Results
90-25-05: 90-25-05 BOEING: Amendment 39-6790. Docket No. 89-NM-271-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: All Model 747 series airplanes, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tNOTE: This AD references Boeing Document Number D6-36022, "Aging Airplane Corrosion Prevention and Control Program, Model 747," Revision A, dated July 28, 1989, for inspection procedures, compliance times, and reporting requirements. In addition, this AD specifies inspection and reporting requirements beyond those included in the Document. Where there are differences between the AD and the Document, the AD prevails. \n\n\tTo control corrosion, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tWithin one year after the effective date of this AD, revise the FAA-approved maintenance program to include the corrosion control program specified in Boeing Document Number D6-36022, "Aging Airplane Corrosion Prevention and Control Program, Model 747," Revision A, dated July 28, 1989, (hereinafter referred to as "the Document"). \n\n\tNOTE: All structure found corroded or cracked as a result of an inspection conducted in accordance with this paragraph must be addressed in accordance with FAR Part 43. \n\n\tNOTE: Where non-destructive inspection (NDI) methods are employed, in accordance with Section 4.1 of the Document, the standards and procedures used must be acceptable to the Administrator in accordance with FAR 43.13. \n\n\tNOTE: Procedures identified in the Document as "optional" are not required to be accomplished by this AD. \n\n\tB.\t1.\tIf, as a result of any inspection conducted in accordance with the program required by paragraph A., above, Level 3 corrosion is determined to exist in any area, accomplish one of the following within 7 days after such determination: \n\n\t\t\ta.\tSubmit a report of any findings of Level 3 corrosion to the Manager of the Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO) and inspect the affected area on all Model 747 aircraft in the operator's fleet; or \n\n\t\t\tb.\tSubmit for approval to the Manager of the Seattle ACO one of the following: \n\n\t\t\t\t(1)\tProposed adjustments to the schedule for performing the tasks in that area on remaining airplanes in the operator's fleet, which are adequate to ensure that any other Level 3 corrosion is detected in a timely manner, along with substantiating data for those adjustments; or \n\n\t\t\t\t(2)\tData substantiating that the Level 3 corrosion found is an isolated occurrence and that no such adjustments are necessary.\n \n\tNOTE: Notwithstanding the provision of Section 1.1. of the Document that would permit corrosion that otherwise meets the definition of Level 3 corrosion (i.e., which is determined to be a potentially urgent airworthiness concern requiring expeditious action) to be treated as Level 1 if the operator finds that it "can be attributed to an event not typical of the operator's usage of other airplanes in the same fleet," this paragraph requires that data substantiating any such finding be submitted to the FAA for approval. \n\n\tNOTE: As used throughout this AD, where documents are to be submitted to the Manager of the Seattle ACO, the document should be submitted directly to the Manager, Seattle ACO, and a copy sent to the cognizant FAA Principal Inspector (PI). The PI will then forward comments or concurrence to the Seattle ACO. The Seattle ACO will not respond to the operator without the PI's comments or concurrence. \n\n\t\t2.\tThe FAA may impose adjustments other than those proposed, upon a finding that such adjustments are necessary to ensure that any other Level 3 corrosion is detected in a timely manner. \n\n\t\t3.\tPrior to the compliance time specified for the first task required in the adjusted schedule approved under paragraph B.1. or B.2. of this AD, revise the FAA-approved maintenance program to include those adjustments. \n\n\tNOTE: The reporting requirements of this paragraph and of paragraph D., below, do not relieve operators from reportingcorrosion as required by FAR Section 121.703. \n\n\tC.\tTo accommodate unanticipated scheduling requirements, it is acceptable for a repeat inspection interval to be increased by up to 10% but not to exceed 6 months. The cognizant FAA Principal Inspector (PI) must be informed, in writing, of any extension.\n \n\tNOTE: Except as provided in this paragraph, notwithstanding Section 3.1., paragraph 4, of the Document, all extensions to any compliance time must be approved by the Manager of the Seattle ACO. \n\n\tD.\tReport forms for Level 2 corrosion and a follow-up report for Level 3 corrosion must be submitted at least quarterly in accordance with Section 5.0 of the Document. \n\n\tE.\tIf the repeat inspection or task intervals of an operator's existing corrosion inspection program are shorter than the corresponding intervals in Section 4.3 of the Document, they may not be increased without specific approval of the Manager of the Seattle ACO. \n\n\tF.\tBefore any airplane that is subject to this AD can be added to an air carrier's operations specifications, a program for the accomplishment of tasks required by this AD must be established in accordance with the following: \n\n\t\t1.