Results
92-07-04: 92-07-04 BRITISH AEROSPACE (BAe), REGIONAL AIRCRAFT LIMITED: Amendment 39-8200. Docket No. 91-CE-61-AD. Supersedes AD 90-02-14, Amendment 39- 6434. Applicability: HP 137 Mk1, Jetstream Models 200, 3101, and 3201 airplanes (all serial numbers), certificated in any category. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To prevent landing gear or flap extension malfunction during operation of the emergency hydraulic system, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 600 hours time-in-service (TIS) after February 5, 1990 (the effective date of AD 90-02-14, Amendment 39-6434), modify the detent ball catch of the emergency gear and flap extension hydraulic system selector valve in accordance with the instructions in BAe Alert Service Bulletin (SB) 29-A-JA881143, dated February 24, 1989. (b) Upon the accumulation of 1,600 hours TIS, or within the next 200 hours TIS after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later, and thereafter atintervals not to exceed 1,800 hours TIS, accomplish the following: (1) Modify the emergency gear and flap extension hydraulic system valve in accordance with paragraphs A.(1) through A.(5) of the "ACCOMPLISHMENT INSTRUCTIONS" in BAe SB 29-JA 901242, dated June 18, 1991, Revision 1, dated September 25, 1991. (2) Measure for excessive torque in accordance with paragraphs A.(1) through A.(3) of the "ACCOMPLISHMENT INSTRUCTIONS" in AP Precision Hydraulics Ltd. SB 8679-29-02, dated April 1991, Revision 1, dated August 1991. (i) If torque is not found excessive in accordance with paragraph A.(4) of the "ACCOMPLISHMENT INSTRUCTIONS" in AP Precision Hydraulics Ltd. SB 8679-29-02, dated April 1991, Revision 1, dated August 1991, prior to further flight, release the safety catch and perform paragraphs A.(7) through A.(10) of the "ACCOMPLISHMENT INSTRUCTIONS" in BAe SB 29-JA 901242, dated June 18, 1991, Revision 1, dated September 25, 1991. (ii) If excessive torque is found in accordance with paragraph A.(4) of the "ACCOMPLISHMENT INSTRUCTIONS" in AP Precision Hydraulics Ltd. SB 8679-29-02, dated April 1991, Revision 1, dated August 1991, prior to further flight, recondition the selector valve as specified in paragraph A.(5) of the "ACCOMPLISHMENT INSTRUCTIONS" in AP Precision Hydraulics Ltd. SB 8679-29-02, dated April 1991, Revision 1, dated August 1991, release the safety catch, and perform paragraphs A.(7) through A.(10) of the "ACCOMPLISHMENT INSTRUCTIONS" in BAe SB 29-JA 901242, dated June 18, 1991, Revision 1, dated September 25, 1991. (c) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. (d) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance times that provides an equivalent level of safety may be approved by the Manager, Brussels Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Europe, Africa, and Middle EastOffice, c/o American Embassy, B- 1000 Brussels, Belgium. The request should be forwarded through an appropriate FAA Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Brussels Aircraft Certification Office. (e) The inspections and modifications required by this AD shall be done in accordance with BAe Alert Service Bulletin 29-A-JA881143, dated February 24, 1989; BAe Service Bulletin 29-JA 901242, which incorporates the following pages: Pages Level Date 2, 3, 5, and 6 Original June 18, 1991 1 and 4 Revision 1 September 25, 1991; and AP Precision Hydraulics Ltd. Service Bulletin 8679-29-02, which incorporates the following pages: Pages Level Date 1, 2, and 3 Original April 1991 4 Revision 1 August 1991 This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from British Aerospace, Regional Aircraft Limited, Manager Product Support, Prestwick Airport, Ayrshire, KA9 2RW Scotland; or British Aerospace, Inc., Librarian, Box 17414, Dulles International Airport, Washington, DC, 20041; and AP Precision Hydraulics Ltd., P.O. Box 1, Shaw Road, Speke, Liverpool, England, L24 9JY. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Central Region, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel, Room 1558, 601 E. 12th Street, Kansas City, Missouri, or at the Office of the Federal Register, 1100 L Street, NW; Room 8401, Washington, DC. (f) This amendment (39-8200) supersedes AD 90-02-14, Amendment 39-6434. (g) This amendment (39-8200) becomes effective on April 30, 1992.
