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47-47-10: 47-47-10 REPUBLIC: (Was Mandatory Note 13 of AD-769-2.) Applies to Model RC-3 Aircraft. Compliance required prior to February 1, 1948. To prevent possible float strut failures during rough water landings, install wing reinforcing angles 17W21028, float strut brace assemblies 17W22013, spacers 17W22011 and lugs 17W22010. (Republic Service Bulletin No. 19 dated September 9, 1947, covers this same subject.)
60-17-03 R1: 60-17-03 R1 SIKORSKY: Amendment 191 as amended by Amendment 495, Amendment 747, Amendment 199, Amendment 39-1552, Amendment 39-2212, and Amendment 39-2743 is further amended by Amendment 39-6097. Applicability: All S-58 series helicopters. (Docket No. 88-ASW-49) Compliance: Required as indicated unless already accomplished. As a result of a fatigue failure of the main rotor blade spar the following must be accomplished: (a) All main rotor blade assemblies (less cuff) P/N's S1615-20100, -2, -4, -5, -6, S1615-20201-1, -2, -7, -8, -13 and -14, with 1,330 or more hours' time in service shall be removed from service before further flight. (b) An X-ray inspection covering the complete cross sectional area of the spar from the root section to the tip of the blade must be conducted for cracks, internal flaws on inclusions in the material of the spar on all main rotor blade assemblies P/N'S S1615-20100, -2, -4, -5, -6, S1615-20201-1, -2, -7, -8, -13, -14, within the following time specified: (1) All main rotor blades with 800 or more hours' time in service, prior to the next flight. (2) All main rotor blades with less than 800 hours' time in service, within the next 100 hours' time in service except no rotor blade shall exceed 800 hours' time in service before X-ray inspection is conducted. (c) Pending completion of the X-ray inspection in paragraph (b)(2), a daily visual inspection must be conducted on the spar of all blades with 500 or more hours' time in service as follows: (1) Using a magnifying glass of not less than 8-power, inspect the external surface of the spar from the root section to the tip of the blade for cracks. (2) Inspection of the upper surface of the spar must be conducted with the blade in normal static position. (3) Inspection of the lower surface of the spar must be conducted by disconnecting the pitch controls and rotating the blade 180 degrees in pitch so that the surface beinginspected is in tension due to the blades own dead weight. (d) If any cracks, internal flaws or inclusions are found in the spar material the blade must be replaced prior to further flight. (e) The service life limit specified in (a) may be extended to 3,200 hours' total time in service for S1615-20201-7, -8, and -14 main rotor blade assemblies (less cuff) and S1615-20100, -2, -4, -5, -6, S1615-20201-1, -2, and -13 main rotor blade assemblies modified to S1615-20201-7, -8, or -14 assemblies, provided the blade assemblies are inspected at the times and in the manner set forth in Sikorsky Service Bulletin No. 58B15-4K, dated July 16, 1976 or later FAA approved revisions and, if low pressure is indicated, the cause is determined and corrected before further flight in accordance with that service bulletin. NOTE: The check for black or red color indication on the pressure indicator for the main rotor blades, as specified in Part IV (Items 1 and 2) of the accomplishment instructions of Sikorsky Service Bulletin No. 58B15-4, may be accomplished by a properly trained pilot. Results of the requirements of checks must be recorded in accordance with the requirements of FAR Section 43.9. (f) Upon request an alternate means of compliance which provides an equivalent level of safety with the requirements of this AD may be used when approved by the Manager, Rotorcraft Standards Staff, Aircraft Certification Service, ASW-110, FAA, Fort Worth, Texas 76193-0110. (g) In accordance with Sections 21.197 and 21.199, the helicopter may be flown to a base where compliance may be accomplished. This amendment amends Amendment 191 (25 FR 8026), AD 60-17-03, as amended by Amendment 495 (27 FR 10117), Amendment 747 (29 FR 7668), Amendment 199 (31 FR 3064), and Amendment 39-1552 (37 FR 23711), Amendment 39-2212 (40 FR 22249), and Amendment 39-2743 (41 FR 44998) which was effective October 26, 1976. This amendment (39-6097, AD 60-17-03 R1) becomes effective February 2, 1989.