\tFor airplanes that have previously been operated under an FAA- approved maintenance program, the initial task on each area to be accomplished by the new operator must be accomplished in accordance with the previous operator's schedule or with the new operator's schedule, whichever would result in the earlier accomplishment date for that task. After each task has been performed once, each subsequent task must be performed in accordance with the new operator's schedule. \n\n\t\t2.\tFor airplanes that have not previously been operated under an FAA- approved maintenance program, each initial task required by this AD must be accomplished either prior to the airplane's being added to the air carrier's operations specifications, or in accordance with a schedule approved by the Manager, Seattle ACO. \n\n\tG.\tIfcorrosion is found to exceed Level 1 on any inspection after the initial inspection, the corrosion control program for the affected area must be reviewed and means implemented to reduce corrosion to Level 1 or better.\n \n\t\t1.\tWithin 60 days after such a finding, if corrective action is necessary to reduce future findings of corrosion to Level 1 or better, such proposed corrective action must be submitted for approval to the Manager, Seattle ACO.\n \n\t\t2.\tWithin 30 days after the corrective action is approved, revise the FAA- approved maintenance program to include the approved corrective action. \n\n\tH.\tAn alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. \n\n\tNOTE: The request should be submitted directly to the Manager, Seattle ACO, and a copy sent to the cognizant FAA Principal Inspector (PI).The PI will then forward comments or concurrence to the Seattle ACO. \n\n\tI.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tThe requirements shall be done in accordance with Boeing Document Number D6- 36022, "Aging Airplane Corrosion Prevention and Control Program, Model 747," Revision A, dated July 28, 1989. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, Northwest Mountain Region, 1601 Lind Avenue S.W., 5th Floor, Renton, Washington; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 1100 L Street N.W., Room 8301, Washington, D.C. \n\n\tThis amendment (39-6790, AD 90-25-05) becomes effective December 31, 1990.
97-14-08: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Gulfstream Model G-159 (G-I) airplanes, that currently requires repetitive inspections to detect cracks and loose rivets in the forward brackets for the main landing gear (MLG) uplock beam assembly, and replacement of the brackets, if necessary. This amendment requires installation of redesigned brackets that preclude the potential for cracking and loose rivets; when accomplished, this installation constitutes terminating action for the currently required inspections. This amendment is prompted by the development of an installation that will positively address the identified unsafe condition. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent failure of the bracket for the MLG uplock beam assembly due to cracking and loose rivets; such failure could result in the inability to retract the MLG.
2019-21-11: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2019-19-11 for certain Pratt & Whitney (PW) PW1519G, PW1521G, PW1521GA, PW1524G, PW1525G, PW1521G-3, PW1524G-3, PW1525G-3, PW1919G, PW1921G, PW1922G, PW1923G, and PW1923G-A model turbofan engines. AD 2019-19-11 required initial and repetitive inspections of the low-pressure compressor (LPC) inlet guide vane (IGV) and the LPC rotor 1 (R1) and, depending on the results of the inspections, possible replacement of the LPC. This AD requires the same inspection of the LPC R1 for cracks or damage, removes the inspection of the LPC IGV for proper alignment, and expands the applicability to certain additional PW turbofan engines. This AD also reduces the compliance time for these inspections for certain PW turbofan engines. This AD was prompted by recent findings of cracks in the LPC R1 and an additional in-flight failure of the LPC R1. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
82-15-07: 82-15-07 ROBINSON HELICOPTER COMPANY: Amendment 39-4419. Applies to Model R-22 series helicopters certificated in all categories, serial numbers 0002 through 0282. Compliance is required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To prevent loss of power to the tail rotor, accomplish the following: Within 100 hours' additional time in service after the effective date of this AD, remove from further service the following tail rotor drive shaft components in accordance with Robinson Helicopter Company Service Bulletin No. 21 dated June 1, 1982, or FAA approved equivalent: T/R Driveshaft Assembly A197-* thru Rev. P, Damper Assembly A041-1 thru Rev. H, Plate, Flex Coupling A193-3, Spacer A559-1 thru Rev. F, Spacer A559-2. Replace with: T/R Driveshaft Assembly A197-* Rev. Q and subsequent, Damper Assembly A041-1 Rev. I and subsequent, Plate, Flex Coupling A947-3, Spacer A559-1 Rev. G and subsequent. *The dash number of the replacementA197 shaft must be the same as the one removed to obtain the correct length. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with Sections 21.197 and 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations to operate rotorcraft to a base for the accomplishment of modification required by this AD. Alternate inspections, modifications, or other actions which provide an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Chief, Western Aircraft Certification Field Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. This amendment becomes effective July 26, 1982.
