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2011-26-06: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Airbus Model A330-200 and -300 series airplanes, Model A340-200 and -300 series airplanes, and Model A340-500 and -600 series airplanes. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as:
During a pre-flight test before delivery of an aeroplane from the Airbus production line, a fault message was triggered on FDU1 [fire detection unit].
Investigations by the supplier on the faulty FDU have identified a soldering quality issue on one of the internal cards. This quality issue resulted from a specific repair process that was applied to some FDU * * * during manufacturing.
The FDU monitors the engine, Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) and Main Landing Gear (MLG) bay fire detection systems.
This condition, if not corrected, may adversely affect the fire detection system performance in case of a fire in the area that is monitored by the faulty FDU, potentially resulting in an unsafe condition.
* * * * *
We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
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66-04-03: 66-04-03 SIKORSKY: Amdt. 39-194 Part 39 Federal Register February 12, 1966, as amended by Amendment 39-1563 is further amended by Amendment 39-2577. Applies to Models S-55 Series and S-62A Helicopters.
Compliance required as indicated.
To prevent operation with fatigue cracks in the spar of a main rotor blade, accomplish the following:
(a) Except as provided in (e), remove from service S14-10-2100 series main rotor blades with 2,225 or more hours' time in service on the effective date of this AD within the next 25 hours' time in service.
(b) Except as provided in (e), remove from service S14-10-2100 series main rotor blades with less than 2,225 hours' time in service on the effective date of this AD before the accumulation of 2,250 hours' time in service.
(c) Except as provided in (e), remove from service S14-10-2201 series main rotor blades with 2,100 or more hours' time in service on the effective date of this AD within the next 150 hours' time in service.
(d) Except as provided in (e), remove from service S14-10-2201 series main rotor blades with less than 2,100 hours' time in service on the effective date of this AD before the accumulation of 2,250 hours' time in service.
(e) The service life limits specified in (a), (b), (c), and (d) may be extended to 6,000 hours' total time in service for S14-10-2201-9 main rotor blades and S14-10-2100 series and S14- 10-2201 series blades modified to S14-10-2201-9 blades, provided the blades are inspected at the times and in the manner set forth in Sikorsky Service Bulletin No. 55B10-7E dated March 26, 1976 or No. 62B10-6E dated March 26, 1976 or later FAA approved revisions, as applicable, and, if low pressure is indicated, the cause is determined and corrected before further flight in accordance with the applicable service bulletin.
Amendment 39-194 became effective February 12, 1966.
Amendment 39-1563 became effective November 30, 1972.
This Amendment 39-2577 becomeseffective April 27, 1976.
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2011-06-06 R1: We are revising an existing airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to all Eclipse Aerospace, Inc. Model EA500 airplanes equipped with Pratt & Whitney Canada, Corp. (P&WC) Model PW610F-A engines. The existing AD currently requires incorporating an operating limitation of a maximum operating altitude of 30,000 feet into Section 2, Limitations, of the airplane flight manual (AFM). Since we issued that AD, P&WC has developed a design change for the combustion chamber liner assembly. This new AD retains the requirements of the current AD, clarifies the engine applicability, and allows the option of incorporating the design change to terminate the current operating limitation and restore the original certificated maximum operating altitude of 41,000 feet. We are issuing this AD to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
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2011-26-03: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Model 777-200, -300, and -300ER series airplanes. That AD currently requires installing Teflon sleeving under the clamps of certain wire bundles routed along the fuel tank boundary structure, and cap sealing certain penetrating fasteners of the main and center fuel tanks. This AD expands the applicability in the existing AD. This AD was prompted by fuel system reviews conducted by the manufacturer, which determined that electrical arcing on the fuel tank boundary structure or inside the fuel tanks could result in a fire or explosion. We are issuing this AD to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
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52-01-02: 52-01-02 BELL: Applies to All Models 47B, and 47B3 Helicopters and to Model 47D Helicopters Serial Numbers 1 to 79, Inclusive.
Compliance required at next 300-hour overhaul, but not later than March 1, 1952.
To increase the safety of the main rotor blade equalizer horns and drag brace fittings, which have failed in accidents involving damage to the main rotor, replace the existing equalizer horn (P/N 47-120-027-2) and drag brace fitting (P/N 47-110-145-2) with revised parts P/N 47- 120-167-1 and P/N 47-110-235-1, respectively.
(Bell Service Bulletin No. 77 covers this same subject.)
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59-16-04: 59-16-04 SIKORSKY: Amendment 34 (24 F.R. 6581) as amended by Amendment 39-2140. Applies to all model S-58 helicopters including military types HSS-1, HSS-1F, HSS-1N, HUS-1, HUS-1A, HUS-1AN, HUS-1G, HUS-1Z, H-34A, H-34C, H-34J, CH-34A, CH-34C, HH-34F, SH-34G, SH-34H, SH-34J, UH-34D, UH-34E, UH-34G, UH-34J, VH-34C, VH-34D, except for those modified in accordance with Sikorsky Modification Kit, P/N S1607-5695-1.
Compliance required as indicated.
Due to the present design of the damper trunnion assembly, torque cannot be maintained on the bolt, thereby leading to fretting and fatiguing of the bolt. Although this problem has been partially corrected by replacing the AN 177-34 bolt with S1610-23198 bolt (NAS 627-48 bolt with cotter pin hole), working of the bolt in the assembly has not been completely eliminated. Accordingly, it is considered essential that close surveillance be maintained and the following inspection be carried out pending the development and installation of aredesigned trunnion assembly to correct this difficulty.
