Results
2024-10-10: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus Helicopters Model SA-365N, SA-365N1, AS-365N2, and AS 365 N3 helicopters. This AD was prompted by a report of an obstructed tail rotor (TR) pedal control that was blocked during flight. This AD requires a one-time inspection for proper positioning of the TR actuator harness and cable ties installation and, depending on the results, accomplishing corrective action, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
84-25-03: 84-25-03 BOEING: Amendment 39-4969. Applies to Boeing Model 767 airplanes noted in the Boeing Service Bulletin listed below. To prevent freezing of the ram air turbine (RAT) actuator motors and ensure deployment of the RAT when required, accomplish the following within 140 days after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished: \n\n\tA.\tReplace the RAT rotary actuator electric motor P/N S258T711-3 with motor P/N S258T711-4, and operationally test the RAT deployment system in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 767-29-17, Revision 2 dated June 29, 1984, or later FAA approved revision. A - 3 motor may be modified to a -4 configuration by accomplishing rework in accordance with EEMCO Service Bulletin 5076-29-1, Revision 1, dated June 25, 1984, or later FAA approved revision. \n\n\tB.\tAlternate means of compliance which provide an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tC.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of replacements required by this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the above specified Service Bulletins from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to the Boeing Commercial Airplane Company, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124, or they may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington 98108. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective January 25, 1985.
2024-10-11: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus Canada Limited Partnership Model BD-500-1A10 and BD-500- 1A11 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report indicating that the rigging pin in the bulkhead internal crank assembly of the overwing emergency exit door (OWEED) escape slide mechanism was not removed during production. This AD requires inspecting the OWEED escape slide mechanism to determine if a rigging pin is installed and, if installed, removing the rigging pin, as specified in Transport Canada AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2004-05-07: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 767 series airplanes, that currently requires a one-time inspection to detect abrasion damage and installation discrepancies of the wire bundles located below the P37 panel, and corrective action if necessary. For airplanes already subject to the existing AD, this amendment requires inspecting to determine whether the existing location of a certain wire support standoff is adequate, relocating the wire support standoff if necessary, installing protective sleeving over the wire bundles, and installing wire bundle support clamps if necessary. This amendment also expands the applicability of the existing AD to include additional airplanes, and require inspecting the sleeving on certain wire bundles, and accomplishing corrective action if necessary, on those airplanes. The actions specified by this AD are intended to detect and prevent abrasion damage and correct installation discrepancies of the wire bundles located below the P37 panel, which could result in arcing to structure and consequent fire or loss of function of affected systems. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
2001-09-10: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11 series airplanes equipped with Pratt & Whitney Model PW4400 series engines, that currently requires revising the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) to advise the flight crew of applicable operational limits. This amendment corrects a typographical error in one paragraph of the existing AD that resulted in a reference to an incorrect engine fan blade which is not subject to the requirements of that paragraph. The actions specified in this AD are intended to ensure that the flight crew is informed of applicable limitations in airplane performance, and to prevent reduced acceleration and climb performance relative to performance data in the AFM, which could result in the airplane overrunning the end of the runway during takeoff or landing, or impacting obstacles or terrain. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
2024-10-05: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 757 airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of operators finding frequent and severe damage to the blowout vent grilles throughout the lower lobe cargo compartment. This AD requires repetitive detailed inspections of certain decompression panels and pressure equalization valves, as applicable, in the forward and aft lower lobe cargo compartments for damage, and applicable on- condition actions. For certain airplanes, this AD also requires installation of decompression panels with billet grilles. For other certain airplanes, this AD also requires replacement of a certain soft bulkhead with a rigid bulkhead. For certain other airplanes, this AD requires installation of doublers to a certain bulkhead assembly panel. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
