Results
62-24-01: 62-24-01 BEECH: Amdt. 508 Part 507 Federal Register November 14, 1962. Applies to All Models 45 (YT-34), A45, B45 (T-34A) and D45 (T-34B) Aircraft With 1,000 Hours or More Total Time In Service. Compliance required within the next ten hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD unless already accomplished within the last 490 hours' time in service and thereafter at intervals not exceeding 500 hours' time in service from the last inspection. Remove both horizontal stabilizers from the aircraft and thoroughly inspect the front and rear spars between the butt rib and the inboard end for cracks, using the dye penetrant method or FAA approved equivalent. If any crack is found in either the spar or reinforcing doubler, replace the stabilizer. NOTE: Operators are requested to send a completed Form FAA 1226 to their local FAA General Aviation District Office if replacement of the stabilizer is required by this AD. (Beech Service Bulletin 45 (YT-34), B45-No. 35, A45 (T-34A) - No. 5, and D45 (T- 34B) - No. 2 covers this same subject.) This directive effective November 26, 1962.
70-25-02: 70-25-02 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-1122. DC-8 Airplanes. Applies to airplanes certificated in all categories equipped with Mark II and Mark III anti-skid system installation. \n\n\tCompliance required within the next 50 hours' time in service after effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent misuse of ground spoilers, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(1)\tAdd to Limitations Section of the FAA approved Airplane Flight Manual, the following Ground Spoiler Operation Limitation: DO NOT EXTEND GROUND SPOILERS DURING FLIGHT \n\n\t(2)\tInstall a placard on the pedestal immediately below the word "spoiler" to read: "Deployment in Flight Prohibited, " or an equivalent installation approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective December 5, 1970.
2005-13-17: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the Agusta S.p.A. (Agusta) Model AB412 Series helicopters. This action requires inspecting each affected tail rotor blade (blade) forward tip weight retention block (tip block) and the aft tip closure (tip closure) for adhesive bond voids, and removing any blade with an excessive void from service. This AD also requires modifying certain blades by installing shear pins and tip closure rivets on all affected blades. This amendment is prompted by reports of in-flight loss of tip blocks and tip closures resulting in minor to substantial damage. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent loss of the tip block or tip closure, loss of a blade, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
2005-12-02: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) to supersede Airworthiness Directive (AD) 98-10-12, which applies to all Revo, Incorporated (REVO) (Type Certificate 1A13 formerly held by Colonial Aircraft Company, Lake Aircraft Corporation, Consolidated Aeronautics, Inc., and Global Amphibians LLC) Models Colonial C-2, Lake LA-4, Lake LA-4A, Lake LA-4P, and Lake LA-4-200 airplanes. AD 98-10-12 currently requires you to ensure adequate clearance between the attachment fitting and the horizontal stabilizer rear beam and between the attachment fitting and the stabilizer skin with inspections, possible replacement, and adjustments as necessary. This new AD is the result of several reports of fatigue cracks found in the horizontal stabilizer attachment fitting (part number 2-2200-21) of Model LA-4-200 airplanes that were in compliance with AD 98-10-12. This includes an airplane accident with a fatality attributed to a fatigue crack in the horizontal stabilizer attachment fitting. Consequently, this AD requires either a dye penetrant inspection of the horizontal stabilizer attachment fitting for any evidence of fretting, cracking, or corrosion (with necessary replacement and modification) or replacement of the fittings depending on the number of operational hours on the fitting. The AD also requires you to repetitively replace the fitting every 850 hours time-in-service (TIS), repetitively inspect (visually) the fittings between replacement times, and report to FAA the results of the initial inspection and any cracks found on repetitive inspections. We are issuing this AD to detect, correct, and prevent future cracks in the horizontal stabilizer attachment fitting, which could result in failure of the horizontal stabilizer attachment fitting. This failure could result in loss of control of the airplane.