2016-04-23: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 787-8 airplanes. This AD requires an inspection of the station 337 (door number 1) outboard partitions for a tie rod and quick release pins, and to ensure that both partition supports are engaged in the structural bracket at each outboard partition, and corrective actions if necessary. This AD was prompted by reports of missing right and left outboard partition tie rods at door number 1. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct partitions with missing tie rods or release pins or with supports that are not engaged in the structural bracket. These partitions could come loose during a high-acceleration event and strike the flight attendant seats in the door 1 location, causing serious injury to the seat occupants, or could affect safe egress from the airplane. \n\n((Page 10075))
2000-24-06: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 707, 727C, and 727-100C series airplanes, that currently requires repetitive inspections to detect cracking of the main cargo door skin and frames, and repair, if necessary. The existing AD also provides optional terminating modifications. This amendment requires follow-on repetitive inspections of repaired or modified areas for certain airplanes. This amendment is prompted by reports of cracking and/or tearing of the main cargo door outer skin and subsequent failure of the door frame. The actions specified by this AD are intended to detect and correct such cracking and/or tearing, which could result in failure of the door frame and consequent rapid decompression of the airplane.
99-17-19: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to Bell Helicopter Textron, A Division of Textron Canada (BHTC), Model 206L, L-1, L-3, and L-4 helicopters, that currently requires the creation of a component history card or equivalent record using the Retirement Index Number (RIN) system for certain mast and trunnions and a system for tracking increases to the accumulated RIN. That AD also establishes retirement lives for the mast and trunnion. This amendment requires the same actions required by the existing AD but increases the RIN multiplier for the mast and corrects a helicopter model number. This amendment is prompted by further tests and analyses that indicate the RIN multiplier for the Model 206L-4 helicopters needs to be increased and the discovery of an error in a model designation in the existing AD. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent fatigue failure of the mast or trunnion, which could result in loss of the main rotor system and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
2000-23-25: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to certain Boeing Model 747-100, 747-200, 747-300, 747SP, and 747SR series airplanes powered by Pratt & Whitney JT9D-3 or JT9D-7 series engines. This action requires inspections of the vertical chords of the aft torque bulkhead of the outboard nacelle struts, and corrective action, if necessary. This action also provides optional terminating action for the inspections. This action is necessary to detect and correct cracking of the vertical chords adjacent to the lower spar fitting, which could result in separation of the diagonal brace load path. Continued operation with a separated diagonal brace load path increases loads on the upper link, midspar fitting, and dual side links, which could result in separation of the strut and engine from the airplane. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
2000-23-27: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Bombardier Model DHC-8-102, -103, and -301 series airplanes, that currently requires a one- time inspection for wear and breakage of wire segments of the individual lighting units of the ceiling and sidewall lights, and replacement of any damaged wiring. The existing AD also requires installation of teflon spiral wrap on the wiring of the ceiling and sidewall lights. This amendment adds a requirement for a one-time inspection to determine if teflon spiral wrap is installed on the wiring of the lavatory lighting system, and installation, if necessary. This amendment is prompted by issuance of mandatory continuing airworthiness information by a foreign civil airworthiness authority. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent the possibility of a fire on an airplane due to such chafing and consequent short circuiting, overheating, and smoking of the wires on the aircraft structure.
2016-04-17: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 777-200 series airplanes. This AD was prompted by an evaluation by the design approval holder (DAH) indicating that the skin lap splices at certain stringers in certain fuselage sections are subject to widespread fatigue damage (WFD) on aging Model 777 airplanes that have accumulated at least 45,000 total flight cycles. This AD requires inspections to detect cracking of fuselage skin lap splices in certain fuselage sections, and corrective actions if necessary; modification of left-side and right-side lap splices; and post-modification repetitive inspections for cracks in the modified lap splices, and corrective actions if necessary. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct fatigue cracking of the skin lap splices, and consequent risk of sudden decompression and the inability to sustain limit flight and pressure loads.
