Results
2021-19-07: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain \n\n((Page 54040)) \n\nHelicopteres Guimbal Model CABRI G2 helicopters. This AD was prompted by a report that, during scheduled maintenance on two helicopters, cracks were found on a certain main rotor (MR) non- rotating scissor link. This AD requires replacing an affected MR non- rotating scissor link with a serviceable part. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2000-18-05: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all Aerospatiale Model ATR42 and ATR72 series airplanes, that requires modification of the alerting capability of the anti-icing advisory system to improve crew awareness of icing conditions, replacement of the median wing de-icing boots with extended de-icing boots, and installation of de-icing boots on the metallic wing leading edge. This amendment is prompted by issuance of mandatory continuing airworthiness information by a foreign civil airworthiness authority. The actions specified by this AD are intended to reduce the degradation of lift and drag characteristics in prolonged severe icing exposure, which could result in loss of lift and consequent reduced controllability of the airplane.
95-04-07 R2: This amendment revises an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model DC-10-10, -15, and -30 airplanes, and KC-10A (military) airplanes, that currently requires inspections to determine the condition of the lockwires on the forward engine mount bolts and correction of any discrepancies found. That amendment also provides for termination of the inspections for some airplanes by installing retainers on the bolts. That AD was prompted by reports of stretched or broken lockwires on the forward engine mount bolts. The actions specified by that AD are intended to prevent broken lockwires, which could result in loosening of the engine mount bolts, and subsequent separation of the engine from the airplane. This amendment provides an additional optional terminating modification and clarification of the requirements of the previous optional terminating modification, and removes the reporting requirements for the repetitive inspections.
2000-15-14: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11 series airplanes. This action requires repetitive inspections to verify operation of the remote control circuit breakers (RCCB) of the alternating current (AC) cabin bus switch, and replacement of any discrepant RCCB with a new RCCB. This action is necessary to prevent propagation of smoke and fumes in the cockpit and passenger cabin due to an inoperable RCCB of the AC cabin bus switch during smoke and fume isolation procedures. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.\n\n\tThe incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the regulations is approved by the Director of the Federal Register as of August 23, 2000.\n\n\tComments for inclusion in the Rules Docket must be received on or before October 10, 2000.
2018-26-06: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all The Boeing Company Model 737-600, -700, -700C, -800, -900, and -900ER series airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of loose, worn, or missing attachment bolts for the main landing gear (MLG) center door assemblies. This AD requires repetitive detailed inspections of the forward and aft MLG center door assembly attachments for loose, missing, damaged, or bottomed-out attachment bolts, and any wear to the retention clip assemblies as applicable; and applicable on-condition actions. This AD also provides an \n\n((Page 67044)) \n\noptional terminating action for the repetitive inspections. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2007-03-20: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: The back-up mode can be activated by an electrostatic discharge or by a malfunction of the collective pitch signal. The two engines fitted on the same helicopter can therefore be frozen in this back- up position at 85% N1. Freezing both engines in the back-up mode can lead to an inability to continue safe flight and forced landing. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2000-18-03: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to Rolls-Royce plc models RB211-524D4-19, -524D4-B-19, -524D4-B-39, -524D4X-19, and 524D4X-B-19 turbofan engines with a cold stream nozzle assembly Part Number (PN) LJ32826 installed. This action requires inspection for cracks and repair of the cold stream nozzle assembly longitudinal flange. This amendment is prompted by a report of the loss of a large section of cold stream nozzle assembly in flight. The actions specified in this AD are intended to detect cracks that could result in failure of the cold stream nozzle assembly, possible release of cold stream nozzle debris from the engine, and possible damage to airplane control surfaces.
