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2009-15-19: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: BAE Systems (Operations) Ltd has determined that in order to assure the continued structural integrity of the horizontal stabilizer lower skin and joint plates in the rib 1 area of certain BAe 146 aircraft, a revised inspection programme for this area is considered necessary. The disbonding of joints can lead to corrosion which, if undetected, could result in degradation of the structural integrity of the horizontal stabilizer. * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2009-04-01: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: The review of manufacturing process and service experience has shown that the ALRP-5 fuel metering pump units released to service between May 2006 and April 2007 can be vulnerable for seizing. This vulnerability is demonstrated by occurrence of aluminum and bronze chips at the filter. This condition, if not corrected might lead to seizing of the pump and engine RPM decrease. This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI, which could result in low-time pump seizure, loss of engine fuel flow and engine power, possibly leading to an autorotation landing.
67-17-03: 67-17-03 FAIRCHILD-HILLER: Amdt. 39-412 Part 39 Federal Register May 16, 1967. Applies to Model F-27 Airplanes, Serial Numbers 1 through 122, and Model FH-227 Airplanes, Serial Numbers 501 through 529. Compliance required as indicated. To detect cracks in the skin of the upper inboard forward part of the horizontal stabilizer, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 50 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished within the last 100 hours' time in service, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 150 hours' time in service from the last inspection, remove the stabilizer inboard leading edge fairing and inspect the top skin for cracks in the area from Stabilizer Station 0 to Station 30.0 and aft from the front spar to stringer No. 10, using X-ray, or visually with a glass of at least 10-power, or an FAA-approved equivalent inspection. (b) If a crack is found during an inspection, repair the crack before further flight with an FAA-approved repair, or replace the cracked part with a part of the same part number that has been inspected in accordance with (a) and found free of cracks, or with an FAA-approved equivalent part. (c) The repetitive inspection interval specified in (a) may be increased from 150 hours' time in service to 1,200 hours' time in service from the last inspection on Model F-27 Series airplanes modified in accordance with Fairchild Hiller Service Bulletin 55-11, Revision 1, dated November 17, 1966, or later FAA-approved revision, or an FAA-approved equivalent modification, and on Model FH-227 airplanes modified in accordance with Fairchild Hiller Service Bulletin 55-1, Revision 1, dated November 17, 1966, or later FAA-approved revision, or an FAA-approved equivalent modification. (d) Equivalent inspections and repairs may be approved by an FAA maintenance inspector. Equivalent parts, Service Bulletin revisions, and modifications, must be approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Eastern Region. (e) Upon request with substantiating data submitted through an FAA maintenance inspector, compliance times specified in this AD may be increased by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Eastern Region. This supersedes AD 66-08-03. This directive effective May 16, 1967.
93-23-05: 93-23-05 GENERAL ELECTRIC AIRCRAFT ENGINES: Amendment 39-8739. Docket No. 92-ANE-09. Applicability: General Electric (GE) Aircraft Engines Model(s) CT7-5A2 and -7A turboprop engines, incorporating gas generator turbine (GGT) rotor assembly parts and power turbine (PT) disks, as listed by serial number in GE CT7 Turboprop Service Bulletin (SB) A72- 228, Revision 2, and GE CT7 Turboprop SB A72-229, Revision 2, both dated February 7, 1991, installed on, but not limited to, Saab 340A and Casa CN235-10 aircraft. