Results
47-33-04: 47-33-04 BEECH: (Was Service Note 2 of AD-757-2.) Applies to C18S Aircraft. Compliance required prior to October 15, 1947, and each 100 hours of operation thereafter. Inspect gaskets between fuel tank liquidometer units and tanks for fuel leakage. If leakage is evident, replace gasket with Armstrong No. 710 gasket, Beech P/N 189631, without use of sealing compound. (Installation of 189631 gasket eliminates necessity for continued inspections.)
2018-11-04: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Aircraft Industries a.s. Models L 410 UVP-E20 and L 410 UVP-E20 CARGO airplanes. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as un-commanded negative thrust mode activated on an engine. We are issuing this AD to require actions to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2003-17-11: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Rolls-Royce Deutschland Ltd & Co KG (RRD) (formerly Rolls-Royce plc) Dart 528-7E, 529-7H, -7E, -8E, -8H, -8X, -8Y, -8Z, 529D-7E, -7H, -8E, - 8H, -8X, -8Y, -8Z, 531, 532-2L, -7, -7N, -7P, -7L, -7R, 535-2, -7R, 542-4, -4K, -10, -10J, -10K, 552-2, 552-7, and -7R turboprop engines. This AD requires removal of any Sermetel coating (Omat 7/46) from certain high pressure (HP) turbine discs and intermediate pressure (IP) turbine discs, and inspection of discs after coating removal. This AD is prompted by reports of Sermetel coating (Omat 7/46) applied to certain turbine discs which, if allowed to remain on the discs would react adversely with the disc dry film lubricant, and could result in uncontained HP or IP turbine disc failure, resulting in possible damage to the airplane. We are issuing this AD to prevent uncontained HP or IP turbine disc failure, which could result in damage to the airplane.
70-03-01: 70-03-01 HAWKER SIDDELEY: Amdt. 39-928. Applies to Hawker Siddeley Dove Model DH-104 airplanes. Compliance is required within the next 300 landings after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. To prevent fatigue failure of the nose landing gear locking lever and jack attachment lever, replace the existing nose landing gear locking lever and jack attachment lever with Modification 978 levers in accordance with Hawker Siddeley Technical News Sheet Series CT(104) No. 155, Issue 4, dated 29 September 1969, or an FAA-approved equivalent. This amendment becomes effective February 22, 1970.
64-22-03: 64-22-03 PIPER: Amdt. 802 Part 507 Federal Register August 28, 1964. Applies to Models PA-24 and PA-24-250 Aircraft Serial Numbers 24-1 through 24-3284. Compliance required within the next 50 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. To eliminate possible breakage or loosening of the wires leading to the landing gear safety switch with resultant malfunction of the landing gear safety switch accomplish the following: (a) On the left main landing gear, inspect for broken and loose wires and terminals at the connections to the landing gear safety switch. Repair any broken or loose wires and terminals before further flight. (b) Install Piper Kit No. 754475, or FAA approved equivalent, leaving sufficient slack in the wires between the new clamp and the safety switch to prevent pulling of the wires. (Piper Service Letter No. 379, dated July 12, 1962, pertains to this subject.) This directive effective September 28, 1964.
98-08-05: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to certain Industrie Aeronautiche e Meccaniche (I.A.M.) Model Piaggio P-180 airplanes. This AD requires inspecting the main landing gear (MLG) for interference between the MLG drag brace link and the MLG retraction actuator, and modifying this area if interference is found. This AD is the result of mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the airworthiness authority for Italy. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent MLG failure caused by interference between the MLG retraction actuator and the MLG drag brace link, which could result in loss of control of the airplane during landing operations.
2018-11-14: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 767-300 and -300F series airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of fatigue cracking on airplanes with Aviation Partners Boeing winglets installed. This AD requires high frequency eddy current (HFEC) inspections for cracking of the lower outboard wing skin, and repair or modification if necessary. This AD also requires one of three follow-on actions: Repeating the HFEC inspections, modifying certain internal stringers and oversizing and plugging the existing fastener holes of the lower wing, or modifying the external doubler/tripler and doing repetitive post-modification inspections. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
98-07-12: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all Dornier Model 328-100 series airplanes, that currently requires repetitive tightening of the screws and quick-release fasteners on the wing/body fairing panels. This action will continue to require the repetitive tightening of these parts on certain airplanes. This amendment requires the installation of new fastener systems for those panels on certain airplanes and the application of new torque values. Accomplishment of these actions will terminate the requirement for repetitive tightening of the screws and fasteners of those airplanes. In addition, the AD will limit the applicability of the existing AD by removing certain airplanes. This amendment is prompted by the manufacturer s development of new fastener systems that will not vibrate and loosen. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent separation of loosened wing/body fairing panels from the airplane, which, if notcorrected, could lead to structural damage to the horizontal or vertical stabilizer, and potential injury to persons on the ground.
