Results
2014-05-07: We are superseding airworthiness directive (AD) 2010-11-51 for Eurocopter France (Eurocopter) Model AS350B, BA, B1, B2, C, D, and D1 helicopters and Model AS355E, F, F1, F2, and N helicopters with certain part-numbered tail gearbox (TGB) control levers installed. AD 2010-11- 51 required repetitive visual inspections of the TGB control lever for a crack and replacing a cracked TGB control lever with an airworthy TGB control lever. This new AD retains the requirements of AD 2010-11-51 and also requires inspecting other areas of the TGB control lever not previously inspected and at additional inspection intervals. This AD was prompted by several reports of cracking in a TGB control lever. The actions of this AD are intended to prevent failure of the TGB control lever, loss of tail rotor control, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
2014-04-13: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Agusta S.p.A. (Agusta) Model AB412 and AB412 EP helicopters. This AD requires inspecting the tail rotor (T/R) blade for a crack, corrosion, nick, scratch, dent, or other damage and replacing or repairing the blade, depending on the damage. This AD is prompted by reports of T/R blade failures caused by fatigue cracking that originated from surface damage. These actions are intended to prevent failure of the T/R blade and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
2014-05-05: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 777 airplanes. This AD requires, for certain airplanes, replacing radio altimeter transceivers with upgraded units, and, for all airplanes, replacing low range radio altimeter antennas with new antennas. This AD was prompted by operator reports of erratic low range radio altimeter (LRRA) operation while the airplane is airborne. We are issuing this AD to prevent adverse system responses and flight deck effects that could result in loss of controllability of the airplane or landing short of the runway during landing.
2021-05-02: The FAA is removing Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2021-05-02, which applied to all Airbus Helicopters Model AS350B, AS350BA, AS350B1, AS350B2, AS350B3, AS350C, and AS350D helicopters; Model AS355E, AS355F, AS355F1, AS355F2, AS355N, and AS355NP helicopters; and Model EC130B4 and EC130T2 helicopters. AD 2021-05-02 required determining whether the helicopter has been operated in a severe environment since the last inspection of the main rotor hub-to-mast attachment screws, an inspection of the main rotor hub-to-mast attachment screws if the helicopter has been operated in a severe environment, and replacement of the main rotor hub-to-mast attachment screws if necessary, as specified in a European Aviation Safety Agency (now European Union Aviation Safety Agency) (EASA) AD, which was incorporated by reference. Since the FAA issued AD 2021-05- 02, reported inspection results and further investigation have confirmed that the report of failed main rotor hub-to-mast attachment screws, which prompted AD 2021-05-02, was an isolated case which resulted from a maintenance mistake. Therefore, the FAA has determined that no unsafe condition is likely to exist or develop on the main rotor hub-to-mast attachment screws on other helicopters in the fleet. Accordingly, AD 2021-05-02 is removed.
92-19-10: 92-19-10 BOEING: Amendment 39-8368. Docket No. 92-NM-23-AD. Supersedes AD 90-20-08, Amendment 39-6742.\n\n\tApplicability: Model 727-100 and -100C series airplanes, certificated in any category.\n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously.\n\n\tTo prevent degradation of the skin panel structural integrity, which could lead to depressurization of the cabin, accomplish the following:\n\n\t(a)\tFor Model 727-100 and -100C series airplanes, having line position 001 through 547: Within 15 months after October 23, 1990 (the effective date of AD 90-20-08, amendment 39-6742), conduct an internal and external close visual inspection for corrosion of the skin panels, doublers, and triplers located between body stations (BS) 950 and BS 1183 and stringers S-26L and S-26R. Perform the inspections in accordance with Parts II.A. and II.B. of Boeing Service Bulletin 727-53-0085, Revision 3, dated September 28, 1989, or Revision 4, dated July 11, 1991. Repeat the external inspection at intervals not to exceed 15 months. Repeat the internal inspection and apply corrosion inhibitor at intervals not to exceed 36 months.