86-25-52 R1: 86-25-52 R1 AEROSPATIALE: Telegram issued December 19, 1986, as amended by Amendment 39-5655. Applies to all Model ATR-42 airplanes, certificated in any category. Compliance required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. To minimize the potential hazards associated with in-flight icing conditions or the operation of ice removal systems, accomplish the following before further flight into known or forecast icing conditions: A. Revise the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) as follows: 1. Replace AFM Limitations, Power Plant, 2-04, Page 4, with the Revision dated December 1986, and 2. Replace AFM Normal Procedures, Flight Conditions, 3-02, Page 1, with the Revision dated December 1986. B. Revise Panel 24.VU to change the definition of airframe ice protection system as originally designated "Deicing" by permanently covering the term "deicing" on panel 24.VU. C. Or, as an alternate means of compliance: 1. Modify the stall warning system in accordance with Aerospatiale Service Bulletin ATR-42-30-0011, dated March 19, 1987. 2. Remove permanent cover of term "Deicing" on panel 24.VU. 3. Replace AFM Limitations Power Plant, 2-04, Page 4, with the Revision dated October 1986, or FAA-approved AFM revisions dated later than December 1986. 4. Replace AFM Normal Procedures Flight Conditions, 3-02, Page 1, with the Revision dated October 1986, or FAA approved AFM revisions dated later than December 1986. D. An alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. E. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of the modifications required by this AD. All persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate documents from the manufacturer, may obtain copies upon request to Aerospatiale, 316 Route de Bayonne, 31060 Toulouse Cedex 03, France. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or the Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. This amendment, 39-5655, becomes effective July 10, 1987, as to all persons, except those persons to whom it was made immediately effective by telegraphic AD T86-25-52, issued December 19, 1986.
85-13-02: 85-13-02 BOEING: Amendment 39-5085. Applies to Boeing Model 767 series airplanes certificated in all categories, as enumerated in Boeing Service Bulletin No. 767-21-0041, Revision 1, dated February 15, 1985. To assure the effectiveness of the cargo compartment fire protection system, accomplish the following, unless already accomplished. \n\n\tA.\tWithin 90 days after the effective date of this AD, revise the wiring and test the operation of the aft equipment/lavatory/galley ventilation fans and the left and right air conditioning pack flow controls in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 767-21-0041, Revision 1, dated February 15, 1985, or later FAA approved revision. \n\n\tB.\tAlternate means of compliance which provide an acceptable level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tC.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base forthe accomplishment of inspections and/or modifications required by this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the above specified service bulletin from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request from the Boeing Commercial Airplane Company, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, WA 98124. It may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. \n\n\tThis Amendment becomes effective July 28, 1985.
2005-08-12: The FAA adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain CENTRAIR 101 series gliders. This AD requires you to replace non- strengthened rudder pedals with reinforced rudder pedals. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the airworthiness authority for France. We are issuing this AD to replace the non-strengthened rudder pedals and to prevent failure of the rudder controls. This failure could lead to loss of directional control of the glider.
2024-11-03: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain International Aero Engines, AG (IAE AG) Model V2500 engines. This AD was prompted by an analysis of an event involving an International Aero Engines, LLC (IAE LLC) Model PW1127GA-JM engine, which experienced a high-pressure compressor (HPC) 7th-stage integrally bladed rotor (IBR-7) separation that resulted in an aborted takeoff. This AD requires performing an angled ultrasonic inspection (AUSI) of certain high-pressure turbine (HPT) 1st-stage hubs and HPT 2nd-stage hubs for cracks and replacing if necessary. This AD also requires accelerated replacement of certain HPT 1st-stage hubs and HPT 2nd-stage hubs. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2024-08-09: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain GA8 Airvan (Pty) Ltd Model GA8 and GA8-TC320 airplanes. This AD is prompted by reports of insufficient electrical bonding of the solenoid (relay) box assembly that could result in degraded performance, errors, or intermittent failures of equipment connected to electrical Bus 1, Bus 2, associated electrical control, and protective devices fitted within or attached to the solenoid box. This AD requires inspecting for an existing wire connecting the relay box earth point to the ground power socket, and if one is not present, installing a mechanical connection. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
88-14-07: 88-14-07 BOEING: Amendment 39-5966. Applies to Model 737 series airplanes, line numbers 001 through 1425, equipped with non-modular aft lavatories, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tNOTE: "Non-modular" refers to lavatories which are not stand-alone components, and are assembled on the airplane. \n\n\tTo prevent accumulation of combustible materials behind the airplane sidewall, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tWithin 3 months after the effective date of this AD, inspect the area behind the towel and cup dispenser for the presence of a shroud enclosing the dispenser back. \n\n\t\t1.\tIf the dispenser is equipped with a shroud which prevents material from falling behind the lavatory sidewall and is acceptable to the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, or an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, no further action is required. \n\n\t\t2.\tIf an acceptable existing shroud has not been installed, inspect the area behind the towel and cup dispenser in the aft lavatories and remove all foreign material. Repeat this inspection at intervals not to exceed 3 months, until the requirements of paragraph B., below, are accomplished. \n\n\tB.\tWithin 15 months after the effective date of this amendment, install a shroud behind the towel and cup dispenser in the aft lavatories, which encloses the dispenser back and prevents material from falling behind the sidewall, in a manner approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, or an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector. \n\n\tC.\tAn alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tNOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI), who may add any comments and then send it to the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office. \n\n\tD.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tThis amendment, 39-5966, becomes effective August 11, 1988.
