Results
74-23-01: 74-23-01 GATES LEARJET: Amendment 39-2000. Applies to Model 23 (Serial Numbers 23-003, 23-005, 23-006, and 23-008 through 23-099) and Model 24 (Serial Numbers 24-100 through 24-134) airplanes. Compliance: Required within the next 10 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. To prevent possible shorting of the external power receptacle terminals and battery positive terminal to adjacent structure, control cables and equipment, accomplish the following: A) On Model 23 (Serial Numbers 23-003, 23-005, 23-006, 23-008 and 23-009) airplanes, check to determine if the battery quick disconnects are installed and visually inspect the external power receptacle terminals for sealing and if not installed and/or properly sealed, prior to further flight, comply with Gates Learjet Service Bulletin No. SB-23/24-258, or later approved revisions. B) On Model 23 (Serial Numbers 23-010 thru 23-099) and Model 24 (Special Numbers 24-100thru 24-134) airplanes, visually inspect the external power receptacle terminals for sealing and if not properly sealed, prior to further flight, insulate the terminals in accordance with Gates Learjet Service Bulletin SB-23/24-258 or later approved revisions. C) Any equivalent method of compliance with this AD must be approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Central Region. This amendment becomes effective November 5, 1974.
2013-13-02: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all B-N Group Ltd. Models BN-2, BN-2A, BN2A MK. III, BN2A MK. III-2, BN2A MK. III-3, BN-2A-2, BN-2A-20, BN-2A-21, BN-2A-26, BN-2A-27, BN-2A-3, BN-2A- 6, BN-2A-8, BN-2A-9, BN-2B-20, BN-2B-21, BN-2B-26, BN-2B-27, BN-2T, and BN-2T-4R airplanes. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as inadequate sealing of the fuel filler cap (fuel tank cap) and the fuel filler receptacle (fuel tank opening), which could lead to contaminated fuel and result in in-flight shutdown of the engine. We are issuing this AD to require actions to address the unsafe condition on these products.
69-15-09: 69-15-09 CESSNA: Amdt. 39-797 applies to Models 310, 310A thru 310F, 320 and 320-1 Airplanes (All Serial Numbers). Compliance: Required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To prevent fuel starvation during high angle descent, accomplish the following: (A) Effective immediately, operation of the airplane with less than five (5) gallons of fuel in each main tank is prohibited. (B) Prior to further flight on all models listed above, install a permanent type placard in full view of the pilot as near as possible to the main fuel quantity indicator with the following wording: "OPERATION WITH LESS THAN FIVE (5) GALLONS OF FUEL IN EACH MAIN TANK IS PROHIBITED. USABLE FUEL IN EACH MAIN TANK IS 45 GALLONS." (C) Prior to further flight on all models listed above, install a permanent type placard in full view of the pilot as near as possible to the manifold pressure gauge with the following wording: "MAINTAIN POWER WITHIN GREEN ARCS DURING DESCENT" NOTE:The operator may make and install the above placards. Minimum 1/8 inch high letters must be used. This amendment becomes effective July 25, 1969, for all persons except those to whom it was made effective by letters dated July 9 and July 15, 1969.
70-15-09: 70-15-09 BRITISH AIRCRAFT CORPORATION: Amdt. 39-1038. Applies to Model BAC 1-11 200 and 400 series airplanes. Compliance is required as indicated. (a) Within the next 750 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, replace the existing 200 ampere fuse in the APU starter motor circuit with a 150 ampere fuse in accordance with British Aircraft Corporation Model BAC 1-11 Service Bulletin No. 49-PM4480 dated November 10, 1969, or later ARB-approved issue, or an FAA-approved equivalent. (b) For airplanes which have not incorporated BAC 1-11 Modification PM2518 on or before the effective date of this AD, within the next 750 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, modify the APU starting system as follows: (1) Incorporate a second power relay in accordance with British Aircraft Corporation Model BAC 1-11 Service Bulletin No. 49-PM2429, Revision 4, dated June 1, 1967, or later ARB-approved issue, or an FAA- approved equivalent. (2) Incorporate a separate APU start control in accordance with British Aircraft Corporation Model BAC 1-11 Service Bulletin No. 49-PM2891, Revision 5 dated December 15, 1969, or later ARB-approved issue, or an FAA-approved equivalent. (c) For airplanes which have incorporated BAC 1-11 Modification PM2518 on or before the effective date of this AD, within the next 1500 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD unless already accomplished, modify the APU starting system in accordance with paragraphs (b)(1) and (b)(2) of this AD. (British Aircraft Corporation Model BAC 1-11 Alert Service Bulletin No. 49-A-PM4480 covers this subject.) This amendment becomes effective August 16, 1970.
