Results
2007-26-13: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for certain MT-Propeller Entwicklung GmbH variable pitch and fixed pitch propellers manufactured before 1995, which had not been overhauled since April 1994. That AD currently requires overhauling the propeller blades and performing initial and repetitive visual inspections of affected propeller blades. That AD also requires removing all propeller blades from service with damaged erosion sheath bonding or loose erosion sheaths and installing any missing or damaged polyurethane protective strips. This AD requires the same actions. This AD results from the need to clarify the population of affected propellers previously listed in AD 2006-05-05. We are issuing this AD to prevent erosion sheath separation leading to damage of the airplane.
77-26-01: 77-26-01 HAWKER SIDDELEY AVIATION, LIMITED: Amendment 39-3099. Applies to DH/BH-125 airplanes, all series except 600A and 700A and excluding those airplanes with Modification 252239 embodied which introduces the Walter Kidde supply valve. Compliance is required as indicated unless already accomplished. To ensure the retainment of the threaded insert and prevent possible sudden discharge of the high pressure oxygen supply into the crew compartment, accomplish the following: (a) Within 10 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, locate the oxygen master supply valve and passenger supply valve, both P/N SDV 826-1, and check to assure that threaded insert in the gland bushing is secure and spot lock the insert all in accordance with the Section entitled "Accomplishment Instructions" of Hawker Siddeley Aviation, Limited Alert Service Bulletin 35-A25, dated October 13, 1977, or an FAA-approved equivalent. (b) Prior to installation of any oxygen supplyvalves from spares stock, unless already accomplished, check, tighten, and lock the insert in accordance with paragraph (a) of this AD. This amendment becomes effective January 3, 1978.
92-18-06: 92-18-06 BRITISH AEROSPACE: Amendment 39-8350. Docket No. 92-NM-46-AD. Applicability: Model BAe 146-100A, -200A, and -300A series airplanes, equipped with Dunlop hydraulic fuses, part number ACM29100; certificated in any category. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. To prevent potential loss of airplane braking and directional control, accomplish the following: (a) Prior to the accumulation of 4,000 landings since installation of Dunlop hydraulic fuses having part number ACM29100 (Mod. states 1 or 2), or within 60 days after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later, remove green and yellow hydraulic systems Dunlop hydraulic fuses having part number ACM29100 (Mod. states 1 or 2) and install new hydraulic fuses having part number ACM30506 (Mod. 1), in accordance with British Aerospace Modification Service Bulletin SB.32-130-70295C, dated September 27, 1991. (b) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113. NOTE: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Standardization Branch. (c) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. (d) The removal and installation shall be done in accordance with British Aerospace Modification Service Bulletin SB.32-130-70295C, dated September 27, 1991. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from British Aerospace, PLC, Librarian for Service Bulletins, P.O. Box 17414, Dulles International Airport, Washington, DC. 20041-0414. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC. (e) This amendment becomes effective on October 8, 1992.
68-10-03: 68-10-03 MCCAULEY: Amdt. 39-596. Applies to the following models with hub serial numbers whose first two digits are 62, 63, 64 or 65: D2A34C49, D2A34C49-A installed on Continental IO-470-S engines. D2AF34C54, D2AF34C54-A installed on Continental TSIO-470-D engines. 2AF34C55, 2AF34C55-A, 2AF34C55-8, 2AF34C55-C, 2AF34C55-D, 2AF34C55-E, 2AF34C55-F, 2AF34C55-G installed on Continental IO-470-L engines. D2AF34C60, D2AF34C60-A, D2AF34C60-B installed on Continental IO-360-A engines. To detect and prevent formation of cracks and possible hub failure, accomplish the following on propellers with 1200 hours' or more time in service within the next 25 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless previously accomplished: (a) Remove propeller from aircraft and disassemble. Remove hub alignment dowels and hub mounting studs from hub. (b) Inspect dowel and stud holes and adjacent areas for cracks by penetrant method. Replace before further flight any crackedhub with an approved replacement hub or hub which has been inspected and altered according to this AD. (c) Remove sharp corners formed where the hub mounting stud holes and hub alignment dowel pin holes intersect the inside of the propeller hub, in accordance with instructions in McCauley Service Manual or an alteration approved by the Chief, Engineering & Manufacturing Branch, Eastern Region. Propellers with 1200 hours' or more time in service which have been inspected according to Paragraph (b) within 300 hours' time in service prior to the effective date of this AD, but which have not been modified according to Paragraph (c), need not comply with this AD until 300 hours' time in service from such previous inspection. This amendment is effective May 11, 1968.