90-24-09: 90-24-09 BOEING: Amendment 39-6815. Docket No. 90-NM-231-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: Model 747 series airplanes, listed in Boeing Service Bulletin 747-57- 2231, Revision 2, dated September 27, 1990, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. \n\tTo prevent failure of the flap tracks, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tVisually inspect the forward end clevis lugs of flap tracks for evidence of cracking, in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 747-57-2231, Revision 2, dated September 27, 1990, and in accordance with the following schedule: \n\n\t\t1.\tFor Group 1 airplanes: Perform the inspection at flap track positions 1 through 8 within the next 30 days after the effective date of this AD. \n\n\t\t2.\tFor Group 2 airplanes: Perform inspection at flap track positions 1, 2, 7, and 8 prior to the later of the following: \n\n\t\t\ta.\tPrior to the accumulation of 30,000 flight hours or 8 years after airplane delivery, whichever occursfirst; or \n\n\t\t\tb.\tWithin 120 days after the effective date of this AD. \n\n\t\t3.\tFor Group 3 airplanes: Perform the inspection at flap track positions 1 through 8 prior to the later of the following: \n\n\t\t\ta.\tPrior to the accumulation of 30,000 flight hours or 8 years after airplane delivery, whichever occurs first; or \n\n\t\t\tb.\tWithin 120 days after the effective date of this AD. \n\n\tB.\tIf cracking is found, replace the flap track prior to further flight, in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 747-57-2231, Revision 2, dated September 27, 1990. \n\n\tC.\tIf no cracking is found, repeat the inspection required by paragraph A. of this AD, at intervals not to exceed 300 flight cycles for Group 1 airplanes, and 1,200 flight cycles for Group 2 and Group 3 airplanes. \n\n\tD.\tAccomplishment of the modification of the forward end clevis lugs of flap tracks as specified in Boeing Service Bulletin 747-57-2231, Revision 2, dated September 27, 1990, constitutes terminating action for the inspections required by paragraphs A. and C. of this AD. \n\n\tE.\tAn alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. \n\n\tNOTE: The request should be submitted directly to the Manager, Seattle ACO, and a copy sent to the cognizant FAA Principal Inspector (PI). The PI will then forward comments or concurrence to the Seattle ACO. \n\n\tF.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service information from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. This information may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue S.W., Renton, Washington. \n\n\tThis amendment (39-6815, AD 90-24-09) becomes effective on December 5, 1990.
2007-03-17: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as loose rivets on frames C18 BIS and C19, which could result in a reduced structural integrity of the tail area. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
97-20-09 PL: 97-20-09 CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF FORESTRY; FIREFLY AVIATION HELICOPTER SERVICES (PREVIOUSLY ERICKSON AIR CRANE CO.); GARLICK HELICOPTERS, INC.; HAWKINS AND POWERS AVIATION INC.; INTERNATIONAL HELICOPTERS, INC.; RANGER HELICOPTER SERVICES; ROBINSON AIRCRANE; SCOTT PAPER CO.; SMITH HELICOPTERS; SOUTHERN HELICOPTER; SOUTHWEST FLORIDA AVIATION; WESTERN INTERNATIONAL AVIATION, INC.; UNC HELICOPTERS; AND U.S. HELICOPTER, INC.: Priority Letter issued on September 17, 1997. Docket No. 97-SW-35-AD.\n\n\tApplicability: Model HH-1K (Type Certificate Data Sheet (TCDS) H5NM), TH-lF (TCDS H12NM, and R00008AT), TH-1L (TCDS H5NM, H7SO, and H4NM), UH-1A (TCDS H3SO), UH-1B (TCDS H1RM, H3NM, H13WE, H3SO, H5SO, and R00012AT), UH-1E (TCDS H5NM, H7SO, H8NM, and H4NM), UH-1F (TCDS H2NM, H7NE, H11SW, H12NM, and R00008AT), UH-1H (TCDS H13WE, H3SO, and H15NM), UH-lL (TCDS H5NM, H7SO, and H4NM), UH-1P (TCDS H12NM, and R00008AT), and SW204 (TCDS H6SO), SW204HP (TCDS H6SO), SW205 (TCDS H6SO), helicopters, with tailboom vertical fin spar, part number (P/N) 205-032-899, 205-030-846, or 205-032-851, all dash numbers, installed, certificated in any category.