Results
2014-03-08: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus Model A318, A319, A320, and A321 series airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report that an investigation showed that when a certain combination of a target/proximity sensor serial number is installed on a flap interconnecting strut, a ``target FAR'' signal cannot be detected when it reaches the mechanical end stop of the interconnecting strut. This AD requires an inspection to determine the part number of the interconnecting struts installed on the wings, identifying the part number and the serial number of the associated target and proximity sensor if applicable, and replacing or re-identifying the flap interconnecting strut if applicable. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct a latent failure of the flap down drive disconnection due to an already-failed interconnecting strut sensor, which could result in asymmetric flap panel movement and consequent loss of control of the airplane.
99-19-37: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Bombardier Model DHC-8-100 and -300 series airplanes, that requires replacement of the main landing gear (MLG) uplock actuator on both the left and right MLG with a new redesigned uplock assembly. This amendment is prompted by issuance of mandatory continuing airworthiness information by a foreign civil airworthiness authority. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent failure of the MLG to extend when a "gear down" selection is made.
2010-16-05: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Model 747 airplanes. This AD requires inspecting to verify the part number of the low-pressure flex-hoses of the crew oxygen system installed under the oxygen mask stowage boxes in the flight deck, and replacing the flex-hose with a new non-conductive low-pressure flex- hose if necessary. This AD results from reports of low-pressure flex- hoses of the crew oxygen system that burned through due to inadvertent electrical current from a short circuit in the audio select panel. We are issuing this AD to prevent inadvertent electrical current, which can cause the low-pressure flex-hoses of the crew oxygen system to melt or burn, causing oxygen system leakage and smoke or fire.
2014-03-10: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for various restricted category helicopters, originally manufactured by Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. (Bell), model numbers HH-1K, TH-1F, TH-1L, UH- 1A, UH-1B, UH-1E, UH-1F, UH-1H, UH-1L, and UH-1P. This AD requires inspecting the tail rotor (T/R) cable assembly for an incorrectly machined body. This AD is prompted by a report from Bell that a defective body on the cable prevents the barrel assembly from fully engaging in the body cavity. These actions are intended to prevent disengagement of the cable from the barrel, failure of the T/R pitch control, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
2010-15-08: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD), which applies to all Model 737-100, -200, -200C, -300, -400, and -500 series airplanes. That AD currently requires repetitive inspections to find cracks, fractures, or corrosion of each carriage spindle of the left and right outboard mid-flaps, and corrective action if necessary. That AD also currently requires repetitive gap checks of the inboard and outboard carriage of the outboard mid-flaps to detect fractured carriage spindles, and corrective actions if necessary. This new AD requires any new or serviceable carriage spindle installed per the requirements of the existing AD to meet minimum allowable diameter measurements taken at three locations. This AD also requires new repetitive inspections, measurements, and overhaul of the carriage spindles, and applicable corrective actions. In addition, this AD requires replacing any carriage spindle when it has reached its maximum life limit. This AD results from reports of fractures that resulted from stress corrosion and pitting along the length of the spindle and spindle diameter, and additional reports of corrosion on the outboard flap carriage spindles. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct cracked, corroded, or fractured carriage spindles, and to prevent severe flap asymmetry, which could result in reduced control or loss of controllability of the airplane.
2006-04-03: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all Airbus Model A330-200 and -300 series airplanes, Model A340-200 and -300 series airplanes, and Model 340-541 and -642 airplanes. This AD requires identifying the part number of the emergency evacuation slides or slide rafts installed on Type "A" exit doors, and modifying the regulator valves of the slide and slide raft assemblies if necessary. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent failure of an emergency evacuation slide raft to deploy and inflate during an emergency situation, which could impede an evacuation and result in injury to passengers or crewmembers. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
68-16-02: 68-16-02 SIAI-MARCHETTI: Amdt. 39-628. Applies to Model S.205/22R airplanes - Serial Nos. 213, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 379, 380, 381, 382, and 384. Compliance required within the next 200 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. To provide a position indicating means for the main landing gear, install a Burgess MK4BR microswitch on the right and left wing in accordance with Siai-Marchetti Service Bulletin No. 205B5A, dated April 11, 1968, or later RAI-approved issue, or an FAA-approved equivalent. This amendment becomes effective September 7, 1968.
99-19-34: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Bombardier Model DHC-8-100 and -300 series airplanes, that requires modification of certain hydraulic systems that provide hydraulic pressure for the control of the rudder and for the main landing gear brakes. This amendment is prompted by issuance of mandatory continuing airworthiness information by a foreign civil airworthiness authority. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent damage to certain hydraulic system components in the number 2 engine nacelle, which could result in loss of the number 1 and number 2 hydraulic systems, and consequent reduced controllability of the airplane.