2013-01-01: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Bombardier, Inc. Model CL-600-2B19 (Regional Jet Series 100 & 440) airplanes. That AD currently requires revising the airplane flight manual, deactivating and removing certain hydraulic accumulators, inspecting for cracks on accumulators and screw caps, and replacing certain accumulators. For certain airplanes, this new AD reduces the compliance time for a certain replacement. This AD was prompted by reports of on-ground hydraulic accumulator screw cap/end cap failure. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct hydraulic accumulator screw cap/end cap failure, which could result in the loss of the associated hydraulic system and high-energy impact damage to adjacent systems and structure, and consequent loss of control of the airplane.
73-19-04: 73-19-04 BELL: Amdt. 39-1711. Applies to Model 47 series helicopters certificated in all categories that are equipped with main rotor blade grips, P/N 47-120-135-1, -2, -3 or P/N 47- 120-252-1, -3. Compliance required within the next 100 hours' time in service after the effective date of this A.D., unless already accomplished. To prevent possible fatigue cracks from developing, accomplish the following for each main rotor blade grip: (a) Inspect the grip thread relief fillet. The inboard radius and bottom of the fillet must have a smooth finish and be free of nicks or sharp tool marks (Ref. Figure 1-22 of Bell 47D- 1, 47G and 47G-2 Maintenance and Overhaul Instructions). (b) Inspect the root radius of the 4 1/2 inch diameter threads for sharp notches. The root radius must be smooth and free of sharp notches or grooves. (c) If the grip thread relief fillet is not as specified in subparagraph (a) or has nicks or sharp tool marks, or if the thread root radius has a sharp notch or groove, replace the affected grip prior to next flight, except the helicopter may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a base where the grip may be replaced. This amendment becomes effective October 10, 1973.
2013-11-09: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for Turbomeca S.A. Arrius 2B, 2B1, and 2F turboshaft engines. That AD currently requires replacement of injector manifolds and borescope- inspection of the flame tube and the high-pressure (HP) turbine area for possible damage. This new AD requires, depending on the engine model, repetitive replacements of fuel injection manifolds and the privilege injector, or, repetitive replacements of the privilege injector. This AD was prompted by a report that the corrective actions of the existing AD were insufficient to eliminate the unsafe condition. We are issuing this AD to prevent an uncommanded in-flight shutdown of Arrius 2B1 and 2F turboshaft engines and damage to the helicopter.
2013-10-06: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus Model A330-200 Freighter, A330-200, A330-300, A340-200, A340- 300, A340-500, and A340-600 series airplanes. This AD was prompted by several reports of a burning smell and/or smoke in the cockpit during cruise phase leading, in some cases, to diversion to alternate airports. This AD requires an inspection to identify the installed windshields and replacement of any affected windshield. We are issuing this AD to prevent significantly increased workload for the flightcrew, which could, under some flight phases and/or circumstances, constitute an unsafe condition.
71-24-01: 71-24-01 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amdt. 39-1336 as amended by Amendment 39-1413. Applies to all DC-9 Series (except All-freighter) certified in all categories. \n\n\tCompliance required within the next 100 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent failure of the cabin ceiling lights rotary switch and circuit, accomplish the following: \n\n\tModify the ceiling light control wiring in accordance with either Douglas Aircraft Company Alert Service Bulletin A33-55, dated October 8, 1971, or later FAA-approved revisions, or Douglas Aircraft Company Service Bulletin No. 33-56, dated February 25, 1972, or later FAA-approved revisions, or other modification approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. \n\n\tAmendment 39-1336 was effective November 20, 1971. \n\n\tThis amendment 39-1413 is effective March 24, 1972.
2013-08-17: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Eurocopter France (Eurocopter) Model SA-365N, SA-365N1, AS-365N2, AS 365 N3, and SA-366G1 helicopters. This AD requires an initial and recurring inspection of the 9-degree frame for a crack, and repair of the frame if there is a crack. This AD was prompted by the discovery of a crack in the 9-degree frame of a Eurocopter Model AS-365N2 helicopter, and these cracks could develop on the other specified model helicopters because they contain the same 9-degree frame. The actions specified by this AD are intended to detect a crack in the 9-degree frame to prevent loss of structural integrity and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.