Aircraft-logs.com

Results
78-08-11: 78-08-11 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-3190. Applies to DC-10-10, -10F, -30, -30F and -40 Series airplanes, certificated in all categories.\n\n\tCompliance required before April 10, 1979, unless already accomplished, or unless incorporated in production. \n\n\tTo minimize the probability of an aborted takeoff resulting from a false stall warning during the takeoff roll, add a five second time delay between nose gear lift-off and the initiation of a stall warning by accomplishing the following:\n\n\t(a)\tModify the airplanes in accordance with McDonnell Douglas DC-10 Service Bulletin 22-94 dated August 4, 1977, or later FAA approved revisions.\n\n\t(b)\tIncorporate revisions in the FAA Approved Airplane Flight Manual, Documents MDC-J1010, MDC-J1030, MDC-J5830, MDC-J1040 and MDC-J2140, by adding the following new heading and text in Section III Procedures:\n\n\t\tSTALL WARNING PREFLIGHT CHECK\n\n\t\tRotate "STALL TEST" switch to "L (MOM)." Note five second delay before stick shaker \t\t\tactivation. Rotate "STALL TEST" switch to "R (MOM)." Again note five second delay before stick \t\tshaker activation.\n\n\t(c)\tEquivalent modifications, procedures, or revisions may be used when approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region.\n\n\t(d)\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR's 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for accomplishment of the modification required by this AD.\n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective May 18, 1978.
2009-19-01: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: An operator has reported the loss of a centre flap inner tab on an in-service A300 aircraft. The centre flap inner tab detached during approach to an airport. A similar event was reported several years ago on a pre-mod 04770 aircraft. * * * * * * Investigations led by the manufacturer revealed that the centre hinge bracket developed a fatigue crack causing complete failure of the bracket. The tab rotated causing failure of the inboard link followed by the failure of the outboard link. [D]etachment of a centre flap inner tab * * * could be a potential risk to persons on [the] ground * * . * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
89-25-03: 89-25-03 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-6408. Docket No. 89-NM-228-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: Model DC-9-10, -20, -30, -40, -50, -81, -82 and C-9 (Military) series airplanes, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent crack propagation, which could result in rapid cabin depressurization, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tFor airplanes fuselage numbers 1 through 950: Prior to the occurrence of the latest of the compliance times set forth below, inspect the left- and right-hand window belt panels and adjacent structure for cracks using eddy current methods, in accordance with McDonnell Douglas Alert Service Bulletin (ASB) A53-142, Revision 8, dated October 25, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as ASB 53-142): \n\n\t\t1.\tPrior to the accumulation of 30,000 or more landings; or \n\n\t\t2.\tWithin 2,500 landings since the last inspection in accordance with Amendment 39-5136, AD 85-19-02; or \n\n\t\t3.\tWithin 500 landingsafter the effective date of this AD. \n\n\tB.\tFor airplanes, fuselage numbers 951 through 1157: Prior to the occurrence of the latest of the compliance times set forth below, inspect the left- and right-hand window belt panels and adjacent structure for cracks using eddy current methods, in accordance with McDonnell Douglas ASB A53-142: \n\n\t\t1.\tPrior to the accumulation of 30,000 or more landings; or \n\n\t\t2.\tWithin 10,000 landings since the last inspection in accordance with Amendment 39-5136, AD 85-19-02; or \n\n\t\t3.\tWithin 500 landings after the effective date of this AD. \n\n\tC.\tRepeat the inspections required by paragraph A. of this AD at intervals not to exceed 800 landings, until such time as the preventive modification is installed in accordance with McDonnell Douglas Service Bulletin 53-142, dated June 30, 1983. \n\n\tD.\tRepeat the inspections required by paragraph B. of this AD at intervals not to exceed 20,000 landings, until such time as preventive modification is installedin accordance with McDonnell Douglas Service Bulletin 53-142, dated June 30, 1983. \n\n\tE.\tCredit may be given for inspections and repairs already accomplished in accordance with earlier versions of the McDonnell Douglas ASB A53-142. \n\n\tF.\tIf any fuselage skin cracks are found, accomplish the procedures described in paragraphs F.1., F.2., or F.3., below: \n\n\t\t1.\tBefore further flight, repair fuselage skin cracks in accordance with Option 2 described in ASB A53-142; or \n\n\t\t2.\tBefore further flight, repair fuselage skin cracks in accordance with McDonnell Douglas DC-9 Drawing J060131. Repairs of fuselage skin cracks accomplished in accordance with Drawing J060131 must be visually inspected at intervals not to exceed 2,000 landings, and must be replaced by repairs accomplished in accordance with McDonnell Douglas Drawing J060109 within 4,000 landings. After accomplishment of repairs in accordance with Drawing J060109, inspect the unrepaired areas of the airplane in accordance withthe requirements of paragraphs C., above, for fuselages 1 through 950, or paragraph D., above, for fuselages 951 through 1157 or \n\n\t\t3.\tBefore further flight, install a placard in plain view of the pilot reading "Pressurized Flight Prohibited," and accomplish either paragraph F.1. or F.2., above, within 4,000 landings. \n\n\tG.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes unpressurized to a base to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tH.\tAn alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tNOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI), who will either concur or comment, and then send it to the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service information from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to McDonnell Douglas Corporation, 3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846. This information may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or the Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 3229 East Spring Street, Long Beach, California. \n\n\tThis AD supersedes Amendment 39-5136, AD 85-19-02, which became effective on October 12, 1985. \n\n\tThis amendment (39-6408, AD 89-25-03) becomes effective on December 18, 1989.