During the 50-hour periodic inspection of the damper trunnion for freedom per item No. 20(c) of the Periodic Inspection Check Sheet, Airframe System S-58 Maintenance Manual, remove the damper trunnion bolt P/N S1610-23198 and inspect for condition. If indications of wearing, scouring or fretting are found the bolt must be replaced prior to further flight.
This amendment 39-2140 becomes effective April 8, 1975.
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2011-26-01: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Piaggio Aero Industries S.p.A. Model P-180 airplanes. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as the baggage door lockpins not engaging properly and the baggage door open light illuminating when the baggage door is not open, which could lead to the pilot disregarding a valid warning. We are issuing this AD to require actions to address the unsafe condition on these products.
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2011-25-08: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for International Aero Engines (IAE) V2500-A1, V2522-A5, V2524-A5, V2525- D5, V2527-A5, V2527E-A5, V2527M-A5, V2528-D5, V2530-A5, and V2533-A5 turbofan engines. This AD was prompted by three reports of high- pressure turbine (HPT) case burn-through events, numerous reports of loss of stage 1 blade outer air seal segments, and HPT case bulging. This AD requires initial and repetitive 360 degree borescope inspections of HPT stage 1 blade outer air seal segments for evidence of certain distress conditions. This AD also requires incorporation of improved durability stage 1 blade outer air seal segments at the next exposure to the HPT module subassembly as terminating action to the repetitive inspections. We are issuing this AD to prevent HPT case burn-through, uncontrolled under-cowl engine fire, and damage to the airplane.
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59-20-04: 59-20-04\tBOEING: Applies to the following 707-100 series aircraft only: Serial Numbers 17586 through 17591, 17609 through 17612, 17628 through 17652, 17658 through 17672, 17696 through 17702, 17925 through 17927. \n\tCompliance required not later than November 15, 1959. \n\tThere have been failures of the welded flanges located at each end of the turbocompressor bleed duct mounted on the high pressure bleed port of the engine. These failures have caused damage to the surrounding structure due to excessive pressure and temperature in the cowl and also required engine shutdown due to high EGT and low EPR. Therefore, the following modification(s) shall be accomplished as indicated: \n\t(a)\tAn additional filetweld shall be added to the external side of the three flanges on the turbocompressor engine bleed duct assembly. (Each pod utilizing a turbocompressor.) \n\t(b)\tThe existing boss weld on the turbocompressor engine bleed duct shall be strengthened by welding gussets to both the boss and duct. These gussets are to be fabricated in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin No. 543 figure 2. \n\tNOTE: The above modification(s) are included in Boeing Airplane Company Service Bulletin No. 543 dated August 14, 1959.
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52-16-01: 52-16-01 MARTIN: Applies to All Model 202A Airplanes.
Item I is to be accomplished by means of a progressive modification program to be submitted to and approved by the FAA. The program shall begin no later than August 10, 1952, and shall be completed no later than May 1, 1953.
I. In order to prevent inadvertent actuation of the propeller reversing solenoid valves, Protect the reversing solenoid circuits from all other electrical circuits and protect the reversing solenoid circuits from each other. This is to be accomplished in accordance with Attachment A (see AD 52-13-02 Lockheed) and the following instructions which pertain to specific features to be considered in isolation of the circuits. Other features which are not specifically referred to in this list shall be treated in an equivalent manner.
A. Comply with TWA Engineering Orders 5686, 5776, and 5887.
B. Modify the 19 pin connector at the propeller control relay box as specified in item 2 of attachment A.
C. Modify the Hamilton Standard relay box on the front of the control pedestal to shield the reversing solenoid relay contacts, etc., from all other circuits which are energized at any time except when reversing is desired. Reversing relay boxes which have separate pin connectors for the reversing solenoid wire and the remaining circuits, shall be so installed that it will not be possible inadvertently to interchange any connectors between the relay boxes.
D. Modify the configuration of the propeller control relay box in a manner equivalent specified in item I.C.
E. Modify reversing solenoid circuit wiring in accordance with item 4 of attachment A.
II. The following maintenance practices are to be instituted not later than August 10, 1952.
A. At each nearest scheduled service to 350 hours:
(1) Inspect all points covered by TWA Engineering Orders 5686 and 5776.
(2) Perform an electrical check of the reverse safety switches in the pedestal assembly to assure that the switch is open when the throttles are moved forward out of the reverse position, unless it is shown that failure of any of the reverse safety switches to open will be clearly apparent to the flight crew by reason of improper operation of the propeller control system. Because of the many technical considerations involved, analyses showing that the objective of this revision has been accomplished should be referred to the FAA for engineering evaluation and approval.
B. At any time that an electrical fault occurs in a circuit which is carried in the same bundles or the same conduits as the reversing solenoid circuit, representative terminal points in the faulty circuit are to be inspected to determine whether any damage may have occurred within the bundles or conduit. If there is evidence of possible damage, all the wiring involved is to be removed and inspected. Damaged wiring is to be replaced as necessary.
III. Operating instructions: Comply with item 5 of attachment A.
IV. (Note: Propeller governor design changes which are under development and whose purpose is to provide a high pressure hydraulic circuit bypass to safeguard against inadvertent reversing and to provide ability to feather even when the reversing solenoid is energized, are still under consideration and may be the subject of a future directive.)
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