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75-07-12: 75-07-12 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-2151. Applies to all Douglas Aircraft Company DC-10-30 series airplanes, certificated in all categories. \n\n\tCompliance required as indicated unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tAfter the effective date of this airworthiness directive do not install Autothrottle/Speed Control Computer Part Number 2593342-910C. \n\n\tNote: Refer to paragraph 2 of McDonnell Douglas DC-10 Service Bulletin No. 22-67 dated February 21, 1975 or later FAA-approved revision. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective April 7, 1975.
70-22-07: 70-22-07 ROLLS-ROYCE: Amdt. 39-1098. Applies to Rolls-Royce Dart engines Models 506, 510, and 526, installed on, but not necessarily limited to, British Aircraft Corporation Viscount 744 and 745D; and Armstrong Whitworth Argosy 650 Series 101 airplanes. Compliance is required within the next 500 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. To prevent the loss of propeller control in the event of an annulus gear failure, accomplish the following: (a) For Rolls-Royce Dart Model 506 engines, incorporate Rolls-Royce Dart Modification 1431 in accordance with Rolls-Royce Dart Aero Engine Service Bulletin Number Da72-297, Revision 7, dated February 20, 1970, or later ARB-approved revision, or an FAA-approved equivalent. (b) For Rolls-Royce Dart Models 510 and 526, incorporate Rolls-Royce Dart Modification 1550 in accordance with Rolls-Royce Dart Aero Engine Service Bulletin Number Da72-348, Revision 9, dated November 28, 1969, or later ARB-approved revision or an FAA-approved equivalent. This amendment becomes effective November 23, 1970.
2000-20-51: This document publishes in the Federal Register an amendment adopting Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2000-20-51, which was sent previously to all known U.S. owners and operators of Robinson Helicopter Company (RHC) Model R22 helicopters by individual letters. This AD requires checking the yoke half assembly (yoke) for any crack and replacing a cracked yoke assembly before further flight. This AD also requires replacing certain yokes with airworthy yokes before further flight after January 1, 2001. This AD is prompted by the discovery of cracks in the yoke. The actions specified by this AD are intended to detect crack formation and growth, which could result in separation of the yokes from the main rotor drive shaft and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
66-23-01: 66-23-01\tBOEING: Admit. 39-288 Part 39 Federal Register September 16, 1966. Applies to Model 727 Series Airplanes Listed in Boeing Service Bulletin 28-25, Revision 1, Dated January 19, 1966. \n\n\tCompliance required as indicated, unless already accomplished. \n\n\tIt has been determined that certain of the B-nuts at the engine firewall on Boeing Model 727 Series airplanes are susceptible to cracking. To correct this condition: \n\n\t(a)\tWithin the next 600 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, inspect the engine fuel feed system B-nut, P/N NAS596, located at each engine firewall to determine if it is an AFCO (Aircraft Fitting, Inc.) manufactured part. Identification must be made in accordance with the instructions listed in Boeing Service Bulletin 28-25, dated December 3, 1965, or later FAA-approved revision. \n\n\t(b)\tIf the B-nut is not an AFCO part, no further action under this AD is required. If the B-nut is an AFCO part, accomplish the following before further flight: \n\n\t\t(1)\tInspect for cracks using a 10-power glass, dye penetrant or ultrasonic method. \n\n\t\t(2)\tIf cracks are found, remove the fuel line tube assembly and replace with a new part in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 28-25, dated December 3, 1965, or later FAA- approved revision or an equivalent approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. \n\n\t\t(3)\tIf no cracks are found, repeat the inspection required under (1) every 600 hours' time in service until the AFCO B-nuts are replaced as specified in (c). \n\n\t(c)\tWithin the next 3,000 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished under (b), remove all fuel feed line tube assemblies incorporating AFCO B-nuts and replace in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 28-25, dated December 3, 1965, or later FAA-approved revision or an equivalent approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. \n\n\t(d)\tUpon request of the operator, an FAA maintenance inspector, subject to prior approval of the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region, may adjust the repetitive inspection period of the operator if the request contains substantiating data to justify the increase for that operator. \n\n\tThis directive effective October 16, 1966.