92-22-03: 92-22-03 BRITISH AEROSPACE: Amendment 39-8389. Docket No. 91-NM-277-AD. Applicability: All Viscount Model 744, 745D, and 810 series airplanes, certificated in any category. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. To prevent structural failure of the bulkhead and associated decompression of the passenger cabin, accomplish the following: (a) Within 90 days after the effective date of this AD, using both visual and specified non-destructive test methods, inspect the rear pressure bulkhead for corrosion, cracks, and damage, in accordance with British Aerospace Viscount Alert Preliminary Technical Leaflet 195, Issue 2, dated August 20, 1991 (for Model 810 series airplanes); or British Aerospace Viscount Alert Preliminary Technical Leaflet 325, Issue 2, dated August 22, 1991 (for Model 744 and 745D series airplanes); as applicable. (b) Repeat the visual and non-destructive test inspections required by paragraph (a) of this AD at the following intervals: (1) For "Part One: Rear Pressure Bulkhead - Forward Face - Rear Face," as specified in the applicable service bulletin: Repeat the inspections at intervals not to exceed 500 landings or 6 months, whichever occurs first. (2) For "Part Two: Rear Pressure Bulkhead Web Lap-Joints," as specified in the applicable service bulletin: Repeat the inspections at intervals not to exceed 1,600 landings or 2 years, whichever occurs first. (3) For "Part Three: Rear Pressure Bulkhead Rear Face, Boundary Member, Adjacent Skin and Structure," as specified in the applicable service bulletin: Repeat the inspections at intervals not to exceed 2,500 landings or 3 years, whichever occurs first. (c) If corroded, cracked, or damaged parts are found as a result of inspections required by paragraphs (a) or (b) of this AD, prior to further flight, repair in accordance with British Aerospace Viscount Alert Preliminary Technical Leaflet (PTL) 195, Issue 2, dated August 20, 1991; or PTL 325, Issue 2, dated August 22, 1991; as applicable. (d) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113. NOTE: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Standardization Branch, ANM-113. (e) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. (f) The inspections and repairs shall be done in accordance with British Aerospace Viscount Alert Preliminary Technical Leaflet 195,Issue 2, dated August 20, 1991; or British Aerospace Viscount Alert Preliminary Technical Leaflet 325, Issue 2, dated August 22, 1991; as applicable. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from British Aerospace, PLC, Librarian for Service Bulletins, P.O. Box 17414, Dulles International Airport, Washington, DC 20041-0414. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC. (g) This amendment becomes effective on December 3, 1992.
2000-23-30: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain EMBRAER Model EMB-120 series airplanes, that requires installation of an additional drain at the fuselage aft section. This action is necessary to prevent mechanical blockage of the elevator control cables due to the freezing of water collected inside the fuselage between the rear pressure bulkhead and the fire wall of the auxiliary power unit. Such cable blockage could result in reduced controllability of the airplane. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
2000-23-28: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all Boeing Model 777 series airplanes, that currently requires repetitive testing of the engine fire shutoff switch (EFSS) to determine if the override mechanism and the switch handle are operational, and replacement of the EFSS, if necessary. That AD also requires, for certain airplanes, installation of a collar on a specific circuit breaker of the standby power management panel, and installation of placards to advise the flightcrew that the override mechanism must be pushed in order to pull the fire switch. This amendment adds various actions that would terminate the repetitive testing requirements. This amendment is prompted by a report indicating that a solenoid and an override mechanism of the EFSS were not operational due to overheating of the solenoid. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent damage to the EFSS solenoid and to the override mechanism, and consequent failure of the EFSS due to overheating of the solenoid; such failure could result in the inability of the flightcrew to discharge the fire extinguishing agent in the event of an engine fire.