\n\n\t(b)\tFor all Model 727-100 and -100C series airplanes, having line position 548 or subsequent: Within 15 months after the effective date of this AD, conduct an internal and external close visual inspection for corrosion of the skin panels, doublers, and triplers located between BS 950 and BS 1183 and stringers S-26L and S-26R. Perform the inspections in accordance with Parts II.A. and II.B. of Boeing Service Bulletin 727-53-0085, Revision 4, dated July 11, 1991. Repeat the external inspection at intervals not to exceed 15 months. Repeat the internal inspection and apply corrosion inhibitor at intervals not to exceed 36 months.\n\n\t(c)\tIf no corrosion or minor corrosion, as defined in Part II.A.2. of Boeing Service Bulletin 727-53-0085, Revision 3, dated September 28, 1989; or Revision 4, dated July 11, 1991, is detected as a result of any inspection required by paragraphs (a) or (b) of this AD, prior to further flight, accomplish the procedures specified in paragraph (c)(1) or (c)(2) of this AD, as applicable:\n\n\t\t(1)\tFor each internal close visual inspection conducted in accordance with paragraph (a) or (b) of this AD, perform an internal ultrasonic inspection for voids in accordance with Part II.C.2. of the applicable service bulletin. If voids or minor corrosion are detected, perform a Low Frequency Eddy Current (LFEC) inspection to determine the amount of material loss, in accordance with Part II.D. of the applicable service bulletin.\n\n\t\t(2)\tFor each external close visual inspection conducted in accordance with paragraph (a) or (b) of this AD, perform an external ultrasonic inspection for voids in accordance with Part II.C.3. of the applicable service bulletin. If voids or minor corrosion are detected, perform a LFEC inspection to determine the amount of material loss, in accordance with Part II.D. ofthe applicable service bulletin.\n\n\t(d)\tIf major corrosion, as defined in Parts II.A.3. or II.B. of Boeing Service Bulletin 727-53-0085, Revision 3, dated September 28, 1989, or Revision 4, dated July 11, 1991, is detected as a result of any inspection required by paragraphs (a) or (b) of this AD; or if material loss is 10 percent or more of the skin, doubler, or tripler thickness; prior to further flight, repair or replace the affected skin panel in accordance with Parts V. or VI. of the applicable service bulletin.\n\n\t(e)\tIf material loss is less than 10 percent of the skin, doubler, or tripler, and voids are present, prior to further flight, repair in accordance with Part III.B., III.D., IV.B., V., or VI. of Boeing Service Bulletin 727-53-0085, Revision 3, dated September 28, 1989; or Part VI.B., III.C., IV.B., V., or VI. of Revision 4, dated July 11, 1991.\n\n\t(f)\tFor repairs made in accordance with Part III. or IV. of the service bulletin, within 15 months after the repair is made, perform a LFEC inspection to determine corrosion progression, in accordance with Part II.D. of Boeing Service Bulletin 727-53-0085, Revision 3, dated September 28, 1989; or Revision 4, dated July 11, 1991. Repeat the inspections at intervals not to exceed 15 months.\n\n\t(g)\tBlind fasteners installed in accordance with Part IV. of Boeing Service Bulletin 727-53-0085, Revision 3, dated September 28, 1989; or Revision 4, dated July 11, 1991, are to be used as an interim repair only. The blind fasteners have a life limit of 10,000 landings before they must be replaced with solid fasteners in accordance with Part IV. of the service bulletin.\n\n\t\t(1)\tThe blind fasteners must be inspected for loose or missing fasteners after accumulating 3,000 landings since installation or 1,000 landings after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 3,000 landings.\n\n\t\t(2)\tBlind fasteners installed prior to the effective date of this AD must be replaced prior to accumulating 10,000 landings or within 3,000 landings after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later.\n\n\t(h)\tReplacement of the skin panels with an unbonded skin panel in accordance with Part II. of Boeing Service Bulletin 727-53-85, Revision 2, dated July 3, 1975; Part VI. Boeing Service Bulletin 727-53-0085, Revision 3, dated September 28, 1989; or Revision 4, dated July 11, 1991; constitutes terminating action for the inspection requirements of this AD for those panels.\n\n\t(i)\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Seattle ACO.\n\n\tNOTE: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Seattle ACO.\n\n\t(j)\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished.\n\n\t(k)\tThe inspections, repair, and replacement shall be done in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 727-53-85, Revision 2, dated July 3, 1975; Boeing Service Bulletin 727-53-0085, Revision 3, dated September 28, 1989; or Boeing Service Bulletin 727-53-0085, Revision 4, dated July 11, 1991; as applicable. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW.,suite 700, Washington, DC.\n\n\t(l)\tThis amendment becomes effective on November 20, 1992.
