Results
2011-08-06: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD requires removing certain power turbine rotors from service using a specific drawdown schedule. This AD was prompted by reports of fatigue cracks in the airfoil of the power turbine blades. We are issuing this AD to prevent fracture of the power turbine blade airfoil, which could result in sudden loss of engine power and prevent continued safe flight or safe landing.
96-12-08: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to Twin Commander Aircraft Corporation (Twin Commander) 500, 680, and 690 series airplanes that do not have a nose landing gear drag link bolt with the manufacturer s serial number, manufacture date, and the last three digits of the drawing number, 055, on the bolt head. This action requires replacing the nose landing gear (NLG) drag link bolt with one that has been manufactured with the proper heat treatment. This action was prompted by the failure of an improperly heat treated NLG drag link bolt causing collapse of the nose landing gear on a certain Twin Commander Model 690B airplane while taxiing. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent the NLG from collapsing, which if not corrected, could result in loss of the airplane.
96-12-11: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all Canadair Model CL-215-1A10 series airplanes. This action requires repetitive inspections to detect discrepancies of the microswitches fitted at the water door actuator, and replacement of any discrepant microswitch. This action also requires a terminating action for the repetitive inspections. This amendment is prompted by a report indicating that the water doors on one airplane opened inadvertently during flight, due to corrosion of the microswitches fitted to the water door actuator. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent such uncommanded opening of the water doors, especially at high speed during a takeoff run, a water pick-up run, or a landing run, which could cause damage to the airplane.
2011-07-13: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD requires an inspection of the elevator spar for cracks and, if any crack is found, either replacement with a serviceable elevator spar that is found free of cracks or repair/ modification with an FAA-approved method. This AD also requires reporting to the FAA the results of the inspection. This AD was prompted by reports of a total of nine elevator spar cracks across seven of the affected airplanes, including a crack of 2.35 inches just below the outboard hinge of the right-hand elevator. We are issuing this AD to prevent structural failure of the elevator spar due to such cracking, which could result in separation of the elevator from the airplane with consequent loss of control.
76-20-04: 76-20-04 SWEARINGEN : Amendment 39-2735 as amended by Amendment 39-3348. Applies to all Model SA226-T, SA226-AT, and SA226-TC airplanes with Serial Numbers as follows: Model SA226-T: T201 through T274. Model SA226-AT: AT001 through AT054. Model SA226-TC: TC201 through TC228E. Within the next 25 hours time in service after the effective date of this airworthiness directive and within each subsequent 50 hours of time in service, inspect the left hand and right hand wheel wells for evidence of fuel or hydraulic leaks as follows: A. Hydraulic System 1. Inspect the hydraulic power pack area in the left hand wheel well and all hydraulic lines in both landing gear wheel wells for condition or hydraulic leakage. Special attention should be given to the hydraulic gage line, P/N 27-81006-37, 731, 749, and 775, particularly in the area of bends. 2. Use either engine to pressurize the system to 2000 +psi and inspect the hydraulic lines, fittings and other components in both left and right wheel wells for any signs of leakage, including fluid misting from a spraying-type leakage. 3. If damaged lines or hydraulic leaks are found, repair or replace in accordance with FAA-approved maintenance procedures before further flight. B. Fuel System 1. By using airframe boost pump, pressurize and inspect fuel supply line aft of firewall and inside wheel wells for leakage. 2. If fuel leaks are found, repair in accordance with FAA-approved maintenance procedures before further flight. C. Voluntary written reports on the results of the inspection conducted in accordance with Paragraphs A and B, either positive or negative, should be forwarded to the Chief, Aircraft Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, Federal Aviation Administration, Southwest Region, P.O. Box 1689, Fort Worth, Texas 76101. (Reporting approved by the Office of Management and Budget under OMB No. 04-R0174.) D. Special flight permits may be issued pursuant to Sections 21.197 and 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations to authorize flights to a base for accomplishment of the inspections required by this airworthiness directive. E. After the effective date of this AD and as an alternate means of compliance: 1. If Swearingen Aviation Corporation Models SA226TC (applies to serial numbers TC-201 through TC-212), SA226T (applies to serial numbers T-201 through T-251, except T-249), and SA226AT (applies to serial numbers AT-001 through AT-033, except AT-025) airplanes are modified in accordance with Swearingen Aviation Corporation service bulletin SB 21-009 dated May 11, 1977, "Addition of Bleed Air Heat Exchangers"; and if Swearingen Aviation Corporation Models SA226TC (applies to serial numbers TC-201 through TC-228, except TC-227E and TC-228E), SA226T (applies to serial numbers T-201 through T-271), and SA226AT (applies to serial numbers AT-001 through AT-056) airplanes are modified in accordance with Swearingen Aviation Corporation service bulletin SB 54-003 dated April 28, 1977, "Improved Fire Resistance of the Fuel and Hydraulic Systems;" then the repetitive inspections specified in paragraphs A and B of this AD are no longer necessary. 2. Or, if modifications are made to the above airplane models in a manner approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, ASW-210, Southwest Region, then the repetitive inspections called for in paragraphs A and B of this AD are no longer necessary. Amendment 39-2735 became effective October 11, 1976. This amendment 39-3348 becomes effective on November 17, 1978.
