Results
2004-15-22: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the specified Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation (Sikorsky) model helicopters that requires installing a Number 5 bearing chip detector in each engine, installing an on-board chip detector annunciation system, and revising the Rotorcraft Flight Manual (RFM) to add procedures for crew response to an on-board chip detector annunciation. This amendment is prompted by reports of the failure of the engine's Number 5 bearing that resulted in erratic movement of the high-speed engine-to-transmission shaft (shaft), oil leakage, an in-flight fire and an emergency landing. The actions specified by this AD are intended to detect an impending engine bearing (bearing) failure, which, if undetected and not addressed by appropriate crew action, may result in oil leakage, severing of the shaft housing, an uncontained in-flight fire, and a subsequent emergency landing.
48-10-02: 48-10-02 BELL: Applies to Models 47B Series and 47D. Compliance required by April 1, 1948. As a precautionary measure, remove main wood rotor blades and inspect area between the outboard edge of face plates and inboard edge of fiberglass cover, and also the extreme butt end for wood checks or cracks. When inspection is completed, the extent of check, cracks and wood condition found should be reported to the manufacturer who has provided forms for this purpose in his Service Bulletin. Report also if inspection results reveal no checks or cracks. Upon completion of inspection and prior to flight the cracks should be filled with Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co. 3M adhesive filler No. EC612. After the filler has dried, five brush coats of Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co. adhesive sealer No. EC498 should be applied to the inspected area. If no checks or cracks are present, only the five brush coats of sealer must be applied. (Bell Service Bulletin No.47C47, revised March 4, 1948, contains more detailed information on this subject.)
2013-02-11: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus Model A310-203 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report of an analysis that demonstrated a reduced fatigue life for the side link bolts, center sway link bolts, and thrust link bolts on the forward engine mounts. This AD requires repetitive replacement of those bolts. We are issuing this AD to prevent deterioration of the structural integrity of the bolts, which could result in possible damage to an engine or wing.
2022-08-08: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus SAS Model A318 series airplanes; Model A319-111, -112, - 113, -114, -115, -131, -132, and -133 airplanes; Model A320-211, -212, -214, -216, -231, -232, and -233 airplanes; and Model A321-111, -112, - 131, -211, -212, -213, -231, and -232 airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports that, during inspections accomplished as specified in certain airworthiness limitation items (ALIs), cracks were detected in the double joggle areas at frame (FR) 16 and FR20 in the nose forward fuselage. This AD requires repetitive special detailed inspections of certain areas and applicable on-condition actions, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2004-15-03: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for General Electric Company (GE) CF34-3A1 and -3B1 series turbofan engines with certain serial numbers (SNs) of stage 5 low pressure turbine (LPT) disks, part number (P/N) 6078T92P01, and or certain SNs of stage 6 LPT disks, P/N 6089T89P01. This AD requires initial and repetitive visual and eddy current inspections of those disks. This AD also allows as optional terminating action to the repetitive inspections, replacement of those SN disks. This AD also requires replacement of certain stage 5 and stage 6 LPT disks. This AD results from a report of a stage 5 LPT disk that failed due to cracking from low-cycle-fatigue (LCF) during factory testing. We are issuing this AD to prevent LCF failure of stage 5 LPT disks and stage 6 LPT disks, which could lead to uncontained engine failure.
49-38-02: 49-38-02 DOUGLAS: Applies to All Models C-54 and DC-4 Aircraft. \n\n\tTo be accomplished at every 9,000 hours total airplane flight time. \n\n\tIn those cases where the present bolts have or will have accumulated more than 9,000 hours time prior to the next regular overhaul period, the first replacement time may be extended, at the discretion of the CAA Inspector, to coincide with a regular overhaul period but in no case should the adjustment time exceed 1,500 hours accumulated after January 26, 1948. Thereafter the bolt replacement shall be at the 9,000- or 18,000-hour period, whichever is applicable. \n\n\tReplace the following bolts: Fuselage to Center Wing Attachment; Outer Wing to Center Wing Attachment; Vertical Stabilizer Attachment to Fuselage Tail, Station 953; Engine Mount to Fire Wall Attachment; Horizontal Stabilizer to Fuselage Tail Assembly Attachment. \n\n\tThe 9,000-hour period may be extended to 18,000 hours when studs 4105725-1 and -2 in outer wing attachment have been replaced with special studs Nos. 4357723-1 and -2 having letter "R" stamped on thread end and bolts in all other attachments listed are replaced with NAS bolts with threads rolled after heat treatment. \n\n\tThe bolt part numbers and the number of bolts required are shown on pages 4 and 5 of the Douglas Service Magazine of August 1947. Bolts removed from the airplane are to be scrapped and are not to be used again. \n\n\t(Douglas Service Letter No. 66, Supplement No. 2, dated July 18, 1951, covers this same subject relative to wing alignment at Station 421.) \n\n\tThis supersedes AD 48-04-03.
2013-01-07: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Turbomeca S.A. Arriel 2D turboshaft engines. This AD was prompted by a low fuel pressure event caused by deterioration and a loss of the low- pressure drive function within the hydro-mechanical metering unit (HMU). This AD requires replacing the HMU at a reduced life. We are issuing this AD to prevent an uncommanded in-flight shutdown of the engine, and possible loss of the helicopter.
2022-07-15: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus SAS Model A318, A319, A320, and A321 series airplanes. This AD was prompted by the detection of several channel failures on a newly developed braking and steering control unit (BSCU). This AD requires replacing affected BSCUs and revising the operator's existing FAA- approved minimum equipment list (MEL), as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. This AD also limits the installation of affected parts. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2004-15-18: The FAA supersedes Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2003-24-13, which applies to certain Cessna Aircraft Company (Cessna) Models 172R, 172S, 182S, 182T, T182T, 206H, and T206H airplanes that are equipped with a certain Honeywell KAP 140 autopilot computer system installed on the center instrument control panel near the throttle. AD 2003-24-13 currently requires you to install an update to the operating software of certain KAP 140 autopilot computer system, change the unit's part number, and change the software modification identification tab. This AD is the result of the FAA inadvertently omitting four affected Honeywell KAP 140 autopilot computer system part numbers and an affected airplane serial number from the applicability section of AD 2003-24-13. This AD retains the actions required in AD 2003-24-13, corrects the applicability section, and incorporates a revised installation bulletin issued by Honeywell.
69-08-02: 69-08-02 BEECHCRAFT: Amendment 39-744 as amended by Amendment 39-758 is further amended by Amendment 39-1222. Applies to all 99 Series airplanes (Serial Numbers U- 1 through U-89). Compliance: Required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To prevent possible loss of elevator control, accomplish the following: Prior to further flight and thereafter at intervals of not to exceed 25 hours' time-in-service from the date of the previous visual inspection, visually inspect the forward face of the elevator spar web adjacent to the outboard hinge bracket on both elevators. If cracks are found as a result of the visual inspection, the elevator must be repaired in accordance with Beechcraft Service Instructions No. 0190-133, or replaced with a serviceable part prior to further flight, except that the airplane may be flown in accordance with Federal Aviation Regulation 21.197 to a base where the repair can be performed. The above visual inspections required by this airworthiness directive will no longer be applicable when the reinforcements described in Beechcraft Service Instructions No. 0190-133 are installed. Amendment 39-744 became effective April 15, 1969, for all persons except those to whom it was made effective by telegram dated March 28, 1969. Amendment 39-758 became effective April 29, 1969. This Amendment 39-1222 becomes effective June 3, 1971.