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65-05-01: 65-05-01 AERO PRODUCTS: Amdt. 39-42 Part 39 Federal Register March 4, 1965. Applies to Model A6441FN-606 Propeller Blades with Serial Numbers 3999 or below. Compliance required as indicated. To detect propeller blade cracks and prevent blade failure, accomplish the following: (a) When propeller roughness is reported, aircraft shall not be flown, except for evaluation flight to determine cause of propeller roughness, until cause of roughness is corrected. Only essential persons shall be carried during an evaluation flight. (b) Except as provided in (c), inspect by X-ray the cuff area of blades in accordance with Aero Products Propeller Service Bulletin No. 82 dated October 15, 1959, or later FAA- approved revisions at the following times unless already accomplished: (1) X-ray blades which had 10,000 or more hours' time in service on January 6, 1965, within 120 hours' time in service after January 6, 1965. (2) X-ray blades which had 8,000 or more butless than 10,000 hours' time in service on January 6, 1965, within 180 hours' time in service after January 6, 1965. (3) X-ray blades which had less than 8,000 hours' time in service on January 6, 1965, prior to the accumulation of 8,180 hours' time in service. (c) The following blades are not required to be initially X-rayed as required by (b) - (1) Blades shipped from Allison or after December 23, 1964; (2) Blades which had 10,000 or more hours' time in service on January 6, 1965, that have been magnafluxed externally and internally in the A and B thrust member cavity by any overhaul facility within the last 250 hours' time in service before January 6, 1965; (3) Blades which had less than 10,000 hours' time in service on January 6, 1965, that have been magnafluxed externally and internally in the A and B thrust, member cavity by any overhaul facility within the last 750 hours' time in service before January 6, 1965; or (4) Blades which have been modified in accordance with (e). The repetitive inspections required by (d) for blades 0.150 inch thickness or greater must be accomplished until modified in accordance with (e)(3). (d) Repeat the X-ray inspection required by (b) for blades with thrust member minimum thickness in the "A" area at last overhaul of 0.150 inch or greater thickness at the following times until modified in accordance with (e): (1) X-ray blades which had 10,000 or more hours' time in service on January 6, 1965, at intervals not to exceed 250 hours' time in service. (2) X-ray blades which had 8,000 or more but less than 10,000 hours' time in service on January 6, 1965, at intervals not to exceed 750 hours' time in service until the blade has accumulated 10,000 hours' time in service. Thereafter, X-ray at intervals not to exceed 250 hours' time in service. (3) X-ray blades which had less than 8,000 hours' time in services on January 6, 1965, at intervals not to exceed 750 hours' time inservice. (e) Modify the cuff of blades to provide an inspection window in accordance with Allison Commercial Service Letter No. 167, dated February 12, 1965, or later FAA-approved revisions at the following times based on thrust member thickness in the "A" area at last overhaul unless already accomplished: (1) Modify blades 0.144 inch thickness or less within 100 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD. (2) Modify blades 0.145 inch to 0.149 inch thickness within 250 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD. (3) Modify blades 0.150 inch thickness or greater within 500 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD. (f) Visually inspect the blade shank surface within the cuff window for cracks in accordance with Allison Commercial Service Letter No. 167 or later FAA-approved revisions at the time modification required by (e) is made, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 25 hours' time in service. (g) Remove cracked blades from service and report immediately by telephone or telegram to the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Central Region, Kansas City, Missouri. (h) Remove blades from service according to the following schedule based on thrust member minimum thickness in the "A" area at last overhaul: (1) Remove from service blades 0.144 inch thickness or less which had 10,000 or more hours' time in service on February 17, 1965; within 50 hours' time in service after February 17, 1965. (2) Remove from service blades 0.144 inch thickness or less which had less than 10,000 hours' time in service on February 17, 1965, prior to the accumulation of 10,050 hours' time in service. (3) Remove from service blades 0.145 inch to 0.149 inch thickness which had 12,000 or more hours' time in service on February 17, 1965, within 50 hours' time in service after February 17, 1965. (4) Remove from service blades 0.145 inch to 0.149 inch thickness which had less than 12,000 hours' time in service on February 17, 1965, prior to the accumulation of 12,050 hours' time in service. (i) Upon the request of the operator, an FAA maintenance inspector, subject to the prior approval of the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Central Region, may adjust the repetitive intervals specified in this AD to permit compliance at an established inspection period of the operator if the request contains substantiating data to justify the increase for such operator. NOTE. - "A" area is identified in Allison-Aero-products Overhaul Manual, Section 63-6- 0, Pages 315 and 316. This supersedes AD 65-01-01. This directive effective March 4, 1965.
