Results
58-05-01: 58-05-01 DOUGLAS: Applies to Goodyear Outboard Wheel Halves P/N 9531419 Installed on Douglas DC-7C 17.00-20 Main Wheel Assembly P/N 9540934. Affects Wheel Assemblies Manufactured Prior to Serial Number 157-1569 and Also Wheel Halves Serial Numbers 1573, 1574, 1575, 1595, 1596, 1597, 1771, 1833 and 1834. \n\n\tCompliance required at the first wheel or tire change after May 10, 1958, and at each 100 landings thereafter. If wheel inspection is performed during any portion of the 100-landing interval, no inspection will be required until the next 100 landings thereafter. \n\n\tAs the result of failures of Goodyear wheel half P/N 9531419 and in order to reduce the possibility of recurrence of these failures, the following inspection is required: \n\n\tInspect the outboard half P/N 9531419 in accordance with Goodyear Service Letter DC7C-3, dated January 15, 1957, or equivalent (Goodyear Service Letter DC7C-6, dated November 15, 1957, covers this same subject.) The inspections may be adjusted to tire change periods where the individual operators service experience justifies.
2021-02-19: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 787-8, 787-9, and 787-10 airplanes. This AD requires repetitive general visual inspections of the bilge barriers located in the forward and aft cargo compartments for disengaged or damaged decompression panels, reinstallation of disengaged but undamaged decompression panels, and replacement of damaged decompression panels. This AD was prompted by reports of multiple incidents of torn decompression panels being found in the bilge area. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2004-01-19: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11 and -11F airplanes, that requires replacement of the wire assembly connectors of the bag rack lighting with new, moisture-resistant connectors and reidentification of the bag racks. This action is necessary to prevent arcing of the wire assembly connectors of the overhead storage bin, and service module and bin extension assemblies, and consequent smoke/fire in the cabin. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
2010-05-13: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to all Model 737-100, -200, -200C, -300, -400, and - 500 series airplanes. That AD currently requires a one-time inspection for scribe lines and cracks in the fuselage skin at certain lap joints, butt joints, external repair doublers, and other areas; and related investigative/corrective actions if necessary. This new AD expands the area to be inspected and, for certain airplanes, requires earlier inspections for certain inspection zones. This AD results from additional detailed analysis of fuselage skin cracks adjacent to the skin lap joints on airplanes that had scribe lines. The analysis resulted in different inspection zones, thresholds and repetitive intervals, and airplane groupings. We are issuing this AD to prevent rapid decompression of the airplane due to fatigue cracks resulting from scribe lines on pressurized fuselage structure.
2021-03-16: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Airbus Helicopters Model AS350B, AS350B1, AS350B2, AS350B3, AS350BA, AS350D, AS355E, AS355F, AS355F1, AS355F2, AS355N, and AS355NP helicopters. This AD was prompted by the in-flight loss of a sliding door. This AD requires inspecting each sliding door and replacing the upper rail or front roller or removing the front roller from service if necessary. The actions of this AD are intended to address an unsafe condition on these products.
2009-25-05: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Several operators have reported cases of inadvertent single spoiler deployment during flight on the DHC-8 Series 400 aircraft. Investigation has revealed that the probable cause for this deployment is internal contamination of the Lift/Dump (L/D) valve and moisture ingress into the L/D valve armature. This condition, if not corrected, could cause uncommanded deployment of the spoilers resulting in increased drag and in combination with a loss of aileron, could result in a significant reduction in aircraft roll control. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
59-01-03: 59-01-03 HARTZELL: Applies to HC-12X20, HC-13X20, HC-82X and HC-83X Series Propellers With Hub Serial Numbers As Indicated Herein. Compliance required as indicated. To minimize the possibility of failure of the split rings used to retain the blades in the hub, replace (if not previously accomplished) all unmarked split rings with new split rings marked with the letter "N", as follows: (1) Prior to February 15, 1959. HUB MODEL HUB SERIAL NO. INCLUSIVE HC-82XF-1DB, -1BB T-913 to T-2891 HC-82XF-2B F-400 to F-1675 (2) Prior to April 15, 1959. HUB MODEL HUB SERIAL NO. INCLUSIVE HC-82X20-1B C-104 to C-267 HC-12X20-7D, 7C, 7E R-118 to R-260 HC-12X20-8D, 3C, 3E P-157 to P-494 HC-83X20-2C D-448 to D-1530 HC-83XF-2A U-105 to U-437 HC-83X20-2CL V-104 to V-179 HC-13X20-6L X-101 to X-111 (3) Prior to June 1, 1959. HUB MODEL HUB SERIAL NO. INCLUSIVE HC-82XG-1D G-102 to G-305 HC-82XG-2B K-592 to K-2919 HC-82XL-1D100-Y to 121-Y HC-82XG-6B 100D to 169D After compliance, stamp the letter "N" after the hub serial number. This letter "N" should be stamped on propellers already modified. Serial numbers of propellers modified at the factory are listed in Hartzell Bulletin No. 64. The aircraft log book should contain this information for propellers modified in the field. (Hartzell Bulletin No. 64 covers this same subject.)