2014-03-15: We are superseding airworthiness directive (AD) 2008-14- [[Page 12371]] 16 for certain 328 Support Services GmbH (Type Certificate Previously Held by AvCraft Aerospace GmbH; Fairchild Dornier GmbH; Dornier Luftfahrt GmbH) Model 328-100 and 328-300 airplanes. AD 2008-14-16 required installing warning placards on the inside of the passenger door and service doors and modifying the hinge supports and support struts of the passenger doors. This new AD continues to require the actions required by AD 2008-14-16 and also requires replacing the fasteners which were installed as part of the modification with new fasteners of the correct length, adds new airplanes, and removes one airplane. This AD was prompted by reports that certain fasteners, which were installed as part of the modification, are the wrong length. We are issuing this AD to prevent incidents of inadvertent opening and possible detachment of a passenger door in-flight, resulting in damage to airframe and systemsand loss of control of the airplane.
2014-03-04: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Bombardier, Inc. Model DHC-8-400 series airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report of a translating door handle jamming during opening of an aft door. This AD requires replacing the handle shaft with a new single-piece machined handle shaft on the aft entry and service doors, and requires revising the maintenance program by incorporating a new airworthiness limitation task. We are issuing this AD to prevent a migrated pin from jamming a translating door handle, which could prevent opening of the door and impede an emergency evacuation.
70-16-07: 70-16-07 HUGHES: Amendment 39-1059. Applies to Model 369 Series helicopters, certificated in all categories, which incorporate P/N 369A1100 and P/N 369A1100-501 main rotor blade serial numbers listed in Hughes Service Information Notice No. HN-8, dated November 19, 1969, or later FAA approved revision and serial numbers listed in OH-6A Information Notice Numbers, 120, 120A, and 120B dated October 24, 1969; November 5, 1969; and December 19, 1969, respectively. Compliance required as indicated: To prevent failure of the main rotor blade P/N 369A1100 and P/N 369A1100-501 accomplish the following or an equivalent inspection procedure approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region: Within 25 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, determine the identification notation on the blade top and bottom doublers in accordance with the procedures in Part I a, b, and c of Hughes Service Information Notice No. HN-8, dated November 19, 1969, or later FAA approved revision. (a) For blades displaying "PR-12" ink stamps or blades lacking ink stamps below the part number on either of the doublers: (1) Inspect prior to further flight in accordance with Part I d of Hughes Service Information Notice No. HN-8, above. (2) If indications of cracks or doubler peeling or separation are found, remove the blade from service prior to further flight. (3) If indications of cracks or doubler peeling or separation are not found, repeat the inspection required under (1) above, at periods not to exceed 25 hours time in service from the last inspection until the blades are removed from service as specified in (4), below. (4) Remove from service prior to the accumulation of 100 hours time in service from the effective date of this AD. (b) Blades displaying ink stamp letters and numerals other than "PR-12" below the part number on both doublers may be returned to service with no further inspection, following refinishing and identification per Hughes Service Information Notice No. HN-8, dated November 19, 1969, or later FAA approved revision. This amendment becomes effective August 8, 1970.
91-09-12: 91-09-12 BOEING: Amendment 39-6976. Docket No. 90-NM-245-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: All Model 737-300, 737-400, and 737-500 series airplanes, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required within the next 36 months after the effective date of this AD, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo preclude cross connection of the engine fire extinguishing wiring and plumbing during maintenance, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tFor airplanes listed in Boeing Service Bulletin 737-26-1067, dated June 28, 1990: Modify the engine fire extinguishing system wiring and plumbing in accordance with the service bulletin. Accomplishment of this modification constitutes terminating action for the repetitive inspections and functional tests required by Airworthiness Directive 89-03-51, Amendment 39-6213, on Boeing Model 737-300, 737-400, and 737-500 airplanes following maintenance on the engine fire extinguishing wiring and plumbing. \n\n\tB.\tFor airplanes line position 1890 and subsequent on which PRR 34774 or an equivalent modification was incorporated during production: The repetitive inspections and functional tests required by Airworthiness Directive 89-03-51, Amendment 39-6213, are terminated. \n\n\tC.\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. \n\n\tNOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Seattle ACO.\n \n\tD.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington. \n\n\tThis amendment (39-6976, AD 91-09-12) becomes effective on May 28, 1991.