90-26-05: 90-26-05 BOEING: Amendment 39-6832. Docket No. 90-NM-261-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: Model 737-300, 737-400, and 737-500 series airplanes, and Model 757- 200 series airplanes; equipped with Transaero P/N 91466 series double flight attendant seats; certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent injury to flight attendants, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tWithin 21 days after the effective date of this AD, inspect the front edge of the affected seat pans for areas of abnormal flexibility when hand pressure is applied perpendicular to the seat pan, and for permanent deflection or misfair of the seat pan edge when stowed.\n\n\t\t1.\tIf no obvious damage is detected, repeat the inspection at intervals not to exceed 30 days.\n\n\t\t2.\tIf any of the above conditions are found, prior to further flight, accomplish one of the following: \n\n\t\t\ta.\tInstall a placard stating that the damaged seat is not to be occupied; orb.\tReplace the seat pan with a new seat pan of the same part number, and continue to inspect at intervals not to exceed 30 days thereafter in accordance with paragraph A. of this AD; or \n\n\t\t\tc.\tRepair the seat pan in a manner approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, and continue to inspect at intervals not to exceed 30 days in accordance with paragraph A. of this AD. \n\n\tB.\tThe actions required by paragraph A. of this AD may be terminated upon replacement of affected seat pans with seat pans that have been approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. \n\n\tC.\tAn alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. \n\n\tNOTE: The request should be submitted directly to the Manager, Seattle ACO, and a copy sent to the cognizant FAA Principal Inspector (PI). The PI will then forward comments or concurrence to the Seattle ACO. \n\n\tD.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service information from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. This information may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue S.W., Renton, Washington. \n\n\tThis amendment (39-6832, AD 90-26-05) becomes effective on December 26, 1990.
69-04-04: 69-04-04 PILATUS: Amdt. 39-720. Applies to Model PC-6 airplanes, Serial Numbers 342 through 675, 2001 through 2009, 2012 through 2018, 2025 through 2035, 2040 and 2041. Compliance required within the next 25 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. To prevent fatigue failure of the forward aileron mass balance attachment bolt P/N N-116 M5X40 (932.11.41.39), replace bolt on left and right aileron with new bolts of the same part number that have been supplied by the Pilatus Aircraft Works, Stans, Switzerland or Fairchild Hiller Corporation, Hagerstown, Maryland, after April 15, 1968 in accordance with Pilatus Service Bulletins No. 81 and 81A or later Swiss Federal Air Office-approved issue or an FAA approved equivalent. This amendment becomes effective February 14, 1969.
2009-18-18: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: A recent event occurred during which the LH [left-hand] forward side glass window of an ATR 72-212 aeroplane blew out while performing a ground pressure test. The investigation revealed some anomalies on the forward side window at the level of the Z-bar on the windows external side and at the level of the inner retainer on the windows internal side. These anomalies are considered as precursors of this failure. * * * * * An in-flight loss of a forward side window could have catastrophic consequences for the aeroplane and/or cause injuries to people on the ground. The loss of the forward side window while the aeroplane is on the ground with a positive differential cabin pressure could also cause injuries to people inside or around the aeroplane. * * * * * This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.
2009-18-19: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: An A340 operator has reported an uncommanded engine N[deg]4 shut down during taxi after landing. The root cause of this event has been identified as failure of the fuel pump Non Return Valve (NRV) preventing the collector cell jet pump from working. This led to engine N[deg]4 collector cell fuel level to drop below the pump inlet and consequently causing engine N[deg]4 flame out. * * * * * Multiple NRV failures in combination with failure modes trapping fuel could potentially increase the quantity of unusable fuel on aircraft possibly leading to fuel starvation which could result in engine in-flight shut down and would constitute an unsafe condition. * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2009-18-16: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: DGAC [Direction Generale de l'Aviation Civile] France issued AD F-2005-078 [which corresponds to FAA AD 2006-02-06] to require the modification (Airbus modification 13023), defined in Airbus SB [service bulletin] A310-53-2124, to increase the service life of junctions of center box upper frame bases to upper fuselage arches. This structural modification falls within the scope of the work related to the extension of the service life of A310 aircraft and widespread fatigue damage evaluations. The threshold timescales for accomplishment of the tasks as defined in SB A310-53-2124 were refined and reduced. * * * * * * * * The unsafe condition is fatigue cracking of the frame foot run-outs, which could lead to rupture of the frame foot and cracking in adjacent frames and skin, and which could result in reduced structural integrity of the fuselage. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
78-08-11: 78-08-11 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-3190. Applies to DC-10-10, -10F, -30, -30F and -40 Series airplanes, certificated in all categories.\n\n\tCompliance required before April 10, 1979, unless already accomplished, or unless incorporated in production. \n\n\tTo minimize the probability of an aborted takeoff resulting from a false stall warning during the takeoff roll, add a five second time delay between nose gear lift-off and the initiation of a stall warning by accomplishing the following:\n\n\t(a)\tModify the airplanes in accordance with McDonnell Douglas DC-10 Service Bulletin 22-94 dated August 4, 1977, or later FAA approved revisions.\n\n\t(b)\tIncorporate revisions in the FAA Approved Airplane Flight Manual, Documents MDC-J1010, MDC-J1030, MDC-J5830, MDC-J1040 and MDC-J2140, by adding the following new heading and text in Section III Procedures:\n\n\t\tSTALL WARNING PREFLIGHT CHECK\n\n\t\tRotate "STALL TEST" switch to "L (MOM)." Note five second delay before stick shaker \t\t\tactivation. Rotate "STALL TEST" switch to "R (MOM)." Again note five second delay before stick \t\tshaker activation.\n\n\t(c)\tEquivalent modifications, procedures, or revisions may be used when approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region.\n\n\t(d)\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR's 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for accomplishment of the modification required by this AD.\n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective May 18, 1978.