2007-12-12: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: * * * discovery of interferences between the power wire supplying the galley's coffee-maker and the surrounding structure. These interferences might, by chafing and degrading the wire insulation, generate short circuits between the wire and the aircraft ground through the composite cabinet structure, without activation of the Circuit Breaker (C/B). Several hot spots may then be created and generate a large amount of thick smokes just behind the cockpit. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
84-08-01: 84-08-01 SIKORSKY AIRCRAFT DIVISION: Amendment 39-4846. Applies to all Sikorsky Model S-76A helicopters, certificated in all categories, that are equipped with Part Number (P/N) 76000-05100-043, or -045 tail rotor pitch control shaft assemblies. Compliance is required within 25 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD unless already accomplished within the last 75 hours time in service and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 100 hours time in service from the last inspection. To prevent possible failure of the tail rotor pitch control shaft bearing assembly and subsequent partial loss of directional control of the helicopter, accomplish the following: (a) Inspect the tail rotor pitch control shaft bearing assembly for axial movement in accordance with Paragraph E of Sikorsky Alert Service Bulletin (ASB) No. 76-66-18, as revised by ASB No. 76-66-18A, or with an equivalent procedure approved under paragraph (c) of this AD. (b) If the control shaft assembly axial movement exceeds 0.010 inch, replace with a serviceable assembly in accordance with Paragraph E of Sikorsky ASB No. 76-66-18, as revised by ASB No. 76-66-18A, or with an equivalent procedure approved under paragraph (c) of this AD. (c) Upon submission of substantiating data and upon request by an owner or operator through an FAA maintenance inspector, the repetitive inspection interval of this AD may be adjusted and an equivalent method of compliance with this AD may be approved by the Manager, Boston Aircraft Certification Office, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, Massachusetts 01803, telephone number (617) 273-7329. (Sikorsky S-76 Maintenance Manual SA 4047-76-2-1, 5-20-00, Item No. 22, page 30A, March 12, 1984, pertains to the repetitive inspection.) This amendment becomes effective April 24, 1984.
88-22-07: 88-22-07 CESSNA: Amendment 39-6050. Applies to all TP206, TU206, T207, T210 and P210 Series airplanes (all serial numbers) certificated in any category. Compliance: Required within the next 75 hours time-in-service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. To prevent power loss or fire due to failure of certain Aeroquip 601 hose assemblies, accomplish the following: (a) Visually inspect all of the exterior metal braided flex hose assemblies, including firesleeve hose assemblies, in the engine compartment. If the Aeroquip Part Number AE701 appears on the hose identification tag, no further action is required per this AD. (b) If the hose identification tag displays the model/part number suffix 601, accomplish the following: (1) Determine if the hose is identified with a cure date 1Q84 through 3Q87. NOTE: The cure date refers to the quarter and year of manufacture, for example, 1Q84 refers to a hose manufactured in the firstquarter of 1984. (2) Review the airplane/engine log books or records to determine if any engine compartment Model 601 hose was replaced between April, 1984 and May, 1988. (3) If the hose identification tag indicates that the hose was not manufactured with a cure date of 1Q84 through 3Q87 and the above review of the log books indicates that no Model 601 hoses were replaced between April, 1984 and May, 1988, no further action is required per this AD. (4) If any engine compartment Model 601 hose displays a manufactured code date of 1Q84 through 3Q87, if there is no manufacturing code tag, or the engine/airplane logs/records indicate that a Model 601 hose was installed between April 1984, and May, 1988, replace the suspect hoses as follows: (i) Prior to further flight replace the waste gate supply hose assembly, Aeroquip P/N 601000-4-0310 or the hose identified as Cessna S1236-4-0310 supplied by sources other than Cessna, or as identified above with an AeroquipP/N AE3663162E0310 hose or equivalent in accordance with Cessna Service Bulletin SEB 88-5, dated June 24, 1988, or with an Aeroquip 601000-4-0310 hose assembly displaying a manufacturing cure date of 4Q87 or subsequent. (ii) Within the next 12 calendar months, replace all other suspect Aeroquip 601 type hose assemblies in the engine compartment with a serviceable hose displaying a manufacturing cure date of 4Q87 or subsequent. (c) Airplanes may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a location where this AD may be accomplished. (d) An equivalent means of compliance with this AD may be used, if approved by the Manager, Wichita Aircraft Certification Office, Federal Aviation Administration, 1801 Airport Road, Room 100, Mid-Continent Airport, Wichita, Kansas 67209. All persons affected by this AD may obtain copies of the documents referred to herein upon request to the Cessna Aircraft Company, Piston Aircraft Marketing Division, P.O. Box 1521, Wichita, Kansas67201. These documents may also be examined at the FAA, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel, Room 1558, 601 East 12th Street, Kansas City, Missouri 64106. This amendment, 39-6050, becomes effective on November 24, 1988.