85-12-10: 85-12-10 SLINGSBY SAILPLANES: Amendment 39-5079. Applies to Slingsby T.53.B gliders certificated in all categories. Compliance is required as indicated unless already accomplished. To prevent structural failure due to fatigue cracks, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 10 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, install a placard on the instrument panel in full view of the pilot reading: "CLOUD FLYING AND AEROBATIC MANEUVERS PROHIBITED." (b) (1) Within the next 10 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 5 hours time in service from the last inspection, visually inspect the welded frame P/N T53B-1079, which joins the forward spar member with the rear spar member of the fuselage center section, for cracks at the forward extremity of the lower two tubes where they are welded to the thin vertical channels. (2) Within the next 10 hours time in service after the effectivedate of this AD, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 5 hours time in service from the last inspection, inspect the two aft brackets (welded brackets - P/N T53B-10-168, Issue 1-4; riveted brackets - P/N T53B-10-168, Issue 5) that attach the wing center section to fuselage frame No. 6 for fatigue cracks using the dye penetrant crack detection method in accordance with Slingsby Engineering Limited Technical Instruction No. 100/T53, Issue 1, dated October 20, 1981, or an FAA- approved equivalent. (c) If cracks are found as a result of the inspections required by paragraph (b)(1), prior to further flight, modify the tubular structure in accordance with Slingsby Sailplanes Technical Instruction No. 68, dated August 14, 1974, or an FAA-approved equivalent. (d) If cracks are found as a result of the inspections required by paragraph (b)(2), prior to further flight, replace the aft two brackets in accordance with Slingsby Sailplanes Technical Instruction No. 70, dated September11, 1974, or an FAA-approved equivalent, and Slingsby Engineering Limited Technical Instruction No. 100/T53, Issue 1, dated October 20, 1981, or an FAA-approved equivalent. (e) The placard required by paragraph (a) may be removed, and the inspections required by paragraph (b) may be discontinued, after the modification of the tubular structure, in accordance with Slingsby Sailplanes Technical Instruction No. 68, dated August 14, 1974, or an FAA-approved equivalent, has been accomplished, and when the aft two brackets have been replaced in accordance with Slingsby Sailplanes Technical Instruction No. 70, dated September 11, 1974, or an FAA-approved equivalent, and Slingsby Engineering Limited Technical Instruction No. 100/T53, Issue 1, dated October 20, 1981, or an FAA-approved equivalent. (f) Within the next 25 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished within the past 75 hours time in service, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 100 hours time in service from the last inspection, comply with the following: (1) Dye penetrant inspect the metal lugs P/N T53B-10-115, and channel section P/N T53B-10-118, on fuselage frame No. 6, in accordance with Slingsby Engineering Limited Technical Instruction No. 100/T53, Issue 1, dated October 20, 1981, or an FAA- approved equivalent. (2) If cracks are found as a result of the inspections required by paragraph (f)(1) of this AD, prior to further flight, replace the metal lugs and/or channel section in accordance with Slingsby Engineering Limited Technical Instruction No. 100/T53, Issue 1, dated October 20, 1981, or FAA-approved equivalent. Upon request, an equivalent means of compliance with the requirements of this AD may be approved by the Manager, Brussels Aircraft Certification Office, AEU-100, Europe, Africa, and Middle East Office, FAA, c/o American Embassy, 1000 Brussels, Belgium, telephone 513.38.30 ext. 2710. Slingsby Sailplane Technical Instruction No. 70 dated September 11, 1974, Slingsby Sailplane Technical Instruction No. 68 dated August 14, 1974, and Slingsby Engineering Limited Technical Instruction dated October 20, 1981, are incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1). All persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Slingsby Engineering Limited, Ings Lane, Kirbymoorside, York, Y06, 6EZ, England. These documents also may be examined at the Office of the Regional Counsel, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, Massachusetts 01803. This AD supersedes Amendment 39-2308 (40 FR 32318), AD 75-17-07. This Amendment 39-5079 becomes effective on July 22, 1985.
