Results
2005-08-16: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Model Avro 146-RJ series airplanes. This AD requires an inspection of the Thales Avionics distance bearing indicator (DBI) to determine part number (P/N) and serial number (S/N), and replacement of the affected DBI with a new or modified DBI. This AD is prompted by a report of defective electrical insulators in DBIs. We are issuing this AD to prevent a short circuit in the DBI due to defective electrical insulation, which could potentially cause a loss of primary navigation instruments (such as airspeed indicator, altimeter, and global positioning system (GPS) information).
67-29-02: 67-29-02 FAIRCHILD-HILLER: Amdt. 39-498 Part 39 Federal Register October 25, 1967. Applies to Type F-27 and FH-227 Airplanes. Unless already accomplished, compliance is required with the next 200 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD. To compensate for the loss of electrical power to the copilots' flight and navigation instruments (attitude, turn and bank, and gyroscopic direction indicators), in the event of a single ground fault in the D.C. power system, accomplish the following: (a) In aircraft where the emergency electrical power to operate the copilot attitude indicator, turn and bank indicator, and gyroscopic direction indicator is derived from the D.C. power system, modify the emergency electrical power system for these instruments in a manner such that the emergency electrical power is derived from the right engine driven emergency alternator. Accomplish this by loading the emergency alternator (increasing the power factor to unity) to allowit to adequately power the three (3) instrument systems. The modifications must be approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Eastern Region. (b) Modifications accomplished in accordance with Fairchild-Hiller FH-227 Service Bulletin 24-1, dated April 25, 1967, or Fairchild-Hiller FH-227 Service Bulletin 24-2, dated May 22, 1967, for the serial number applicable in the Bulletins, or later FAA-approved revisions, are acceptable for showing compliance with this Airworthiness Directive. (c) Upon request, with substantiating data submitted through an FAA maintenance inspector, compliance time may be increased by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Eastern Region. This amendment effective October 27, 1967.
97-09-07: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11 series airplanes, that currently requires inspections to detect damage of the support brackets and clamps of the transfer pipe of the tail tank, and of the transfer pipe assembly; and replacement of damaged parts, or installation of a doubler, if necessary. This amendment adds a requirement to install a fuel transfer pipe of the tail tank, and to install support brackets and clamps of the fuel feed pipe of engine No. 2, which constitutes terminating action for the repetitive inspections. This amendment also requires, for certain airplanes, removal of a temporary protective doubler installed on the fuel pipe assembly. This amendment is prompted by reports of cracking of the support brackets in the refuel and fuel transfer lines of the tail fuel tank and damage to the nylon clamps and transfer pipe assembly. The actions specified by this AD are intended toprevent such cracking and damage, which could result in further damage to the transfer pipe assembly and possible fuel leakage.
2024-12-04: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Pratt & Whitney (PW) Model PW2037, PW2037M, and PW2040 engines with a certain high-pressure turbine (HPT) 2nd stage blade assembly installed. This AD was prompted by an in-flight shutdown (IFSD) caused by the fracture of HPT 2nd stage turbine hub assembly lugs, which resulted in blade liberation and a titanium fire in the high-pressure compressor (HPC). This AD requires a visual inspection of the HPT 2nd stage blade assemblies for missing contact marks, a dimensional shadowgraph inspection of the HPT 2nd stage blade assemblies for blade root profile dimensional deviations, and an eddy current inspection (ECI) of the HPT 2nd stage turbine hub assembly for conforming slot flatness. This AD also requires removal from service and replacement of any HPT 2nd stage turbine hub assembly or HPT 2nd stage blade assembly that does not pass any inspection. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
59-19-02: 59-19-02 VERTOL: Applies to all Models 44A, B, and C Helicopters. Compliance required prior to next flight. Failures of the engine cooling fan discs, blades, and adapter rings have been experienced in Vertol 44 helicopters. The disc failures originated as a crack at the fan blade mounting hole on the forward face of the disc rim and then progressed to the point where a circumferential portion of the disc separated and penetrated the fuselage and helicopter buoyant float. The blade failures originated in the root radius on the convex camber and progressed through the blade section until the airfoil separated from the base. The adapter rings cracked through the holes to either the outer, inner, or both diameters. (a) To preclude recurrence of failures, the fan assembly, P/N 42P6410, must be retired and replaced with hub and fan assembly, P/N 42P6459-4. The new fan assembly includes a "Z" ring stiffener (P/N 04P9392-1) for the fan disc, thickened forged blades (P/N 42P6421-3) in place of the existing cast blades, and a steel adapter (P/N 04P6458-1) in place of the existing aluminum adapter, resulting in an infinite fatigue life of the assembly. (b) Fan disc assemblies, P/N 42P6422, which have been retried may be incorporated in the replacement 42P6410-8 fan assembly, provided no cracks are revealed by a Zyglo or dye- check inspection. Fan Disc assemblies having cracks must be destroyed or mutilated so as to preclude the possibility of their being returned to service. All cast blades P/N 42P6421-2 and aluminum adapter rings P/N 42P6458- 1, must be destroyed or mutilated to preclude their further use. (Vertol SDTM-1931 covers this same subject.)
