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79-19-10: 79-19-10 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-3566. Applies to the McDonnell Douglas DC-8-62, -62F and DC-8-63, -63F Series airplanes certificated in all categories, incorporating 7079-T6 aluminum wing front spar pylon support fittings, (P/N) 5753054-1/-2 and 5753055-1/-2. \n\n\tNOTE: This AD is not applicable to 7075-T73 aluminum fittings (P/N) 5753054-501/-502 and 5753055-501/-502. Operators who are unable to verify part numbers visually, may ascertain the fitting material by NDT methods presented in the McDonnell Douglas DC-8 Alert Service Bulletin A57-87, Revision 1, dated September 10, 1979. \n\n\tCompliance required as indicated. \n\n\tTo detect cracks and prevent failure of the wing front spar pylon support fittings, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tWithin the next 300 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished within the last 2,700 hours' time in service in an approved equivalent manner: \n\n\t\t(1)\tBefore inspection, thoroughly cleaneach wing front spar pylon support fitting in accordance with the procedures outlined in McDonnell Douglas DC-8 Alert Service Bulletin A57-87 Revision 1, dated September 10, 1979, \n\n\t\t(2)\tConduct a visual inspection of all four wing front spar pylon support fittings in accordance with the procedures outlined in McDonnell Douglas DC-8 Alert Service Bulletin A57-87, Revision 1, dated September 10, 1979. \n\n\t(b)\tIf no cracks are found during the inspections per paragraph (a), conduct repetitive inspections in accordance with paragraph (a) at intervals not to exceed 3,000 hours' time in service or one (1) year, whichever comes first. \n\n\t(c)\tIf cracks are found which are repairable as defined in McDonnell Douglas DC-8 Alert Service Bulletin A57-87, Revision 1, dated September 10, 1979, make repairs per DC-8 Structural Repair Manual, Chapter 54 or McDonnell Douglas DC-8 Alert Service Bulletin A57-87, Revision 1, as applicable prior to further flight, and revert to the repetitive inspection requirements of paragraph (b). \n\n\t(d)\tIf cracks are found which are defined as non-repairable in McDonnell Douglas DC-8 Alert Service Bulletin A57-87, Revision 1, dated September 10, 1979, remove and replace the fitting prior to further flight. \n\n\t(e)\tIf a cracked fitting is replaced with a 7079-T6 aluminum fitting, inspect the replacement fitting in accordance with the repetitive inspection requirements of paragraph (b). \n\n\t(f)\tWithin 24 hours after the inspection, report the results of the inspection per paragraph (a) to the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region, through the principal maintenance inspector for the operator. \n\n\t(g)\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of inspections required by this AD. \n\n\t(h)\tAlternative inspections, modifications or other actions which provide an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective September 27, 1979.
83-08-02: 83-08-02 BOEING: Amendment 39-4634. Applies to Model 747 series airplanes certificated in all categories listed in Boeing Service Bulletin 747-57-2206, Revision 1, and Service Bulletin 747-57-2217, Revision 1, or later FAA approved revisions. The effectivity is divided into eight groups for Service Bulletin 747-57-2206-R1 and three groups for Service Bulletin 747-57-2217- R1, listed in the service bulletins. To prevent trailing edge flap track fuse bolt failures, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tWithin 400 landings after the effective date of this AD, unless accomplished within the last 1600 landings, and at intervals thereafter not to exceed 2000 landings until the replacement called for in paragraphs B. or C. is accomplished, visually inspect the bolts listed in Table I, below, for deformation and failure. Bolts found deformed or failed must be replaced in accordance with paragraph B. or C., as applicable, prior to further flight. Bolts found acceptable for service are to beretorqued in accordance with Table I prior to further flight. \n\n\tB.\tUnless previously accomplished, replace forward fuse bolts on flap tracks No. 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, and 8 with redesigned bolts in accordance with Figures 1, 3, and 5 of Boeing Service Bulletin 747-57-2206-R1, or later FAA approved revision, within 200 landings after the effective date of this AD, or prior to the accumulation of the thresholds listed in Table 1, 3, and 4, Section III, of the above Boeing Service Bulletin whichever is later. Installation of these bolts constitutes terminating action for these tracks. \n\n\tC.\tUnless previously accomplished, replace on flap tracks No. 2, 4, 5, and 7, forward fuse bolts listed in Table I & II of Boeing Service Bulletin 747-57-2217-R1 or later FAA approved revisions, in accordance with Figures 2 and 3 of the bulletin within 200 landings after the effective date of this AD, or prior to the accumulation of 25,000 landings, whichever is later. Installation of these bolts constitutes terminating action for these tracks. \n\n\tD.\tFor purposes of complying with this AD, subject to acceptance by the assigned FAA Maintenance Inspector, the number of landings may be determined by dividing each airplane's hours time in service by the operator's fleet average from takeoff to landing for the airplane type. \n\n\tE.\tAlternate means of compliance with the AD which provide an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tF.\tAircraft may be ferried to a base for maintenance in accordance with Sections 21.197 and 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations. \n\n\tG.\tThis AD supersedes AD 78-25-06. \n\n\n\t\t\t\t\tTABLE I \n\n\nFlap\nInspect & Retorque \nIn Accordance\nAirplane\n\n1 & 8\nFig. 2 S/B 57-2206-R1\nSee Table I Section III\nof S/B 57-2206-R1\nI-IV, VII, & VIII \nAs defined by S/B 57-2206-R1\n2 & 7\nFig. 1 S/B 57-2217-R1\nSee Table I of\nS/B 57-2217-R1\nIII\nAs defined by S/B57-2217-R1\n4 & 5\nFig. 4 S/B 57-2217-R1\nSee Table II of S/B 57-2217-R1\t\t\nI, II, & III\nAs defined by S/B 57-2217-R1 \n\n\tNOTE: Later FAA approved revisions of the above service bulletins may be used. \n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Boeing Commercial Airplane Company, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. These documents may also be examined at FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective May 31, 1983.