51-10-01: 51-10-01 DOUGLAS: Applies to All Model DC-6 Aircraft. \n\n\tCompliance required at first engine change after receipt of parts but not later than June 1, 1952. \n\n\tIn order to increase the strength of the wing flap operating link assembly at wing Station 281, and to replace the temporary reworks of the present links as outlined in Douglas General Service Letter DC-6 No. 60, the following should be accomplished: \n\n\t\t(a)\tReplace wing flap operating link assembly, P/N 4330069, with new heavier link, P/N 4393814. \n\n\t\t(b)\tVisually inspect 4330069 links every 60 hours of operation until replacement per item (a), is accomplished. If links have been reworked and shotpeened per Douglas General Service Letter DC-6 No. 60, inspect every 500 hours of operation until replacement is made. \n\n\t(Douglas General Service Letter DC-6 No. 60 covers this same subject.)
92-06-03: 92-06-03 BOEING: Amendment 39-8183. Docket 91-NM-49-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: Model 747 series airplanes, line number 696 and subsequent; equipped with evacuation system packboards and cover assemblies identified in the Boeing Service Bulletin 747-25-2807, Revision 2, dated August 22, 1991, and Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747- 25A2889, dated November 1, 1990; certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo provide satisfactory reliability of the evacuation system, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tFor evacuation system packboard and cover assemblies identified in either Boeing Service Bulletin 747-25-2807, Revision 2, dated August 22, 1991, or Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-25A2889, dated November 1, 1990: Within the next 120 days after the effective date of this AD, inspect the evacuation system packboard and cover assemblies in accordance with Part III, "Accomplishment Instructions," Paragraph B., of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-25A2889, dated November 1, 1990. \n\n\t\t(1)\tIf the inspection reveals that the angle measured is 155 degrees or greater, prior to further flight, modify the packboard and cover assemblies in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-25A2889, dated November 1, 1990, and Boeing Service Bulletin 747-25-2807, Revision 2, dated August 22, 1991, as applicable. \n\n\t\t(2)\tIf the inspection reveals that the angle measured is less than 155 degrees, within the next 15 months after the effective date of this AD, modify the packboard and cover assemblies in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-25A2889, dated November 1, 1990, and Boeing Service Bulletin 747-25-2807, Revision 2, dated August 22, 1991, as applicable. \n\n\t(b)\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. \n\n\tNOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Seattle ACO. \n\n\t(c)\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\t(d)\tThe inspection and modification shall be done in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-25A2889, dated November 1, 1990; and Boeing Service Bulletin 747-25- 2807, Revision 2, dated August 22, 1991, which contains the following list of effective pages: \n\n\nPage Number\nRevision Level\nDate\n1, 3-4\n2\nAugust 22, 1991 \n2, 5, 7, 8,\n17-18 \n1\nJuly 25, 1991\n6, 9-16\t\n(original)\nDecember 7, 1989 \n\nThis incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from Boeing Commercial Airplane Group. P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 1100 L Street NW., Room 8401, Washington, DC. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective on April 21, 1992.
2009-18-13: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Evidence from development testing and flight test Trent 900 engines has identified cracking on some HP Turbine Nozzle Guide Vane (NGV) Convex Surfaces. Analysis of test data and review of the manufacturing process has revealed compounding effects that may contribute to a shortfall in component life and an increased likelihood of premature cracking in this region. Excessive cracking on the Convex Surface may lead to the release of NGV material or the blockage of Turbine gas flow. This results in a risk of fracture to the HP Turbine Blade. We are issuing this AD to prevent the release of a high-pressure (HP) turbine blade, which could result in an engine power loss or in- flight shut down of one or more engines, resulting in an inability to continue safe flight.