2019-20-09: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2011-18- 15, which applied to certain De Havilland Aircraft of Canada Limited Model DHC-8-400 series airplanes. AD 2011-18-15 required initial and repetitive torque checks of the bolt preload; detailed inspection of the barrel nuts and cradle for cracking, pitting, and corrosion if the bolt preload is correct; and replacement of certain hardware if necessary. This AD continues to require those actions. This AD also requires new inspections and replacement of certain hardware, which would terminate the repetitive torque checks and inspections; and removes airplanes from the applicability. This AD was prompted by in- service reports of cracked barrel nuts found at the front spar locations of the wing-to-fuselage attachment joints, and a loose washer in the barrel nut assembly. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2019-20-12: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus SAS Model A330-243, -243F, -341, -342, and -343 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a determination that cracks can develop on the ripple damper weld of the hydraulic pressure tube assembly and reports of failure of the ripple damper of the hydraulic pressure tube assembly. This AD requires replacement of the affected hydraulic pressure tube assembly or modification of both engines, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
99-01-15: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all Airbus Model A340-211, -212, -213, -311, -312, and -313 series airplanes. This action requires repetitive operational tests to ensure proper operation of the actuator of the secondary locks of the thrust reversers; and corrective actions, if necessary. This amendment is prompted by issuance of mandatory continuing airworthiness information by a foreign civil airworthiness authority. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent the inadvertent opening of a thrust reverser door in the event of failure of the primary and secondary locks of the thrust reverser. Such inadvertent opening could result in reduced controllability of the airplane.
85-19-03 R2: 85-19-03 R2 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-5137 as amended by Amendment 39-5200 is further amended by Amendment 39-5844. Applies to McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9, DC-9-80, and C-9 (Military) series airplanes, fuselage numbers 1 through 1371, certificated in any category, with more than 30,000 landings.\n\n\tCompliance required as indicated, unless previously accomplished.\n\n\tA.\tWithin the next 1,600 landings after the effective date of this AD, inspect the skin and doublers around the upper anticollision light cutout for cracks in accordance with McDonnell Douglas Service Bulletin 53-186, dated April 17, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as SB 53-186), Figure 2, or later revisions approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region.\n\n\tB.\tIf no cracks are found under Condition I, Phase I, as referenced in SB 53-186, perform repetitive eddy current inspections at intervals not to exceed 3,500 landings in accordance with Figure 2 of SB 53-186, until such time as stress coining of plate nut clearance holes, as outlined under Condition 1, Phase II of SB 53-186, or SB 09530186 (originally identified as McDonnell Douglas DC-9 Service Sketch 3626C), is accomplished.\n\n\tC.\tIf cracks are found, before further flight:\n\n\t\t1.\tFor cracks less than 1.00 inch long, repair cracked area in accordance with Conditions II or III of the Accomplishment Instructions in SB 53-186, or SB 09530186.\n\n\t\t2.\tFor cracks 1.00 to 1.25 inches long, repair cracked area in accordance with Condition III of the Accomplishment Instructions in SB 53-186, or SB 09530186.\n\n\t\t3.\tFor cracks greater than 1.25 inches, repair in accordance with data approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region.\n\n\tD.\tTerminating Action. Completion of the Accomplishment Instructions of SB 53-186, or SB 09530186, or later revisions approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, constitutes terminating action for this AD.\n\n\tE.\tAlternative inspections, modifications, or other actions which provide an acceptable level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region.\n\n\tF.\tUpon request of operator, an FAA maintenance inspector, subject to prior approval of the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, may adjust the repetitive inspection intervals specified in this AD to permit compliance at an established inspection period of the operator if the request contains substantiating data to justify the increase for that operator.\n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service information from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to McDonnell Douglas Corporation, 3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846, Attention: Director of Publications, C1-L00 (54-60). These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington or the Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 4344 Donald Douglas Drive, Long Beach, California.\n\n\tAmendment 39-5137 (AD 85-19-03) became effective October 14, 1985.\n\n\tAmendment 39-5200 (AD 85-19-03 R1) became effective January 19, 1986.\n\n\tThis amendment, 39-5844, becomes effective March 21, 1988.