2014-04-11: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Airbus Helicopters Model AS350B, BA, B1, B2, B3, and D, and Model AS355E, F, F1, F2, and N helicopters with certain tail rotor (T/R) blades. This AD requires installing additional rivets to secure each T/R blade trailing edge tab (tab), and inspecting for evidence of debonding of the tab after the rivets are installed. This AD was prompted by reports of T/R blade tab debonding. The actions of this AD are intended to prevent loss of a T/R blade tab, which could result in excessive vibration and loss of control of the helicopter.
2014-05-02: We are superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2002-10-11, which applied to certain The Boeing Company Model 737-100, -200, -200C, -300, -400, and -500 series airplanes. AD 2002-10-11 required repetitive inspections for cracking and corrosion of the aft pressure bulkhead, and corrective actions if necessary; and, for certain airplanes, enlargement of frame chord drain holes, and repetitive inspections of the frame chord drain path for debris, and corrective actions if necessary. This new AD specifies a drain path inspection for all airplanes. For certain airplanes, this new AD reduces the repetitive inspection interval; and adds repetitive inspections of the frame chord drain path for obstructions and debris, and corrective actions if necessary. This AD was prompted by three reports of severe corrosion in the area affected by AD 2002-10-11. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct corrosion or cracking of the aft pressure bulkhead, which could result in loss of the aft pressure bulkhead web and stiffeners, and consequent rapid decompression of the airplane.
2014-03-01: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Agusta S.p.A. (Agusta) Model AB139 and AW139 helicopters with a certain wire strike protection system (WSPS) top cable cutter assembly installed. This AD requires reworking or replacing the top cable cutter assembly to increase clearance between the WSPS and the main rotor (M/R) blades and requires that the reworked or replaced part be marked at the end of the part number to reflect the field modification. This AD was prompted by a report of in-flight contact between the top cable-cutter assembly and two M/R blades. The actions of this AD are intended to prevent damage to the M/R blades and subsequent loss of helicopter control.
91-15-22: 91-15-22 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-7087. Docket No. 91-NM-18-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: McDonnell Douglas Model DC-10-40 series airplanes, as listed in McDonnell Douglas Service Bulletin 71-154, dated January 18, 1991, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent fuel line and engine fuel shutoff cable damage and possible fire caused by an uncontained engine failure, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tWithin one year after the effective date of this AD, replace the fuel line shield on the left side of the number 2 engine bellmouth panel, and install an additional plate, as applicable, in accordance with the accomplishment instructions of McDonnell Douglas DC-10 Service Bulletin 71-154, dated January 18, 1991. \n\n\tB.\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (AC0), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. \n\n\tNOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI), who may concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Los Angeles ACO. \n\n\tC.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tD.\tThe replacement and installation requirements shall be done in accordance with McDonnell Douglas DC-10 Service Bulletin 71-154, dated January 18, 1991. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from McDonnell Douglas Corporation, 3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846, Attention: DC-10 Technical Publications, Technical Administrative Support C1-L5B. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, Renton, Washington; or at the LosAngeles Aircraft Certification Office, 3229 East Spring Street, Long Beach, California; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 1100 L Street N.W., Room 8401, Washington, D.C. \n\n\tThis amendment (39-7087, AD 91-15-22) becomes effective on September 9, 1991.