2011-06-10: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to certain Piper Aircraft, Inc. Models PA-46-310P and PA- 46-350P airplanes that are equipped with a Lewis or Transicoil turbine inlet temperature (T.I.T.) gauge and associated probe. That AD currently requires cleaning, inspecting, and calibrating the T.I.T. system; replacing any T.I.T. system that fails the calibration test; repetitively replacing the T.I.T. probe on certain airplanes; and inserting a copy of the AD into the pilot's operating handbook (POH) for certain airplanes. This new AD retains [[Page 18034]] the actions required by the previous AD (AD 99-15-04 R1), adds certain Model PA-46R-350T airplanes to the Applicability section, expands the applicability to include other T.I.T. systems, and incorporates new service information. This AD was prompted by the manufacturer revising related service information and adding an airplane model to the list of affected airplanes. We are issuing this AD to prevent improper engine operation caused by improperly calibrated T.I.T. indicators or defective T.I.T. probes, which could result in engine damage/failure with consequent loss of control of the airplane.
96-11-18: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9-80 series airplanes, and Model MD-88 and MD-90 airplanes, that requires a one-time measurement of the length of the oxygen mask lanyards of the passenger service unit (PSU), and modification of lanyards that are longer than the proper length. This amendment is prompted by a report that the length of the oxygen mask lanyards of the PSU were found to be too long, apparently due to improper installation during production. The actions specified by this AD are intended to ensure that the length of these oxygen mask lanyards is correct, so that the oxygen canister will be properly activated when needed during an emergency.
77-21-02: 77-21-02 SOCIETE NATIONALE INDUSTRIELLE AEROSPATIALE (Formerly Nord Aviation): Amendment 39-3053 as amended by Amendment 39-3142. Applies to all Nord 262 Series airplanes certificated in all categories. Compliance is required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To prevent interruption of fuel flow to the operating engine as a consequence of failure of one engine, accomplish the following: (a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this AD, within the next 300 hours time in service after October 31, 1977, accomplish the following: (1) For airplanes not equipped with auxiliary tanks in center wing, install a rigid metal partition inside fuel tank No. 1 (LH and RH) in accordance with paragraph II "Embodiment Instructions" of Nord 262 Fregate Service Bulletin No. 28-18 (Mod. 825), dated June 23, 1977, or an FAA-approved equivalent. (2) For airplanes equipped with auxiliary tanks in center wing, install a rigid metal partition inside fuel tank No. 1 (LH and RH) in accordance with paragraph II "Embodiment Instructions" of Nord 262 Fregate Service Bulletin No. 28-19 (Mod. 826), dated June 23, 1977, or an FAA-approved equivalent. (3) After accomplishing paragraph (a)(1) or (a)(2) of this AD, adjust the zero point on the fuel quantity indicator in accordance with paragraph II "Accomplishment Instructions" of Nord - 262 Fregate Service Bulletin No. 28-20 (Mod. 828), dated June 23, 1977, or an FAA-approved equivalent. (b) An airplane may be operated for a period of time not to extend past April 1, 1978, without the airplane being modified in accordance with paragraph (a) of this AD if - (1) Modification kits required under paragraph (a) of this AD have been ordered but have not been delivered; (2) An operating limitation placard is installed in clear view of the pilot that reads, "Warning-in the event of one engine failing, immediate action to correct asymmetrical flight must be taken to prevent loss of the operating engine"; and (3) The period of time for continued operation without being in compliance with paragraph (a) of this AD must be approved by the FAA District Office having jurisdiction over the operator. Requests for approval must substantiate that the modification kits required under paragraph (a) of this AD have been ordered but have not been delivered. (c) The placard required by paragraph (b) of this AD may be removed upon compliance with paragraph (a) of this AD. Amendment 39-3053 became effective October 31, 1977. This amendment 39-3142 is effective March 2, 1978, as to all persons except those persons to whom it was made immediately effective by the telegram dated December 8, 1977, which contained this amendment.
96-09-13: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to all Beech Aircraft Corporation (Beech) Models 99, 99A, A99A, B99, C99, B200, B200C, 1900, 1900C, and 1900D airplanes. This action requires revising the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) to provide the flight crew with recognition cues for, and procedures for exiting from, severe icing conditions, and to limit or prohibit the use of various flight control devices. This amendment is prompted by results of a review of the requirements for certification of the airplane in icing conditions, new information on the icing environment, and icing data provided currently to the flight crews. The actions specified by this AD are intended to minimize the potential hazards associated with operating the airplane in freezing rain or freezing drizzle conditions by providing more clearly defined procedures and limitations associated with such conditions.
2011-07-08: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Two A340-300 aeroplanes experienced one single door opening of engine number (n[deg]) 3 Thrust Reverser (TR) pivoting door during climb. These events were the result of a primary lock malfunction and incorrect engagement of the secondary lock. * * * * * Deployment of one TR door in flight, particularly during the take-off or go around, could result in heavy buffet at low speed, or could significantly reduce take off performance [and increase pilot workload during takeoff or go around], which would constitute an unsafe condition. * * * * * This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.