2018-07-08: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Agusta S.p.A. (Agusta) Model A109E, A109K2, A109S, AW109SP, A119, and AW119 MKII helicopters. This AD reduces the life limit of and requires inspecting a tail rotor blade retention bolt (bolt). This AD is prompted by the discovery of a cracked bolt. The actions of this AD are intended to address an unsafe condition on these products.
89-11-03: 89-11-03 BOEING: Amendment 39-6223. \n\tApplicability: Model 737-300 and -400 series airplanes, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent the ingestion of "blue ice" into the engine and the potential loss of an engine, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tWithin 200 hours time-in-service after the effective date of this AD: \n\n\t\t1.\tConduct a leak check of the forward lavatory service system, in accordance with Boeing Telex M-7272-89-2127 dated April 25, 1989, and repeat the check at intervals thereafter not to exceed 200 hours time-in-service; or \n\n\t\t2.\tDrain the forward lavatory system, lock the lavatory(s), and placard the lavatory(s) inoperative. \n\n\tB.\tLeaks discovered at any time must be repaired prior to further flight, or the forward lavatory system must be drained, and the lavatory(s) locked and placarded inoperative, prior to further flight. \n\n\tC.\tAn alternate means of compliance or adjustmentof the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tNOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI), who will either concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office. \n\n\tD.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of the inspections and/or modifications required by this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service information from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Boeing Commercial Airplanes, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington, 98124. This information may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or at the Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. \n\n\tThis amendment (39-6223, AD 89-11-03) becomes effective on June 5, 1989.
2018-07-06: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 747-8 series airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report of restricted movement of the right brake pedals after landing rollout. This AD requires revising the airplane flight manual (AFM) by adding an autobrake system limitation. This AD also requires modifying intercostal webs near a main entry door, which terminates the AFM limitation. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2005-13-15: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Boeing Model 737-200, -200C, -300, -400, -500, -600, -700, - 700C, -800, and -900 series airplanes. This AD requires a one-time detailed inspection for discrepancies of the secondary fuel vapor barrier of the wing center section, and related investigative/ corrective actions if necessary. This AD is prompted by reports that the secondary fuel vapor barrier was not applied correctly to, or was missing from, certain areas of the wing center section. We are issuing this AD to prevent fuel or fuel vapors from leaking into the cargo or passenger compartments and coming into contact with a possible ignition source, which could result in fire or explosion.
62-23-02: 62-23-02 BELL: Amdt. 498 Part 507 Federal Register October 23, 1962. Applies to Model 47 Series Helicopters Equipped with Main Rotor Mast Thrust Bearing, P/N 47-130-110-1. Compliance required as indicated. Excessive wear and evidence of impending failure of the main rotor mast thrust bearing have occurred. To preclude progression of bearing deterioration to a hazardous degree, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 25 hours' time in service following the effective date of this AD and thereafter at periods not to exceed 25 hours, conduct a close visual inspection of the engine oil filter. (b) If metal particles are found during any inspection of the engine oil filter, the following shall be accomplished prior to further flight: (1) The source of the contaminant shall be located and eliminated and other components of the engine and transmission which may be jeopardized by metal particles shall be inspected and overhauled as prescribed by the appropriate Bell maintenance manual; and (2) The main rotor mast thrust bearing, P/N 47-130-110-1, shall be thoroughly inspected and replaced with a like component if found not to be in a serviceable condition. (c) Clean engine oil filter carefully before reinstalling. NOTE: For the purpose of this AD, the operations outlined under (a) and (c) are considered to be preventive maintenance and may, therefore, be accomplished by persons specified in Section 18.10(c) of the Civil Air Regulations. This directive effective October 29, 1962. Revised September 16, 1966.
2018-07-12: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus Model A350-941 airplanes. This AD requires performing repetitive station position pick-off unit (SPPU) calibration tests, and applying the corresponding airplane fault isolation if necessary. This AD was prompted by a report indicating malfunctions of the SPPU and failures of the internal wiring due to water ingress via certain electrical connectors, inducing subsequent icing during flight. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.