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. To prevent fatigue cracks that can lead to an uncontained engine failure, accomplish the following: (a) Inspect GGT rotor Stage 1 forward cooling plates, Stage 1 aft cooling plates, Stage 1 disks, Stage 2 forward cooling plates, Stage 2 aft cooling plates, and Stage 2 disks, in accordance with GE CT7 Turboprop SB A72-228, Revision 2, dated February 7, 1991, before exceeding the "max total cycles prior to inspect" limits listed in Tables 1 and 2 of the SB, but not later than December 31, 1995. (1) If evidence of shotpeening is found on any of these parts, prior to further flight, replace the affected parts with serviceable parts. (2) If no evidence of shotpeening is found, prior to further flight, mark the parts with the SB number, in accordance with GE CT7 Turboprop SB A72-228, Revision 2, dated February 7, 1991, and return to service without reducing low cycle fatigue limits. (b) Inspect Stage 3 and Stage 4 PT disks, in accordance with GE CT7 Turboprop SB A72-229, Revision 2, dated February 7, 1991, prior to exceeding the "max total cycles prior to inspect" limits listed in Table 1 of the SB, but not later than December 31, 1995. (1) If evidence of shotpeening is found, prior to further flight, replace the affected disks with serviceable disks. (2) If no evidence of shotpeening is found, prior to further flight, mark the disks with the SB number, in accordancewith GE CT7 Turboprop SB A72-229, Revision 2, dated February 7, 1991, and return to service without reducing low cycle fatigue limits. (c) The inspections, markings, and repairs shall be done in accordance with the following service bulletins: Document No. Page No. Issue Date GE CT7 Turboprop SB 1-4 & 6 Revision 2 Feb 7, 1991 A72-228 5 & 7-12 Original Jan 30, 1990 Total pages: 12 GE CT7 Turboprop SB 1-3 Revision 2 Feb 7, 1991 A72-229 4-7 Original Jan 30, 1990 Total pages: 7 This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register, in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from General Electric Aircraft Engines, 1000 Western Avenue, Lynn, MA 01910. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, New England Region, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel, Attn: Rules Docket No. 92-ANE-09, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, MA; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street NW., suite 700, Washington, DC. (d) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Engine Certification Office. The request should be forwarded through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Engine Certification Office. NOTE: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this airworthiness directive, if any, may be obtained from the Engine Certification Office. (e) Special flight permits may be issued, in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199, to operate the aircraft to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. (f) This amendment becomes effective on January 10, 1994.
2009-01-03: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: There have been several cases reported where the landing gear did not retract after take-off. Subsequent investigation revealed this was caused by fatigue failure of the nose landing gear electrical harness. In conjunction with one engine being inoperable, this could, in certain operating conditions, affect continued safe flight and landing. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
99-05-07: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. (BHTI) Model 214B and 214B-1 helicopters, that requires creation of a component history card or an equivalent record using the Retirement Index Number (RIN) system, establishing a system for tracking increases to the accumulated RIN, and establishing a maximum accumulated RIN for the pillow block bearing bolts (bearing bolts) of 17,000 before they must be removed from service. This amendment is prompted by fatigue analyses and tests that show certain bearing bolts fail sooner than originally anticipated because of the unanticipated high number of lifts and takeoffs (torque events) performed with those bearing bolts in addition to the time-in-service (TIS) accrued under other operating conditions. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent fatigue failure of the bearing bolts, which could result in failure of the main rotor system and subsequent loss of control ofthe helicopter.
46-33-02: 46-33-02 GLOBE: (Was Mandatory Note 2 of AD-766-5.) Applies to Models GC-1A, GC-1B Aircraft Serial Numbers 3 to 174 Inclusive. Compliance required prior to October 1, 1946. Install stiffeners, Globe P/N 11-213-1471-1 R & L, on the flange of the upper bulkhead at fuselage Station 167, with six rivets per stiffener, to prevent the formation of cracks originating at the joggles in the flange outboard of the stabilizer attachment points. Any crack should be stop drilled. If it extends into the web of the bulkhead an 0.040-inch 24ST alclad reinforcing plate extending to the flange should be installed on the web with rivets spaced not more than 3/4 inches apart. (Globe Customer Service Maintenance Bulletin No. 2 covers this same subject.)
