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66-13-02: 66-13-02\tBOEING: Amdt. 39-236 Part 39 Federal Register May 13, 1966. Applies to Models 707 and 720 Series Airplanes Listed in Boeing Service Bulletin 1789, Revision 1. \n\n\tCompliance required as indicated, unless already accomplished.\n \n\t(a)\tWithin the next 125 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, incorporate the following operating limitation in either the Airplane Flight Manual or on a placard installed adjacent to the cabin dome light switch: \n\n\t"THE DOME LIGHT SWITCH MUST BE IN EITHER THE BLUE, LOW OR BRIGHT POSITION DURING \t\t\tTAKEOFF AND LANDING". \n\n\t(b)\tWithin the next 1,200 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, install a new relay in the emergency exit light circuit or rewire the circuit to use existing contacts on the essential a.c. power failure relay, so that the emergency exit lights will function automatically when power is lost on the essential a.c. bus in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 1789, Revision 1, or later FAA-approved revision or an equivalent approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region.\n \n\t(c)\tThe operating limitation imposed under (a) may be removed when the modification required in (b) has been accomplished.\n\n\tThis directive effective May 13, 1966.
2004-01-11: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Hamburger Flugzeugbau G.m.b.H. Model HFB 320 HANSA airplanes, that requires replacement of the elevator trim control cable assemblies with new assemblies. This action is necessary to prevent loss of elevator trim and possible loss of rudder and/or elevator function due to stress-corrosion cracking of certain cable terminals. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
95-04-08: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to Boeing Model 747-300 and -400 series airplanes equipped with certain stretched upper deck evacuation slides manufactured by BFGoodrich series airplanes. This amendment requires modification of the slide's main restraint strap, regulator assembly, and turbo fan flapper retaining roll pins. This amendment is prompted by reports of loss of air pressure and non-inflation of the inflatable tubes of the slide due to problems associated with the restraint strap, regulator assembly, and turbo fan flapper retaining roll pins. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent loss of air pressure or non-inflation of the inflatable tubes of the slide, which could impede the successful evacuation of passengers from the airplane during an emergency.
2004-01-05: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Dassault Model Falcon 2000 and 900EX, and Dassault Model Mystere-Falcon 900 series airplanes. This AD requires measuring the paint thickness on the upper and lower surfaces of the left and right sides of the horizontal stabilizer, performing corrective actions if necessary, and installing maintenance caution placards on the upper surface of the left and right sides of the horizontal stabilizer. This action is necessary to prevent structural damage to the horizontal stabilizer after a direct lightning strike, which could result in reduced controllability of the airplane. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
58-10-07: 58-10-07 VICKERS: Applies to All Viscount 700 Series Aircraft. Compliance required as indicated. Cases have been reported of a variation in the clearances between the aileron lock arms and their associated locking levers on different aircraft when the control locks are disengaged. Vickers-Armstrong has issued the following corrective measures which the British Air registration Board considers mandatory: 1. As soon as possible, but not later than August 1, 1958, all aircraft should be inspected to determine that a nominal clearance of 0.15 inch is provided at the inboard and outboard aileron control lock assemblies. 2. If the clearances are less than 0.10 inch, the locking levers can be filed to a maximum of 0.10 inch to obtain the required clearance of not less than 0.15 inch. 3. If the clearances are between 0.10 and 0.15 inch, the filing of the locking levers to obtain the required clearance of not less than 0.15 inch, can be deferred until the next major check or next removal of the ailerons, whichever occurs sooner. The FAA concurs with this action and considers compliance therewith mandatory. (Vickers-Armstrong PTL No. 173 and Modification No. D.2491 cover this subject.)
2010-04-04: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: There have been several in-service cases reported of impact damage to the blowout (decompression) panel protective cage assemblies installed in the aft baggage cargo compartment. When damaged, these cages could prevent proper operation of the blowout panels, with potential degradation of smoke detection and fire extinguishing capabilities in the event of a fire. * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2008-09-24 R1: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above that would revise an existing AD. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Bombardier Aerospace has completed a system safety review of the aircraft fuel system against fuel tank safety standards introduced in Chapter 525 of the Airworthiness Manual through Notice of Proposed Amendment (NPA) 2002-043. The identified non-compliances were then assessed using Transport Canada Policy Letter No. 525-001, to determine if mandatory corrective action is required. The assessment showed that it is necessary to introduce Critical Design Configuration Control Limitations (CDCCL), in order to preserve critical fuel tank system ignition source prevention features during configuration changes such as modifications and repairs, or during maintenance actions. Failure to preserve critical fuel tank system ignition source prevention features could result in a fuel tank explosion. * * * This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI. DATES: This AD becomes effective December 21, 2009. The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of a certain publication listed in the AD as of December 21, 2009. On June 6, 2008 (73 FR 24143, May 2, 2008), the Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of certain other publications listed in the AD. We must receive comments on this AD by January 19, 2010.
2021-01-03: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain International Aero Engines AG (IAE) V2500-A1, V2522-A5, V2524- A5, V2525-D5, V2527-A5, V2527E-A5, V2527M-A5, V2528-D5, V2530-A5, V2531-E5, and V2533-A5 model turbofan engines. This AD was prompted by a root cause analysis of an event involving an uncontained failure of a high-pressure turbine (HPT) 1st-stage disk that resulted in high-energy debris penetrating the engine cowling. This AD requires removing certain HPT 1st-stage and HPT 2nd-stage disks from service. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2004-01-04: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain EMBRAER Model EMB-120 series airplanes, that currently requires revising the airplane flight manual (AFM), and either installing hydraulic tube assemblies incorporating a check valve, or visually inspecting the check valve if already installed and performing corrective actions if necessary. This action adds airplanes to the applicability of the existing AD. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent the landing gear doors from becoming blocked from opening during application of emergency procedures in the event of a loss of hydraulics. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
55-15-01: 55-15-01 BOEING: Applies to All Boeing 377 Series Aircraft with Hamilton Standard Propellers. Compliance required by first scheduled engine change after November 1, 1955, but not later than November 1, 1956. To increase the fire resistance integrity of the propeller feathering system against damage by a powerplant fire, all flexible hose components of propeller feathering lines forward of the firewall in zone 2 must be replaced with lines and fittings which will meet current fire resistance requirements. The following hose assemblies are considered acceptable for this applications: (a) Aeroquip 680-10S hose assemblies with Aeroquip 304 protective sleeves over end fittings (Aeroquip assembly P/N 304000). (b) Resistoflex SSFR-3800-10 hose assemblies. (c) Aeroquip 309009-10S hose assemblies.