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66-03-01: 66-03-01 BRISTOL SIDDELEY: Amdt. 39-186 Part 39 Federal Register January 28, 1966. Applies to de Havilland Model Gipsy Queen Series 30 Engines With Crankshafts With Modification 2036 or 2162 Installed. Compliance required as indicated. To prevent further failures of the crankshaft front end that could result in loss of the propeller, accomplish the following: (a) Unless already accomplished within the last 375 hours' time in service, inspect crankshaft for cracks within the next 25 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD in accordance with Bristol Siddeley Technical News Sheet (TNS) GQ30 No. 70, dated November 16, 1965, or later ARB-approved issue, or an FAA- approved equivalent, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 400 hours' time in service from the last inspection until modified in accordance with (c). (b) Replace cracked crankshafts before further flight with an uncracked crankshaft. (c) Incorporate Modification 2925 (which introduces shot peening underneath the chrome to improve the fatigue strength) on crankshaft within the next 1,600 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD unless already accomplished. This directive effective January 28, 1966.
61-14-02: 61-14-02 BELL: Amdt. 300 Part 507 Federal Register July 1, 1961. Applies to All Models 47J, 47J-2, 47G-3, and 47G-2A Helicopters With Float Gear Kit No. 47-706-661 installed. Compliance required as indicated. Several cases of failures have been reported of the forward cross tube failing near the left attaching point (cross tube to centerframe) through drilled holes which have been welded closed and filed smooth. To remove defective tubes and preclude the possibility of float cross tube No. 47-512-111-9 failing during landing, the following one-time inspection is required: (a) Within the next 10 hours' time in service after the effective date, remove paint from around the P/N 47-512-111-9 cross tube for an area approximately 2 inches on each side of the stop plates, P/N 47-500-024-1 and visually inspect for any indication of welded holes in this area. (b) If no evidence of welds is found, prime and repaint as necessary. (c) If any indication of a weldexists, replace the cross tube with an FAA approved part within the next 5 hours' time in service following the above inspection. (Bell Service Bulletin No. 132 dated May 23, 1961 covers this subject.) This directive effective July 12, 1961.
2005-10-18: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD), which applies to certain Boeing Model 747 series airplanes. That AD currently requires a one-time inspection to determine the material type of the stop support fittings of the main entry doors (MEDs). That AD also currently requires repetitive detailed inspections to detect cracks of certain stop support fittings of the MEDs, and replacement of any cracked stop support fitting with a certain new stop support fitting. This new AD adds new inspections, and replacement if necessary, of the stop support fittings of MED 3, and adds airplanes to the applicability. This AD is prompted by reports of MED 3 having certain stop support fittings that are susceptible to stress corrosion cracking. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct stress corrosion cracking of the stop support fittings of the MEDs, which could result in damage to the adjacent forward edge frame of the door and consequent loss of a MED and rapid decompression of the airplane. \n\nDATES: This AD becomes effective June 23, 2005. \n\n\tThe incorporation by reference of Boeing Service Bulletin 747-53- 2358, Revision 1, dated April 19, 2001; and Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 747-53-2485, dated January 8, 2004; as listed in the AD, is approved by the Director of the Federal Register as of June 23, 2005. \n\n\tOn January 25, 1999 (63 FR 70316, December 21, 1998), the Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of Boeing Service Bulletin 747-53-2358, dated August 26, 1993.
55-25-04: 55-25-04 SIKORSKY: Applies to All Model S-55 Helicopters. Compliance required as indicated. A recent failure of the tail cone skin in the area where the tail cone is spliced to the fuselage has been reported in a Model S-55 helicopter. Since this is the means of attaching the tail cone to the fuselage and to preclude further failures, the following inspections and reinforcements for the splice area are considered necessary. 1. Tail cones with less than 1,500 hours, add reinforcements at the next major inspection or within the next 150 hours. 2. Tail cones with 1,500 hours to 2,000 hours, inspect the skin for cracks at the next major inspection or within the next 150 hours. If no cracks are found, add reinforcements. If cracks are found, replace the skin and add reinforcements. 3. Tail cones with 2,000 hours or more, inspect the skin for cracks at the next intermediate inspection or within the next 50 hours. If no cracks are found, add reinforcements. Ifcracks are found, replace the skin and add reinforcements. 4. The inspection procedures to be followed, the reinforcements to be added and the method of attaching the reinforcements are explained in detail in Sikorsky Information Circular No. 1420-632.