2005-08-08: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD), which applies to certain McDonnell Douglas series airplanes. That AD currently requires repetitive inspections of the electrical connectors of the explosive cartridge wiring of the engine fire extinguisher containers to verify if the identification number labels are installed and legible; repetitive electrical tests of all explosive cartridge wiring of the engine fire extinguisher containers to verify proper installation and function; and corrective actions if necessary. This new AD requires an inspection of the emergency shut off wire assembly; installation of lanyards on the electrical connectors for the engine fire extinguishing agent containers and for the auxiliary power unit fire extinguishing agent containers if applicable; and related investigative/corrective actions, as applicable. This AD is prompted by reports of cross-wired electrical connectors of the engine fire extinguishing agent containers. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct cross-wired electrical connectors of the fire extinguishing system, which could release fire extinguishing agent into the incorrect engine nacelle in the event of an engine fire.
2024-10-03: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus Canada Limited Partnership Model BD-500-1A10 and BD-500-1A11 airplanes. This AD was prompted by the determination that reliance on design assurance level (DAL) D software for flight-critical fly-by-wire (FBW) rigging functions may result in undetected inaccurate positioning of the primary flight control surfaces. This AD requires the use of specific issues of the aircraft maintenance publication (AMP) for electrical rigging procedures, and an electrical rigging confirmation check of primary flight control surfaces for certain airplanes, as specified in a Transport Canada AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2024-09-02: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Leonardo S.p.a. Model AW169 helicopters. This AD was prompted by manufacturing defects in certain forward and aft float assemblies. This AD requires replacing certain aft float assemblies or, as an alternative, deactivating the emergency flotation system (EFS). This AD also prohibits installing certain forward and aft float assemblies. These actions are specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
85-26-02: 85-26-02 MESSERSCHMITT-BOLKOW-BLOHM: Amendment 39-5226. Applies to Model BO-105 series helicopters, through serial No. 750, certificated in any category that are equipped with one of the following tandem hydraulic units: Part Numbers (P/N) 105-45021, 105- 45023, 105-45028, 105-83001, 105-83011, D133-3073, and DSK1-30142. Compliance is required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. To detect or prevent possible jamming of the helicopter main rotor control system, accomplish the following: (a) Before the first flight of each day after the effective date of this AD, operate the System II hydraulic actuators to detect binding of the control. If binding is detected, clean and seal the System II hydraulic actuators in accordance with paragraph (b) of this AD. (b) Within the next 10 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, clean and seal the System II hydraulic actuators in accordance with MBB BO-105, ASB No. 26, Part 2B, dated December 12, 1985, or with an equivalent approved in accordance with paragraph D of this AD. After sealing, the operational check in paragraph (a) is no longer required. (c) The operational check in paragraph (a) may be performed by the pilot. NOTE: For the requirements regarding recording compliance and method of compliance with this AD in the aircraft's permanent maintenance records, see FAR Section 91.173. (d) Upon request, an equivalent means of compliance with this AD may be used when approved by the Manager, Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Europe, Africa, and Middle East Office, c/o American Embassy, Brussels, Belgium, APO NY 09667-1011. (e) The aircraft may be flown in accordance with FAR Sections 21.197 and 21.199 to a base where the actuators may be sealed in accordance with paragraph (b) of this AD. The manufacturer's specifications and procedures identified and described in this directive are incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1). All persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to MBB Helicopter Corp., P.O. Box 2349, West Chester, Pennsylvania 19380. These documents may also be examined at the Office of the Regional Counsel, Federal Aviation Administration, Southwest Region, Room 158, Building 3B, 4400 Blue Mound Road, Fort Worth, Texas 76106. This amendment becomes effective February 25, 1986, as to all persons except those persons to whom it was made immediately effective by priority letter AD 85-26-02, issued December 23, 1985, which contained this amendment.
