Results
61-16-07: 61-16-07 SUD AVIATION: Amdt. 321 Part 507 Federal Register August 5, 1961. Applies to All Alouette II SE 3130 Helicopters. Compliance required as indicated. As a result of two cases of cracks in the main rotor hubs, all main rotor hubs P/N 3130. S12.20.001 must be retired from service upon accumulation of 660 hours' time in service, except that main rotor hubs which have already accumulated 650 or more hours' time in service on the effective date of this directive must be retired from service within the next 10 hours' time in service. (Sud Aviation Helicopters Service Alouette II SE 3130 No. AL 12.11.204 covers this subject.) This directive effective August 5, 1961.
2017-26-02: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 757-200 series airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report indicating that the main cargo door (MCD) forward-most cam latch on the forward center cam latch pair broke during flight. This AD requires repetitive inspections for discrepancies of cam latches, latch pins, and latch pin cross bolts of the MCD; replacement of all alloy steel latch pin cross bolts with corrosion-resistant steel (CRES) latch pin cross bolts of the MCD; and related investigative and corrective actions if necessary. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2005-09-05: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Eurocopter France (Eurocopter) Model EC120 helicopters that requires inspecting the tail rotor drive shaft (drive shaft) damper half-clamps (half-clamps) to determine if they are centered on the friction ring, and if not correctly positioned, centering the half-clamps on the friction ring. This amendment is prompted by the discovery of half- clamps that were incorrectly positioned. The actions specified by this AD are intended to detect incorrect positioning of the drive shaft half-clamps, and to prevent interference of the half-clamps with the drive shaft, which could result in scoring on the drive shaft, failure of the drive shaft, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
85-25-06: 85-25-06 McDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-5177. Applies to McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9 and C-9 (Military) series airplanes, fuselage numbers 1 through 1165, certificated in any category. Compliance required as indicated unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo eliminate a potential fire ignition source from the generator power feeder cable installation, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tWithin 12 months after the effective date of this airworthiness directive (AD), for all McDonnell Douglas DC-9 and C-9 (Military) series airplanes, inspect and repair, as necessary, power feeder cable installation in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of McDonnell Douglas DC-9 Service Bulletin 24-78, dated April 9, 1985, or later revisions approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tB.\tWithin 12 months after the effective date of this airworthiness directive (AD), modify the power feeder cable installation on all McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9-81 and DC-9-82 series airplanes in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of McDonnell Douglas DC-9 Service Bulletin 24-78, dated April 9, 1985, or later revisions approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tC.\tAlternate means of compliance which provide an acceptable level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tD.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to McDonnell Douglas Corporation, 3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846, Attention: Director, Publications and Training, C1-750 (54-60). These documents also may be examined at theFAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or the Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 4344 Donald Douglas Drive, Long Beach, California. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective January 10, 1986.
61-16-06: 61-16-06 PIPER: Amdt. 314 Part 507 Federal Register July 29, 1961. Applies to All PA- 24 and PA-24 "250" Aircraft Modified to Incorporate Brittain Wing Tip Fuel Tanks (Supplemental Type Certificates Nos. SA4-1235 and SA4-1351). Compliance required within the next 150 hours' time in service after the effective date or at the next disassembly of fuel selector valves, whichever occurs first. The fuel selector valve handles of aircraft equipped with Brittain wing tip fuel tanks can easily be reinstalled with incorrect indexing after the valves have been disassembled for servicing and lubrication. Incorrect indexing can cause serious fuel system malfunctioning and one accident resulting from this condition has been reported. To preclude future incorrect indexing of the fuel selector valve handles, the following must be accomplished: (a) Remove any valve shafts with four flat sides at the handle end and replace with Brittain P/N 4018-15 shafts, or equivalent. The Brittain P/N 4018-15 shaft is identical to the original except that one of the four sides at the handle end has been modified to a convex shape. (b) After reassembly and reinstallation of the selector valves, determine that the valve handles are properly indexed with respect to the selector valve placard. (Brittain Aircraft Enterprises Service Letter No. 4000-1 dated April 26, 1961, covers this same subject.) This directive effective August 31, 1961.
2017-25-17: We are superseding airworthiness directive (AD) 2011-27-08 for Agusta S.p.A. (Agusta) Model A109S and AW109SP helicopters. AD 2011-27- 08 required repetitively inspecting each elevator assembly for a crack. This new AD retains the initial inspection interval and adds a repetitive borescope inspection. This AD is prompted by the discovery of another crack on an elevator assembly since AD 2011-27-08 was issued. The actions of this AD are intended to prevent an unsafe condition on these helicopters.
2017-25-12: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all The Boeing Company Model 737-100, -200, -200C, -300, -400, and -500 series airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of cracking in the webs of the stub beams at certain fuselage stations. These cracks are the result of fatigue caused by cyclical loading from pressurization, wing loads, and landing loads. This AD requires repetitive inspections for cracking of the webs of the stub beams at certain fuselage stations, and applicable on-condition actions. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2005-07-21: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all Boeing Model 747-200F and -200C series airplanes, that currently requires repetitive detailed inspections or a one-time open-hole high frequency eddy current inspection to detect cracking of certain areas of the upper deck floor beams, and corrective actions if necessary. This amendment requires new one-time inspections for cracking of the web, upper chord, and strap of the upper deck floor beams. This action also requires modifying or repairing the upper deck floor beams, as applicable, which eventually necessitates accomplishment of new repetitive inspections for cracking of the upper deck floor beams. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent fatigue cracks in the upper chord and web of upper deck floor beams and the resultant failure of such floor beams. Failure of a floor beam could result in damage to critical flight control cables and wire bundles that pass through the floor beam, and consequent loss of controllability of the airplane. Failure of the floor beam also could result in the failure of the adjacent fuselage frames and skin, and consequent rapid decompression of the airplane. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition. \n\nDATES: Effective May 16, 2005. \n\n\tThe incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the regulations is approved by the Director of the Federal Register as of May 16, 2005. \n\n\tThe incorporation by reference of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-53A2420, dated March 26, 1998, as listed in the regulations, was approved previously by the Director of the Federal Register as of May 11, 1998 (63 FR 20311, April 24, 1998).
2005-08-06: The FAA adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all CENTRAIR 101 series gliders with other than elevator or aileron part number (P/N) SY991A hinge pins installed. This AD requires you to replace any installed elevator or aileron hinge pins that are not P/N SY991A hinge pins with P/N SY991A pins. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the airworthiness authority for France. We are issuing this AD to replace incorrectly heat-treated elevator or aileron hinge pins, which could result in failure of the elevator or ailerons. Such failure during takeoff, landing, or flight operations could lead to loss of glider control.
2017-25-14: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Fokker Services B.V. Model F28 Mark 0070 and 0100 airplanes. This AD requires contacting the FAA to obtain instructions for addressing the unsafe condition on these products, and doing the actions specified in those instructions. This AD was prompted by a report of an engine multiple fan blade-off (MFBO) event, caused by engine fan flutter. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.