Results
2003-23-05: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Titeflex Corporation hoses installed on Boeing 737-300, -400, - 500, -600, -700, -700C, -800, -900, 747-400, 757-200, -300, 767-200, - 300, and -300F airplanes. This AD requires, within 24 months after the effective date of the AD, inspection of certain Titeflex Corporation hoses for proper date and paint code, replacement if necessary, and inspection for proper heat treatment of aluminum B-nuts, if necessary. This AD is prompted by certain Titeflex Corporation hoses discovered with incorrect heat treatment of B-nuts. We are issuing this AD to prevent fire extinguishing system and fuel system hose failure due to improperly heat treated aluminum B-nuts.
94-11-02: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to all Boeing Model 767 series airplanes. This action requires repetitive detailed visual and eddy current inspections to detect cracks of certain midspar fuse pins, and replacement of any cracked midspar fuse pin with a new fuse pin. This amendment is prompted by reports of longitudinal fatigue cracks on certain midspar fuse pins installed on Boeing Model 767 series airplanes. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent loss of the strut and engine due to cracking of both fuse pins on the same strut.
67-22-07: 67-22-07 MOONEY: Amdt. No. 39-444, Part 39, Federal Register July 21, 1967. Applies to Model M20F, Serial Numbers 660003, 660004, and 670001 through 670303. Compliance required within the next 15 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD unless already accomplished. To prevent water retention in the rudder assembly, accomplish the following: Drill .375 (3/8) inch diameter holes in the rudder as shown by Figure 1 of Mooney Service Bulletin M20-149 or FAA-approved equivalent. This may be accomplished without removal of the rudder or any part replacements. This amendment effective August 21, 1967.
2009-20-08: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Boeing Model 727 airplanes. This AD requires performing an operational test of the engine fuel suction feed of the fuel system, and other related testing and corrective actions if necessary. This AD results from a report of in-service occurrences of loss of fuel system suction feed capability, followed by total loss of pressure of the fuel feed system. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct failure of the engine fuel suction feed capability of the fuel system, which could result in multi-engine flameout, inability to restart the engines, and consequent forced landing of the airplane.
2008-07-04: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: A case of loose bond (ungluing) of one mounting wooden block of the control stick base cover, found during the cover reinstallation, was reported to the Type Certificate Holder (TCH) and led to the issuance of the "recommended'' Service Bulletin (SB) No. 031004 in February 2004. Since that date, other similar occurrences have been reported. This SB in its revision 1, has therefore been reclassified "mandatory'' by the TCH. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2005-11-10: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Bombardier Model DHC-8-102, -103, -106, -201, -202, -301, -311 and -315 airplanes. This AD requires installation of check valves in Numbers 1 and 2 hydraulic systems, removal of the filters from the brake shuttle valves, and removal of the internal garter spring from the brake shuttle valves. This AD results from two instances of brake failure due to the loss of hydraulic fluid from both Numbers 1 and 2 hydraulic systems and one incident of brake failure due to filter blockage in the shuttle valve. We are issuing this AD to prevent the loss of hydraulic power from both hydraulic systems, which could lead to reduced controllability of the airplane, and to prevent brake failure, which could result in the loss of directional control on the ground and consequent departure from the runway during landing.
57-05-01: 57-05-01 CURTISS-WRIGHT: Applies to all C-46 Series aircraft. Compliance required by August 1, 1957. During emergency extension of the landing gear, hydraulic dump valves are actuated in the landing gear hydraulic system to vent fluid directly overboard in order to prevent trapped fluid from preventing the lowering of the landing gear. On early model aircraft this fluid was vented overboard on the inboard side of the nacelles directly aft of the exhaust stack. This has resulted in fires in areas where no fire detection or protection is provided. In order to prevent this occurrence, item (1), (2), or (3) should be accomplished. (1) The vent line should be rerouted to vent from nacelle tail cone in accordance with Curtiss-Wright Service Bulletin C-46 1226 or Curtiss-Wright Drawing No. 20-575-3206. (2) The vent line should be rerouted to return to the main system as outlined in change A of T.O. 01-25LA-209. (3) The vent line should be rerouted to anapproved equivalent of item (1) or (2). Either item (1) or (2) may have been accomplished on later model aircraft at the factory or by the military; however, the aircraft may have been further modified and should be inspected for compliance.
67-17-01: 67-17-01 AERO PRODUCTS: Amdt. 39-417 Part 39 Federal Register May 11, 1967. Applies to Models A6441FN-606 and A6441FN-606A Propellers. Compliance required as indicated. (a) On or before July 1, 1967, unless already accomplished, on each propeller in which is installed a fixed spline P/N 6522974, Serial No. 1367 and up, or P/N's 6523110 and 6509978, accomplish the following: (1) Remove from service all fixed splines P/N's 6523110 and 6509978. (2) Remove from service any P/N 6522974, Serial No. 1367 and up, fixed spline which does not meet the specification requirements for core hardness. (Reference: Allison Commercial Service Letter 189, Page 7, titled "Fixed Spline," Paragraph B.4.c.) (b) Within the next 10 hours' time in service, unless already accomplished, each propeller in which is installed a fixed spline P/N 6523110, or 6509978, or P/N 6522974, with Serial No. 1367 and up, must be inspected and marked as required by Allison telegram THO- 641W-LOD, dated April 7, 1967, as modified by Allison telegram THO-662W-LOD, dated April 10, 1967. Thereafter, repetitive daily inspections are required as specified in those telegrams. (c) If, during the daily inspection, it is determined that a propeller blade is beyond tolerance as set forth in those telegrams, the propeller shall be removed from service and be - (1) Retained by the operator, with immediate notification to the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Central Region, pending further instructions by him; or (2) Returned to an approved overhaul base and the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Central Region, notified immediately. (d) The daily inspection required by this AD may be discontinued when the fixed splines identified in (a)(1) have been removed from service and replaced by airworthy fixed splines, or when the fixed splines identified in (a)(2) have been inspected for core hardness and determined to meet specifications or have been replaced by airworthy fixed splines. (e) Within the next 10 hours' time in service from the effective date of this amendment, unless already accomplished, each propeller which has not been modified to comply with the restrictor installation of paragraph (a) of AD 67-20-01 and in which is installed a fixed spline Part Number 6508538, accomplish the markings and inspections outlined in paragraphs (b) and (c). This amendment effective September 20, 1967, for all persons except those to whom it was made effective by telegram dated September 8, 1967. This supersedes AD 67-12-01. This directive effective May 11, 1967. Revised September 20, 1967.
2020-24-06: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) AD 2019- 08-13 for Textron Aviation, Inc., (type certificate previously held by Cessna Aircraft Company) Models 525, 525A, and 525B airplanes with Tamarack Aerospace Group (Tamarack) active load alleviation system (ATLAS) winglets installed in accordance with Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) SA03842NY. AD 2019-08-13 was prompted by mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as malfunction of the ATLAS. This AD results from the identification of corrective actions that, if implemented, allow operators to reactivate the ATLAS and restore operations to normal procedures. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2003-23-04: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 757-200 series airplanes, that currently requires modification of the number 3 left and right emergency exit doors. This amendment requires a new, improved modification of the number 3 left and right emergency exit doors, which terminates the requirements in the existing AD. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent the number 3 emergency exit doors from jamming, which could impede the safe evacuation of passengers and crew during an emergency. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.