51-21-02: 51-21-02 PIPER: Applies to All Model PA-12 Airplanes. Compliance required not later than October 15, 1951, and each 100 hours of operation thereafter unless reinforcements are installed. Carefully inspect aileron hinge brackets to false spar attachment fittings, P/N N10931, (3 per wing), for cracks at the bend between the channel and flat portions of the fittings. If cracked fittings are found, add reinforcement bracket P/N 12047. With reinforcement brackets P/N 12047 installed, special inspections may be discontinued. (Piper Service Bulletin No. 107, dated September 24, 1948, covers this same subject.)
68-17-03R1: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) to revise AD 68-17-03, which applies to all Pilatus Aircraft Ltd. (Pilatus) PC-6 series airplanes. AD 68-17-03 requires you to repetitively inspect the rudder end rib for cracks and replace the rudder end rib with a modified rudder end rib when you find cracks. Installing the modified rudder end rib terminates the repetitive inspection requirements of AD 68-17-03. Under a licensing agreement with Pilatus, Fairchild Republic Company (also identified as Fairchild Industries, Fairchild Heli Porter, or Fairchild-Hiller Corporation) produced Model PC-6 series airplanes (manufacturer serial numbers 2001 through 2092) in the United States. AD 68-17-03 was intended to apply to all affected serial numbers of Model PC-6 series airplanes listed on Type Certificate Data Sheet (TCDS) No. 7A15, including the Fairchild-produced airplanes. Consequently, this AD clarifies that all models of the PC-6 airplane on TCDS No. 7A15 (including those models produced under the licensing agreement by Fairchild Republic Company) are included in the applicability. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct cracks in the rudder end rib, which could result in failure of the rudder end rib. This failure could result in loss of rudder control.
2006-13-02: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain EMBRAER Model ERJ 170 airplanes. This AD requires inspecting for excess sealant applied to the attachment bolts of the negative pressure relief valve, and performing corrective actions if necessary. This AD results from reports that excess sealant was applied to the attachment bolts of the negative pressure relief valve, which interfered with the valve's movable diaphragm. We are issuing this AD to prevent incorrect operation of the negative pressure relief valve, which could result in negative pressures that exceed the structural strength limits of the airframe and lead to reduced structural integrity of the airplane.
2018-13-03: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain International Aero Engines (IAE) PW1133G-JM, PW1133GA-JM, PW1130G-JM, PW1127G-JM, PW1127GA-JM, PW1127G1-JM, PW1124G-JM, PW1124G1-JM, and PW1122G-JM turbofan engines. This AD requires a one-time visual inspection of the engine fan hub for damage, and removal of parts if damage or defects are found that are outside the serviceable limits. This AD was prompted by reports of damage to the engine fan hub. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
57-15-02: 57-15-02 CURTISS-WRIGHT: Applies to all Model C-46 Series aircraft. Compliance required as indicated. Due to repeated service failures of H-3-38-M1 wheel assemblies (Hayes and/or Goodrich Model No. 1900M), the following action is required: 1. At each 100 to 125 hours, conduct a visual inspection of the demountable flange in the area of the lightening holes with the aid of a flashlight or equivalent. If cracks are detected, the flange must be either retired or reworked in accordance with paragraphs 3.5.2.2.1 and 3.5.2.2.2 of Goodrich Manual No. 14932. 2. Unless already inspected within the period specified herein, all H-3-38-M1 wheel assemblies (used or unused) must be disassembled and inspected prior to installation and thereafter at each 85th landing or regular periodic inspection period nearest to 330 hours, whichever occurs first. (a) Visually inspect the lock ring groove area for corrosion. All corrosion in this area must be removed by hand working with No. 300 sandpaper or equivalent, remachining or grinding away of metal is not permitted. Corrosion in the lock ring groove area of the wheelbase can be removed only to a depth of 0.015 inch from the original surface of the groove. Should corrosion and pitting be in excess of this dimension, the wheelbase must be retired from service. The nominal lock ring groove diameter in the wheel is 17.250 inches. After corrosion cleanup this diameter should not be less than 17.220 inches. The O.D. of the wheelbase in the lock ring groove area and the bottom of the lock ring groove should be concentric within 0.015 inch. The lock ring groove should be retreated to prevent corrosion at every wheel disassembly per treatment specified in B.F. Goodrich Service Letter No. 1022 or equivalent. Note: The original