2004-01-16: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11 and -11F airplanes, that requires revising the wire connection stackups for the terminal strip of the generator feeder tail compartment of the auxiliary power unit (APU), and removing a nameplate, as applicable. For certain airplanes, this AD also requires replacing the terminal strips and revising the terminal hardware stackup for the feeder of the center cargo loading system. This action is necessary to prevent arcing damage to the terminal strips and damage to the adjacent structure, which could result in smoke and/or fire in the center and/or aft cargo compartments. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
2021-04-04: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2020-19- 02, which applied to certain Airbus Helicopters (previously Eurocopter France) Model SA330J helicopters. AD 2020-19-02 required repetitively inspecting affected tail rotor (T/R) blades and depending on the inspection results, repairing or replacing the T/R blade. AD 2020-19-02 also prohibited installing an affected T/R blade unless it passed the inspections. This AD retains the requirements of AD 2020-19-02 and also clarifies the applicability, clarifies the affected T/R blades in the required actions, reduces a compliance time, and corrects the prohibition requirement. This AD was prompted by the determination that these corrections are necessary. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
68-04-02: 68-04-02 BELL: Amdt. 39-555. Applies to Model 206A Helicopters, Serial Numbers 4 through 110, 112 through 116, 118, 119, 122, 124 through 126, 128, 129 and 133. Compliance required within the next 25 hours time in service after the effective date of this Airworthiness Directive, unless already accomplished in accordance with Bell Helicopter Service Letter, Model 206A No. 38, dated January 10, 1968. To prevent possible hazardous damage to the main rotor or the tail rotor due to failure of the exhaust stack clamps which attach the exhaust ducts to the engine exhaust flanges, accomplish the following modification: Replace exhaust stack clamp as follows: Remove clamps, P/N N3657, from the exhaust stacks. Install two new clamps, National Utilities Corporation, P/N 4656AA, on exhaust stacks with studs facing outboard. Tighten the two nuts on each clamp evenly until each nut is finger tight. Torque nuts to 30 inch pounds. Grasp top of stack and shake, at the same time tap clamp lightly with a plastic mallet and then recheck torque. Repeat this procedure until torque can be maintained at 30 inch pounds. Safety wire nuts to stud shanks with safety wire, P/N MS20995C32. This amendment becomes effective on March 15, 1968.
2004-01-18: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11 and -11F airplanes, that requires revising the vent fan wiring in the right forward cabin drop ceiling, right mid cabin drop ceiling, and right forward cargo compartment, as applicable. This action is necessary to prevent fire and/or smoke in the right forward cabin drop ceiling, right mid cabin drop ceiling, or right forward cargo compartment. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
2004-01-13: The FAA supersedes Airworthiness Directive (AD) 97-22-16, which applies to certain Raytheon Model 1900, 1900C, and 1900D airplanes. AD 97-22-16 currently requires you to replace the bearings on the vent blower assemblies with improved design bearings and install a thermal protection device for the vent blowers. That AD resulted from reports of vent blower assembly bearings seizing and locking the blower motor on several of the affected airplanes. This AD retains the actions required in AD 97-22-16 for certain vent blower assemblies and requires you to incorporate further product improvement modifications on all affected vent blower assemblies. This AD is the result of reports that vent blower assemblies modified in accordance with AD 97-22-16 are still malfunctioning. We are issuing this AD to prevent smoke from entering the cockpit and cabin due to the current configuration of vent blower assemblies, which could result in the pilot becoming incapacitated or impairing her/hisjudgment. Such a condition could lead to the pilot not being able to make critical flight safety decisions and result in loss of control of the airplane.
2003-09-09 R1: This amendment revises Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2003-09- 09, which applies to certain Cessna Aircraft Company (Cessna) Models 441 and F406 airplanes. AD 2003-09-09 currently requires repetitively inspecting the fuel boost pump wiring inside and outside the boost pump reservoir and repair or replacement of the wiring as necessary. AD 2003-09-09 also requires eventual installation of an improved design wire harness and fuel boost pump as terminating action for the repetitive inspections. The way the compliance time is currently written puts certain airplane owners/operators in non-compliance with the AD. Also, the terminating action for the repetitive inspections did not provide the option of installing the protective sleeving modification for boost pump lead wires. This document clarifies and corrects the compliance time and provides the option of installing the protective sleeving modification for boost pump lead wires. The actions specified by this AD are intended to detect, correct, and prevent chafing and/or arcing of the fuel boost pump wiring, which could result in arcing within the wing fuel storage system. This condition could lead to ignition of explosive vapor within the fuel storage system.