80-22-51: 80-22-51 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-4080. Applies to DC-10-10, DC-10-30, and DC-10-40 airplanes certificated in all categories with Walter Kidde fire extinguisher systems installed. Compliance required as noted in the body of this AD, unless already accomplished. To prevent the loss of fire fighting capability due to failure of the Walter Kidde fire extinguisher cartridge P/N 876296-01E to discharge the fire extinguishing agent container, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tInspect and replace as necessary each cartridge installed in the engine, APU, and cargo fire extinguishing systems of aircraft with fuselage numbers 323 through 335, and fuselage number 337 in accordance with paragraphs C and D below prior to further flight unless already accomplished. \n\n\tB.\tFor all other DC-10 series airplanes, determine within 24 hours following the effective date of this AD, which aircraft have had Walter Kidde fire extinguishing systems repairs or replacements since January 1, 1980.For those aircraft on which repairs or replacements have been made, inspect and replace as necessary each cartridge installed in the engine, APU, and cargo fire extinguishing systems in accordance with paragraphs C and D below prior to further flight, unless already accomplished. \n\n\tC.\tIdentify date stamp and lot number located on the wrench flats of the cartridge. \n\n\t\t1.\tCartridges with date and lot number prior to calendar year 1980 (XX-80) are acceptable and need not be removed. Document the inspection by use of an inspection record such as Aircraft Log Book or in the maintenance records of the aircraft. No further action is required. \n\n\t\t2.\tIf either date is calendar year 1980 (XX-80), remove the cartridge and inspect for part number. If the part number indicated by rubber stamp on the inside shank is "01E,", remove from service and dispose of in a proper manner. If the part is identified as "D" on the shank or P/N 876296 (basic P/N), these cartridges may be reinstalledper maintenance procedures and returned to service. \n\n\tD.\tReplace defective cartridges with cartridges having acceptable part numbers. \n\n\t\t1.\tFor cargo installations, aircraft may be dispatched without cargo in affected compartment. Placard cargo compartment unusable if appropriate cartridges are not available. \n\n\t\t2.\tAPU installation may be placarded inoperative if appropriate cartridges are not available. \n\n\tE.\tAll P/Ns 876296-01E should be removed from stock and properly disposed of or returned to vendor. \n\n\tF.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with Sections 21.197 and 21.199 or Part 21 of the Federal Aviation Regulations to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of inspections required by this AD. \n\n\tG.\tAlternative means of compliance or other actions which provide an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Chief, Los Angeles Area Aircraft Certification Office, FAA Northwest Region. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effectiveApril 20, 1981 to all persons, except those to whom it was made immediately effective by telegram dated October 18, 1980.
2021-20-06: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Airbus Helicopters Model AS355E, AS355F, AS355F1, and AS355F2 helicopters. This AD was prompted by multiple fatigue cracks in power turbine (PT) 3rd stage wheels. This AD requires revising the existing Rotorcraft Flight Manual (RFM) for your helicopter and installing a placard. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2006-16-15: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD), which applies to certain McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11 series airplanes. That AD currently requires a revision of the airplane flight manual (AFM) to alert the flightcrew that both flight management computers (FMCs) must be installed and operational. That AD also requires an inspection to determine the serial number of the FMCs; and follow-on corrective actions, if necessary, which terminate the AFM revision. That AD also requires an inspection to verify if a certain modification is on the identification plates of the FMCs; and applicable follow-on and corrective actions. This new AD requires installation of upgraded FMC software, which would terminate the existing AD. This new AD also adds airplanes to the applicability, including adding Model MD-10-10F and MD-10-30F airplanes. This AD results from a report that the FMC does not acknowledge the pre-set glareshield control panel (GCP) altitude when profile (PROF)mode is engaged in descent mode. We are issuing this AD to prevent the un-commanded descent of an airplane below the selected level-off altitude, which could result in an unacceptable reduction in the separation between the airplane and nearby air traffic or terrain.
75-23-09: 75-23-09 BOEING: Amendment 39-2420. Applies to all Boeing 747-200C and 747-200F series airplanes certificated in all categories. Compliance required as indicated. \n\tIn addition to the door warning light procedures in Boeing B-747 Operations Manual Bulletin 74-13, the following procedures are required to provide assurance of latch system integrity. Before further flight, and thereafter following each nose cargo door operation, accomplish the following: \n\tA.\tClose door electrically or manually until each latch pin is extended and the green, latches closed, light is illuminated on the nose door control panel at the loadmaster's station. \n\tB.\tPull and collar circuit breakers C1407/28V DC "control nose cargo door." Circuit breakers are located on the P15 panel on the right hand side of the electronics bay. Access to this area is either from the ground through the electronics bay hatch or through the main deck floor. Optional to pulling and collaring C1407 and C1572 circuit breakers, pull and collar C1629, C1630, C1631, C1632, C1633, and C1634 circuit breakers on the H122 cargo door power panel. \n\tC.\tPlacard the nose door control panel H121 and the nose wheel well control panel P37, "POWER REMOVED PER AD - CIRCUIT BREAKERS C1407 AND C1572 PULLED:" If optional circuit breakers procedure is used, placard the H122 cargo door power panel, "POWER REMOVED - CIRCUIT BREAKERS PULLED." \n\tD.\tVerify that all 16 latches are closed for dispatch by noting that each latch pin is fully extended into the latch fitting, per Boeing B-747 Dispatch Deviation Procedures Guide, Document D6-33391, page 2.52.6B, View B. \n\tBoeing Service Bulletin 747-52-2117 will be released in the near future which will give instructions for the modification of the nose cargo door latch and lock system. Incorporation of this FAA approved modification will constitute terminating action under the inspection provisions of this AD. \n\tThe manufacturer's specifications and procedures identified and described in this directive are incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5. U.S.C. 552 (a)(1). \n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Boeing Commercial Airplane Company, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. The documents may also be examined at FAA Northwest Region, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective upon publication in the Federal Register for all persons except those to whom it was made effective immediately by telegram dated October 23, 1975.