Results
94-15-09: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to all Aerospatiale Model ATR72 series airplanes. This action requires inspections to detect damage, corrosion, or cracking of the hinge pin on each shock absorber on the main landing gear (MLG), and repair or replacement of the pins, if necessary. This amendment is prompted by reports of rupture of certain hinge pins due to stress corrosion of the pins in the shock absorber on the MLG on Model ATR72 series airplanes. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent loss of the MLG during a hard landing due to malfunction of the shock absorber on the MLG.
93-21-05: 93-21-05 AEROSPATIALE: Amendment 39-8719. Docket 93-NM-54-AD. Applicability: Model ATR42-200 and -300 series airplanes, serial numbers 3 through 179 inclusive; certificated in any category. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. To prevent a severe out-of-trim condition, which could lead to reduced controllability of the airplane, accomplish the following: (a) Within 6 months after the effective date of this AD, modify the autopilot disengagement wiring located at shelf 82VU, in accordance with Aerospatiale Service Bulletin ATR42-22-0012, dated April 2, 1990; or Revision 1, dated October 12, 1992. (b) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113. NOTE: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Standardization Branch, ANM-113. (c) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. (d) The modification shall be done in accordance with Aerospatiale Service Bulletin ATR42-22-0012, dated April 2, 1990; or Aerospatiale Service Bulletin ATR42-22-0012, Revision 1, dated October 12, 1992. Revision 1 of Aerospatiale Service Bulletin ATR42-22-0012 contains the following list of effective pages: Page Number Revision Level Shown on Page Date Shown on Page 1-4, 7-8 1 October 12, 1992 5-6 Original April 2, 1990 This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from Aerospatiale, 316 Route de Bayonne, 31060 Toulouse, Cedex 03, France. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC. (e) This amendment becomes effective on December 13, 1993.
2009-15-16 R1: The FAA is revising an existing airworthiness directive (AD), which applies to all McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9-10 series airplanes, DC-9-30 series airplanes, DC-9-81 (MD-81) airplanes, DC-9-82 (MD-82) airplanes, DC-9-83 (MD-83) airplanes, DC-9-87 (MD-87) airplanes, MD-88 airplanes, and MD-90-30 airplanes. That AD currently requires modifying the flight deck door. This AD revises the applicability by removing certain airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report indicating that certain equipment of the flight deck door is defective. We are issuing this AD to prevent failure of this equipment, which could jeopardize flight safety. \n\nDATES: This AD is effective August 5, 2010, to all persons except those persons to whom it was made immediately effective by AD 2009-15-16, issued July 15, 2009, which contained the requirements of this amendment. \n\tThe Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of a certain publication listed in the AD as of August 5,2010. \n\tOn July 6, 2010 (75 FR 38017, July 1, 2010), the Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of a certain other publication listed in the AD. \n\tWe must receive any comments on this AD by September 20, 2010.
2010-16-04: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Model 767-200, -300, and -300F series airplanes. This AD requires inspecting to verify the part number of the low-pressure flex-hoses of the flightcrew and supernumerary oxygen system installed under the oxygen mask stowage box at flightcrew and supernumerary oxygen mask locations, and replacing the flex-hose with a new non-conductive low- pressure flex-hose if necessary. This AD results from reports of low- pressure flex-hoses of the flightcrew oxygen system that burned through due to inadvertent electrical current from a short circuit in an adjacent audio select panel. We are issuing this AD to prevent inadvertent electrical current, which can cause the low-pressure flex- hoses used in the flightcrew and supernumerary oxygen systems to melt or burn, resulting in oxygen system leakage and smoke or fire.