2021-04-06: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Pilatus Aircraft Ltd. (Pilatus) Model PC-7 airplanes. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as a missing release bar retaining screw on a Harley-type buckle assembly installed on a harness shoulder strap. This condition, if not corrected, could lead to loss of pilot restraint and consequently loss of airplane control or injuries to the crew. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2010-05-12: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: During a puncture voltage test of the aluminum-loaded paint on an in-service DHC-8 aircraft, conducted to validate an SFAR 88 [Special Federal Aviation Regulation No. 88] related task, Bombardier Aerospace (BA) discovered that the top wing fuel tank skin between Yw171.20 and Yw261.00 was painted with a non-aluminized enamel coating * * *. With this type of paint application, it is possible that, in the worst case scenario, a lightning strike could puncture the wing skin and create an ignition source in the fuel tank. Ignition sources inside fuel tanks, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in fuel tank explosions and consequentloss of the airplane. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
95-08-04: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Model DC-9-80 series airplanes and Model MD-88 airplanes, that requires an inspection to detect damage, burn marks, or discoloration at certain electrical plugs and receptacles of the sidewall lighting in the passenger cabin, and correction of discrepancies. This amendment would also require modification of the electrical connectors, which, when accomplished, would terminate the inspection requirement. This amendment is prompted by reports of failures of the electrical connectors in the sidewall fluorescent lighting, which resulted in smoke or lighting interruption in the passenger cabin. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent failures of the electrical connectors, which could result in poor socket/pin contact, excessive heat, electrical arcing, and subsequently, connector burn through and smoke in the passenger cabin.
2021-03-18: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Dassault Aviation Model FALCON 7X airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report of deviations concerning the assembly and overhaul of certain crew oxygen mask stowage boxes, including incorrect application of a certain thread-locker on the fitting sensor screws. This AD requires an inspection of certain crew oxygen mask stowage boxes for discrepancies, and replacement if necessary, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2004-01-02: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 767-200, -300, and -300F series airplanes. This action requires modification of the aft pitch load fitting of the diagonal brace of the nacelle strut of each wing. This action is necessary to prevent loss of the fuse pin of the pitch load fitting due to fatigue caused by improper clearance between the fuse pin and bushing, which could result in increased loads in the wing-to-strut joints and consequent separation of the strut and engine from the wing. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
96-09-21: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all Saab Model SAAB SF340A, SAAB 340B, and SAAB 2000 series airplanes, that requires revising the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) to provide the flight crew with recognition cues for, and procedures for exiting from, severe icing conditions, and to limit or prohibit the use of various flight control devices. This amendment is prompted by results of a review of the requirements for certification of the airplane in icing conditions, new information on the icing environment, and icing data provided currently to the flight crews. The actions specified by this AD are intended to minimize the potential hazards associated with operating the airplane in severe icing conditions by providing more clearly defined procedures and limitations associated with such conditions.
95-06-51: This document publishes in the Federal Register an amendment adopting Airworthiness Directive (AD) T95-06-51 that was sent previously to all known U.S. owners and operators of Lockheed Model L-1011-385 series airplanes by individual telegrams. This AD requires inspection to detect corrosion, severed braided strands, or fuel leakage of the fuel feed line hose assembly on engine number two; and subsequent inspection or replacement of the fuel hose with a serviceable part, if necessary. This AD also requires treatment of the ends of the fuel hose and modification of the heat-shrunk plastic cover and steel identification band area. This amendment is prompted by a report of failure of an aluminum-braided flexible fuel hose on a Model L-1011-385 series airplane due to corrosion. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent failure of a flexible fuel hose, which could result in failure of an engine, loss of fuel, and a resultant fire.