2019-19-13: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus Helicopters Model EC225LP helicopters. This AD requires determining the total hours time-in-service (TIS) of the free wheel shafts of certain main rotor gearboxes (MGBs), replacing the MGB or right-hand side (RH) free wheel shaft, installing placard(s), and revising the Rotorcraft Flight Manual (RFM) for your helicopter. This AD was prompted by a report of wear of the ramps of the RH free wheel shaft. The actions of this AD are intended to address an unsafe condition on these products.
76-23-03 R1: 76-23-03 R1 BELLANCA: Amendment 39-2772, as amended by Amendment 39-5454. Applies to BellancaMN Models 17-30, serials 30-139 thru 30-262, 17-30A, serials 30-263 and up, 17-31, serials 32-1 thru 32-14, and 17-31A, serials 32-15 and up, airplanes certificated in all categories. For airplanes with 200 or more hours time in service on the effective date of this AD, compliance is required within the next 10 hours time in service and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 100 hours time in service or the next annual inspection, whichever occurs first. For airplanes with less than 200 hours time in service on the effective date of this AD compliance is required before the accumulation of 210 hours time in service and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 100 hours time in service or the next annual inspection, whichever occurs first. To prevent exhaust system failures which could result in cabin air contamination and heat damage to components in the nacelle accomplish the following: (A) Visually inspect the muffler and tailpipe assemblies for cracks paying particular attention to the ball joint welds, the outlets of the muffler and resonator, and the support for the tailpipe assembly. (B) Inspect the exhaust system for freedom of movement at the ball joints by removing the tailpipe support bolts. When the bolts are removed: (1) The left tailpipe assembly must drop from its supported position unassisted. (2) The right tailpipe assembly must move from its supported position when a two pound force is applied one inch below the resonator can 90 degrees to the axis of the resonator, i.e., the assembly must move when a two pound pull is applied one inch below the resonator can forward and down. (3) If a greater forces than the above are required: (a) Disassemble the ball joint and inspect for surface abnormalities such as galling or wear marks. (b) Rework the ball joints as required to correct noted discrepancies.(c) Reassemble the ball joint. Do not overtighten the clamp as this may distort ball surfaces. (4) Repeat (B)(1) thru (B)(3) as required until compliance with (B)(1) and (B)(2) is demonstrated. Amendment 39-2772 became effective November 23, 1976. This amendment, 39-5454, becomes effective November 7, 1986.