\n\n\tNOTE 1: This AD applies to each helicopter identified in the preceding applicability provision, regardless of whether it has been modified, altered, or repaired in the area subject to the requirements of this AD. For helicopters that have been modified, altered, or repaired so that the performance of the requirements of this AD is affected, the owner/operator must use the authority provided in paragraph (c) to request approval from the FAA. This approval may address either no action, if the current configuration eliminates the unsafe condition, or different actions necessary to address the unsafe condition described in this AD. Such a request should include an assessment of the effect of the changed configuration on the unsafe condition addressed by this AD. In no case does the presence of any modification, alteration, or repairremove any helicopter from the applicability of this AD.\n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously.\n\n\tTo prevent in-flight failure of the tailboom vertical fin spar (vertical fin spar) and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter, accomplish the following:\n\n\t(a)\tWithin 8 hours time-in-service (TIS) after the effective date of this AD, modify the vertical fin spar as follows:\n\n\t\t(1)\tRemove the 42 gearbox cover and open the drive shaft cover on the vertical fin spar assembly (see Figure 1).\n\n\t\t(2)\tRemove the first four rivets from the fin spar located at the bottom of the vertical fin spar left-hand side at the tailboom and vertical fin spar junction, and the first four rivets aft of the junction along the lower edge of the vertical fin spar side-skin as shown (see Figure 2).\nCAUTION: Extreme care must be taken when drilling and removing rivets from the side of vertical fin spar to ensure the vertical fin spar assembly is not damaged.\n\n\t\t(3)\tTrim the vertical fin spar left-hand side-skin using extreme care to not damage the vertical fin spar assembly (see Figure 3).\n\n\t\t(4)\tDeburr the rivet holes and trimmed side-skin edges. Remove all debris. In a ventilated work area, remove any surface contaminants with a cloth that has been dampened with aliphatic naphtha or an equivalent cleaning solvent.\n\n\t\t(5)\tReattach the side-skin to the vertical fin spar using MS 20470AD rivets. DO NOT install the bottom two rivets into the vertical fin spar where the side-skin was trimmed.\n\n\t\t(6)\tAttach the vertical fin spar side-skin lower edge using the rivets specified in Figure 2.\n\n\t\t(7)\tRefinish all reworked areas.\n\n\t(b)\tAfter modifying the vertical fin spar assembly, immediately inspect the vertical fin spar, and thereafter, inspect at intervals not to exceed 8 hours TIS, for cracks as follows:\n\n\t\t(1)\tRemove the lower aft tailboom inspection door, located at tailboom station 180 (see Figure 4).\n\n\t\t(2)\tRemove the 42 gearbox cover and open the drive shaft cover on the vertical fin (see Figure 1).\n\n\t\t(3)\tThrough the lower aft tailboom inspection door, using a bright light and an inspection mirror, inspect the vertical fin spar assembly adjacent to the tailboom top skin on the forward side, paying special attention to the left-hand edge and the adjacent surfaces (see Figure 2).\n\n\t\t(4)\tIn a ventilated work area, clean all surfaces to be inspected with a cloth dampened with aliphatic naphtha or an equivalent cleaning solvent. Using a bright light and a 10x magnifying glass, inspect the vertical fin spar assembly adjacent to the tailboom top-skin on the in-board and out-board sides, the vertical edge, and the two open rivet holes. Using a bright light and a mirror, inspect the aft side of the vertical fin spar in the same area. Special attention must be given to the left-hand edge of the vertical fin spar and any adjacent surfaces between fin station 66.31 and 71.31 (see Figure 2).\n\n\t\t(5)\tIf any crack is discovered on the vertical fin spar, replace the vertical fin spar assembly with an airworthy vertical fin spar assembly before further flight.\n\n\t(c)\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Rotorcraft Certification Office, FAA. Operators shall submit their requests through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Rotorcraft Certification Office.\n\n\tNOTE 2: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Rotorcraft Certification Office.\n\n\t(d)\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with sections 21.197 and 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.197 and 21.199) to operate the helicopter to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished.\n\n\t(e)\tPriority Letter AD 97-20-09, issued September 17, 1997, becomes effective upon receipt.