91-24-08: 91-24-08 McDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-8094. Docket No. 91-NM-221-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: Model MD-11 series airplanes, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent fatigue cracking and possible structural failure of the outboard flaps, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tPrior to the accumulation of 400 landings, or within 30 days after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later, perform a borescope inspection to detect cracks in the left and right outboard flap inboard and outboard closure rib spindle support fittings, in accordance with Paragraph 2, "Accomplishment Instructions," of McDonnell Douglas Alert Service Bulletin A57-15, Revision 2, dated October 28, 1991 (hereinafter referred to as the Service Bulletin). \n\n\t(b)\tWithin 30 days after the effective date of this AD, perform a visual inspection for cracks and delamination of the upper skin of the outboard flaps in accordance with the Service Bulletin. \n\n\t(c)\tIf no cracking or delamination is found as a result of the inspections required by paragraphs (a) and (b) of this AD, accomplish either subparagraph (c)(1) or (c)(2) of this AD: \n\n\t\t(1)\tRepeat the borescope inspections of the spindle support fittings required by paragraph (a) of this AD at intervals not to exceed 400 landings; and repeat the visual inspections of the upper skin required by paragraph (b) of this AD at intervals not to exceed 60 days. In cases where no cracking is found, the accomplishment of the modification shown in Figures 3 and 4 and described in Tables I and II of the Service Bulletin constitutes terminating action for the repetitive inspections required by this paragraph. Or \n\n\t\t(2)\tPrior to further flight, accomplish the modification shown in Figures 3 and 4 and described in Tables I and II of the Service Bulletin. \n\n\t(d)\tIf a crack with a length of less than 1 inch is found in the spindle support fitting as a result of the borescope inspections required by paragraphs (a) or (c)(1) of this AD, accomplish either subparagraph (d)(1) or (d)(2) of this AD: \n\n\t\t(1)\tPrior to further flight, accomplish the modification shown in Figures 3 and 4 and described in Tables I and II of the Service Bulletin. In cases where such cracking is found, this modification is considered to be an interim (temporary) action only. Or \n\n\tNOTE: The FAA is considering further rulemaking to require the accomplishment of a permanent repair. \n\n\t\t(2)\tPrior to further flight, incorporate a permanent repair in a manner approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. The accomplishment of this permanent repair constitutes terminating action for the repetitive inspections required by paragraph (c)(1) of this AD. \n\n\t(e)\tIf a crack with a length of greater than 1 inch is found in the spindle support fitting as a result of the borescope inspections required by paragraph (a) or (c)(1) of this AD, prior to further flight, accomplish a permanent repair in a manner approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Accomplishment of this permanent repair constitutes terminating action for the repetitive inspections required by paragraph (c)(1) of this AD. \n\n\t(f)\tIf cracks or delamination are found in the skin as a result of the inspections required by paragraph (b) of this AD, prior to further flight, accomplish the modification shown in Figures 3 and 4 and described in Tables I and II of the Service Bulletin. Accomplishment of this modification constitutes terminating action for the repetitive inspections required by paragraph (c)(1) of this AD. \n\n\t(g)\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate.NOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI), who may concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Los Angeles ACO. \n\n\t(h)\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the inspection requirements of this AD. \n\n\t(i)\tThe inspection and modification requirements shall be done in accordance with McDonnell Douglas MD-11 Alert Service Bulletin A57-15, revision 2, dated October 28, 1991. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from McDonnell Douglas Corporation, Technical Publications-Technical Administrative Support, C1-L5B, 3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue S.W., Renton, Washington; or at theLos Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 3229 East Spring Street, Long Beach, California; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 1100 L Street N.W., Room 8401, Washington, D.C. \n\n\tThis amendment (39-8094, AD 91-24-08) becomes effective on December 12, 1991.
