Results
2015-19-09: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all The Boeing Company Model 787-8 airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of a potential latent failure of the fuel shutoff valve actuator circuitry, which was not identified during actuator development. This AD requires replacing certain engine and auxiliary power unit (APU) fuel shutoff valve actuators with new actuators, and also requires revising the maintenance or inspection program to include a new airworthiness limitation into the Airworthiness Limitations Section (ALS) of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness (ICA). We are issuing this AD to detect and correct latent failures of the fuel shutoff valve to the engine and auxiliary power unit (APU), which could result in the inability to shut off fuel to the engine and APU and, in case of certain fires, an uncontrollable fire that could lead to structural failure.
2015-19-06: We are superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2012-24-10 for certain The Boeing Company Model 747-400 and -400F series airplanes. AD 2012-24-10 required installing new software, replacing the duct assembly with a new duct assembly, making wiring changes, and routing certain wire bundles. This new AD retains the requirements of AD 2012- 24-10 and requires installing a new or serviceable pressure switch bracket and altitude pressure switch. This new AD also adds an airplane to the applicability. This AD was prompted by reports of intermittent or blank displays of a certain integrated display unit (IDU) that were due to an intermittent false electrical ground that was not addressed by the software installation or wiring changes required by AD 2012-24- 10. We are issuing this AD to prevent IDU malfunctions, which could affect the ability of the flightcrew to read primary displays for airplane attitude, altitude, or airspeed, and consequently reduce the ability of the flightcrewto maintain control of the airplane.
2000-14-12: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11 series airplanes, that requires replacement of the upper and lower reading lights in the forward crew rest area with a redesigned light fixture. This amendment is prompted by reports of burning and smoldering blankets in the forward crew rest area due to a reading light fixture that came into contact with the blankets after the light was inadvertently left on. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent a possible flammable condition, which could result in smoke and fire in the forward crew rest area.
86-09-04: 86-09-04 BRITISH AEROSPACE AIRCRAFT GROUP: Amendment 39-5290. Applies to Model HS 748, constructor numbers 1793, 1794, and 1795 (Mod 402); and 1796 (Mod 400); and to any other airplanes which incorporate Modification 6953, certificated in any category. Compliance is required within 60 days after the effective date of this AD. To prevent the accidental disarming of the emergency lighting system, accomplish the following, unless previously accomplished: 1. Modify the emergency lighting system in accordance with BAe HS 748 Service Bulletin 33/29, dated April 2, 1984. 2. An alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. 3. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of inspections and/or modifications required by this AD. All persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service document from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to British Aerospace, Inc., Librarian, Box 17414, Dulles International Airport, Washington, D.C. 20041. This document may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or the Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. This amendment becomes effective May 26, 1986.
81-26-06: 81-26-06 LOCKHEED-CALIFORNIA COMPANY: Amendment 39-4283. Applies to Lockheed Model L-1011 series airplanes, Serial Numbers as listed below, certificated in all categories. Compliance required within 30 days after the effective date of this AD, unless previously accomplished: A. To prevent an unnecessary shutdown of the number 2 engine due to false Airborne Vibration Monitor System indications, incorporate electrical system modifications in accordance with Part 2, Accomplishment Instructions, of Lockheed-California Company L-1011 Service Bulletin 093-23-083 dated October 13, 1981, for the following 42 aircraft: S/N 1083-1090 S/N 1117-1119 S/N 1134-1136 S/N 1092-1097 S/N 1121-1123 S/N 1139 S/N 1099-1103 S/N 1126-1129 S/N 1141 S/N 1105-1106 S/N 1132 S/N 1145-1147 S/N 1112-1113 B. Alternative means of compliance providing an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Chief, Los Angeles Area Aircraft Certification Office, FAA Northwest Mountain Region. C. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. The manufacturer's specifications and procedures identified and described in this directive are incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1). All persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Lockheed-California Company, P.O. Box 551, Burbank, California 91520, Attention: Commercial Support Contracts, Dept. 63-11, U-33, B-1. These documents also may be examined at FAA Northwest Mountain Region, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington 98108; or the Los Angeles Area Aircraft Certification Office, 4344 Donald Douglas Drive, Long Beach, California 90808. This Amendment becomes effective December 31, 1981.
2015-19-08: We are superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2011-19-04, for all Airbus Model A318, A319, A320, and A321 series airplanes. AD 2011-19-04 required repetitive inspections for cracking of the left- hand and right-hand inboard and outboard elevator servo-control rod eye-ends, and corrective actions if necessary. This new AD requires an inspection to determine if certain elevator servo-control parts are installed, and replacement if necessary. This AD was prompted by a determination that certain elevator servo-control parts that do not conform to the approved type design have been installed and may have the potential of cracks in the rod eye-end. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct rod eye-end cracking, which could result in uncontrolled elevator surface and consequent reduced control of the airplane.