2005-18-06: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD), which applies to all Bombardier Model CL-600-2B19 series airplanes. That AD currently requires revising the airplane flight manual (AFM) to provide the flightcrew with operating limitations and procedures to enable them to maintain controllability of the airplane in the event that aileron control stiffness is encountered during flight. This new AD requires revising the Airworthiness Limitations section of the Instructions of Continued Airworthiness to incorporate certain repetitive tasks for the aileron control system and requires a briefing to advise flightcrews that certain aileron control checks are no longer required. After accomplishing the applicable initial tasks, the existing AFM revisions for the aileron control check may be removed from the AFM. This AD results from the development of terminating actions for the AFM revisions. We are issuing this AD to prevent aileron control stiffness during flight, which could result in reduced or possible loss of controllability of the airplane. DATES: This AD becomes effective October 6, 2005. The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of Canadair Regional Jet Temporary Revision 2B-2068, dated December 13, 2004, listed in the AD as of October 6, 2005. The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of Canadair Regional Jet TR RJ/109-2, dated August 9, 2002, as of October 10, 2002 (67 FR 60117, September 25, 2002).
75-11-10: 75-11-10 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-2218 as amended by Amendment 39-2377 is further amended by Amendment 39-2539. Applies to Douglas Model DC-10-10, -10F, -30, -30F, and -40 Series airplanes, certificated in all categories, with factory serial or fuselage numbers as indicated in the following Douglas Service Bulletins or All Operators Letters or later FAA-approved revisions: \n\n\tPara. (A), below - S/B 52-139, dated April 28, 1975 \n\n\tPara. (B), below - AOL 10-814, dated May 9, 1975 \n\n\tPara. (C), below - S/B 52-140, dated April 30, 1975 \n\n\tPara. (D), below - S/B 52-139, dated April 28, 1975 \n\n\tTo prevent inadvertent opening of Type I passenger doors (most forward left and right doors) accomplish the following: \n\n\t(A)\tCompliance required not later than 48 hours after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished either within 10 days prior to the effective date of this AD, or in accordance with that telegraphic AD dated April 24, 1975, amended April 28, 1975. \n\n\t\t(1)\tConduct the following one-time inspection of the Type I doors: \n\n\t\t\t(a)\tInspect the close (down) lock torque tube spline for damage. Repair or replace, if required. \n\n\t\t\t(b)\tVisually inspect the door close (down) lock and spring for general condition and insure the spring is not riding over the flange of the drive spline. \t \n\n\t\t\t(c)\tFunctionally operate the door to insure that the close (down) lock is properly engaged. \n\n\t\t\t(d)\tInspect the air storage bottle control valve lever to insure that it is in its normal operating (stowed) position. \n\n\t\t(2)\tPrior to each flight, except as provided herein, accomplish the following on the Type I doors: \n\n\t\t\t(a)\tAfter the door is closed, and the inside operating handle is positioned in the neutral position, inspect or check the close (down) lock to insure that it is properly engaged. \n\n\t\t\t(b)\tThe inspection or check required by (A)(2)(a), above, does not have to be accomplished if it can be verified that the door handle has not been disturbed subsequent to the accomplishment of the inspection or check required by (A)(2)(a), above. Any method used to insure that the operating handle has not been disturbed must not interfere with normal and emergency operation of the door. \n\n\t\t\t(c)\tThe inspection or check required by (A)(2)(a), above, does not have to be accomplished if it can be verified during the inspection required by (A)(1), above, that a production P/N ABA8025-1 6 1/2 coil close (down) lock spring is installed, and the conditions inspected in (A)(1), above, are satisfactory. \n\n\t\t\t(d)\tThe flight crew will be advised after the inspection or check required by (A)(2)(a), above, is satisfactorily accomplished. \n\n\t\t\t(e)\tThe inspection or