2007-25-11: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Two events have been reported of Fokker 100 (F.28 Mk.0100) aircraft, where the Nose Landing Gear (NLG) failed to extend in the normal mode and problems were experienced to open the NLG doors, almost preventing extension of the NLG in the emergency (alternate) mode. Subsequent investigation and tests have shown that the friction of the bearing in the roller of the NLG Door Uplock Bracket Assembly is high, causing increased resistance in the mechanical system that unlocks the NLG doors. This condition, if not corrected, may result in a NLG up landing, which is considered a hazardous event. * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2007-18-09: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD), which applies to all Airbus Model A318-100, A319-100, A320-200, A321-100, and A321-200 series airplanes, and Model A320-111 airplanes. That AD currently requires an inspection to determine whether certain braking and steering control units (BSCUs) are installed or have ever been installed. For airplanes on which certain BSCUs are installed or have ever been installed, the existing AD requires an inspection of the nose landing gear (NLG) upper support, and corrective action if necessary; and a check of the NLG strut inflation pressure, and an adjustment if necessary. For some of these airplanes, the existing AD also requires a revision to the aircraft flight manual to incorporate an operating procedure to recover normal steering in the event of a steering failure. This new AD instead requires repetitive inspections of the NLG upper support, and related investigative/corrective actions in accordance with new service information; and removes the one-time inspection that was required by the existing AD. This new AD also provides an optional terminating action for the repetitive inspections. This AD results from a report of an incident where an airplane landed with the NLG turned 90 degrees from centerline, and from additional reports of NLG upper support anti-rotation lugs rupturing in service. We are issuing this AD to prevent landings with the NLG turned 90 degrees from centerline, which could result in reduced controllability of the airplane.
92-02-06: 92-02-06 BOEING: Amendment 39-8142. Docket No. 91-NM-262-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: Model 747-400 series airplanes, listed in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-35A2075, Revision 1, dated September 19, 1991, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required within the next 30 days after the effective date of this AD, unless accomplished previously. \n\n\tTo prevent pilot incapacitation during an emergency situation requiring supplemental oxygen to the flight crew, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tInspect the captain's and first officer's oxygen hoses below the oxygen mask stowage boxes in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-35A2075, Revision 1, dated September 19, 1991. Replace damaged or short hoses before further flight, in accordance with the service bulletin. \n\n\t(b)\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft CertificationOffice (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. The request shall be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Seattle ACO. \n\n\t(c)\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\t(d)\tThe inspection and replacement requirements of this AD shall be done in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-35A2075, Revision 1, dated September 19, 1991. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 1100 L Street NW., Room 8401, Washington, D.C.(e)\tThis amendment (39-8142, AD 92-02-06) becomes effective on January 24, 1992.
2007-24-08: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to all Boeing Model 767 airplanes. That AD currently requires repetitive measurements of the rudder and elevator freeplay, repetitive lubrications of rudder and elevator components, and related investigative/corrective actions if necessary. This new AD instead requires revised repetitive measurements of the rudder freeplay and the elevator freeplay for each of the power control actuators (PCAs) that move the rudder and elevator, corrective and related investigative actions if necessary, and repetitive lubrications of the rudder and elevator components. For some airplanes, this AD also requires related concurrent actions. This AD results from reports of freeplay-induced vibration of the rudder and the elevator. The potential for vibration of the control surface should be avoided because the point of transition from vibration to divergent flutter is unknown. We are issuing this AD to prevent excessive vibration of the airframe during flight, which could result in loss of control of the airplane.
96-09-11: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to de Havilland DHC-6 series airplanes. This action requires revising the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) to provide the flight crew with recognition cues for, and procedures for exiting from, severe icing conditions, and to limit or prohibit the use of various flight control devices. This amendment is prompted by results of a review of the requirements for certification of the airplane in icing conditions, new information on the icing environment, and icing data provided currently to the flight crews. The actions specified by this AD are intended to minimize the potential hazards associated with operating the airplane in freezing rain or freezing drizzle conditions by providing more clearly defined procedures and limitations associated with such conditions.
2007-24-02: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to all Model 737-100, -200, -200C, -300, -400, and -500 series airplanes. The existing AD currently requires repetitive detailed inspections for damage of the electrical wire and sleeve that run to the fuel boost pump through a conduit in the fuel tank, and arcing damage of the conduit and signs of fuel leakage into the conduit; replacement of the sleeve with a new, smaller-diameter sleeve; and related investigative and corrective actions, as applicable. This new AD reduces the inspection threshold for certain airplanes. This AD \nresults from a report of a fuel tank explosion on a Model 727-200F airplane on the ground, and a report of chafed wires and a damaged power cable sleeve of a fuel boost pump discovered during an inspection on a Model 737-300 airplane. (The fuel boost pump installation on certain Model 737 airplanes is almost identical to the installation on Model 727 airplanes.) We are issuing this AD to detect and correct chafing of the fuel boost pump electrical wiring and \nleakage of fuel into the conduit, and to prevent electrical arcing between the wiring and the surrounding conduit, which could result in arc-through of the conduit, and consequent fire or explosion of the fuel tank.\n\nDATES: This AD becomes effective December 6, 2007. \n\n\tThe Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of a certain publication listed in the AD as of December 6, 2007. \n\n\tOn June 6, 2007 (72 FR 28597, May 22, 2007), the Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-28A1263, Revision 1, dated March 19, 2007. \n\n\tWe must receive any comments on this AD by January 22, 2008.