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2008-06-29: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Boeing Model 737-300, -400, and -500 series airplanes. This AD requires repetitive inspections of the downstop assemblies on the main tracks of the No. 2, 3, 4, and 5 slats and the inboard track of the No. 1 and 6 slats to verify if any parts are missing, damaged, or in the wrong order. This AD also requires other specified actions, and related investigative and corrective actions if necessary. This AD results from reports of fuel leaking from a puncture in the slat track housing (referred to as the "slat can''). We are issuing this AD to detect and correct loose or missing parts from the main slat track downstop assemblies, which could puncture the slat can and result in a fuel leak and consequent fire.
64-07-04: 64-07-04 LOCKHEED: Amdt. 705 Part 507 Federal Register March 14, 1964. Applies to All Models 49, 149, 649, 649A, 749, 749A, 1049-54, 1049C, 1049D, 1049E, 1049G and 1049H Series Aircraft. Compliance required as indicated. (a) To insure that the bolts in the parallelogram linkages of the primary flight control boost systems remain secured and safetied, accomplish the following within 400 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless previously accomplished. (1) Replace the five castellated nuts in each of the four parallelogram linkages between the boost valve and boost mechanism of each of the boost systems with self-locking castellated nuts and cotter pins using MS-17825(WEP) in lieu of AN 310 nuts and MS- 17826(WEP) in lieu of AN 320 nuts or an equivalent approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Western Region. (2) All torque requirements that applied to the AN 310 and 320 castellated nuts also apply to the MS-17825(WEP) and MS-17826(WEP) self-locking castellated nuts, respectively. (b) Replace the self-locking castellated nuts with new self-locking castellated nuts prior to exceeding the reusability limits specified by the nut manufacturer. (Lockheed Service Information Letter 514, dated November 27, 1963, covers this same subject.) This directive effective April 14, 1964.
2008-06-26: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: One A320 operator has reported a disbond on the composite rudder control rod. Investigations conducted by the supplier revealed that this disbond is due to an incorrect low volume of resin in the fibre composite. The supplier and AIRBUS have confirmed that some rudder control rods installed on A330 and A340-200/-300 aircraft before delivery or delivered as spare are also affected by this defect. Rudder control rod rupture can lead, in the worst case, in combination with a yaw damper runaway to an unsafe condition. * * * * * The unsafe condition is reduced control of the airplane. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
71-02-06: 71-02-06 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amdt. 39-1148. Applies to DC-8/DC-9 series airplanes utilizing Douglas P/N 4750048-501 or -502 emergency evacuation slide girt bar latch assemblies incorporating a cadmium plated pivot pin. \n\n\tCompliance required within the next 500 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent failures in the deployment of the emergency evacuation slide, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tModify DC-8 series airplanes in accordance with Douglas Aircraft Company Service Bulletin No. 25-183, dated July 11, 1969, or later FAA approved revisions, and \n\n\t(b)\tModify DC-9 series airplanes in accordance with Douglas Aircraft Company Service Bulletin No. 25-150, Revision 1, dated October 14, 1969, or later FAA approved revisions, or \n\n\t(c)\tAn equivalent modification approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective February 26, 1971.