61-12-01: 61-12-01 DOUGLAS: Amdt. 293 Part 507 Federal Register June 3, 1961. Applies to All Model DC-8 Series Aircraft. \n\n\tCompliance required as indicated. \n\n\tAn instance has been reported wherein the left wing flight spoilers extended during takeoff resulting in a left wing heavy condition. The loss of spoiler control was attributed to a sheared rivet in rod assembly P/N 4719278 of the aileron shift mechanism in the left wheel well. To preclude further difficulties with this part which can result in a hazardous condition, the following inspection, operational checks or rework must be accomplished: \n\n\t(a)\tPrior to each flight, conduct an operational check of the outboard spoiler control system, observing the pressure drop in the spoiler hydraulic system during the check. During rapid rotation of the aileron control wheel a pressure drop of approximately 200 p.s.i. is normal. If a drop in hydraulic pressure does not occur, inspect the spoiler system for a sheared rivet in rod assembly P/N 4719278 of the spoiler shifting mechanism. If the rivet is not sheared a more thorough examination of the spoiler system should be made to determine and correct the cause of the malfunction since operation of the system should result in some pressure drop. In addition, after any maintenance work on the outboard spoilers or outboard spoiler control system and prior to return of the aircraft to service, the spoiler system should be thoroughly checked to ascertain that the rivet in rod assembly P/N 4719278 is not sheared and that the system operates normally. If sheared, the rivet must be replaced or "Rod Assembly-Lateral Control Spoiler" P/N 4719278-1 and "Spring" P/N 4771197-1B installed per Douglas Drawing No. 5718924 "J" change, or FAA approved equivalent, prior to next flight. Pilots and flight engineers, in addition to authorized maintenance personnel, are authorized to perform the operational check. \n\n\t(b)\tThe operational check and inspection described in (a) may bediscontinued when rework per Douglas Drawing No. 5718924 "J" change, or FAA approved equivalent, is accomplished. \n\n\t(Douglas Service Bulletin No. A27-104 dated March 27, 1961, covers this subject.) \n\n\tThis directive effective June 9, 1961.
2005-10-19: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Boeing Model 747-100, 747-100B, 747-200B, 747-300, 747-400, 747-400D, 747SR, and 747SP series airplanes. This AD requires replacing or modifying the control panels for the galley cart lift and modifying related electrical cable assemblies, as applicable. This AD is prompted by reports of injuries to catering personnel and flight attendants who were loading or unloading galley carts on one deck when, due to a disabled or malfunctioning safety interlock door switch, the galley cart lift unexpectedly moved when it was activated from the control panel on the other deck. We are issuing this AD to ensure that the galley cart lift can be sent only from the deck on which it is in use, which will prevent unexpected movement of the cart lift that could result in possible injury to catering personnel or flight attendants.
54-02-01: 54-02-01 LYCOMING: Applies to All Model O-290-D2 Engines. Compliance required by February 1, 1954, and at each subsequent 100-hour inspection. In order to preclude the possibility of serious engine damage from incipient detonation under certain atmospheric and altitude conditions, the magneto timing of all Lycoming O-290-D2 engines must be set at 18 degrees BTC. To insure that the magneto timing does not change substantially from this setting, it should be checked and reset, if necessary, at each subsequent 100-hour inspection. (Lycoming Service Bulletin No. 169 covers this same subject, but recommends that the timing be checked every 50 hours.)
2005-10-12: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the Schweizer Aircraft Corporation (Schweizer) Model 269C, C-1, and D helicopters. This action requires inspecting, modifying, and testing the lateral control trim actuator assembly on certain serial-numbered helicopters. This amendment is prompted by three reported incidents of the inner spring tube separating from the lateral trim control housing resulting in a lateral cyclic control restriction. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent separation of the inner spring tube from the lateral trim control housing and the associated loss of trim control, increased local resistance to right cyclic stick movement, and an emergency landing or subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
57-04-01: 57-04-01 CESSNA: Applies to All Model 310 Aircraft Prior to and Including Serial Number 35392, Except Those Incorporating Aileron Hinges Having P/N 0824006-1 and -2. Compliance required not later than April 15, 1957, and at 100-hour intervals of operation thereafter. Inspect the outboard aileron hinge for cracks in the upper flange, adjacent to the bearing. Any hinges found cracked should be replaced with the new, redesigned outboard aileron hinge (P/N 0824006-1 left, and 0824006-2 right). When the redesigned outboard aileron hinge is installed, this special inspection is no longer required. To facilitate hinge replacement, it is permissible to cut a standard size inspection opening in the wing lower skin, below the outboard hinge, attachment point. (Cessna Service Bulletin No. 310-7 covers this same subject.)
61-08-01: 61-08-01 DOUGLAS: Amdt. 273 Part 507 Federal Register April 8, 1961. Applies to All DC-6 and DC-7 Series Airplanes Which Do Not Have Antifuel Transfer Check Valves Installed In The Fuel System. \n\n\tCompliance required within the next 330 hours' time in service. \n\n\t(a)\tInstall a placard in the flight compartment in full view of the pilot to read as follows: "Fuel Transfer in Flight Prohibited." \n\n\t(b)\tRevise the operations procedures section covering fuel system management in the FAA approved airplane flight manual to incorporate fuel system operation procedures in accordance with the above placard and delete the item which states that check valves are installed. Flight manual revisions must be approved by FAA. \n\n\tWhen check valves to prevent transfer of fuel are installed, this AD is no longer applicable. \n\n\t(Douglas Service Bulletin No. DC-6-294 dated November 19, 1948, revised February 17, 1950, covers an acceptable installation of check valves.) \n\n\tThis directive effective May 9, 1961.