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91-02-03: 91-02-03 BOEING: Amendment 39-6853. Docket No. 90-NM-270-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: Model 767 series airplanes, listed in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767- 29A0054, dated March 26, 1990, and airplanes line numbers 308 and 311, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent fire caused by the chafing of wires on hydraulic components, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tFor airplanes listed in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-29A0054, dated March 26, 1990: Within 500 hours time-in-service after July 2, 1990 (the effective date of Amendment 39-6633, AD 90-13-06), perform the procedures required by paragraph C. of this AD. \n\n\tB.\tFor airplanes line numbers 308 and 311: Within 500 hours time-in-service after the effective date of this AD, perform the procedures required by paragraph C. of this AD. \n\n\tC.\tInspect the wire bundles in the aft fairing areas of the left and right engine struts to determine if sufficient separation exists between the wire bundles and hydraulic components, in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-29A0054, dated March 26, 1990; Revision 1, dated May 24, 1990; or Revision 2, dated November 8, 1990. If adequate separation is not present, prior to further flight, repair, adjust the wire bundles, and install protective coverings on the wiring and hydraulic tubing in accordance with the Alert Service Bulletin. \n\n\tD.\tAn alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. \n\n\tNOTE: The request should be submitted directly to the Manager, Seattle ACO, and a copy sent to the cognizant FAA Principal Inspector (PI). The PI will then forward comments or concurrence to the Seattle ACO. \n\n\tE.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operateairplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service information from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Boeing Commercial Airplanes, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. This information may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington. \n\n\tAirworthiness Directive 91-02-03 supersedes AD 90-13-06, Amendment 39-6633. \n\tThis amendment (39-6853, AD 91-02-03) becomes effective on January 14, 1991.
95-03-10: This document publishes in the Federal Register an amendment adopting airworthiness directive (AD) 95-03-10 that was sent previously to all known U.S. owners and operators of Textron Lycoming O-235 series reciprocating engines by individual letters. This AD requires a one-time inspection within the next 5 hours time in service to determine the part number (P/N) and revision letter of the push rod installed on the engine. All push rods with P/N 73806 and revision letters "V" or "W" must be replaced with serviceable parts. This amendment is prompted by reports of several failures of push rods. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent engine roughness and power loss, which could result in loss of the aircraft.
95-26-05: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to Robinson Helicopter Company (RHC) Model R44 helicopters, that currently requires revisions to the Limitations section, the Normal Procedures section, and the Emergency Procedures section of the R44 Rotorcraft Flight Manual, revised September 6, 1994. These revisions limit operations in high winds and turbulence; provide information about main rotor (M/R) stall and mast bumping; and provide recommendations for avoiding these situations. Additionally, emergency procedures are provided for use should certain conditions be encountered. This action would require similar revisions to the Limitations, Normal Procedures and Emergency Procedures sections required by the existing AD, but the revision to the Limitations section would prohibit only pilots without a certain level of experience and training from operating in the flight conditions specified. This action is prompted by data that indicates pilots who possess a certain level of experience and training are more able to recognize and react to the adverse meteorological conditions specified in the AD. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent M/R stall or mast bumping, which could result in the M/R blades contacting the fuselage causing failure of the M/R system and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
2010-23-18: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: During inspection in production and on in-service aircraft, a number of OverHeat Detection System (OHDS) installation non- conformities have been identified along the bleed air ducting. Some installation issues which may lead to a degraded leak detection capability have been reported. In case of hot air leakage, the potential degradation of the OHDS would not allow preventing damages to structure or components, and therefore could lead to an unsafe condition. * * * * * Nonconforming installation or a failure of the OHDS could allow undetected leakage of bleed air from the hot engine/auxiliary power unit causing damage to the airplane structure and various airplane components and systems. This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.