86-17-06: 86-17-06 ALLISON GAS TURBINE DIVISION, GENERAL MOTORS CORP. (Allison, formerly Detroit Diesel Allison): Amendment 39-5370. Applies to Allison 501-D13, -D13A, -D13D, and -D13H engine reduction gear assemblies equipped with thrust sensitive switch assembly, P/N's 6792891, 6794122, 6794359, 6807776, 23005483, or 23005485. Compliance is required within 60 days after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. To prevent the possibility of unwanted autofeather or the inability to autofeather when required, accomplish the following: Replace thrust sensitive switch assemblies, P/N's 6792891, 6794122, 6794359, 6807776, 23005483, and 23005485 with P/N 6870559, a single carbon contact switch assembly, in accordance with the detailed instructions provided in Allison Commercial Engine Alert Bulletin CEB-A-73-84, Revision 2, dated October 1, 1984, or FAA approved equivalent. Aircraft may be ferried in accordance with the provisions of FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to a base where the AD can be accomplished. Upon request, an equivalent means of compliance with the requirements of this AD may be approved by the Manager, Chicago Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, 2300 East Devon Avenue, Des Plaines, Illinois 60018. Upon submission of substantiating data by an owner or operator through an FAA maintenance inspector, the Manager, Chicago Aircraft Certification Office, may adjust the compliance time specified in this AD. Allison Commercial Engine Alert Bulletin CEB-A-73-84, Revision 2, dated October 1, 1984, identified and described in this document, is incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1). All persons affected by this directive who have not already received this document from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Allison Gas Turbine Division, General Motors Corp., P.O. Box 420, Indianapolis, Indiana 46206-0420. This document also may be examined at the Office of the Regional Counsel, FAA, ATTN: Rules Docket No. 82-ANE-50, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, Massachusetts 01803 and may be examined weekdays, except Federal holidays, between 8:00 a.m. and 4:30 p.m. This amendment becomes effective on September 15, 1986.
2010-16-01: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an airworthiness authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The earlier MCAI, Brazilian Airworthiness Directive 2007-08-02, effective September 27, 2007, describes the unsafe condition as: Fuel system reassessment, performed according to RBHA-E88/SFAR- 88 (Regulamento Brasileiro de Homologacao Aeronautica 88/Special Federal Aviation Regulation No. 88), requires the inclusion of new maintenance tasks in the Critical Design Configuration Control Limitations (CDCCL) and in the Fuel System Limitations (FSL), necessary to preclude ignition sources in the fuel system. * * * The new MCAI, Brazilian Airworthiness Directive 2009-08-03, effective August 20, 2009, describes the unsafe condition as: An airplane fuel tank systems review required bySpecial Federal Aviation Regulation Number 88 (SFAR 88) and "RBHA Especial N[uacute]mero 88'' (RBHA E 88) has shown that additional maintenance and inspection instructions are necessary to maintain the design features required to preclude the existence or development of an ignition source within the fuel tanks of the airplane. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products. DATES: This AD becomes effective September 9, 2010. The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in this AD as of September 9, 2010. On July 30, 2008 (73 FR 35904, June 25, 2008), the Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of a certain publication listed in this AD.
2010-15-06: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: During an annual inspection, a water ballast hose connector was found disconnected from the fuselage wall of an Astir CS. The investigation has shown that the hose-fuselage connection bonding has been degraded over years of service. This condition, if not corrected, could lead to the following consequences: --The water contained in the wing tanks could run down into the fuselage and fuselage tail which could cause a displacement of the sailplane centre of gravity and consequently may lead to the loss of the sailplane controllability, or/and --The loosened hose may jam the flight controls (push rods) and consequently may lead to the loss of thesailplane controllability. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
65-19-04: 65-19-04 LOCKHEED: Amdt. 39-124 Part 39 Federal Register August 26, 1965. Applies to Model 1329 Airplanes, Serial Numbers 5001 through 5050. Compliance required within the next 100 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished within the last 20 hours' time in service, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 120 hours' time in service from the last inspection. (a) Inspect and repair as necessary the landing gear emergency extension system in accordance with Lockheed Alert Service Bulletin No. 329-176, dated July 9, 1964, or an FAA-approved equivalent. (b) Inspect the main landing gear inboard door latch rollers and actuating mechanisms for improper action or binding. If improper action or binding is found, disassemble the mechanism, clean and inspect all parts, correct the cause of the improper action or binding, and reassemble the latch mechanisms following the lubrication instructions of Lockheed Handbook of Operating and Maintenance Instruction, SMR-151, Section 12-47. (c) The repetitive inspections required by this AD may be discontinued when the modification described in Lockheed Service Bulletin 329-177 or 329-186, or an FAA-approved equivalent is accomplished. (d) Upon request of an operator, an FAA maintenance inspector, subject to prior approval of the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Southern Region, may adjust the repetitive inspection intervals specified in this AD to permit compliance at an established inspection period of the operator if the request contains substantiating data to justify the increase for such operator. This supersedes AD 64-19-05. This directive effective September 25, 1965.