2008-05-16: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Eurocopter France (ECF) Model EC130 B4 helicopters that requires, within 110 hours time-in-service (TIS), modifying and testing the wiring of the battery overheat sensing circuit. This amendment is prompted by a malfunction in the battery overheat sensing circuit found during a scheduled inspection. The actions specified by this AD are intended to correct the connection of the thermal switch to the cockpit indicator light, to notify the flight crew of an overheated battery, and to prevent a thermal runaway of the battery, an in-flight fire, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
84-04-02: 84-04-02 AIRBUS INDUSTRIE: Amendment 39-4816. Applies to Model A300 B2 and B4 series airplanes, that have not incorporated modification No. 1642, described in Airbus Industrie Service Bulletin A300-55-017, Revision 3, dated November 5, 1979. Compliance is required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To detect cracks in the upper machined skins of the lefthand, righthand, and center spar boxes of the horizontal stabilizer, and to prevent the possible structural failure of the horizontal stabilizer, accomplish the following: A. Prior to the accumulation of 12,000 hours time in service, or within the next 300 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later, unless already accomplished, inspect the upper skins of the horizontal stabilizer's lefthand, righthand, and center spar boxes in accordance with the instructions in paragraph 2.B inspection, of Airbus Industrie Service Bulletin A300-55-022, Revision 1, dated March 28, 1979. B.Repeat the inspection required in paragraph A. of this AD at intervals not exceeding 3,000 hours total time in service from the last inspection until the aircraft has accumulated 21,000 hours total time in service. After 21,000 hours total time in service have been accumulated, perform the inspection required in paragraph A. of this AD at intervals not exceeding 1,500 hours time in service from the last inspection. C. If cracks are found during the inspections required by paragraphs A. or B. of this AD, perform inspections and repairs in accordance with the Modification, Inspection and Repair Alternatives Flow Chart in Figure 1 of the Service Bulletin and continue the inspection required by paragraphs A. or B. D. Incorporation of Airbus Industrie Modification 1642 constitutes terminating action to the requirements of this AD. E. Alternate means of compliance which provide an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. F. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of inspections and/or modifications required by this AD. This amendment becomes effective March 28, 1984.
2008-06-10: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Bombardier Model CL-600-2B19 (Regional Jet Series 100 & 440) airplanes. This AD requires repetitive detailed inspections for cracking of the left side and right side frame and reinforcement angles at fuselage station (FS) 640 between stringer 9 and stringer 12, and corrective actions if necessary. This AD also provides an optional terminating action for the repetitive inspections. This AD results from reports that cracks have been discovered on the frame and reinforcement angles at FS 640. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct cracking of the frame, which could lead to failure of the fuselage structure and possible loss of the airplane.
65-24-03: 65-24-03 FAIRCHILD: Amdt. 39-147 Part 39 Federal Register October 8, 1965. Applies to Model F-27 Series Airplanes. Compliance required as indicated. (a) For airplanes repaired in accordance with Fairchild Service Bulletin 51-2 within the last 575 hours' time in service before the effective date of this AD, comply with (c) and (d) beginning within 600 hours' time in service after the repair. (b) For airplanes not repaired in accordance with Fairchild Service Bulletin 51-2 within the last 575 hours' time in service before the effective date of this AD, comply with (c) and (d) beginning within the next 25 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD. (c) Inspect in accordance with Service Bulletin 51-2, Revision 8, dated September 23, 1966, including Supplements 001 through 011 or later additional supplements and revisions approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Eastern Region, or in accordance with an equivalent inspection program approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Eastern Region. (d) If cracks are found or if repaired cracks are found to be propagating, replace the cracked part with a part of the same part number or an FAA-approved equivalent, or incorporate an FAA Engineering approved repair before further flight, except that the airplane may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a base where the repair can be made. (e) Upon request of an operator, an FAA maintenance inspector, subject to prior approval of the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Eastern Region, may adjust the repetitive inspection intervals specified in this AD to permit compliance at an established inspection period of the operator if the request contains substantiating data to justify the increase for such operator. This supersedes AD 63-16-3. This directive effective November 7, 1965. Revised April 4, 1967
2008-05-04: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: [A]ll permanent fuselage skin * * * and lap joint doubler * * * repair principles published in the SRM (Structural Repair Manual) * * * have been replaced with Oct/05 Revision by updated, simplified and harmonized repair principles. These updates led to the de-validation of some repairs and to reassess the repair inspection requirements. This situation if not corrected, can affect the aircraft structural integrity with a possible risk of decompression. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2008-02-12: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain McDonnell Douglas Model 717-200 airplanes. This AD requires modification of the conduit for the forward boost pump of the center fuel tank. This AD results from the finding that a potential chafing condition exists in the volute assembly of the forward boost pump for the center fuel tank. We are issuing this AD to prevent chafing of the fuel boost pump wiring that could lead to arcing to the inside of the 45-degree angle fitting, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.