2005-08-14: The FAA adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all LET a.s. (formerly LET n.p.) (LET) Model Blanik L-13 AC sailplanes. This AD requires you to replace the original control bridge with the new strengthened control column mounting bridge. This AD is the result of a report of one case of cracks in the attachment of control levers on the control bridge. We are issuing this AD to correct cracks in the bedding of the front and rear control levers, which could result in failure of the control bridge for the sailplane. This failure could lead to loss of sailplane control.
2015-20-07: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Bombardier, Inc. Model CL-600-2C10 (Regional Jet Series 700, 701, & 702), CL-600-2D15 (Regional Jet Series 705), and CL-600-2D24 (Regional Jet Series 900) airplanes. This AD was prompted by a determination that no instructions for continued airworthiness exist for the nose landing gear (NLG) alternate extension actuator of the NLG alternate release system. This AD requires revising the maintenance or inspection program, as applicable, to incorporate a new airworthiness limitation task for the NLG alternate extension actuator. We are issuing this AD to prevent failure of the NLG alternate release system and, if the normal NLG extension system also fails, failure of the NLG to extend, and consequent damage to the airplane and injury to occupants.
2024-10-10: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus Helicopters Model SA-365N, SA-365N1, AS-365N2, and AS 365 N3 helicopters. This AD was prompted by a report of an obstructed tail rotor (TR) pedal control that was blocked during flight. This AD requires a one-time inspection for proper positioning of the TR actuator harness and cable ties installation and, depending on the results, accomplishing corrective action, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
84-25-03: 84-25-03 BOEING: Amendment 39-4969. Applies to Boeing Model 767 airplanes noted in the Boeing Service Bulletin listed below. To prevent freezing of the ram air turbine (RAT) actuator motors and ensure deployment of the RAT when required, accomplish the following within 140 days after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished: \n\n\tA.\tReplace the RAT rotary actuator electric motor P/N S258T711-3 with motor P/N S258T711-4, and operationally test the RAT deployment system in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 767-29-17, Revision 2 dated June 29, 1984, or later FAA approved revision. A - 3 motor may be modified to a -4 configuration by accomplishing rework in accordance with EEMCO Service Bulletin 5076-29-1, Revision 1, dated June 25, 1984, or later FAA approved revision. \n\n\tB.\tAlternate means of compliance which provide an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tC.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of replacements required by this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the above specified Service Bulletins from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to the Boeing Commercial Airplane Company, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124, or they may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington 98108. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective January 25, 1985.
2024-10-11: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus Canada Limited Partnership Model BD-500-1A10 and BD-500- 1A11 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report indicating that the rigging pin in the bulkhead internal crank assembly of the overwing emergency exit door (OWEED) escape slide mechanism was not removed during production. This AD requires inspecting the OWEED escape slide mechanism to determine if a rigging pin is installed and, if installed, removing the rigging pin, as specified in Transport Canada AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.