2015-23-08: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 737-100,-200,-200C,-300,-400, and -500 series airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of cracks in fuselage frames, and a report of a missing strap that was not installed on a fuselage frame during production. This AD requires an inspection to determine if the strap adjacent to a certain stringer is installed, and repair if it is missing; repetitive inspections of the frame for cracking or a severed frame web; and related investigative and corrective actions if necessary. This AD also provides optional actions to terminate certain repetitive inspections. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct missing fuselage frame straps and frame cracking that can result in severed frames which, with multiple adjacent severed frames, or the combination of a severed frame and fuselage skin chemical mill cracks, can result in uncontrolled decompression of the airplane.
2010-20-14: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Model DC-10-10, DC-10-10F, DC-10-15, DC-10-30, DC-10-30F (KC-10A and KDC-10), DC-10-40, DC-10-40F, MD-10-10F, MD-10-30F, MD-11, and MD-11F airplanes. This AD requires installing an in-line fuse in certain float level switches and sleeving the wires between the fuel tank and the in- line fuse. For certain airplanes, this AD also requires installing an in-line fuse in certain fuel pump pressure switches. This AD results from fuel system reviews conducted by the manufacturer. We are issuing this AD to prevent fuel tank explosions and consequent loss of the airplane.
2000-19-03: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to certain EMBRAER Model EMB-135 and EMB-145 series airplanes. This action requires a one-time inspection of the coupling hinge and locking fastener of the Gamah couplings of the fuel system tubing located in the wing dry bay to detect discrepancies, and follow-on corrective actions. This action is necessary to prevent failure of the rivets of the Gamah couplings and consequent separation of a Gamah coupling, which could result in fuel leakage and consequent fire in or around the wing. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
80-19-09 R1: 80-19-09 R1 GATES LEARJET: Amendment 39-3913 as amended by Amendment 39-3998. Applies to the following Model 23, 24, 25, 28, 29, 35 and 36 series airplanes certificated in all categories: Model Serial Numbers *23 (equipped with jet pumps) 23-003 thru 23-099 24 24-100 thru 24-357 25 25-003 thru 25-319 28 28-001 thru 28-005 29 29-001 and 29-002 35 35-001 thru 35-348 36 36-001 thru 36-045 *NOTE: Model 23 airplanes were not equipped with jet pumps when manufactured. Model 23 airplanes which have been retrofitted with jet pumps in the field will be so identified on the title page of the Airplane Flight Manual. COMPLIANCE: Required as indicated unless already accomplished. To reduce the possibility of fuel contamination and/or the presence of ignition sources in the tailcone service area, accomplish the following: A) Within the next 25 hours time-in-service after May 8, 1980: 1. Run each engine to takeoff thrust momentarily, shut downand immediately open the access cover under the tailcone service area and make the following visual inspections: a. Inspect the fuel and hydraulic system components for deterioration or damage, leakage and stains indicating leakage, paying particular attention to the exterior of the P/N AV16E1182 motive flow shutoff valves. b. Inspect the batteries and electrical equipment for deterioration or damage and conditions which may cause arcing. c. Inspect all vents and drains for obstruction or blockage. d. Before further flight, correct any of the above-noted unsatisfactory conditions. Do not disassemble or reassemble motive flow shutoff valves in the field. Replace leaking valves with a new or factory rebuilt part. 2. Remove the Temporary Airplane Flight Manual Supplement, included in AD 80-09-06 as Figure 1, in the existing Airplane Flight Manual and in place thereof, install Temporary Airplane Flight Manual Supplement, included in this AD as Figure 1A, and comply with its instructions. B) On or before February 13, 1981, install Gates Learjet motive flow valve shrouds and drain lines per Modification Kit No. AMK 80-7. After accomplishing this modification, remove the Temporary Airplane Flight Manual Supplement required by Paragraph A)2. C) Airplanes may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a location where the provisions of this AD can be accomplished. D) Any equivalent method of compliance with this AD must be approved by the Chief, Aircraft Certification Program Office, Room 238, Terminal Building 2299, Mid-Continent Airport, Wichita, Kansas 67209; Telephone (316) 942-4285. This AD supersedes AD 80-09-06, Amendment 39-3764. Amendment 39-3913 became effective September 15, 1980. This amendment 39-3998 becomes effective December 11, 1980. FIGURE 1A TEMPORARY AIRPLANE FLIGHT MANUAL SUPPLEMENT FOR GATES LEARJET MODELS 23, 24, 25 , 28, 29, 35 AND 36 SERIES AIRPLANES (AD 80-19-09 requires this supplement to remain in the below designated Airplane Flight Manual until replaced by an equivalent Gates Learjet Company Flight Manual Supplement.) Model ________ N ________ S/N ________ In addition to the presently specified post-flight procedures, immediately after the engines are shut down, open the access cover under the tailcone service area and accomplish the following, using a flashlight or supplemental light as necessary for adequate illumination. 1. Check the motive flow valves for leaks or stains indicating leaks. 2. Check all vents and drains to assure that they are clean and free from obstruction. 3. Any leaking motive flow valve must be replaced with a new or factory rebuilt part prior to further flight. 4. Secure access cover.
