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92-27-21: 92-27-21 BELL HELICOPTER TEXTRON, INC. (BHTI): Amendment 39-8575. Docket Number 92-ASW-45. Applicability: Model 205A-1 and 205B series helicopters, with increased diameter tail rotor drive shaft (drive shaft), P/N 204-040-620-011, installed, certificated in any category. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. To prevent failure of the drive shaft, loss of tail rotor control, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter, accomplish the following: (a) Within 25 hours' time-in-service after the effective date of this AD: (1) Conduct a one-time inspection of the helicopter and the drive shaft in accordance with paragraphs 1 through 4 of the Accomplishment Instructions of BHTI Alert Service Bulletin (ASB) 205-92-49, dated October 5, 1992, for BHTI Model 205A-1 helicopters, and ASB 205B-92-13, dated October 5, 1992, for BHTI Model 205B helicopters. (2) Reassemble the tail rotor drive shaft assembly in accordance with paragraph 5 of the pertinent ASB to ensure a minimum of 0.50 inch clearance is obtained between the tail rotor drive shaft tunnel (drive shaft tunnel) and the drive shaft. (b) Each time the starter generator is installed after maintenance, ensure a minimum of 0.50 inch clearance is maintained between the drive shaft tunnel and the drive shaft. Adjust the position of the drive shaft tunnel in accordance with paragraph 5 of the pertinent ASB to obtain proper clearance. (c) Remove unairworthy parts found during the inspection required in paragraph (a) and replace with airworthy parts before further flight. (d) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Rotorcraft Certification Office, FAA, Rotorcraft Directorate, Fort Worth, Texas 76193-0170. Operators shall submit their requests through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Rotorcraft Certification Office. NOTE: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Rotorcraft Certification Office. (e) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the helicopter to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. (f) The inspection, removal, and replacement, if necessary, and reassembly shall be done in accordance with the applicable BHTI ASB 205-92-49 or 205B-92-13, both dated October 5, 1992. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. Copies may be obtained from Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., P.O. Box 482, Fort Worth, Texas 76101. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel, 4400 Blue Mound Road, bldg. 3B, room 158, Fort Worth, Texas; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC. (g) This amendment becomes effective on July 7, 1993, to all persons except those persons to whom it was made immediately effective by Priority Letter AD 92-27-21, issued January 7, 1993, which contained the requirements of this amendment.
2022-12-01: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Bombardier, Inc., Model BD-700-1A10 and BD-700-1A11 airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of oxygen leaks caused by cracked, brittle, or broken oxygen hoses that were found during scheduled maintenance tests of the airplane oxygen system. This AD requires an inspection of the oxygen hose assembly to determine if an affected part number is installed, and replacement of affected oxygen hoses. For certain airplanes, this AD allows repetitive testing of the oxygen system until affected hoses are replaced. This AD also prohibits installation of an affected oxygen hose. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
99-06-16: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to CFM International CFM56-5 series turbofan engines, that reduces the low cycle fatigue (LCF) retirement lives for certain high pressure turbine rotor (HPTR) front air seals, and provides a drawdown schedule for those affected parts with reduced LCF retirement lives. This amendment is prompted by results of a refined life analysis performed by the manufacturer that revealed minimum calculated LCF lives significantly lower than the published LCF retirement lives. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent a LCF failure of the HPTR front air seal, which could result in an uncontained engine failure and damage to the aircraft.
99-06-07: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all Short Brothers Model SD3-60 and SD3-60 SHERPA series airplanes, that requires repetitive inspections to detect corrosion and/or wear of the top and bottom shear decks of the left and right stub wings in the area of the forward pintle pin of the main landing gear (MLG), and repair, if necessary. This amendment is prompted by issuance of mandatory continuing airworthiness information by a foreign civil airworthiness authority. The actions specified by this AD are intended to detect and correct corrosion and/or wear of the top and bottom shear decks of the left and right stub wings in the area of the forward pintle pin of the MLG, which could result in failure of the MLG to extend or retract.