2014-03-03: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Cessna Aircraft Company (Cessna) Models 310, 320, 340, 401, 402, 411, 414, and 421 airplanes. This AD was prompted by an investigation of recent and historical icing-related accidents and incidents for the products listed above. This AD requires either having the supplemental airplane flight manual/airplane flight manual supplement (SAFM/AFMS) inside the airplane and accessible to the pilot during the airplane's operation or installing a placard that prohibits flight into known icing conditions and installing a placard that increases published airspeed on approach at least 17 mph (15 knots) in case of an inadvertent encounter with icing. We are issuing this AD to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2014-03-05: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Bombardier, Inc. Model BD-700-1A10 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report that the manufacturer has determined that some completion centers used the heater/brake monitoring unit (HBMU) logic circuit to control the line voltage of the drain mast heaters. Since the drain mast heaters are connected in parallel with the number 2 pitot static (PS) probe heater circuit, a number 2 PS probe heater failure may not be detected by the fault monitoring capabilities of the HBMU. This AD requires modification of the air data probes and sensors. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct an unannunciated failure of two PS probe heaters, which could affect controllability of the airplane in icing conditions.
2014-02-06: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Agusta S.p.A. (Agusta) Model AB412 helicopters. This AD requires visually inspecting the main rotor swashplate outer ring (outer ring) for a crack and replacing that outer ring if a crack exists. This AD is prompted by two cases of cracks caused by fatigue on certain outer rings. These actions are intended to prevent the failure of the outer ring, which would lead to loss of main rotor blade pitch control and subsequently loss of helicopter control.
2018-07-16: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Austro Engine GmbH model E4 and E4P diesel piston engines. This AD requires replacement of the waste gate controller and the control rod circlip. This AD was prompted by reports of broken or disconnected turbocharger waste gate control rods on some engines. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2014-04-01: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Slingsby Aviation Ltd. Model T67M260 airplanes. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as cracked horizontal stabilizer attachment brackets. We are issuing this AD to require actions to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2014-03-21: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 727-200 and 727-200F series airplanes. This AD is intended to complete certain mandated programs intended to support the airplane reaching its limit of validity (LOV) of the engineering data that support the established structural maintenance program. This AD requires a one-time inspection for cracking of the pressure floor of both main wheel wells, and related investigative and corrective actions if necessary; and modifying the pressure floor of both main wheel wells. We are issuing this AD to prevent fatigue cracking in the pressure floor of the main wheel wells, which could lead to rapid loss of cabin pressurization.
2003-13-09: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to certain Boeing Model 747 series airplanes. This action requires repetitive inspections for cracking of the upper skin of the outboard and center sections of the horizontal stabilizer and the rear spar structure, hinge fittings, terminal fittings, and splice plates; and repair if necessary. This action is necessary to find and fix such cracking, which could lead to reduced structural capability of the outboard and center sections of the horizontal stabilizer, and result in loss of controllability of the airplane. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
91-10-07: 91-10-07 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-6991. Docket No. 91-NM-02-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: All McDonnell Douglas Model DC-10 series airplanes, manufacturer's fuselage numbers 1 through 379, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent inadvertent opening of a cargo door in flight, a condition which could result in loss of pressurization and reduced controllability of the aircraft, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tWithin 16 months after performing the torque test required by AD 90-19-12, Amendment 39-6735, perform magnetic particle inspections on the H-11 cargo door latch spool fitting attach bolts or replace the H-11 cargo door latch spool fitting attach bolts with new bolts and associated hardware, in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions for Phase 2 of McDonnell Douglas DC-10 Alert Service Bulletin A52-212, Revision 1, dated September 14, 1990 (hereafter referred to as the "Service Bulletin").1.\tIf a bolt does not pass the magnetic particle inspection, prior to further flight, replace it with a new bolt and seal in accordance with Figure 1 of the Service Bulletin. \n\n\t\t2.\tIf a bolt passes the magnetic particle inspection, prior to further flight, reinstall the bolt and seal in accordance with the Service Bulletin. \n\n\tB.