99-13-12: This amendment supersedes an existing priority letter airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to Bell Helicopter Textron Canada (BHTC) Model 206L, 206L-1, 206L-3, and 206L-4 helicopters, that currently requires visual inspections and visual checks at specified time intervals, and a fluorescent-penetrant inspection (FPI) for any cracks in the tailboom skins around the horizontal stabilizer openings. Inserting a copy of the priority letter AD into the Rotorcraft Flight Manual (RFM) is also required. This amendment revises the inspection procedures and specified time intervals mandated by the priority letter AD. This amendment is prompted by crack growth analysis that indicates the need to detect cracks before they propagate from underneath the horizontal stabilizer supports. The actions specified by this AD are intended to detect a crack in the tailboom skin that could result in separation of the tailboom from the helicopter and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
82-13-03: 82-13-03 DETROIT DIESEL ALLISON: Amendment 39-4403. Applies to all Models 250-C20 and -C20B engines equipped with the Chandler Evans Company (CECO) Model MC-40 fuel control system. Compliance required as indicated unless already accomplished. To prevent possible power turbine overspeed, accomplish the following at the next engine or CECO fuel control/power turbine governor overhaul, but not later than October 1, 1982: Modify the engine high pressure fuel control filter assembly, P/N 6895173 or P/N 6896727, into P/N 6899279 in accordance with the detailed instructions provided in Detroit Diesel Allison Commercial Engine Alert Bulletin CEB-A-1144, Revision 3, dated March 1, 1982, or later FAA approved revision. Upon request of the operator, an equivalent means of compliance with the requirements of this AD may be approved by the Chief, Chicago Aircraft Certification Office, Federal Aviation Administration, Central Region. The manufacturer's specifications and procedures identified and described in this directive are available upon request to Detroit Diesel Allison, Division of General Motors Corporation, Indianapolis, Indiana 46206. These documents may also be examined at the New England Regional Office, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, Massachusetts 01803. A historical file on this AD is maintained by the FAA at the New England Regional Office. This amendment becomes effective July 1, 1982.
98-19-04: This document publishes in the Federal Register an amendment adopting Airworthiness Directive (AD) AD 98-19-04, which was sent previously to all known U.S. owners and operators of Agusta S.p.A. Model A109C, A109E, and A109K2 helicopters by individual letters. This AD requires conducting a tapping inspection of the upperside and lowerside of the main rotor blade (blade) blade tip cap for debonding between the metal shells and honeycomb core; conducting a visual inspection of the upperside and lowerside of the blade tip cap for swelling or deformation between the metal shells and the honeycomb core; and visually inspecting the welded bead along the leading edge of the blade tip cap for cracks. This amendment is prompted by two discoveries of cracks in the leading edge of the blade tip cap of a blade. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent blade tip cap failure and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
84-02-03: 84-02-03 CASA: Amendment 39-4797. Applies to all Model C-212CB and Model C- 212CC airplanes certificated in all categories. Compliance required as indicated. A. To reduce the potential for passenger injury during egress from the forward door, within 600 hours time in service or 4 months after the effective date of this AD, whichever comes first, unless already accomplished, modify the forward exit door on the CB model and doors on the CC model to automatically lock full open in accordance with CASA Service Bulletin 212-52-13 dated September 17, 1982. B. To prevent inability to open the aft left door during an emergency for evacuation, accomplish one of the following no later than March 31, 1984: (1) Install an outward opening rear passenger door in accordance with CASA Service Bulletin 212-53-29 dated July 14, 1983; or (2) Rearrange the cabin interior in accordance with CASA Service Bulletin 212-25-30 dated September 14, 1982, and Aircraft Furnishings International Limited Service Bulletin 25-89 dated September 1982. C. To preclude improper passenger door locking, within the next 600 hours time in service or four months, whichever occurs first, after the effective date of this AD, install an individual switch door warning light system for cockpit warning of an unlocked passenger door in accordance with CASA Service Bulletin 212-52-14 R2 dated February 14, 1983. D. Alternate means of compliance which provide an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. E. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of inspections and/or modifications required by this AD. This amendment becomes effective February 27, 1984.
2007-12-04: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to all Airbus Model A300-600 series airplanes. That AD currently requires inspections of the lower door surrounding structure to detect cracks and corrosion; inspections to detect cracking of the holes of the corner doublers, the fail-safe ring, and the door frames of the door structures; and repair if necessary. That AD also provides for optional terminating action for certain inspections. This new AD retains all requirements of the existing AD, mandates the previously optional terminating action, reduces the applicability of the existing AD, and adds repetitive inspections behind scuff plates for certain affected airplanes. This AD results from a determination that further rulemaking is necessary to improve the fatigue behavior of the cabin door surroundings. We are issuing this AD to prevent corrosion between the scuff plates at exit and cargo doors and fatigue cracks originating from certain fastener holes located in adjacent structure, which could result in reduced structural integrity of the door surroundings.
