Results
2006-15-05: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Boeing Model 737-200, -300, and -400 series airplanes. This AD requires replacing the existing fueling float switch in the auxiliary fuel tank with a new, improved fueling float switch, installing a new liner system inside the float switch conduit, and performing related investigative and other specified actions. This AD results from reports of chafing of the direct-current-powered float switch wiring insulation in the center fuel tank. We are issuing this AD to prevent contamination of the fueling float switch of the auxiliary fuel tank by moisture or fuel, and chafing of the float switch wiring against the float switch conduit in the fuel tank, which could present an ignition source inside the fuel tank that could cause a fire or explosion.
80-04-08: 80-04-08 CESSNA (including Reims Aviation): Amendment 39-3696. Applies to the following models and serial numbers airplanes certificated in all categories: Model 172N (Serial Numbers 17267585 thru 17273278 except 17269319, 17271634, 17271639, 17272091, 17272097, 17272104, 17272105, 17272109, 17272113, 17272121, 17272125, 17272127, 17272130, 17272143, 17272165, 17272166, 17272179 thru 17272181, 17272192, 17272208, 17272211, 17272225, 17272229, 17272233, 17272235, 17272237, 17272240, 17272244 thru 17272246, 17272250, 17272255, 17272258, 17272259, 17272263, 17272264, 17272268, 17272274, 17272276, 17272277, 17272287, 17272292, 17272293, 17272306, 17272308, 17272309, 17272314, 17272335, 17272337, 17272347, 17272348, 17272351, 17272352, 17272369, 17272370, 17272375, 17272378, 17272389, 17272390, 17272395, 17272396, 17272401, 17272408, 17272409, 17272412, 17272414, 17272421, 17272422, 17272428, 17272430, 17272436, 17272441, 17272442, 17272450, 17272459, 17272462, 17272463, 17272472,17272477, 17272478, 17272490, 17272491, 17272494, 17272500, 17272506, 17272511, 17272513, 17272514, 17272538, 17272540, 17272547, 17272551, 17272556, 17272567, 17272571, 17272573, 17272574, 17272577, 17272578, 17272583, 17272584, 17272592, 17272601, 17272602, 17272608, 17272609, 17272615, 17272620, 17272626, 17272627, 17272630, 17272631, 17272635 thru 17272637, 17272639, 17272640, 17272644 thru 17272646, 17272650 thru 17272661, 17272663, 17272664, 17272666 thru 17272669, 17272671 and 17272673 thru 17272714) airplanes and; Model R172K (Serial Numbers R1722000 thru R1723254 except R1722967, R1722986, R1723086, R1723087, R1723090, R1723154, R1723156, and R1723158 thru R1723166) airplanes; Model F172N (Serial Numbers F17201515 thru F17202029) airplanes; and Model FR172K (Serial Numbers FR17200531 thru FR17200660) airplanes. COMPLIANCE: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. To preclude the possibility of a fuel leak or an in-flight fire due to contact between a map light switch and an adjacent fuel line, within the next 25 hours time-in-service after the effective date of this AD accomplish the following: 1) Visually inspect the fuel line and map light switch located in the left hand forward door post for chafing or arcing and replace damaged parts as necessary. If not already existing, provide at least .50 inch clearance between the map light switch and the fuel line in accordance with procedures in FAA Advisory Circular 43.13-1A. 2) Install a cover (insulator), Cessna Part Number 0511080-1, over the map light switch in accordance with Cessna Single Engine Service Information Letter SE80-3 and Supplement #1 thereto, or both dated January 21, 1980. 3) Airplanes may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a location where this AD may be accomplished, providing the map light is not used during this flight. 4) Any equivalent method of compliance with this Airworthiness Directive must be approved by the Chief, Wichita Engineering and Manufacturing District Office, Federal Aviation Administration, Room 238, Terminal Building, Mid-Continent Airport, Wichita, Kansas 67209. This amendment becomes effective February 16, 1980.
87-26-07: 87-26-07 BRITISH AEROSPACE: Amendment 39-5807. Applies to Model H.S. 748 series airplanes, as listed in British Aerospace Service Bulletin 52/127, dated May 29, 1985, certificated in any category. compliance required within 5 months after the effective date of this AD, unless previously accomplished: To prevent the loss of the overwing escape hatch during flight, due to improper locking, accomplish the following: A. Replace the escape hatch locking mechanism with P/N 10D14062 locking mechanism assembly, in accordance with the instructions in British Aerospace Service Bulletin No. 52/127, dated May 29, 1985. B. An alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the( compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. C. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of inspections and/or modifications required by this AD. All persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service document from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to British Aerospace, Inc., P.O. Box 17414, Dulles International Airport, Washington, D.C. 20041. This document may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or at the Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. This amendment becomes effective February 1, 1988.
2019-06-03: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus SAS Model A330-200 Freighter, -200, and -300 series airplanes; and Airbus SAS Model A340-200, -300, -500, and -600 series airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of depressurization of hydraulic reservoirs caused by air leakage from the pressure relief valve (PRV) of the hydraulic reservoir (HR) due to the extrusion of the O-ring seal from certain HR PRVs. This AD requires replacing affected PRVs and re- identifying affected HRs. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2019-05-15: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Pilatus Aircraft Ltd. Model PC-7 airplanes. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as chafed and burned wires located under panel F5. We are issuing this AD to require actions to address the unsafe condition on these products.