check required by (A)(2)(a), above, does not have to be accomplished, provided: \n\n\t\t\t\t(i)\tThe close (down) lock torque tube spline is reinspected for damage; and repaired or replaced, if required. \n\n\t\t\t\t(ii)\tThere are no less than 3 1/2 coils in the cut-off P/N ABA8025-1 close (down) lock spring. \n\n\t\t\t\t(iii)\tA P/N WBA7003-7 washer is installed at the forward end, and a P/N WBA7003-5 washer is installed at the aft end, of the close (down) lock spring. (Reference Douglas Service Bulletin No. 52-139, dated April 28, 1975). And \n\n\t\t\t\t(iv)\tAfter the P/N WBA7003-5 and -7 washers have been installed, the door is functionally operated to insure that the close (down) lock is properly engaged. \n\n\t\t(3)\tAny inspection must be performed by the holder of a mechanic or repairman certificate, or by a person under the direct supervision of the holder of such certificate. A check may be performed by qualified or trained personnel designated by the operator for the purpose of performing the checks. \n\n\t\t(4)\tOperators shall advise flight crews and cabin attendants of the foregoing procedures by the most immediate and practicable means. \n\n\t(B)\tCompliance required within seven days after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished.Inspect the torque tube close (down) locks on the Type I doors to insure that the P/N ABA8023-1 slide catch and P/N ABA8024-1 stop plate are installed on the left hand door, and the P/N ABA8023-2 slide catch and P/N ABA8024-2 stop plate are installed on the right hand door, in accordance with Douglas All Operators Letter No. 10-814, dated May 9, 1975, or later FAA-approved revisions. \n\n\t(C)\tCompliance required as indicated, unless the modification required by (C)(2) is already accomplished. \n\n\t\t(1)\tWithin the next 1500 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 500 hours' time in service from the last inspection, \n\n\t\t\t(a)\tReinspect the air storage bottle control valve lever (reference (A)(1)(d), above) to insure that it is in its normal operating (stowed) position; or \n\n\t\t\t(b)\tVerify that the door handle has not been disturbed subsequent to the accomplishment of the inspection or check required by (A)(2)(a), above. Any method used to insure that the operating handle has not been disturbed must not interfere with normal and emergency operation of the door. \n\n\t\t(2)\tWithin the next 4500 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, \n\n\t\t\t(a)\tInstall retention springs on the Type I door air storage bottle control valve lever in accordance with Douglas Service Bulletin No. 52-140, dated April 30, 1975, or later FAA-approved revisions; or \n\n\t\t\t(b)\tInstall a new design Type I door air storage bottle control valve in accordance with Douglas Service Bulletin No. 52-154, Revision 1, dated March 1, 1976, or later FAA-approved revisions. \n\n\t(D)\tCompliance required within the next 3000 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. \n\n\t\t(1)\tRemove the Type I door cut-off P/N ABA8025-1 close (down) lock springs and P/N WBA7003-5 and -7 washers, and install production P/N ABA8025-1 6 1/2 coil close (down) lock springs on the torque tube. \n\n\t\t(2)\tFollowing installation of the new springs, recheck the engagement of the close (down) lock, and adjust if required, in accordance with Douglas Service Bulletin No. 52-132, Revision 1, dated February 21, 1975, or later FAA-approved revisions. \n\n\t(E)\tThe Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region, may approve equivalent inspections and installations or alternate design modifications upon submittal of substantiating data. \n\n\t(F)\tAirplanes may be flown to a base for performance of maintenance required by this AD per FAR's 21.197 and 21.199, provided that, with respect to the door(s) identified as in need of maintenance, the emergency evacuation slides or slide/rafts will be either removed or deactivated. \n\n\tThis supersedes the telegraphic AD adopted April 24, 1975, amended April 28, 1975, and distributed by telegrams dated April 24, 1975 and April 28, 1975. \n\n\tAmendment 39-2218 became effective May 30, 1975. \n\n\tAmendment 39-2377 became effective October 14, 1975.This amendment 39-2539 becomes effective March 17, 1976.