2007-11-21: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Abnormal manufacturing variations of the universal joints in combination with mechanical wear can lead to a joint failure and subsequent disconnection between selector and the fuel valve. This result in a loss of capability to select the fuel tank for supply. This condition might remain unrecognised by the pilot and can result in fuel starvation during flight and/or unavailability of emergency fuel shutoff. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2019-20-06: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus SAS Model A310 series airplanes. This AD was prompted by a determination that new or more restrictive airworthiness limitations are necessary. This AD requires revising the existing maintenance or inspection program, as applicable, to incorporate new or more restrictive airworthiness limitations. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
97-24-09: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to Burkhart Grob, Luft-und Raumfahrt (Grob), Model G 103 C Twin III SL sailplanes. This action requires repetitively inspecting the propeller bearing and upper pulley wheel for increased play and, if increased play is found, modifying the propeller bearing and pulley wheel with a part of improved design. This AD is the result of mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the airworthiness authority for Germany. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent the loss of the sailplane engine propeller and possible loss of the sailplane.
76-17-08 R1: 76-17-08 ENSTROM: Amendment 39-2700 as amended by Amendment 39-3043. Applies to Models F-28, F-28A, and 280 helicopters certificated in all categories, except for those helicopters which have the following main rotor shaft gear box serial numbers. 032FS 07-012-74PS 39-002-13PS 041PS 08-001-72S 44-011-76PS 067PS 10-002-72PS 44-019-76PS 070PS 19-024-74PS 53-003-73PS 091 34-029-75PS To detect tool marks, surface irregularities, and cracks which may develop into failure of the Main Rotor Shaft (Enstrom Part Number 28-13104) accomplish the following: A. Before further flight visually inspect the main rotor shaft in the area of the radius beneath the rotor hub shoulder, using an eight power or greater magnifying glass and report to the Enstrom Helicopter Corporation, Menominee County Airport, P.O. Box 277, Menominee, Michigan, Phone 906-863-9971, any evidence of circumferentially disposed tool marks or surface irregularities. B. Before further flight, unless previously accomplished within the last 20 hours time in service or one month, and every 20 hours or one month thereafter, whichever occurs first, inspect the main rotor shaft for cracks in the area of the radius beneath the rotor hub shoulder using a 3-step dye-penetrant method. The inspections are to be performed by maintenance personnel familiar with the dye-penetrant inspection method. C. Within 10 hours time in service or 15 days, whichever occurs first after each dye- penetrant inspection, visually check the main rotor shaft for cracks in the area of the radius beneath the rotor hub shoulder using an eight power or greater magnifying glass. D. Before further flight remove from service any main rotor shaft found to contain cracks or other evidence of damage and replace with an airworthy shaft of the same part number or later FAA approved part number. E. Immediately check in accordance with Paragraph B above any helicopter which develops unusual once-per-rotor-revolution vibration. Such vibrations serve as warning of imminent failure. F. Within the next 200 hours time in service or six months after the effective date of this amendment, whichever occurs first, remove main rotor shaft from service or return gearbox and shaft to Enstrom Helicopter Corporation for modification in accordance with Enstrom Service Directed Bulletin No. 0036. G. Repetitive inspections of paragraphs B and C above may be discontinued after main rotor shaft modification in accordance with Enstrom Service Directed Bulletin No. 0036. The manufacturer's specifications and procedures identified and described in this directive are incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1). All persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to the Enstrom Helicopter Corporation, Menominee County Airport, P.O. Box 277, Menominee, Michigan 49858. These documents may also be examined at the FAA Great Lakes Region, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, AGL-210, 2300 East Devon Avenue, Des Plaines, Illinois. A historical file on this AD which includes the incorporated material in full is also maintained at that office. Amendment 39-2700 superseded Amendment 39-2472 (40 F.R. 59197), AD 75-26-19. Amendment 39-2700 became effective September 1, 1976 and was effective immediately for all recipients of the airmail letters dated August 6, 1976 which contained this amendment. This amendment 39-3043 becomes effective October 4, 1977.