86-18-06: 86-18-06 BOEING: Amendment 39-5386. Applies to all Model 747 series airplanes listed in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-57A2234, dated February 21, 1986, certificated in any category. To detect loose or broken bolts used for the forward attachment of the Numbers 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, and 8 trailing edge flap tracks to the wing lower surface, accomplish the following, unless already accomplished: \n\n\tA.\tPrior to the accumulation of 5,000 flight cycles or within the next 300 flight cycles after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later, conduct a one-time inspection for loose or broken bolts in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747- 57A2234, dated February 21, 1986, or later FAA-approved revisions. NOTE: "Proof Torque" inspections previously accomplished in accordance with Boeing Service Letters Numbers 747-SL-57-44, dated December 18, 1985, or 747-SL-57-44A, dated December 20, 1985, constitute an equivalent means of compliance with the above requirement. \n\n\tB.\tIf one bolt is found loose or broken, replace all eight bolts used for the forward attachment of the trailing edge flap track to the wing lower surface within the next 600 flight cycles in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-57A2234, dated February 21, 1986, or later FAA- approved revision. \n\n\tC.\tIf two bolts are found loose or broken, replace all eight bolts used for the forward attachment of the trailing edge flap track to the wing lower surface within the next 300 flight cycles in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-57A2234, dated February 21, 1986, or later FAA- approved revision. \n\n\tD.\tIf three or more bolts are found loose or broken, replace all eight bolts used for the forward attachment of the trailing edge flap track to the wing lower surface prior to further flight in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-57A2234, dated February 21, 1986, or later FAA- approved revision. \n\n\tE.\tAlternate meansof compliance for paragraphs B., or C., above, is:\n \n\t\t1.\tIf broken bolts are found, their replacement may be deferred for 1,200 flight cycles, provided the remaining non-broken bolts are retorqued to installation requirements in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-57A2234, dated February 21, 1986, or later FAA-approved revisions.\n \n\t\t2.\tIf loose bolts are found, retorque all bolts to installation requirements in accordance with the Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-57A2234, dated February 21, 1986, or later FAA- approved revisions. \n\n\t\t3.\tPerform a visual inspection of the H-11 bolts for broken bolts (evidenced by missing heads) within 15 months after the inspections of paragraph A., of this AD, and repeat the inspections thereafter at intervals not to exceed 15 months. \n\n\t\t4.\tReplacement of the bolts with new bolts in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-57A2234, dated February 21, 1986, or later FAA-approved revisions is terminating action for therepetitive inspections required by paragraph E.3. \n\n\tF.\tAn alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tG.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of inspections and/or modifications required by this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received this service information from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to the Boeing Commercial Airplane Company, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124-2207. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or the Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective September 11, 1986.
2021-04-03: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Pilatus Aircraft Ltd. (Pilatus) Model PC-24 airplanes. This AD was prompted by mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI identifies the unsafe condition as improperly manufactured cockpit and cabin evaporator filters installed during production on some PC-24 airplanes. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2009-02-03: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for Lycoming Engines IO, (L)IO, TIO, (L)TIO, AEIO, AIO, IGO, IVO, and HIO series reciprocating engines, TCM TSIO-360-RB reciprocating engines, and Superior Air Parts, Inc. IO-360 series reciprocating engines with certain Precision Airmotive LLC RSA-5 and RSA-10 series fuel injection servos. That AD currently requires inspecting servo plugs for looseness and damage on fuel injection servos that have a servo plug gasket, part number (P/N) 365533, installed, and if loose, inspecting the servo regulator cover threads for damage, inspecting the gasket for damage, reinstalling acceptable parts, and torquing the servo plug to a new, higher torque to maintain the proper clamp-up force between the plug and cover. This AD requires the same inspections, except if the plug is found loose, servo plug gasket, P/N 365533, must be replaced with a new, improved gasket, P/N 2577258. This AD also requires replacement by December 31,2009, of servo plug gaskets, P/N 365533, manufactured and made available on or after August 22, 2006, as mandatory terminating action to the repetitive inspections required by this AD. This AD also prohibits the installation of any servo plug gasket, P/N 365533. This AD also clarifies the TCM engine model applicability, and adds Bendix RSA-5 and RSA-10 series fuel injection servos to the applicability. This AD results from Precision Airmotive LLC introducing the installation of a new improved servo plug gasket, P/N 2577258, to the affected Precision Airmotive LLC RSA-5 and RSA-10 series, and Bendix RSA-5 and RSA-10 series, fuel injection servos. We are issuing this AD to prevent a lean running engine, which could result in a substantial loss of engine power and subsequent loss of control of the airplane.