64-18-03: 64-18-03 DOUGLAS: Amdt. 790 Part 507 Federal Register August 12, 1964. Applies to model DC-8 Series Aircraft. \n\n\tCompliance required as indicated. \n\n\tThere have been instances in which the emergency airbrake handle shaft became disengaged from the remaining portion of the system. This condition may go undetected until the system use is required, therefore, accomplish the following on airplanes which have not been modified in accordance with Douglas DC-8 Service Bulletin 32-62 dated September 14, 1961, or its production equivalent, or an equivalent approved by the Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. \n\n\t(a)\tWithin 150 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, inspect the emergency airbrake control linkage shaft assembly Douglas P/N 4644428 in accordance with paragraph 2A of Douglas Alert Service Bulletin A32-62, Reissue No. 1 dated October 9, 1961. \n\n\t(b)\tIf it is determined from the inspection that there is insufficient engagement of the emergency airbrake control linkage shaft assembly, modify the system before further flight in accordance with Douglas DC-8 Alert Service Bulletin A32-62, Reissue No. 1 dated October 9, 1961, or Douglas DC-8 Service Bulletin 32-62 dated September 14, 1961, or an equivalent approved by the Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. \n\n\t(c)\tIf it is determined from the inspection that there is sufficient engagement of the emergency airbrake control linkage shaft assembly, or if Douglas DC-8 Alert Service Bulletin A32-62 is used in making the modification in accordance with paragraph (b), reinspect the emergency brake control shaft in accordance with paragraph 2A of Douglas Alert Service Bulletin A32-62, Reissue No. 1 dated October 9, 1961, each time after the glare shield or the panel supporting the emergency airbrake handle is installed or after maintenance is performed behind the instrument panel in the area of the emergency airbrake control linkage shaft assembly. \n\n\t(d)\tThe repetitive inspections required in paragraph (c) may be discontinued when the emergency airbrake control shaft assembly is modified in accordance with Douglas DC-8 Service Bulletin 32-62 dated September 14, 1961, or an equivalent approved by the Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. \n\n\t(Douglas DC-8 Service Bulletin 32-62 dated September 14, 1961, and Douglas DC-8 Alert Service Bulletin A32-62, Reissue No. 1 dated October 9, 1961, apply to this same subject.) \n\n\tThis directive effective August 12, 1964.
2018-11-13: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 787-8 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report of possible degraded bond-line performance of co-bonded upper wing stringer-to-skin joints. This AD requires repetitive inspections of certain upper wing stringers for any disbond and corrective actions, if necessary; and a terminating preventive modification of installing disbond arrestment (DBA) fasteners. This AD also requires revising the inspection or maintenance program to incorporate an airworthiness limitation. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2000-10-23: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 747-100, -200, -300, 747SR, and 747SP series airplanes, that currently requires a one-time inspection to detect cracking of the longeron splice fittings at stringer 11, on the left and right sides at body station 2598, and replacement of any cracked fitting with a new fitting. This amendment reduces the compliance time for accomplishment of the currently required inspection and adds a new requirement for repetitive inspections. This amendment is prompted by reports that fatigue cracking was found on longeron splice fittings. The actions specified by this AD are intended to detect and correct such fatigue cracking, which could result in reduced controllability of the horizontal stabilizer.
98-16-04: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to all Cessna Aircraft Company (Cessna) 180, 182, and 185 series airplanes that have wing extension supplemental type certificate (STC) SA00276NY or supplemental type approval (STA) SA93-136 incorporated. This AD requires inspecting between wing station (W.S.) 90 and W.S. 110 for an angle stiffener at the lower wing spar splice. If the angle stiffener is not installed, this AD requires installing a reinforcing strap. This AD is the result of failed test results revealing that the wings of these Cessna airplanes, without the stiffener, do not meet the applicable design requirements after being modified by the above STC. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent wing failure during flight caused by the absence of an angle stiffener, which could cause loss of control of the airplane.
64-19-02: 64-19-02 DEHAVILLAND: Amdt. 786 Part 507 Federal Register August 7, 1964. Applies to Model 114 Heron Aircraft. Compliance required within 150 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD. As a result of cracking of eye ends used in the rudder and elevator trim tab connecting rod assemblies, accomplish the following unless already accomplished: (a) Remove eye ends, P/Ns CM2A and CM2B, and make the crack test specified in T.N.S. Heron (114) No. CF10 issued February 24, 1964. (b) Replace cracked parts before further flight. (Hawker Siddeley Aviation, deHavilland Division T.N.S. Heron (114) No. CF10 covers this same subject.) This directive effective September 7, 1964.