52-15-02: 52-15-02 MARTIN: Applies to All Models 202 Airplanes With Hamilton Standard Reversing Propeller Installations. I. Prior to reactivation of the reversing feature of the propellers: A. Modify the following terminal strips and pin connector assemblies as specified in items 1 and 2 of Attachment A (see AD 52-13-02 Lockheed): (1) Terminal strip at nacelle firewall junction box. (2) Terminal strip at center wing panel. (3) Terminal strip at fuselage Section 225. (4) Terminal strip at nose junction box. (5) 19 pin connector assembly at the propeller control relay box. B. Modify Hamilton Standard propeller reversing relay box at the front of the control pedestal to shield the reversing solenoid circuit relay contacts, etc., from all other circuits which are energized at any time except when reversing is desired. Reversing relay boxes which have separate pin connectors for the reversing solenoid wire and the remaining circuits, shall beso installed that it is not possible inadvertently to interchange any connectors on the two relay boxes. C. Rewire the feathering button circuit so that the wire from the feathering button to the fixed terminal for the auxiliary pump on the "A" relay is not energized when feathering is being accomplished and so that the hold in coil on the feathering button is inoperative during unfeathering. Isolate reversing circuit relay contacts in the propeller control relay box in a manner equivalent to the change specified in item I.B. Protect the exposed relay terminals as specified in items 3. of Attachment A. D. Modify the reversing solenoid circuit wiring in accordance with item 4. of Attachment A. E. Revise the reversing circuits to comply with Hamilton Standard Service Bulletin No. 236. F. In order to prevent reversing of a normally operating propeller when unfeathering the other propeller: If the reversing solenoid circuits for the two propellers are adjacent toeach other in any connectors, at terminal strips, in wire bundles, or any other points where contact may occur between the two circuits due to a fault, isolate the two circuits from each other as specified in Attachment A and observe the maintenance practices in item II.A. G. The "reverse operable" warning device shall be clearly visible when the lock is open just a sufficient amount to permit moving the throttles into the reverse regime. It shall not be possible for the flap to catch on its track or on the control pedestal and remain held in the up position. H. Incorporate throttle pedestal cover plate No. 2021A19719 which has a steel track to prevent lifting the throttles before they reach the idle position. I. If an alternate manually controllable ground circuit is installed to permit unfeathering in case of an open blade switch circuit, the alternate circuit shall be removed. J. Increase the height of the throttle quadrant stop at the positive idle positionso that a lift of at least 1/4-inch is required to lift the pin over the stop. II. Maintenance practices (to be instituted when reversing is reactivated): A. At each nearest scheduled service to 350 hours: (1) Inspect all points specified in I.A.(1) through I.A.(4) unless the modifications made to the system conform to item 1(a) or 1(b) of Attachment A. Perform an electrical check of the reverse safety switches in the pedestal assembly to assure that the switch is open when the throttles are moved forward out of the reverse position, unless it is shown that failure of any of the reverse safety switches to open will be clearly apparent to the flight crew by reason of improper operation of the propeller control system. Because of the many technical considerations involved, analyses showing that the objective of this revision has been accomplished should be referred to the FAA for engineering evaluation and approval. B. At any time that an electrical faultoccurs in a circuit which is carried in the same bundles or the same conduits as the reversing solenoid circuit, representative terminal points in the faulty circuit are to be inspected to determine whether any damage may have occurred within the bundles or conduit. If there is evidence of possible damage, all the wiring involved is to be removed and inspected. Damaged wiring is to be replaced as necessary. III. Operating instructions: (comply with item 5 of Attachment A.) IV. (Note: Propeller governor design changes which are under development and whose purpose is to provide a high pressure hydraulic circuit bypass to safeguard against inadvertent reversing and to provide ability to feather even when the reversing solenoid is energized are still under consideration and may be the subject of a future directive.)
86-23-04: 86-23-04 FOKKER B.V.: Amendment 39-5459. Applies to Model F27 airplanes; serial numbers 10105 to 10648 inclusive, 10654, 10658, 10659, 10660, 10662 to 10667 inclusive, 10669, 10672 and 10678; certificated in any category. To ensure structural integrity of the elevator trim tab, accomplish the following, unless already accomplished: A. Within 60 days after the effective date of this AD, conduct a one-time visual inspection of the elevator trim tab in accordance with Fokker Service Bulletin F27/55-59, Revision 1, dated October 15, 1985. B. If incorrect rivets are installed, repair the tab before further flight in accordance with the above service bulletin. C. An alternate means of compliance or adjustment of compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. D. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of inspections and/or modifications required by this AD. All persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service document from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to the Manager of Maintenance and Engineering, Fokker B.V., Product Support, P.O. Box 7600, 11172J Schiphol Oost, the Netherlands. This document may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or at the Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. This amendment becomes effective December 10, 1986.