86-21-11: 86-21-11 EMPRESA BRASILEIRA DE AERONAUTICA S.A.: Amendment 39-5535. Applies to Embraer Model EMB-120 series airplanes; serial numbers 12004, 12006 through 120028, 120033, and 120034; equipped with engine oil coolers, part numbers 160282-1 or 160282-2, which have accumulated more than 200 hours time-in-service; certificated in any category. Compliance is required within the next 10 hours time-in-service after the effective date of this AD, unless previously accomplished. To prevent oil loss and in-flight engine shutdown, accomplish the following: A. Fabricate and install on the instrument panel near the altimeter, in full view of the pilot, a placard that reads: "MAXIMUM OPERATING LIMITATION 10,000 FEET MSL." B. Installation of engine oil cooler part number 160282-3 or subsequent, constitutes terminating action for the requirements of this AD. This amendment becomes effective February 17, 1987, as to all persons, except those persons to whom it was made immediatelyeffective by Priority Letter AD 86-21-11, issued October 22, 1986.
2005-08-13: The FAA adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Glaser-Dirks Flugzeugbau GmbH (DG Flugzeugbau) Model DG-800B sailplanes equipped with a SOLO 2625 engine or a Mid-West AE 50T engine. This AD requires you to modify the coolant pump and fuel pump electrical circuits, remove the non-resettable digital engine indicator (DEI) circuit breaker (4-ampere) and replace with a resettable 5-ampere circuit breaker, secure (for sailplanes with a SOLO 2625 engine) the choke butterfly valve axis, install edge protection at the sharp edges of the resettable 5-ampere DEI circuit breaker, and incorporate changes in the FAA-approved sailplane flight manual. This AD is the result of mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the airworthiness authority for Germany. We are issuing this AD to prevent electrical failure of the fuel and coolant pumps if a non-resettable circuit breaker trips. This could result in power loss with the inability to restart the fuel pump during a critical phase of flight (for example, takeoff under own power).
2024-08-06: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Rolls-Royce Deutschland Ltd & Co KG (RRD) Model Trent 1000-A, Trent 1000-A2, Trent 1000-AE, Trent 1000-AE2, Trent 1000-C, Trent 1000-C2, Trent 1000-CE, Trent 1000-CE2, Trent 1000-D, Trent 1000-D2, Trent 1000- E, Trent 1000-E2, Trent 1000-G, Trent 1000-G2, Trent 1000-H, Trent 1000-H2, Trent 1000-J2, Trent 1000-K2, and Trent 1000-L2 engines. This AD was prompted by reports of wear in the combining spill valve (CSV) assembly of certain hydro-mechanical units (HMUs). This AD requires removing certain HMUs from service and replacing with a serviceable part. This AD also prohibits the installation of certain HMUs unless the HMU is a serviceable part or the CSV assembly has been replaced, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2024-07-11: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus Canada Limited Partnership Model BD-500-1A10 and BD-500- 1A11 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a design review that identified the fixed emergency locator transmitter (ELT) lithium batteries would not be sufficiently cooled by the outside air in the event of a thermal runaway event. This AD requires replacing the ELT with a new ELT with redesigned batteries, as specified in a Transport Canada AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
89-20-06: 89-20-06 HONEYWELL, INC.: Amendment 39-6335. (Docket No. 89-NM-97-AD) Applicability: Sperry FMZ-800 Flight Management Systems (FMS), Model NZ-600, NZ-800, and NZ-900 series Navigation Computers, part numbers 7004402-653, -654, -801, -803, -804, -805, -806, -811, -812, -813, -823, -824, -832, -833, -834, -843, -844, -845, -901, -902, -903, -904, -905, and -906, if installed with two or more inertial reference systems and one or more omega/VLF sensors. These FMS navigation computers are known to be or have been installed in, but not limited to, Avions Marcel Dassault Model Mystere-Falcon 900, British Aerospace Model BAe 125-800A, Canadair Model CL-601-3A, and Gulfstream Model G-IV series airplanes. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. To prevent FMS navigation errors caused by an erroneous omega/VLF sensor, accomplish the following: A. Within 15 days after the effective date of this AD, add the following to the Limitations Section of the FAA-approved Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) or FAA-approved Airplane Flight Manual Supplement (AFMS). This may be accomplished by inserting a copy of this AD in the AFM or AFMS. ON ALL FLIGHT EXTENDING OFFSHORE ONE HOUR OR MORE BEYOND VOR/DME RANGE: (1) WHEN NAVIGATING WITH TWO FLIGHT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS (FMS), AND WITH ONE OR MORE OPERATIONAL INERTIAL REFERENCE SENSORS AND WITH A SINGLE OPERATIONAL OMEGA/VLF SENSOR, THE OMEGA/VLF SENSOR MUST BE DESELECTED FROM ONE OF THE FMS NAVIGATION COMPUTERS. (2) IF NAVIGATING WITH ONLY ONE FMS NAVIGATION COMPUTER, (BECAUSE OF AN IN-FLIGHT FMS FAILURE), AND WITH TWO OR MORE INERTIAL REFERENCE SENSORS AND WITH A SINGLE OPERATIONAL OMEGA/VLF SENSOR, THE OMEGA/VLF SENSOR MUST BE DESELECTED FROM THE OPERATING FMS NAVIGATION COMPUTER. B. An alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. NOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI), who may add any comments and then send it to the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. C. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. This amendment (39-6335, AD 89-20-06) becomes effective on October 10, 1989.
86-16-51: 86-16-51 DEHAVILLAND: Amendment 39-5433. Applies to DeHavilland Model DHC-8 airplanes, certificated in any category, serial numbers 003, 005, and subsequent. Compliance is required before further flight, unless previously accomplished. To preclude the uncommanded retraction of the main landing gear, accomplish the following: A. Insert a copy of this AD in the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) and advise all flight crew members. For takeoff, landing, and while on the ground, isolate the main landing gear actuation hydraulics by complying with the following revised flight manual procedures: OPERATING LIMITATIONS (A) Nosewheel steering switch must be selected OFF. (B) Takeoff or landing in cross winds exceeding 20 knots is not permitted. NOTE: Information presented in Supplement 12 of the Airplane Flight Manual (Operation with Inoperative Nose Wheel Steering) is in error and will be amended in the next AFM revision. 2. NORMAL OPERATING PROCEDURES:- Flight Compartment Check - POWER ON. - (ADD) Landing Gear Selector Lever - DOWN. Check 3 green lights ON. All door and gear unlocked lights OUT. Selector lever light OUT. - Landing Gear Inhibit Switch - INHIBIT. - Landing Gear Alternate Release Door - OPEN FULLY. - Landing Gear Alternate Extension Door - OPEN FULLY. - Hydraulic Pump Handle - INSERT IN HAND PUMP SOCKET AND OPERATE UNTIL HAND PUMP MOVEMENT BECOMES STIFF. - Hydraulic Pump Handle - STOW. Pre-Taxi Checks: 11. (CHANGE) Nosewheel Steering Switch - OFF. Steer the airplane on the ground by means of differential braking and power lever adjustment. After Takeoff: 1. (CHANGE) Upon Achieving Positive Rate of Climb: - Landing Gear Alternate Release and Landing Gear Alternate Extension Doors - CLOSE FULLY. - Landing Gear Inhibit Switch - NORM. - Landing Gear Selector Lever - UP. Check all gear and door lights and gear selector lever light OUT. NOTE: Should landing gear selector lever be selected UP prior to closing Landing Gear Alternate Release and Landing Gear Alternate Extension Doors and prior to selecting Landing Gear Inhibit Switch to NORMAL, reselect Landing Gear Selector Lever DOWN and accomplish gear retraction as per revised procedure. NOTE: Landing Gear Alternate Release and Landing Gear Alternate Extension Doors and Landing Gear Inhibit Switch are not within reach of captain when secured in left-hand seat in normal flying position. Approach: 1. (CHANGE) Landing Gear Selector Lever - DOWN. - Check 3 green lights ON. - All door and gear unlocked lights OUT. - Selector lever light OUT. - Landing Gear Inhibit Switch - INHIBIT. - Landing Gear Alternate Release Door - OPEN FULLY. - Landing Gear Alternate Extension