49-15-03: 49-15-03 BEECH: Applies to All Models C18S and AT-11 Aircraft Equipped With: (1) Nose Fuel Tank or (2) Wing Fuel Tank Vents Which Discharge Below the Wings. Compliance required not later than next annual inspection. As a result of fuel or vapors discharged from fuel tank vents entering the tail wheel well, fuel fumes in hazardous concentrations may collect in the airplane's cockpit and cabin. To preclude this condition, the following must be accomplished: (1) If the airplane is equipped with a nose fuel tank, install adjacent to the fuel tank selector valve a suitable placard which reads "Use Nose Tank for Warm Up -Take-Off on Main Tanks -At Safe Altitude Use Nose Tank." (2) On airplanes with wing tank vents extending below the wing, accomplish either 2(a) or 2(b) or 2(c). (a) Using an adequate tube splice, extend the rear fuel tank vents to a distance of 7 inches below the wing skin. The ends of these vents are to be scarfed at 45 degrees with the scarfed surface facing aft. (b) Relocate the outlet end of each rear tank vent to a point approximately 27 inches outboard of its present position. (c) Install a suitably designed fabric or equivalent fumeproof panel over the opening of fuselage bulkhead No. 12 to act as a draft barrier. (3) If the wing fuel tanks are equipped with two vent systems (one system having the vent outlet below the wing and the other, above) the system with the vent outlet below the wing should be removed from the rear tanks unless item 2 is complied with. (Beech Service Bulletin No. C18-10 dated January 31, 1949 covers this same subject.)
2018-11-11: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus Model A350-941 airplanes. This AD requires a detailed inspection of the four retaining pins in the main landing gear support structure (MLGSS) trunnion block, left- and right-hand sides, and related investigative and corrective actions if necessary. This AD was prompted by a determination that short retaining pins may have been installed at the incorrect location of the MLGSS forward pintle. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2005-17-15: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Turbomeca Arrius 2F turboshaft engines. This AD requires a one-time removal and inspection of the fuel filter-holder assembly to determine that the fuel control unit (FCU) filter is dimensionally correct. The AD also requires updating the Engine Maintenance Manuals to include a dimensional check of the fuel filter-holder assembly every time the FCU filter element is removed from the fuel filter-holder assembly. This AD results from reports of restricted fuel flow caused by a dimensionally incorrect FCU filter. Ground run testing may not detect the fuel flow limitation. We are issuing this AD to detect a dimensionally incorrect FCU filter that could lead to an undetected limitation of fuel flow, limiting the maximum power available in-flight, which could result in the inability to continue safe flight, avoid obstacles or land safely.
2000-22-02 R1: This document corrects information in an existing airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to all Boeing Model 737 series airplanes. That AD supersedes AD 99-05-15, amendment 39-11063, to require revising the FAA-approved Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) procedure in the existing AD to simplify the instructions for correcting a jammed or restricted flight control condition. This document corrects the format for certain AFM material described in that AD. This correction is necessary to ensure that the flightcrew is aware of certain critical recall items in the AFM procedure that are necessary to address a condition involving a jammed or restricted rudder.
64-17-04: 64-17-04 CHAMPION: Amdt. 774 Part 507 Federal Register July 28, 1964. Applies to Model 402 Aircraft. Compliance required as indicated. There have been instances of cracking of exhaust stack extension at the clamp which attaches it to the main exhaust manifold. This allows hot exhaust gases to discharge into the engine compartment. There have also been failures of the exhaust stack extension rear support hanger. To correct this condition, accomplish the following: (a) Before each flight after the effective date of this AD, check by grasping and shaking for movement each exhaust stack extension to determine whether the exhaust stack extension connection to the manifold is loose or the rear support hanger has failed and make an appropriate entry in the aircraft record. The pilot may perform the check set forth in this paragraph. (b) Repair or replace loose or failed components before further flight. (c) Within 25 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, and within every 50 hours' time in service thereafter, accomplish the following: (1) Remove the attachment clamp which attaches the exhaust stack extension to the manifold on the right and left sides of both engines and visually inspect for cracks in the joining area of the exhaust stack extension and the exhaust manifold. Also visually inspect for elongated locating pin holes and for sheared or worn clamp positioning pins. (2) Check the edge distances of the clamp locating pin holes in the manifold. The minimum allowable edge distance is one-half inch. If the edge distance is less than one-half inch, reinstall the exhaust stack extension in accordance with the reinstallation instructions in Champion Service Letter No. 66. (3) Visually inspect stack extension rear support hanger for failure. (4) Replace or repair any failed or worn parts. (d) The repetitive inspections in paragraphs (a) and (c) may be discontinued when an improvedexhaust stack extension attachment clamp and flexible rear stack hangar have been installed on right and left sides of both engines in accordance with Champion Kit No. 224. (Champion Service Letter No. 66 and Champion Kit No. 224 cover this same subject.) This directive effective July 28, 1964. Revised October 15, 1964.
