Results
2022-09-02: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Bombardier, Inc., Model BD-100-1A10 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report that the nose wheel steering selector valve (SSV) can be slow to deactivate under low temperature conditions. This AD requires replacing the affected nose wheel SSV with a redesigned nose wheel SSV, and performing an operational test of the nose wheel SSV and nose wheel steering control system. This AD also prohibits the installation of a certain nose wheel SSV. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
96-18-14: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to Hartzell Propeller Inc. (Hartzell) HC-A3V, HC-B3M, HC-B3T, HC-B4M, HC-B4T, and HC-B5M series propellers, that requires hub replacement over a 10-year time period with a concurrent blade and blade clamp inspection. This amendment is prompted by reports of two propeller hub failures and one crack indication that occurred on Mitsubishi MU-2B-60 aircraft, the similarity of construction and load transfer paths between the Hartzell propeller models installed on the Mitsubishi MU-2 aircraft and Hartzell's 3, 4, and 5-bladed steel hub propeller models, several blade shank failures, and reports of cracks in blade clamps. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent propeller hub, blade, or blade clamp failure, which can result in loss of aircraft control.
57-13-05: 57-13-05 HAMILTON STANDARD: Applies to All Hamilton Standard Aluminum Alloy Blades Used in Hydromatic (Noncounterweight Type) Propellers, With the Exception of Blades With Integrally Molded Chafing Rings (Refer Hamilton Standard Service Bulletin No. 508) and With the Exception of Those Blades Already Incorporating Corrosion Barriers Installed in Accordance With Service Bulletins Numbers 390, 414, and 414A, Provided This Corrosion Barrier is in Good Condition. Compliance required as noted. 1. At each removal of propeller blade from hub after December 1, 1957, inspect for corrosion the shank area of blades not incorporating a corrosion barrier. Operators who have experienced corrosion in the shank area of any blade in the past 5 years and those who find corrosion during the above inspection must install the corrosion barrier except as outlined in 2. 2. Prior to September 1, 1957, or 450 hours of operating time after July 1, 1957, whichever comes first, for blades installed on P&W R2800 "B" type engines (Refer FAA Engine Listing) in C-46 aircraft. Investigation of a recently failed blade revealed the existence of severe corrosion in the seal area at the shank. This blade did not incorporate a corrosion barrier as recommended by the manufacturer's Service Bulletins Numbers 390 and 414A. In order to minimize the possibility of additional blade failures due to corrosion in the shank area, disassemble the propeller and inspect this area in accordance with Hamilton Standard Service Bulletin No. 508. If no corrosion is present and none is suspected, install the corrosion barrier on each blade in accordance with the instructions contained in the bulletin. If corrosion, pitting, staining, or other conditions indicating chemical attack on the basic blade material are found, rework the shank area in accordance with the instructions contained in the bulletin. Remove from service any blade reworked below the minimum shank diameters tabulated in the bulletin. Install the corrosion barrier on each acceptable blade prior to assembly of the propeller. (Hamilton Standard Service Bulletin No. 508 covers this same subject.)
2004-16-13: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Bombardier Model DHC-8-400, -401, and -402 airplanes. This AD requires an inspection to determine the serial number of the spoiler lift dump valves installed on the inboard and outboard spoilers, and replacement of certain spoiler lift dump valves. This AD also provides for revising the airplane flight manual to include performance penalties, which allows the replacement of affected spoiler lift dump valves to be deferred. This action is necessary to prevent failure of the ground spoilers to deploy on the ground, which could result in overrunning the end of the runway in the event of a rejected takeoff. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
2022-08-09: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Pilatus Aircraft Ltd. (Pilatus) Model PC-24 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a failure of the dual ethernet communication channel on a dual-channel data concentration and processing unit, which triggered the opening of electronic circuit breakers that caused several unintended system activations. This AD requires installing a software (SW) upgrade to the utility management system (UMS), as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