Door - OPEN FULLY. - Hydraulic Pump Handle - INSERT IN HAND PUMP SOCKET AND OPERATE UNTIL HAND PUMP MOVEMENT BECOMES STIFF. - Hydraulic Pump Handle - STOW. - (ADD) Nosewheel Steering Switch - OFF. Go-around from final approach: 5. (CHANGE) Upon achieving positive rate of climb: - Landing Gear Alternate Release and Landing Gear Alternate Extension Doors - CLOSE FULLY. - Landing Gear Inhibit Switch - NORMAL. - Landing Gear Selector Lever - UP. Check all gear and door lights and gear selector lever light OUT. 3. EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES: Engine Failure or Fire After V1: 2. (CHANGE) Gear retraction procedures as above for go- around from final approach. One Engine Inoperative Approach and Landing: 1. (CHANGE) Landing Gear: If No. 1 Engine Inoperative: - Gear extension procedure as above for approach. If No. 2 Engine Inoperative: - Airspeed - 140 KT IAS MAXIMUM. - Landing Gear Inhibit Switch - INHIBIT. - Landing Gear Selector Lever - DOWN. - Landing Gear Alternate Release Door - OPEN FULLY. - Main Landing Gear Release Handle - PULL FULLY DOWN. - Landing Gear Alternate Extension Door - OPEN FULLY. Insert pump handle in hand pump socket and operate until main landing gear locks down (left and right green lights ON, and left door and right door amber lights ON) and handpump movement becomes stiff. - Nose Gear Alternate Release Handle - PULL FULLY UP. Check nose green light and nose door amber light on. If any of the gear locked down (green) lights fail to illuminate: - Gear Locked Down Indicator Light Switch - ON. Check for illumination of appropriate gear down lock alternate light. - Anti-skid Switch - TEST. - PTU Manual Switch - PTU MANUAL. One Engine Inoperative Approach Climb (Overshoot): 3. (CHANGE) Gear retraction procedure as above for go- around from final approach. 4. PERFORMANCE DATA: (A) Takeoff Distance Required - INCREASE BY TWO PERCENT. (B) Takeoff Run Required - INCREASE BY TWO PERCENT. (C) Accelerate-Stop Distance Required - INCREASE BY TWO PERCENT. B. No later than November 1, 1986, incorporate DHC Modification 8/0567 in accordance with DHC Service Bulletin 8-32-35, dated July 31, 1986. Remove the copy of this directive from the AFM. C. Alternate means of compliance which provide an acceptable level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, New York Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, New England Region. All persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer, may obtain copies upon request to DeHavilland Aircraft of Canada, Ltd., Garrett Boulevard, Downsview, Ontario M3K 1Y5, Canada. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or FAA, New England Region, New York Aircraft Certification Office, 181 South Franklin Avenue, Room 202, Valley Stream, New York. This airworthiness directive becomes effective October 20, 1986, as to all persons except those persons to whom it was made immediately effective by telegraphic AD T86-16-51, issued August 15, 1986.
2005-08-07: The FAA adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Pilatus Aircraft Limited (Pilatus) Models B4-PC11, B4-PC11A, and B4- PC11AF sailplanes. This AD requires you to repetitively inspect the control-column support for cracks and, if any cracks are found, replace the control-column support with a new support. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the airworthiness authority for Switzerland. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct cracks in the control-column support, which could result in failure of the support. This failure could lead to loss of the primary flight control system.
2024-08-02: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain ATR--GIE Avions de Transport R[eacute]gional Model ATR42 and ATR72 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report of an electrical contactor that failed with contacts in the intermediate position, causing the airplane to lose power to multiple electrical systems. This AD requires repetitive operational tests of the affected part, and, depending on findings, accomplishment of applicable corrective action, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.