2011-24-06: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to all BAE SYSTEMS (Operations) Limited Model BAe 146- 100A, -200A, and -300A airplanes; and Model Avro 146-RJ70A, 146-RJ85A, and 146-RJ100A airplanes. This AD results from mandatory continuing [[Page 73478]] airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: * * * * * * * * BAE Systems (Operations) Limited amended Chapter 05-10-15 of the AMM [aircraft maintenance manual] to introduce a new hydraulic filter assembly life limit and to remove the tables containing the Mandatory Life Limitations (Landings) on the Bolts and Pins as the information is now included in the SSID [supplemental structural inspection document] which is already mandated by the same AD. In addition, BAE Systems amended Chapter 05-10-15 of the AMM to enable the use of RJ85 MLG [main landing gear] main fittings for lighter weight 146-200 aircraft using the same safe life of 50,000 Flight Cycles (FC) and the use of RJ100 MLG main fittings for lighter weight RJ85, 146-200 and 146-300 aircraft using the same safe life of 40,000 FC. * * * * * The unsafe condition is fatigue cracking of certain structural elements which could adversely affect the structural integrity of these airplanes. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
97-08-51: This document publishes in the Federal Register an amendment adopting Airworthiness Directive (AD) T97-08-51 that was sent previously to all known U.S. owners and operators of Boeing Model 767 series airplanes by individual telegrams. This AD requires an inspection to ensure that all bolts of the hinge fitting assembly support beam on both the left- and right-hand outboard trailing edge flaps are the correct length and type, and correction of any discrepancy found. This action is prompted by a report indicating that a 20-foot section of the right-hand outboard trailing edge flap separated from the airplane due to failure of four bolts of the most inboard hinge fitting. The actions specified by this AD are intended to detect and correct such failed bolts, which could result in loss of an outboard trailing edge flap, and consequent reduced controllability of the airplane.
90-04-01: 90-04-01 BOEING: Amendment 39-6502. Docket No. 89-NM-173-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: Model 747-400 series airplanes, as listed in Boeing Service Bulletin 747- 26-2135, Revision 1, dated December 21, 1989, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo preclude operation of the APU without fire detection, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tWithin the next ten days after the effective date of this AD, unless previously accomplished, add the following to the Limitations Section of the FAA-approved Airplane Flight Manual (AFM). This may be accomplished be inserting a copy of this AD in the AFM: \n\n\tAUXILIARY POWER UNIT: "The DC power main battery switch must remain in the ON position during all APU operation including the 60 second cool down cycle following APU shutdown." \n\n\tB.\tWithin the next 90 days after the effective date of this AD, modify the APU electrical power circuit in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 747-26-2135, Revision 1, dated December 21, 1989. \n\n\tC.\tThe Airplane Flight Manual limitation required by paragraph A., above, may be removed following incorporation of the modification required by paragraph B., above. \n\n\tD.\tAn alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tNOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI), who will either concur or comment, and then send it to the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office. \n\n\tE.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Boeing Commercial Airplanes, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or at the Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. \n\n\tThis amendment (39-6502, AD 90-04-01) becomes effective on March 19, 1990.
2022-03-09: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation Model S-76D helicopters. This AD was prompted by reports that certain Thales global positioning system (GPS) satellite based augmentation system (SBAS) receivers provided, under certain conditions, erroneous outputs on aircraft positions. This AD requires replacing affected GPS receivers and prohibits installing those GPS receivers. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
90-11-06: 90-11-06 BOEING: Amendment 39-6606. Docket No. 90-NM-77-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: Model 747-400 series airplanes, equipped with Pratt and Whitney PW4000 series engines or Rolls Royce RB211-524 series engines, identified in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-28A2143, dated April 19, 1990, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. To prevent inability to fully open and close the outboard engine fuel shutoff valve, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tWithin the next 30 days after the effective date of this AD, replace the outboard engine fuel shutoff valve actuator bonding wire in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-28A2143, dated April 19, 1990. \n\n\tB.\tWithin 10 days after the completion of the modification required by paragraph A., above, report all findings of wires longer than six inches to the Manager, Seattle Manufacturing Inspection District Office, 7300 Perimeter Road South, Seattle, Washington 98108. Reports shall include the serial number of the affected airplanes and identify positions of valves found with long straps. \n\n\tC.\tAn alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tNOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI), who will either concur or comment, and then send it to the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office. \n\n\tD.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service information from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Boeing Commercial Airplanes, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. This information may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. \n\n\tThis amendment (39-6606, AD 90-11-06) becomes effective on June 6, 1990.
2022-02-13: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Airbus Helicopters Model EC120B helicopters. This AD was prompted by a report of corrosion found on the external tail boom skin, under the Very High Frequency (VHF) antenna. This AD requires inspecting the tail boom at the VHF antenna attachments and depending on the results, repairing or modifying the tail boom skin, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2011-24-05: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to certain Airbus Model A330-201, -202, -203, -223, -243, -301, -302, -303, -321, -322, -323, -341, -342, and -343 airplanes; and Model A340-200 and -300 series airplanes. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: During A330 and A340 aeroplanes fatigue tests, cracks appeared on the right (RH) and left (LH) sides between the crossing area of the keel beam fitting and the front spar of the Centre Wing Box (CWB). This condition, if not corrected, could lead to keel beam rupture which would affect the area structural integrity. * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.