83-08-01 R1: 83-08-01 R1 TRW HARTZELL PROPELLER: Amendment 39-4633. Letter issued April 29, 1983. Applies to all the TRW Hartzell Model HC-B3TN-2, HC-B3TN-3, HC-B3TN-5, HC- B4TN-3, HC-B4TN-5, HC-B4MN-5, and HC-B5MP-3 turbopropellers. The HC-B( )TN-2, HC- B( )TN-3, and HC-B( )MP-3 propellers are installed on Pratt & Whitney Aircraft of Canada Model PT6A-( ) series engines. The HC-B( )TN-5 and HC-B( )MN-5 series propellers are installed on the AiResearch TPE-331-( ) series engines.\n \n\tCompliance required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To preclude propeller attach bolt failures or improperly secured propellers, accomplish the following:\n\n\tA.\tPrior to further flight, all new propeller installations and serviceable propellers which are being reinstalled must be installed as follows: \n\n\t\t(1)\tInstall the propeller oil seal to the engine flange after ensuring that the engine and propeller flanges are clean.\n \n\t\t(2)\tCarefully install propeller on the engine flange ensuring that complete and true contact is established.\n\n\t\t(3)\tApply MIL-T-5544 Petrolated Graphite or TRW Hartzell Lubricant P/N A3338 to bolt threads and bolt washer surfaces (and remainder of bolt if desired).\n \n\t\t(4)\tInstall eight new B-3339 bolts and eight new A-2048-2 washers through engine flange into propeller flange.\n \n\t\t(5)\tTorque all bolts, with a torque wrench and an appropriate adapter, to 40 ft.-lbs. and then to 80 ft.-lbs. following torque sequence "A" (shown to below). Final torque all bolts using "B" sequence (shown below) to 100 to 105 ft.-lbs. Safety all bolts in an FAA approved manner.\n\n\n\n\n \n\tNOTE: TRW Hartzell Instructions No. 140 dated March 15, 1982, also pertains to this subject.\n \n\tB.\tWithin the next 300 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, accomplish the following on all applicable turbopropeller installations presently using P/N A- 2047 propeller attach bolts: \n\n\t\t(1)\tCheck the torque, with a torque wrench and an appropriate adapter,of all eight propeller attach bolts (with washers installed). Torque should be 100 to 125 ft.-lbs. with dry threads. (Caution: Do not use any lubricant with the A-2047 bolts. Safety all bolts in an FAA approved manner.)\n \n\t\t(2)\tIf the torque of any 1 of the bolts is found to be less than 100 ft.-lbs., remove all 8 bolts and washers and replace with new (B-3339) bolts and new (A-2048-2) washers in accordance with paragraphs A (1) through (5) herein. (Caution: Do not use an intermix of A-2047 and B-3339 bolts in the same installation.) NOTE: The A-2047 bolt has the letter "H" stamped inside a triangle on the bolt. The B-3339 bolt has the part number stamped inside the cupped head.\n \n\tC.\tUpon request of the operator, an equivalent means of compliance with the requirements of this AD may be approved by the Manager, Chicago Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, 2300 East Devon Avenue, Des Plaines, Illinois 60018.\n \n\tThis amendment supersedes Amendment 39-3290 (43 FR 42731), AD78-18-01.\n \n\tAmendment 39-4633 became effective April 28, 1983.\n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective upon receipt.
98-05-08: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Dornier Model 328-100 series airplanes, that requires replacement of electrical relays 15KF and 16KF, which control the auxiliary propeller control feathering system, with relays having increased load capacity. This amendment is prompted by issuance of mandatory continuing airworthiness information by a foreign civil airworthiness authority. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent failure of the auxiliary propeller control feathering system, which, in the event of an engine failure combined with failure of the primary propeller pitch control, could result in the inability to feather the propeller, and consequent reduced controllability of the airplane.
98-21-03: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain British Aerospace (Jetstream) Model 4101 airplanes, that requires replacement of the existing load limitation labels located in the main baggage compartment with new reduced load limitation labels. This amendment also provides for optional modification of the internal access door of the main baggage compartment, which, if accomplished, terminates the requirement for reduced load limitations. This amendment is prompted by issuance of mandatory continuing airworthiness information by a foreign civil airworthiness authority. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent failure of the internal access door latches of the main baggage compartment in the event of an emergency landing, which could delay or impede passenger evacuation due to baggage spilling into the aisle and blocking the emergency exit door.