2013-17-05: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Bombardier, Inc. Model CL-600-2C10 (Regional Jet Series 700, 701, & 702) airplanes, Model CL-600-2D15 (Regional Jet Series 705) airplanes, Model CL-600-2D24 (Regional Jet Series 900) airplanes, and Model CL- 600-2E25 (Regional Jet Series 1000) airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of erratic pitch movement and oscillatory behaviors of the elevator control system. This AD requires repetitive replacement of the bellcrank supports on the inner rear spar of the horizontal stabilizer with new, improved bellcrank supports. We are issuing this AD to prevent erratic pitch movement and transient accelerations, which could result in a significant pitch upset, and injuries to passengers and flightcrew.
99-06-05: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to certain Pilatus Aircraft Ltd. (Pilatus) Models PC-12 and PC-12/45 airplanes. This AD requires removing the "Alternate Flap System" from the airplane flight controls and inserting a temporary revision that specifies this change in SECTION 2 - LIMITATIONS of the PC-12 Pilot's Operating Handbook. This AD is the result of mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the airworthiness authority for Switzerland. The actions specified by this AD are intended to preclude improper use of the "Alternate Flap System", which could result in flap asymmetry with consequent reduced or loss of control of the airplane.
83-02-51: 83-02-51 BELL HELICOPTER TEXTRON, INC: Amendment 39-4842. Applies to Bell Helicopter Textron Models 222 and 222B helicopters certified in all categories equipped with main rotor controls walking beam assembly Part Numbers 222-010-415-5 and -9. Note that the -5 assembly contains a -7 detail beam and the -9 assembly contains a -11 detail beam. Beam assemblies may be identified in the area of their serial numbers by their detail numbers instead of their assembly numbers. The -7 and -11 details are included in this AD. (Airworthiness Docket No. 83-ASW-6.) Compliance is required as indicated (unless already accomplished). To prevent failure of the walking beam, accomplish the following: (a) Before further flight, remove and inspect walking beam assemblies Serial Numbers VN07-1O7 through VN07-140, VN06-057, VN06-060, VN06-061, VNO6-065, VN06- 069, VN06-089 through VN06-092, VN06-095, VN06-096, VNO6-100, EA-004, and EA-008 as follows: (1) Remove all grease fittings from the walking beam. (2) Using a magnifying glass of at least 10-power magnification and a bright light, inspect each one of the threaded holes from which the grease fittings were removed for evidence of corrosion, trapped foreign material, or thread indentations caused by foreign material having been trapped between the grease fittings and the threads. Of special interest is the presence of shot-peening residue. This residue will have the appearance of small round balls similar to shotgun pellets. These balls may be as small as 0.012 inch in diameter and are difficult to see unless a magnifying glass and bright light are used. (3) If any of the above defects are present, remove the part from service and replace it with a serviceable part. (4) If no defects are found, reinstall the grease fittings with wet zinc chromate primer on the threads. (b) Before further flight and prior to the first flight of each day, conduct the following inspections of all walking beam assembly Part Numbers 222-010-415-5 and -9, regardless of serial number, with emphasis on the area around the grease fittings in the portion of the beams through which the drive links are attached by bolts part number 20-057-9-95D. Remove cracked parts from service before further flight and replace with serviceable parts. (c) Within 10 hours time in service following the effective date of this AD, and each 25 hours thereafter, conduct a dye penetrant inspection of a 2-inch diameter area around the grease fittings described in paragraph (b) above. The area shall be prepared for penetrant inspection by thorough cleaning using Stoddard solvent or equivalent. Do not use methyl-ethyl- ketone (MEK) or paint stripper. Remove cracked parts from service before further flight and replace with serviceable parts. NOTE: Bell Alert Service Bulletin (ASB) 222-83-18 is an equivalent means of compliance with paragraph (b) of this AD. The inspections required in paragraph (b) maybe performed with the parts installed on the helicopter. Any other equivalent means of compliance with this AD must be approved by the Manager, Helicopter Certification Branch, Federal Aviation Administration, Southwest Region. (d) The helicopter may be flown to a repair base for the above inspections under the provisions of FAR 21.197. This amendment becomes effective May 15, 1984, as to all persons except those to whom it was made immediately effective by telegraphic AD T83-O2-51 issued January 21, 1983, which contained this amendment.
