Results
96-07-10: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 747-100, -200, and -300 series airplanes, that requires an inspection to determine if hinge bolts and nuts are installed in the overhead stowage bins, and the installation of hinge bolts and nuts, if necessary. This amendment is prompted by reports that overhead stowage bins in the passenger compartment have fallen out of position due to missing hinge bolts. The actions specified by this AD are intended to ensure that hinge bolts are installed in the overhead stowage bins. Missing hinge bolts could result in the overhead stowage bins falling out of position and injuring airplane occupants.
2011-03-05: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: The TC Holder received from operators, whose fleets are operated in demanding operating-conditions and with very frequent Short Take- Off and Landing (STOL) operations, reports of cracks located in the web of fuselage frame 19. On 05 February 2007, EASA issued Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2007-0028 which mandated Alert Service Bulletin (ASB) 228-266 and required an inspection of the frame 19 on all Dornier 228 aeroplanes. In addition, the TC Holder also initiated a flight-test campaign including strain measurements as well as finite element modelling and fatigue analyses to better understand the stress distribution onto the frame 19 and the associated structural components. The results of these investigations confirmed that STOL operations diminish extensively the fatigue life of the frame 19. Fuselage frame 19 supports the rear attachment of the Main Landing Gear (MLG). This condition, if not corrected, could cause rupture of frame 19, leading to subsequent collapse of a MLG. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2010-06-07: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the specified model helicopters. This AD results from a mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) AD issued by the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which is the Technical Agent for the Member States of the European Community. The MCAI AD states that the AD is issued following a manufacturing nonconformity found on one batch of the servo-control caps. With a defective servo-control, rotation of the distributor might not be stopped mechanically since only friction of inner seals holds the distributor sleeve in its position. The AD actions are intended to address the unsafe condition created by a manufacturing nonconformity found on one batch of servo-control caps. If not corrected this condition could cause untimely movements of servo-controls, which are used on main and anti-torque rotors, and lead to the loss of control of the helicopter.
2011-03-04: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. AD 2009-09-09 currently requires repetitive inspections of the rudder hinges and the rudder hinge brackets for damage, i.e., cracking, deformation, and discoloration. If damage is found during any inspection, AD 2009-09-09 also requires replacing the damaged rudder hinge and/or rudder hinge bracket. This new AD retains the inspection requirements of AD 2009-09-09, adds airplanes to the Applicability section, and adds a terminating action for the repetitive inspection requirements. This AD resulted from the manufacturer developing a modification that terminates the repetitive inspections and from the manufacture adding airplane serial numbers into the Applicability section. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct damage in the rudder hinges and the rudder hinge brackets, which could result in failure of the rudder. This failure could lead to loss of control.
2011-02-07: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for General Electric Company (GE) CF6-45 and CF6-50 series turbofan engines with certain low-pressure turbine (LPT) rotor stage 3 disks installed. That AD currently requires initial and repetitive borescope inspections of the high-pressure turbine (HPT) rotor stage 1 and stage 2 blades for wear and damage, including excessive airfoil material loss. That AD also requires fluorescent-penetrant inspection (FPI) of the LPT rotor stage 3 disk under certain conditions and removal of the disk from service before further flight if found cracked. That AD also requires repetitive exhaust gas temperature (EGT) system checks (inspections). This AD requires HPT rotor stage 1 and stage 2 blade inspections and EGT system inspections. This AD also requires FPI of the LPT rotor stage 3 disk under certain conditions, removal of the disk from service before further flight if found cracked, and an ultrasonic inspection (UI) of the LPT rotor stage 3 disk forward spacer arm. This AD also requires initial and repetitive engine core vibration surveys and reporting to the FAA any crack findings, disks that fail the UI, and engines that fail the engine core vibration survey. This AD was prompted by reports received of additional causes of HPT rotor imbalance not addressed in AD 2010-12-10, and two additional LPT rotor stage 3 disk events. We are issuing this AD to prevent critical life-limited rotating engine part failure, which could result in an uncontained engine failure and damage to the airplane.
