. To be accomplished by March 1, 1956, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 12 calendar months from last inspection. Extreme surface corrosion has been found to exist inside the fuselage spar carry through structures P/N 28018 and 28019 of Luscombe Series 8 aircraft, particularly in those airplanes which are located near coastal areas. If allowed to progress, such corrosion could deteriorate the spar carry through members until a structural failure occurred. This corrosion is internal and cannot be detected by an external inspection. Therefore, the inside surfaces of the spar carry through members must be inspected. This may be accomplished by either of the two following acceptable methods: (1) Remove wings from the airplane and also the wing attachment fittings. The ends of both the front and rear spar superstructures will then be open so that an internal inspection of these hat-section members can be made. (2) Use of this method of inspection will not require the removal of the wings from the airplane. One-half inch holes may be drilled through the top wing skin directly over each spar carry through member so that a visual inspection can be made directly into the bottom of the hat sections. The airframe structure had adequate margins of safety in this area so that the existence of the 1/2-inch inspection holes will not impair the structural integrity of the airplane. Five of these 1/2-inch holes should be drilled over each of the spar carry through hat sections, one hole at the middle of each spar carry through, one hole 5 inches from each outboard end of the wing attachment fittings and one hole approximately centrally located between this latter hole and the middle hole. Thiswill provide a distance of approximately 7 1/2 inches between holes and should render it possible to inspect all of the internal surface of the hat-section spar carry through members. After the inspection has been made, the 1/2-inch holes must be covered with a small patch of aircraft fabric doped to the surface of the wing skin or by the insertion of a rubber or neoprene seal plug, or equivalent. This method will also provide a ready means of rechecking the spar carry through members for corrosion during the time of subsequent inspections. If any evidence of corrosion is found to exist, the affected spar carry through member should be removed and replaced with an identical new part. The above inspections may be discontinued if both spar carry through structures are replaced with new parts that are identical to the original and properly anodized and painted to prevent corrosion, or if an equivalent modification is approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch,FAA Southern Region. Amendment 39-1565 became effective December 2, 1972. This Amendment 39-1640 becomes effective May 22, 1973.