76-03-03: 76-03-03 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-2509. Applies to Models DC-10-10, DC-10-10F, DC-10-30, DC-10-30F and DC-10-40 airplanes, certificated in all categories. \n\n\tCompliance required as indicated. \n\n\tTo prevent possible jamming of the spoiler handle subsequent to ground spoiler deployment, accomplish the following: \n\n\tPART I. On those airplanes which incorporate a spoiler control assembly P/N ABH 7220-505 or ABH 7220-507 that has not been modified in accordance with McDonnell Douglas DC-10 Service Bulletin No. 27-119, dated May 29, 1975, or later FAA-approved revisions: \n\n\t(a)\tWithin 300 hours' additional time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, either \n\n\t\t(1)\tDeactivate the autospoilers and placard them inoperative per McDonnell Douglas AOL 10-108, Revision "C", or later FAA-approved revisions; or \n\n\t\t(2)\tPerform the functional check described in paragraph (3), below, and the corrective action set forth at paragraph (4), below, as necessary. \n\n\t\t(3)\tThe functional check is to determine if a condition exists where the spoiler handle cannot be disarmed and retracted subsequent to automatic ground spoiler deployment. The check is to be performed while the aircraft is on the ground. All three hydraulic systems must be pressurized for this check, and the flaps must be positioned to 25 degrees or less. \n\n\t\t\t(i)\tPlace all 3 throttle levers at the idle position. Place the spoiler/speedbrake lever at the retract position, and lift up to arm the spoiler/speedbrake lever, \n\n\t\t\t(ii)\tLift number 1 and 3 engine reverse levers to the reverse thrust position. Observe that the spoiler/speedbrake lever is driven aft and latches in the ground spoiler detent. \n\n\t\t\t(iii)\tAdvance number 2 engine throttle lever to at least 2 1/2 inches forward of the idle stop. Observe that the spoiler/speedbrake lever drops downward to unlatch from the ground spoiler detent and retracts completely and disarms as a result of number 2engine throttle advancement. \n\n\t\t(4)\tIf the spoiler/speedbrake lever does not react as indicated in the functional check specified in paragraph (3), prior to further flight either deactivate and placard the auto-spoilers inoperative per McDonnell Douglas AOL 10-108, Revision "C", or later FAA-approved revision or modify the speedbrake module assembly, as applicable, in accordance with McDonnell Douglas DC-10 Service Bulletin No. 27-52, dated May 23, 1973, and McDonnell Douglas DC-10 Service Bulletin No. 27-51, Revision 1, dated September 23, 1975, or later FAA-approved revisions, or an equivalent modification approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. \n\n\t(b)\tAfter the effective date of this AD, each time the unmodified speedbrake module assembly undergoes maintenance, prior to further flight conduct the functional check specified in paragraph (a). \n\n\t(c)\tAfter the effective date of this AD, prior to installation on an airplane, a spare speedbrake module assembly must be modified, as applicable, in accordance with McDonnell Douglas DC-10 Service Bulletin No. 27-52, dated May 23, 1973, and McDonnell Douglas DC-10 Service Bulletin No. 27-51, Revision 1, dated September 23, 1975, or later FAA-approved revisions, or an equivalent modification approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. \n\n\tPART II. On all airplanes: \n\n\t(a)\tWithin the next 4000 hours' additional time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, identify and remove speedbrake module assembly P/N ABH 7178-505, ABH 7178-509 or ABH 7178-511, if installed, and replace with P/N ABH 7178-517, ABH 7178-519, ABH 7178-521, ABH 7178-523, or other part approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. Following accomplishment of this action, the specified functional check requirements of paragraph (a)(3) in Part I of this AD may be discontinued. Thereafter normal maintenance procedures areto be followed. \n\n\tSpecial flight permits may be issued under FAR 21.197 and 21.199 for the purpose of operating the aircraft to a base to perform the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective February 17, 1976.
43-12-01: 43-12-01 DOUGLAS: (Was Service Note 4 of AD-669-3.) Applies to DC3A aircraft. \n\n\tAt each periodic inspection, check the elevator hinge brackets and if cracks are present the brackets should be replaced. Due to the possibility of vibration causing fatigue failures, continuous operation of the airplanes in the range of engine speeds between 1,300 and 1,600 r.p.m. should be avoided. A minimum engine speed of 1,700 r.p.m. during cruising flight is recommended. \n\n\t(Douglas Service Letter dated January 15, 1943, covers this same subject.)
2010-23-16: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: It has been found the occurrences of failure of the Flow Control Shutoff Valve (FCSOV) in the closed position. Failure of the two valves (left and right) can cause the loss of the pneumatic source, and lead to loss of the cabin pressurization. Since this condition affects flight safety, a corrective action is required. Thus, sufficient reason exists to request compliance with this AD. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2010-23-04: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: \n\n\tSeveral reports have been received of cracked nacelle attachment fittings. The preliminary investigation determined the cause to be stress corrosion. Stress corrosion cracking could compromise the structural integrity of the nacelle attachment fitting and could adversely affect the safe landing of the aeroplane. \n\nFailure of the fitting could result in collapse of the landing gear. This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.