46-17-01: 46-17-01\tNORTH AMERICAN: (Was Mandatory Note 5 of AD-2-575-3.) Applies to Army BC-1A, AT-6, -6A, -6B, -6C; Navy SNJ-2, -3, -4 Aircraft. \n\n\tTo be accomplished prior to original certification or at first periodic inspection thereafter. \n\n\tInspect the universal joint pins in the flap control push-pull tubes, P/N 19-152642, connecting the outer and inner flap for broken pins. Replace all broken pins with new pins and install a close fitting rubber hose over each universal joint to hold in place any pins which may break in the future. \n\n\t(North American Service Bulletin dated March 6, 1947, covers this subject also.)
2018-11-15: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus Model A320-271N airplanes, and Model A321-271N, -271NX, -272N and -272NX airplanes. This AD requires replacing certain full authority digital engine control (FADEC) electronic engine controllers (EECs); or installing software standard FCS4.4 and re-identifying the FADEC EECs. This AD was prompted by a report that, when operated at low speed and high engine thrust, an engine did not restart following a fuel interruption shorter than five seconds. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
99-10-05: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to certain EMBRAER Model EMB-145 series airplanes. This action requires replacement of certain flexible joints and O-rings of the rear fuselage with improved flexible joints and new O-rings. This action also requires installation of new support assemblies to attach to the engine bleed line tubing in the area of the rear fuselage to improve the engine bleed line tubing alignment. This amendment is prompted by issuance of mandatory continuing airworthiness information by a foreign civil airworthiness authority. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent failure of certain flexible joints that attach to the engine bleed lines in the area of the rear fuselage. Failure of these flexible joints could cause damage to the fuel lines leading to the auxiliary power unit, which could result in an increased risk of fire to occur in the rear baggage compartment during flight.
49-11-02: 49-11-02 AERONCA: Applies to Serial Numbers S7AC and 7AC-1 to 7AC-7170, Inclusive; 7BCM-1 to 7BCM-339, Inclusive; 11CC-1 to -150, Inclusive; and All S11AC, 11AC and 11BC Serial Numbers. Compliance required at next periodic inspection but not later than May 1, 1949. To prevent failure of the rear fuselage-wing attachment fitting, reinforcement is to be accomplished by either of the following methods: 1. Cut on both sides of the rear spar fuselage carry through tube, at each end, a vertical slot 1/4 inch long. Insert a 5/8 inch by 0.083 (or heavier wall) 4130 steel, square or round tube having a minimum length of 2 1/2 inches and weld both sides of slot top and bottom of tube. Drill and ream bolt hole 0.250 plus or minus .001. 2. Insert in each rear spar fuselage wing attachment fitting, on both sides of airplane, a 5/8 inch by 0.083 (or heavier wall) 4130 steel tube having a minimum length of 4 5/8 inches. The insert tube should have a 0.250 plus or minus .001hole drilled 9/16 inch from outer end of tube, and reamed prior to installation. Bolt insert tube in fitting, then drill two vertical 0.250 plus or minus .001 holes through the fuselage carry through tube and the insert tube at 3 and 4 inches, respectively, from end of fitting. Four AN 4-11A bolts and AN 365/428 nuts or equivalent are required to bolt in the two insert tubes. 3. Insert through the entire length of the rear spar fuselage carry through tube a 5/8 inch by 0.083 (or heavier wall) 4130 round or square tube. The insert tube should have a hole drilled and reamed 0.250 plus or minus .001, 9/16 inch from each end of the tube to line up with the original bolt holes. The insert tube should be secured to the fuselage carry through tube by means of one AN 4-11A bolt and AN 365-428 nut or equivalent through both tubes anywhere between the longerons (drill and ream 0.250, plus or minus .001) or by welding both ends of the tubes together. Airplanes having the 5/8 inch by .065 reinforcement tube installed prior to the issuance of this revision need not change to the .083 wall tube. (Aeronca Service Helps and Hints No. 43 covers this same subject.) This supersedes AD's 47-50-01 and 49-02-03.
47-49-05: 47-49-05 LOCKHEED: (Was Mandatory Note 38 of AD-763-3.) Applies to All Model 49 Serials Up to and Including 2088. Compliance required prior to February 15, 1948. Replace quick-disconnect fasteners used to attach aileron control cable housing on radio operator's floor (LAC P/N 28717-8) with screws and AN 366F8-32 nut plates. (LAC Service Bulletin 49/SB-300 covers this same subject.)