98-04-06: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to all Dornier Model 328-100 series airplanes. This action requires repetitive visual inspections for signs of fuel leakage of the outer wing beginning with Rib 21 and continuing outward, and corrective action, if necessary. This amendment is prompted by issuance of mandatory continuing airworthiness information by a foreign civil airworthiness authority. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent fuel leakage on the outboard wing, which could result in a fuel explosion and fire.
2006-11-07: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Raytheon Model Hawker 800XP airplanes. This AD requires inspecting certain bus bars in the DA-A panel to ensure that the bus bars match the panel configuration and clearance is adequate between the bus bars and adjacent components, and performing corrective action if necessary. This AD results from two reports of inadequate clearance between the bus bars in the DA-A panel. We are issuing this AD to prevent insufficient electrical isolation for the electrical bus configuration and inability of the flightcrew to isolate the bus bars in an emergency situation involving a dual generator failure, which could result in extra loads on the main ship batteries and consequent loss of power to the main essential bus.
85-01-06: 85-01-06 BOEING: Amendment 39-4982. Applies to Model 737 series airplanes certificated in all categories listed in Boeing Service Bulletin 737-53A1064, Revision 3, dated November 23, 1983. To prevent sudden loss of cabin pressure resulting from undetected cracking of the frames adjacent to the forward airstair, accomplish the following prior to accumulation of 29,000 landings, or within 90 days from the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later, unless previously accomplished: \n\n\tA.\tVisually inspect for cracks the body station 351.2 and 360 frames in accordance with the Flight Safety Addendum in Boeing Service Bulletin 737-53A1064, Revision 3, or later FAA approved revisions. Repeat the internal visual inspection at intervals not exceeding 3000 landings for Group 1 airplanes without external doublers installed in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 737-53-1058. For all other airplanes, repeat the inspection at intervals not exceeding 6000 landings. \n\n\tB.\tIf cracks are detected, repair before further flight in accordance with Service Bulletin 737-53A1064, Revision 3, or later FAA approved revisions, and continue the repetitive inspections of paragraph A., above. \n\n\tC.\tAs an alternative to the internal inspections of paragraph A., above, operators may visually inspect the external skin for cracks in the area of the forward airstair door cutout in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 737-53A1064, Revision 3, or later FAA approved revisions. Repeat external skin inspections at intervals not exceeding 300 landings until the internal frame inspection of paragraph A. is accomplished within 3000 flight cycles of the initial external visual inspection. Continue inspections in accordance with paragraph A. \n\n\tD.\tIf skin cracks are detected, unless previously accomplished during the same inspection period, inspect the frames in accordance with paragraph A., above. Repair cracks in accordance with the Structural Repair Manual or Boeing Service Bulletin 737-53-1058, as applicable, and continue the inspections of paragraph A. \n\n\tE.\tAirplanes may be flown to a maintenance base for repairs or replacement in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 with prior approval of the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tF.\tModification of airplanes in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions, Part II of Boeing Service Bulletin 737-53A1064, Revision 3, or later FAA approved revisions, constitutes terminating action for this AD. \n\n\tG.\tFor purposes of complying with this AD, subject to acceptance by the assigned FAA Maintenance Inspector, the number of landings may be determined by dividing each airplane's time in service by the operator's fleet average time from takeoff to landing for the airplane type. \n\n\tH.\tUpon request of the operator, an FAA Maintenance Inspector, subject to prior approval of the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, may adjust the repetitive inspection intervals specified in this AD, if the request contains substantiating data to justify the increase for the operator.\n \n\tI.\tAlternate means of compliance which provide an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, Northwest Mountain Region, Seattle, Washington. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to the Boeing Commercial Airplane Company, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. These documents may also be examined at FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective February 25, 1985.
87-20-05: 87-20-05 PACIFIC SCIENTIFIC COMPANY: Amendment 39-5693. Applies to TSO C22f lap belt assemblies, part number 1107177 (all dash numbers), manufactured between September 1, 1984, and January 1, 1986. Compliance required within 180 days after the effective date of this AD, unless previously accomplished. To eliminate lap belt assemblies with belt retractor shafts which do not provide adequate strength, accomplish the following: A. Inspect all Pacific Scientific TSO C22f lap belt assemblies, part number 1107177 (all dash numbers), in accordance with Pacific Scientific Company Safety Advisory Letter (on the Mark V Reel Lap Belt Assembly, which deals with this problem), to determine if they have part number 1106294-01 retractor shafts made of the correct material. This is determined by visual examination of the end of the shaft: If the color is gold anodize, the shaft is acceptable. If the color is a dull battleship grey anodize, the shaft must be replaced prior to further flight. B. Alternate means of compliance which provide an acceptable level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Western Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. C. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to ferry aircraft to a maintenance base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. All persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service information from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Pacific Scientific Company, 1346 S. State College Boulevard, Anaheim, California 92803. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or at 15000 Aviation Boulevard, Hawthorne, California. This amendment becomes effective October 26, 1987.
2006-15-14: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Eurocopter Canada Limited (Eurocopter) Model BO 105 LS A-3 helicopters that requires replacing certain fixed bolts and nuts, re-identifying certain main rotor nuts, and revising the Airworthiness Limitations-- Time Change Items (TCI) list to reflect the new life limits and new part numbers. This amendment is prompted by a re-evaluation of certain fatigue-critical parts, which resulted in establishing new life limits for certain like-numbered parts and re-identifying a certain existing part with a different part number, or in some cases, replacing them with new parts. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent fatigue failure of the fixed bolts and nuts, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.