\tWithin 16 months after accomplishment of the inspections required by paragraph A. of this AD, and at intervals not to exceed sixteen months, replace the H-11 cargo door latch spool fitting attach bolts with new bolts and associated hardware or perform either a magnetic particle or ultrasonic inspection on the H-11 cargo door latch spool fitting attach bolts in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions for Phase 2 of the Service Bulletin. \n\n\t\t1.\tIf a bolt does not pass the magnetic particle/ultrasonic inspection, prior to further flight, replace it with a new bolt and seal in accordance with Figure 1 of the Service Bulletin. \n\n\t\t2.\tIf a bolt passes the magnetic particle/ultrasonic inspection, prior to further flight, reinstall the bolt and seal in accordance with the Service Bulletin. \n\n\tC.\tThe inspections required by paragraphs A. and B. of this AD are not required for Inconel bolts, part numbers RA21026-7, 77711-7, and 3D0031-7. \n\n\tD.\tWithin five years after the effective date of this AD, replace all H-11 cargo door latch spool fitting attach bolts with Inconel bolts, part numbers RA21026-7, 77711-7, and 3D0031-7 (grip lengths as applicable per location as specified in Figure 1 sheets 3 and 4 of the Service Bulletin) in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions for Phase 3 of the Service Bulletin. Installation of Inconel bolts constitutes terminating action for the requirements of paragraphs A. and B. of this AD. \n\n\tE.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes unpressurized to a base for the accomplishment of the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tF.\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA Transport Airplane Directorate. \n\n\tNOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Los Angeles ACO. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to McDonnell Douglas Corporation, P.O. Box 1771, Long Beach, California 90846-0001, Attention: Business Unit Manager, Technical Publications, C1-HDR (54-60). These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue S.W., Renton, Washington or the Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 3229 East Spring Street, Long Beach, California. \n\n\tThis amendment (39-6991, AD 91-10-07) becomes effective on June 11, 1991.
2014-03-14: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus Model A330-200 and -300 series airplanes, and Model A340-200, - 300, -500, and -600 series airplanes. This AD was prompted by results from fuel system reviews conducted by the airplane manufacturer. This AD requires removing bulb-type maintenance lights; installing a drain mast on certain airplanes; and installing muffs on connecting bleed elements on certain airplanes. We are issuing this AD to prevent ignition sources inside fuel tanks, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in fuel tank explosions and consequent loss of the airplane.
2014-03-07: We are superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2009-26-16 for certain The Boeing Company Model MD-11 and MD-11F airplanes. AD 2009- 26-16 required inspecting to determine if wires touch the upper surface of the center upper auxiliary fuel tank, and marking the location, as necessary; inspecting all wire bundles above the center upper auxiliary fuel tank for splices and damage; inspecting for damage to the fuel vapor barrier seal and upper surface of the center upper auxiliary fuel tank; and performing corrective actions, as necessary. AD 2009-26-16 also required installing nonmetallic barrier/shield sleeving, new clamps, new attaching hardware, and a new extruded channel. This new AD requires inspections of additional center upper auxiliary fuel tank locations and corrective actions as necessary. This AD was prompted by reports that identified additional locations where inspections and corrective actions of the center upper auxiliary fuel tank are needed. We are issuing thisAD to reduce the potential of ignition sources inside fuel tanks, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in fuel tank explosions and consequent loss of the airplane.
2014-03-09: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain ATR--GIE Avions de Transport R[eacute]gional Model ATR42 and Model ATR72 airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of defective sealing between the nacelle lower fairing and the underwing box. This AD requires a one-time general visual inspection for damaged (worn, torn, or abraded) or missing seals between the nacelle lower fairing and the underwing box of both the left-hand and right-hand engine nacelles, and replacement of the seal and/or shims if necessary. We are issuing this AD to prevent the decrease of the fire extinguishing agent efficiency, which could delay fire extinction and allow fire propagation out of the nacelle fire protected area, resulting in damage to the airplane.
2014-03-17: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Bombardier, Inc. Model CL-600-1A11 (CL-600), CL-600-2A12 (CL-601), and CL-600-2B16 (CL-601-3A, CL-601-3R, and CL-604 Variants) airplanes. This AD requires repetitive inspections for fractured or incorrectly oriented fasteners on the inboard flap hinge-box forward fittings on both wings, and fastener replacement if necessary. This AD was prompted by two reports of fractured fastener heads found on the inboard flap hinge-box forward fitting. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct incorrectly oriented or fractured fasteners, which could result in detachment of the flap hinge-box and the flap surface, and consequent reduced controllability of the airplane.