2011-01-14: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: The current Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) of PC-6 B2-H2 and B2-H4 models does not include a Chapter 04 in the Airworthiness Limitations Section (ALS). For PC-6 models other than B2-H2 and B2- H4, no ALS at all is included in the AMM. With the latest Revision 12 of the AMM, a new Chapter 04 has been introduced in the AMM for PC-6 B2-H2 and B2-H4 models. For PC-6 models other than B2-H2 and B2-H4, a new ALS document has been implemented as well. These documents include the Mandatory Continuing Airworthiness Information (MCAI) which are maintenance requirements and/or airworthiness limitations developed by Pilatus Aircraft Ltd and approved by EASA. Failure to comply with these MCAI constitutes an unsafe condition. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
96-07-03: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale and Eurocopter France (Eurocopter France) Model AS 350B, BA, B1, B2, and D, and Model AS 355E, F, F1, F2, and N helicopters, without an autopilot installed, that requires a visual inspection to determine whether the cyclic pitch change control rod (rod) end fittings were safetied, and removal and replacement of the rod if the rod end fittings were not safetied. This amendment is prompted by a manufacturer's report that some of the rod end fittings had not been safetied at the factory. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent loss of tightening torque on the adjustment nuts of the rod, shifting of the neutral point of the cyclic stick, reduction in the amount of available movement of the cyclic stick in the roll axis, and subsequent reduction in the controllability of the helicopter.
2021-26-12: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Stemme AG Model Stemme S 12 gliders. This AD was prompted by mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as the incorrect installation of an axle connecting the main landing gear (MLG) to the center steel frame. This AD requires inspecting the MLG installation and repairing if necessary. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
77-23-11: 77-23-11 CESSNA: Amendment 39-3084. Applies to Model 182 Series (Serial Nos. 18260797 thru 18265965) plus all other Cessna Model 182 Series incorporating ELT installations accomplished in accordance with Cessna Service Letter SE73-41 dated December 12, 1973, and references Kits AK150-97F or AK150-104A. Compliance: Required as indicated unless already accomplished. To preclude the possibility of an in-flight fire due to a loose ELT antenna coaxial cable connector making contact with the terminals of the battery relay and thereby shorting the electrical power to ground: A) Before the next flight, visually inspect the ELT antenna coaxial cable for security, and correct as necessary in accordance with Cessna Service Letter SE73-41, or later approved revisions and/or the applicable Cessna Service Manual, by accomplishing the following: 1. Assure that the ELT antenna RF connector is solidly attached at the ELT and is spring loaded in the detent position. If not correctly attached and/or spring loaded, either properly secure the connector, or, if damaged, replace the complete antenna coaxial cable assembly. 2. Assure that the plastic cable clamp, Cessna P/N S1155-3 or equivalent, is properly installed on the ELT coaxial cable and secured to structure above the ELT transmitter and mount (applicable to S/N's 33000 thru 18265175). If the coaxial cable is improperly secured, install a new plastic cable clamp, Cessna P/N S1155-3 or equivalent, if necessary, and properly secure. 3. Assure that the length of excess coaxial cable is coiled and secured to the mounted ELT transmitter by the required plastic sta-strap which has been properly installed. If not, properly secure with a new plastic sta-strap or equivalent. B) If operations are being conducted with the ELT removed, as provided by FAR 91.52(f), ascertain that the antenna cable is secured away from the battery relay. C) Airplanes may be flown, in accordance with FAR 91.52(e)(2), to a location where this AD can be accomplished, provided the operator disconnects the ELT antenna cable and removes it from the aircraft. D) Any equivalent method of compliance with this AD must be approved by the Chief, Engineering & Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Central Region. This amendment becomes effective November 28, 1977, to all persons except those to whom it has already been made effective by air mail letter from the FAA dated October 28, 1977.
96-07-01: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model DC-10 series airplanes and KC-10A (military) airplanes, that requires visual inspections to detect failure of the attachments located in the banjo No. 4 fitting of the vertical stabilizer. This amendment also requires an eddy current inspection to detect cracking of the flanges and bolt holes of that fitting, and repair or replacement of attachments. This amendment is prompted by reports of failed attachments of the vertical stabilizer; the failures are attributed to fatigue. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent loss of the fail safe capability of the vertical stabilizer due to cracking of its attachments.