73-23-06: 73-23-06 BEECH: Amdt. 39-1745. Applies to all Models A23-19, 19A, M19A and B19 (S/Ns MB-1 thru MB-557); and all Models 23, B23, and C23 (S/Ns M-1 thru M-554, M-1095 thru M-1415, M-1419, M-1423, M-1439 and M-1447) airplanes, having the vernier-type throttle control. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To prevent throttle control actuating cable failure and loss of proper adjustment of the throttle control system, within 100 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, accomplish the following: A) Inspect the throttle control cable in accordance with the following procedures: 1. Remove the engine cowling, disconnect the throttle control cable from the carburetor throttle arm, and remove the carburetor from the engine. 2. Move the throttle control through its full travel several times and check by feel for binding or roughness. 3. Lock the cockpit throttle control in the full forward position and apply approximately 50 lbs. pressure at the throttle cable rod end in a direction to force the control cable back into the housing. While this pressure is applied, mark the throttle control cable at the end of the housing. 4. Apply a pulling force of approximately 50 lbs. to the cable rod end and while this force is applied place another mark on the throttle control cable at the end of the housing. 5. If the throttle lock gives under either loading condition specified in Paragraphs A(3) and A(4) or if binding or roughness is evident during operation of the throttle control or if the distance between the marks made on the control cable in accordance with Paragraphs A(3) and A(4) is .25 inch or more, prior to further flight, replace the throttle control assembly with an airworthy assembly. B) Replace the carburetor throttle shaft and stop arm assembly and throttle lever with either Marvel Schebler P/Ns 13-1521 and 12-B57 respectively and Marvel Schebler P/N 81- 311 nut if a MarvelSchebler Model MA-3-SPA carburetor is installed on the engine or Marvel Schebler P/Ns 13-1526 and 12-B56 respectively and Marvel Schebler P/N 81-311 nut if a Marvel Schebler Model HA-6 carburetor is installed on the engine. NOTE: The Marvel Schebler carburetor modifications should be accomplished in accordance with instructions contained in the current Marvel Schebler Overhaul Manual. C) Reinstall the carburetor and rig the throttle control cable to the throttle arm leaving a 1/16 inch cushion in the full throttle position as shown in Section 3 of Beechcraft Models 19, 23, and 24 Series Shop Manual, tighten Marvel Schebler P/N 81-311 nut to 25/60 in. lbs. torque and safety with a cotter pin. D) Any equivalent methods of compliance with this AD must be approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Central Region. Beechcraft Service Instructions No. 0589-159 or later FAA-approved revisions covers this subject. This amendment becomes effectiveNovember 19, 1973.
2013-15-13: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all The Boeing Company Model 757 airplanes. This AD was prompted by two in- service occurrences on Model 737-400 airplanes of total loss of boost pump pressure of the fuel feed system, followed by loss of fuel system suction feed capability on one engine, and in-flight shutdown of the engine. This AD requires repetitive operational tests of the engine fuel suction feed of the fuel system, and corrective actions if necessary. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct loss of the engine fuel suction feed capability of the fuel system, which, in the event of total loss of the fuel boost pumps, could result in dual engine flameout, inability to restart the engines, and consequent forced landing of the airplane.
2010-14-05: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Seven cases of on-ground hydraulic accumulator screw cap or end cap failure have been experienced on CL-600-2B19 (CRJ) aircraft, resulting in loss of the associated hydraulic system and high-energy impact damage to adjacent systems and structure. * * * * * * * * A detailed analysis of the systems and structure in the potential line of trajectory of a failed screw cap/end cap for each accumulator * * * has been conducted. It has been identified that the worst case scenario would be failure of one of the brake accumulator screw caps/end caps, resulting in impact damage causing loss of both hydraulic systems No. 2 and No. 3, with consequent loss of both braking and nose wheel steering and the potential for a runway excursion [resulting in damage to the airplane and hazards to persons or property on the ground]. * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.