89-20-02: 89-20-02 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS HELICOPTER COMPANY (MDHC): Amendment 39-6324. (Docket No. 89-ASW-32) Applicability: Model 369D and E helicopters, certificated in any category, with hubs of four-bladed tail rotors, Part Number (P/N) 369D21700-3 installed. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To prevent fatigue failure of four-bladed tail rotor hubs which could result in loss of control of the helicopter, accomplish the following: (a) Within 10 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, remove each tail rotor hub, (P/N) 369D21700-3, with serial numbers 196 through 251, installed on a helicopter and visually inspect for electrical arc burns and dye penetrant inspect for cracks. If arcing burns or cracks are observed as a result of this inspection, replace the hub with a serviceable unit prior to further flight. NOTE: McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Company Service Information Notices DN-160 and EN-50 pertain to this inspection. (b) Within 100 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, remove each tail rotor hub, (P/N) 369D21700-3, with serial numbers from 1 through 195, and visually inspect for electrical arc burns and dye penetrant inspect for cracks. If arc burns or cracks are observed as a result of this inspection, replace the hub with a serviceable unit prior to further flight. (c) Prior to installation in a helicopter, visually inspect each four-bladed tail rotor hub, (P/N) 369D21700-3, serial numbers 1 through 251, in spares inventory for electrical arc burns and dye penetrant inspect for cracks. If arc burns or cracks are observed as a result of this inspection, reject the hub. (d) Enter the results of the above inspections required by paragraphs (a) and (b) in the aircraft log and report cracks or arc burns to the Los Angeles FAA Aircraft Certification Office within 10 days of the inspection. Include in the report the helicopter model and serial number, hub part number, hub serial number, vendor identification (if possible), total hours of service for the hub, the location of any cracks and arc burns, and the geographical location (city, state) of the helicopter at the time of inspection. (e) Report the results of the inspections of paragraph (c) on hub spares, when arc burns or cracks are found, to the Los Angeles FAA Aircraft Certification Office within 10 days of the inspection. Include the date of the inspection, hub part number, hub serial number, vendor identification (if possible), total hours in service (if previously used, or zero hours if new), the location of arc burns and/or cracks, and the geographical location of the inspection. NOTE: All new hubs (zero service life) which are rejected should be returned to MDHC for further inspection and evaluation. (f) The reporting requirements of this regulation have been approved by the Office of Management and Budget under OMB No. 2120-0056. (g) In accordance with FAR Sections 21.197 and 21.199, the helicopter may be flown to a base where compliance with the AD may be accomplished. (h) An alternate method of compliance with this AD which provides an equivalent level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, 3229 E. Spring Street, Long Beach, California. This amendment (39-6324, AD 89-20-02) becomes effective on October 16, 1989.
46-44-04: 46-44-04 CESSNA: (Was Mandatory Note 4 of AD-768-4.) Applies to 120 and 140 Aircraft Serial Numbers Up to and Including 9721. Replacement required prior to December 1, 1946. All U. S. Rubber Co. P-212 and P-212L Series flexible ducts installed in the carburetor hot air system should be replaced by U. S. Rubber Co. P-208-S duct or P-208 duct coated with neoprene by Cessna or its distributors. (Cessna Service Letter No. 16-120 and 140 covers this same subject.)
2022-09-17: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Scheibe-Aircraft-GmbH Model SF 25 C gliders. This AD was prompted by mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI identifies the unsafe condition as severe corrosion on the inner surface of the control stick tube. This AD requires inspecting the left-hand (LH) and right-hand (RH) control sticks for corrosion and, if corrosion is found, replacing the affected control stick. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2004-16-14: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Thales Avionics TA/RA VSI-TCAS indicators, installed on but not limited to certain transport category airplanes equipped with TCAS II change 7 computers (ACAS II), that requires a revision to the airplane flight manual (AFM) to advise the flightcrew to follow the audio annunciation when an RA fail message is triggered during a multi-aircraft encounter. This action also requires modification of the software for the TA/RA VSI-TCAS indicator, which would terminate the requirement for the AFM revision. This action is necessary to prevent the TA/RA VSI-TCAS indicator from displaying a conflicting "RA FAIL" message during a multi-aircraft encounter, which could result in the flightcrew ignoring the correct aural command and traffic display information if the flightcrew believes the TCAS II computer has malfunctioned, and consequently lead to a mid-air collision with other aircraft. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
2022-09-07: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2019-11-05 for certain Bell Helicopter Textron Canada Limited (now Bell Textron Canada Limited) Model 429 helicopters. AD 2019-11-05 required inspecting the tail rotor (TR) pitch link assemblies, and replacing certain pitch link bearings. This AD was prompted by a report of a worn pitch link, and the FAA's determination that all TR pitch link assemblies are affected by the unsafe condition. This AD continues to require the actions specified in AD 2019-11-05, and revises the applicability and requires inspections of certain other TR pitch link assemblies. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.