93-24-07: 93-24-07 CORPORATE JETS LIMITED (FORMERLY BRITISH AEROSPACE, HAWKER SIDDELEY AVIATION, AND DE HAVILLAND AIRCRAFT CO., LTD): Amendment 39-8756. Docket 93-NM-185-AD. Applicability: Model BH/HS 125-600A, HS 125-700A, and BAe 125-800A series airplanes equipped with a Sundstrand Turbomach auxiliary power unit (APU) Model T-62T-39 installed in accordance with Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) SA1923SW; certificated in any category. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. To prevent failure of the sealant installed around the over-temperature sensor located in the fuel control enclosure box of the APU, which could allow any fuel leakage from the APU into the fuel control enclosure box to leak into the aft equipment bay, thus creating a fire hazard, accomplish the following: (a) Within 14 days after the effective date of this AD, deactivate the APU by pulling and collaring in the OFF position the circuit breakers for the APU ignition, APUfuel supply, and the electric power supply for the APU starter circuit. (b) Within 14 days after the effective date of this AD, revise the Limitations Section of the FAA-approved Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) to include the following statement. This may be accomplished by inserting a copy of this AD in the AFM. "Operation of the Sundstrand Turbomach auxiliary power unit Model T-62T-39 installed in accordance with Supplemental Type Certificate SA1923SW is prohibited." (c) Replacement of the sealant installed around the over-temperature sensor located in the fuel control enclosure box of the APU with new sealant, in accordance with Arkansas Aerospace, Inc., Service Bulletin S.B. 49-72-02, Revision 1, dated August 13, 1993, constitutes terminating action for the requirements of paragraphs (a) and (b) of this AD. After such replacement, the APU may be reactivated and the AFM revision may be removed. (d) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliancetime that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Special Certification Office, FAA, Rotorcraft Directorate. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Special Certification Office. NOTE: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Special Certification Office. (e) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. (f) This amendment becomes effective on December 23, 1993.
79-18-07: 79-18-07 MOONEY: Amendment 39-3547. Applies to Mooney Mite Models M-18L S/N's 2 and up, M- 18C S/N's 201 and up, M-18LA S/N's 100 through 200, M-18C55 S/N's 323 and up, certificated in all categories. Compliance required as indicated: To prevent failure of structural areas due to wood deterioration and to detect other wood and glue joint deterioration in the fuselage and wood wing, accomplish the following within the next 30 days after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished within the last 35 months, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 36 months from the last inspection. (1) Remove the fabric inboard of station 12 on both wings over the main and auxiliary wing spars. Inspect spars for cracks and delaminations especially at all bolt hole locations and in the area of the landing gear attachments. (2) If not already provided, apply a water resistant cloth or plastic adhesive such as duct tape at the wing to fuselage joint from the wing leading edgeto the wing trailing edge under the metal fairing strip, to prevent entry of water at this point. (3) Inspect all wood and glue joints in the wheel well area for cracks and wood deterioration. (4) Remove fabric between fuselage stations 29 to 35.5. Inspect plywood joints for wood deteriorations. (5) Apply hand pressure on top of plywood turtleback in the area of fuselage station 105. If softness is detected, remove fabric and inspect for wood cracks. (6) Inspect welds for cracks and welds which do not completely fill fillet cross section area at rudder and elevator hinges and control horns with a 10-power glass. (7) Inspect the fuel tank attachment points to the fuselage in the areas of the attachment bolts for deterioration. (8) Inspect glue joints in the area of the battery for separation and deterioration. (9) Clear all drain holes in fuselage. (10) If any defects noted in paragraphs (1) through (8) above are detected, repair in accordance with FAA AdvisoryCircular AC 43.13-1A or approved equivalent, or replace with an identical new part or equivalent, prior to further flight. Equivalent repairs or parts must be approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Eastern Region. (11) Upon submission of substantiating data by an owner or operator through an FAA Maintenance Inspector, the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Eastern Region, may adjust the inspection time in this airworthiness directive. This amendment is effective September 3, 1979.