2000-14-11: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 747 series airplanes equipped with General Electric Model CF6-45 or -50 series engines, that requires repetitive inspections and tests of the thrust reverser control and indication system, and corrective actions, if necessary. This amendment also requires installation of a thrust reverser actuation system (TRAS) lock, repetitive functional tests of that installation, and repair, if necessary. Installation of the TRAS lock terminates the repetitive inspections and certain tests. This amendment is prompted by the results of a safety review, which revealed that in-flight deployment of a thrust reverser could result in a significant reduction in airplane controllability. The actions specified by this AD are intended to ensure the integrity of the fail-safe features of the thrust reverser system by preventing possible failure modes, which could result in inadvertent deployment of a thrust reverser during flight, and consequent reduced controllability of the airplane.
82-26-07 R1: 82-26-07 R1 BELL HELICOPTER TEXTRON, INC.: Amendment 39-4512 as amended by Amendment 39-4884. Applies to Model 214ST helicopters certificated in all categories which have upper left tailboom attach longeron part number (P/N) 214-031-431-1 01 installed. Compliance is required as indicated unless already accomplished. To prevent possible separation of the tailboom from the fuselage due to failure of the upper left tailboom attach longeron, accomplish the following: (a) Before the first flight of each day on those helicopters that have not had the longeron modification described in paragraph (d) below, inspect the aft portion of the upper left longeron, P/N 214-031-431-101, that is visible inside the oil cooler compartment and the portion visible inside the aft left electrical compartment for cracks. (b) Within the next 5 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished within the last 20 hours time in service, and thereafterat intervals not to exceed 25 hours time in service, perform the following inspection on those helicopters that have not had the longeron modification installed: (1) Remove forward fairing assembly, P/N 214-061-866-113, and LH and RH fairing assemblies, P/N's 214-061-866-115 and -117. (2) Visually inspect the aft end of the upper left longeron, P/N 214-031-431- 101, immediately adjacent to and inboard of the pin, P/N 100-048-5-4, just aft of the fairing attach bracket, P/N 214-021-700-129. Inspect for a crack that may extend from the pin hole in the longeron across the longeron and forward. (c) If the longeron is found to be cracked during the inspections of paragraphs (a) and (b) of this AD, replace it with a serviceable part and install the modification described in paragraph (d) below before further flight. (d) Within the next 25 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD or before the accumulation of 100 hours total time in service, whichever occurs later, install a reinforcement modification to the longeron, P/N 214-031-431-101, installation. This reinforcement consists of the addition of a new support, P/N 214-031-454-101, and the replacement of a doubler, P/N 214-031-702-131, with a new doubler, P/N 214-031-643-101. Remove the attaching pin, P/N 100-048-5-4, that is installed in the most aft hole in the longeron outboard flange and plug the remaining hole with adhesive. Accomplish the reinforcement in accordance with Bell Helicopter Textron (BHT) Alert Service Bulletin No. 214ST-82-3, dated 10/25/82 or other FAA approved data. (e) After installation of the longeron modification, conduct the following inspection at intervals not to exceed 250 hours time in service: (1) Remove forward fairing assembly, P/N 214-061-866-113, and LH and RH fairing assemblies, P/N's 214-061-866-115 and -117. (2) Visually inspect the aft end of the longeron, P/N 214-031-431-101, immediately adjacent to and inboard of the service deck, P/N 214-031-702-101, for cracks. Also, inspect that portion of the longeron adjacent to the newly installed support that is visible inside the aft left electrical compartment and that portion of the longeron that is visible inside the oil cooler compartment for cracks. (f) Replace any cracked parts found during the inspections of paragraph (e) with serviceable parts. (g) Any equivalent method of compliance with this AD must be approved by the Manager, Aircraft Certification Division, Federal Aviation Administration, 4400 Blue Mound Road, Fort Worth, Texas 76106. (h) In accordance with FAR 21.197, flight is permitted to a base where the inspection required by this AD may be accomplished. Amendment 39-4512 became effective December 23, 1982. This Amendment 39-4884 becomes effective August 17, 1984.
2015-19-03: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all The Boeing Company Model 737-600, -700, -700C, -800, -900, and -900ER series airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of latently failed fuel shutoff valves discovered during fuel filter replacement. This AD requires revising the maintenance or inspection program to include new airworthiness limitations. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct latent failures of the fuel shutoff valve to the engine, which \n\n((Page 55528)) \n\ncould result in the inability to shut off fuel to the engine and, in case of certain engine fires, an uncontrollable fire that could lead to wing failure.
2015-19-01: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 777 airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of latently failed fuel shutoff valves discovered during fuel filter replacement. This AD requires revising the maintenance or inspection program to include a new airworthiness limitation. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct latent failures of the \n\n((Page 55522)) \n\nfuel shutoff valve to the engine, which could result in the inability to shut off fuel to the engine and, in case of certain engine fires, an uncontrollable fire that could lead to wing failure.