2000-19-04: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to certain Raytheon Aircraft Company (Raytheon) Beech Models 1900C, 1900C (C-12J), and 1900D airplanes. This AD requires you to install a spiral wrap around the wing fuel quantity wiring harness and apply an adhesive sealant to the Wiggins couplings on the internal fuel tank wiring carry-through conduit. This AD is the result of reports of chafed or shorted wing fuel quantity harness wires on the affected airplanes. These occurrences were found during regular maintenance inspections. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent chafing between the wing fuel quantity wiring harness and the internal wing harness supports at each wing rib location, which could cause the fuel quantity indication to become unreliable. This could leave the flight crew without an indication of the amount of fuel the airplane has during flight. The actions are also intended to prevent fuel from leaking through the wiring carry-through conduit and into the wing tip or wheel well area, which could lead to a fire or explosion.
2015-23-05: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus Model A330-200, A330-200 Freighter, and A330-300 series airplanes; and Model A340-200 and A340-300 series airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of cracked support strut body ends at a certain frame location of the trimmable horizontal stabilizer (THS). This AD requires repetitive inspections for cracking of the strut ends of the THS support located at a certain frame in the tail cone, and replacement if necessary; and reinstallation or installation of reinforcing clamps on certain strut ends. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct cracked support strut body ends of the THS, which could lead to the loss of all four THS support struts, making the remaining structure unable to carry limit loads, resulting in the loss of the horizontal tail plane.
2010-20-19: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Two cases of a crack on a "dry'' ADG [air driven generator] (Hamilton Sundstrand part number in the 761339 series), in the aft area of the strut and generator housing assembly, have been reported on CL-600-2B19 aircraft. The same part is also installed on CL-600- 2C10, -2D15 and -2D24 aircraft. Investigation determined that the crack was in an area of the strut where the wall thickness of the casting was below specification, due to a manufacturing anomaly in a specific batch of ADGs. Structural failure and departure of the ADG during deployment could possibly result in damage to the aircraft structure. If deployment was activated by a dual engine shutdown, ADG structural failure would also result in loss of hydraulics for the flight controls. * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2000-18-12: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to all Polskie Zaklady Lotnicze Spolka zo.o. (PZL-Mielac) Models PZL M18, PZL M18A, and PZL M18B airplanes. This AD requires you to repetitively inspect the centerwing-to-outboard wing attach joints for cracks in the lugs, corrosion in the main holes, and ovalization of the main holes; repair corrosion and apply anti-corrosion protection; replace the wing attach joints, as necessary; and eliminate any ovalization of the wing main joint holes. This AD is the result two instances of in-flight wing separation on Model PZL M18A airplanes where severe corrosion and pitting led to high stress concentrations on the wing attachment joints. The actions specified by this AD are intended to detect and correct cracks in the lugs, corrosion in the main holes, and ovalization of the main holes, in the centerwing-to-outboard wing attach joints. Such damage could result in failure of the joints with consequent in-flight wing separation.