69-12-08: 69-12-08 AERO COMMANDER DIVISION, NORTH AMERICAN ROCKWELL CORPORATION: Amdt. 39-782. Applies to Aero Commander Model 1121 series airplanes, S/N 3 through 150. Compliance required as indicated unless already accomplished. To prevent failures of fuel supply system hose assemblies, P/N AE700024-1, 6723008- 65, 6723008-67, 67-23008-149, and 6723008-179, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 15 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, (1) pressurize the engine fuel supply system by opening the fuel shutoff valves and turning the fuel boost pumps on. Visually inspect the fuel system flexible hose assemblies, P/N AE700024-1, 6723008-65, 6723008-67, 6723008-149, and 6723008-179 for any indications of leakage. Replace any defective hose assembly in accordance with paragraph (c), (2) install fuel valve switch guards, P/N 5883082-93, or the equivalent approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, Flight Standards Division, Southwest Region, FAA, on the fuel control panel in accordance with Aero Commander Service Bulletin No. J-7 dated May 13, 1969, or later FAA approved revision or in a accordance with a method approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, Flight Standards Division, Southwest Region, FAA, (3) insert FAA approved Airplane Flight Manual Revision dated April 9, 1969 in the applicable Airplane Flight Manual. (b) Within the next 100 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, remove the fuel supply flexible hose assemblies referenced in paragraph (a)(1), unless replaced with new hose assemblies in accordance with paragraph (c), and vacuum test these flexible hose assemblies for separation of the hose liner material from the wire braid reinforcing cover in accordance with Part II of Aero Commander Service Bulletin No. J-7 dated May 13, 1969, or later FAA approved revision or in accordance with an equivalent method approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, Flight Standards Division, Southwest Region, FAA. (c) Replace any defective hose assemblies found as a result of the inspections required by paragraphs (a)(1) and (b), before further flight, following procedures outlined in Part II, steps d., e., and f. of Aero Commander Service Bulletin No. J-7 dated May 13, 1969, or later FAA approved revision, with new hose assemblies of the same part number or the equivalent approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, Flight Standards Division, Southwest Region, FAA. This amendment becomes effective June 21, 1969.
2010-05-02: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Field reports have indicated that the possibility exists that both Primary Flight Displays (PFDs) could indicate a roll attitude offset of up to 10 degrees in the same direction if an accelerated turn onto the active runway is performed immediately followed by take-off. In addition, annunciated heading splits have been reported. This condition has been reported to correct itself after several minutes. Additionally, if the aeroplane is operating in geographical latitudes with low horizontal magnetic field strength, incorrect heading may be displayed if the ADAHRS switches from GPS track to magnetometer heading while the aeroplane is on the ground.This situation, if not corrected, could result in an undesired bank angle, heading splits and/or incorrect heading, which would constitute an unsafe condition. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2010-04-05: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for McCauley Propeller Systems 1A103/TCM series propellers. That AD requires, for certain serial numbers (S/Ns) of McCauley Propeller Systems 1A103/TCM series propellers, initial and repetitive visual and dye penetrant inspections for cracks in the propeller hub, replacement of propellers with cracks that do not meet acceptable limits, and rework of propellers with cracks that meet acceptable limits. This AD requires, for all McCauley Propeller Systems 1A103/TCM series propellers, the same actions but at reduced compliance times. This AD also requires inspections of the bolt holes, reaming holes if necessary, and inspections of steel reinforcement plates and gaskets. This AD results from 16 reports received of propeller hubs found cracked since AD 2003-12-05 was issued. We are issuing this AD to prevent propeller separation due to hub fatigue cracking, which can result in loss of control of the airplane.
95-07-01: This document publishes in the Federal Register an amendment adopting Airworthiness Directive (AD) 95-07-01 that was sent previously to all known U.S. owners and operators of Textron Lycoming O-360, LO-360, HO-360, HIO-360, TIO-360, LIO-360, AEIO-360, O-540, IO-540, TIO-540, LTIO-540, IVO-540, AEIO-540, TIO-541, and IO-720 series reciprocating engines by individual letters. This AD requires removal prior to further flight of suspect unapproved connecting rod bolts and replacement with serviceable connecting rod bolts. This amendment is prompted by reports of connecting rod bolt failures. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent engine failure due to connecting rod bolt failure, which could result in damage to or loss of the aircraft.
50-39-01: 50-39-01 CESSNA: Applies to All Models 190 and 195 Aircraft, Up to and Including Serial Number 7586. Inspection required not later than November 25, 1950, on aircraft having 300 hours or more service and at each 100 hours operation on all aircraft. Service experience has indicated that close inspection of rudder cables is necessary in order to detect premature cable fraying at the forward pulley. Due to the difficulty of inspection and since some failures may have occurred in core strands, the following methods are recommended: Detach the rudder cable from the rudder bellcrank in the aft fuselage or at the rudder horn at the pedal and pull the cable through the inspection openings immediately aft of the rudder pedal or through the tunnel at the aircraft centerline in the cabin. The cable should then be carefully inspected, by flexing, at a point 9 to 10 inches aft of the swaged fitting at the forward end of the cable for broken strands. Replace all cables showing signsof breakage. The above inspection may be discontinued when at least the next larger size pulleys are installed. (Cessna Service Kit, SK 9050-1 provides the larger pulley and inspection opening for those aircraft prior to Serial No. 7587.)