91-15-11: 91-15-11 BOEING: Amendment 39-7075. Docket No. 91-NM-128-AD. Supersedes AD 91-11-08. \n\n\tApplicability: Model 767-200 and 767-300 series airplanes, listed in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767- 28A0036, dated May 3, 1991, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent, during dry pump operation, a potential ignition source in the center wing tanks due to a broken pumping unit diffuser ring, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tWithin the next 30 days after June 30, 1991 (the effective date of Amendment 39-7005), inspect the center wing tank pumping units, part number 5006286, in accordance with the procedures of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-28A0036, dated May 3, 1991. \n\n\t\t(1)\tIf diffuser assembly brazed joints are found to be acceptable, reidentify and reinstall the pumping unit in accordance with the service bulletin. \n\n\t\t(2)\tIf the brazed joints are determined to be discrepant as indicated by the inspection procedure, repair or replace the diffuser assembly in accordance with the service bulletin prior to reinstallation of the pumping unit. \n\n\t(b)\tExcept for center wing tank pumping units that are inspected and found to be acceptable in accordance with paragraph (a)(1) of this AD, within 30 days after the effective date of this AD, inspect the airplane or airplane records to determine if the center wing tank pumping units are suspect, in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-28A0036, Revision 1, dated June 11, 1991. \n\n\t\t(1)\tIf a pumping unit is suspect, prior to further flight, inspect the diffuser assembly brazed joints in accordance with the service bulletin. \n\n\t\t\t(i)\tIf the diffuser assembly brazed joints are found to be acceptable, reidentify and reinstall the pumping unit in accordance with the service bulletin. \n\n\t\t\t(ii)\tIf the brazed joints are determined to be discrepant as indicated by the inspection procedure, repair or replace the diffuser assemblyin accordance with the service bulletin prior to reinstallation of the pumping unit. \n\n\t\t(2)\tIf the pumping unit is not one listed as suspect, no further action is required. \n\n\t(c)\tIn lieu of performing the inspection, repair, and/or replacement described in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this AD, deactivate the center wing fuel tank in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-28A0036, dated May 3, 1991, or Revision 1, dated June 11, 1991. The tank may be reactivated only following completion of the inspections, repairs, and/or replacement required by paragraphs (a) and (b) of this AD. \n\n\t(d)\tWithin 45 days after the effective date of this AD, submit a report of findings of discrepancies detected by the inspection required by paragraphs (a) and (b) of this AD, to the Manager, Seattle Manufacturing Inspection District Office, ANM-108S, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056; fax (206) 227-1181. Include the pump serial numberand affected airplane line or serial number in the report. Information collection requirements contained in this regulation have been approved by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (P.L. 96- 511) and have been assigned OMB Control Number 2120-0056. \n\n\t(e)\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. \n\n\tNOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Seattle ACO. \n\n\t(f)\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\t(g)\tThe inspection, repair, and replacement requirements shall be done in accordance withBoeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-28A0036, Revision 1, dated June 11, 1991. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington, or at the Office of the Federal Register, 1100 L Street NW., Room 8401, Washington, D.C. \n\n\tAirworthiness Directive 91-15-11, supersedes AD 91-11-08, Amendment 39-7005. \n\tThis amendment (39-7075, AD 91-15-11) becomes effective on August 2, 1991.
95-26-04: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to Robinson Helicopter Company (RHC) Model R22 helicopters, that currently requires revisions to the Limitations section, the Normal Procedures section, and the Emergency Procedures section of the R22 Rotorcraft Flight Manual, revised February 4, 1993. These revisions limit operations in high winds and turbulence; provide information about main rotor (M/R) stall and mast bumping; and provide recommendations for avoiding these situations. Additionally, emergency procedures are provided for use should certain conditions be encountered. This action would require similar revisions to the Limitations, Normal Procedures and Emergency Procedures sections required by the existing AD, but the revision to the Limitations section would prohibit only pilots without a certain level of experience and training from operating in the flight conditions specified. This action is prompted by data that indicates pilots who possess a certain level of experience and training are more able to recognize and react to the adverse meteorological conditions specified in the AD. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent M/R stall or mast bumping, which could result in the M/R blades contacting the fuselage causing failure of the M/R system and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.