rim lock ring, P/N G85-30, was of tubular steel construction and cadmium plated for rust prevention. This lock ring causes an electrolitic reaction between the magnesium and steel when exposed to moisture and is therefore conducive to corrosion. These lock rings have been superseded by a new solid aluminum type of the same part number. (b) Inspect the following critical areas for cracks using Zyglo, dye penetrant or equivalent method. All paint must be removed using a stripping agent of the waxless solvent type that does not react chemically with magnesium. (1) Brake drum mounting register, (2) tire bead radius of the fixed flange, (3) tire bead seat radius of the demountable flange, (4) radius of the demountable flange step, (5) flange retaining ring groove in the wheel, and (6) rim lock ring. All parts with cracks in any of the critical areas must be retired from service. Rim lock rings P/N G85-30 with cracks must be replaced with the solid aluminum part or equivalent. 3. The following should be accomplished at the first disassembly of wheel unless already accomplished: (a) The lock ring groove area should be steam cleaned with high pressure steam to insure that this area had not been previously reworked and refinished by filling corroded areas with metal putty. Corroded areas may only be reworked in accordance with item 2(a) above. (b) Rework all demountable flanges by removing the sharp edges of the lightening holes in accordance with Goodrich Service Letter No. 1022. This supersedes AD 56-17-1.
59-24-02: 59-24-02 KIDDE and C-O-TWO: Applies to Smoke Detectors, Kidde Model A4532-M1, and C-O-TWO Models ASDC-2 and ASDT-3, Installed in Civil Transport Category Aircraft. The Walter Kidde Model A4532-M1 and the C-O-TWO Models ASDC-2 and ASDT-3 smoke detectors have unstable and over-sensitive alarm settings; thus resulting in false indications. Due to this unsatisfactory characteristic, the manufacturers, Walter Kidde and Company and the C-O-TWO Division of Fyr-Fyter Company have withdrawn their statements of conformance with Technical Standard Orders, TSO-C1 and C1a for these smoke detectors. Therefore, their TSO approvals are invalidated. All Models A4532-M1, ASDC-2 and ASDT-3 smoke detectors installed in transport category aircraft shall be removed from service prior to January 31, 1960, except when these models are approved as a part of the airplane installation under a supplemental type certificate. The TSO identification shall be eliminated from the detector label of such detectors approved as a part of the airplane installation.
2006-12-24: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for General Electric Company (GE) CF6-45/-50 series turbofan engines. That AD currently requires an initial and repetitive on-wing visual inspection of the side links of the five-link forward mount assembly for cracks, and replacement of the side links and pylon attachment bolts and inspection of the fail-safe bolt and platform lug if the side links are cracked. That AD also requires a shop-level refurbishment of the side links as a terminating action to the on-wing inspection program. This ad requires inspecting and refurbishing the side link at every exposure of the side link. This AD also requires the same actions on certain part number side links installed on CF6-80A turbofan engines. This AD results from a report of a cracked side link. We are issuing this AD to prevent failure of the side links and possible engine separation from the airplane.
2006-12-02: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus Model A318, A319, A320, and A321 airplanes. This AD requires inspecting to determine the part number and serial number of the fuel tank boost pumps and, for airplanes with affected pumps, revising the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) and the FAA-approved maintenance program. This AD also provides for optional terminating action for compliance with the revisions to the AFM and the maintenance program. This AD results from a report that a fuel tank boost pump failed in service, due to a detached screw of the boost pump housing that created a short circuit between the stator and rotor of the boost pump motor and tripped a circuit breaker. We are issuing this AD to ensure that the flightcrew is aware of procedures to prevent the presence of a combustible air-fuel mixture in the fuel tank boost pump, which, in the event of electrical arcing in the pump motor, could result in an explosion and loss of the airplane.
2018-13-04: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Bombardier, Inc., Model BD-100-1A10 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report indicating that certain lanyards for the passenger oxygen masks located in the airplane's entry area are too long. This AD requires replacement of certain oxygen mask lanyards with shorter lanyards. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.