Results
2011-09-03: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Model 382, 382B, 382E, 382F, and 382G airplanes. This AD requires repetitive eddy current inspections to detect cracks in the center wing upper and lower rainbow fittings, and corrective actions if necessary; and repetitive replacements of rainbow fittings, which would extend the repetitive interval for the next inspection. This AD results from a report of fatigue cracking of the wing upper and lower rainbow fittings during durability testing and on in-service airplanes. Analysis of in- service cracking has shown that these rainbow fittings are susceptible to multiple site fatigue damage. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct such fatigue cracks, which could grow large and lead to the failure of the fitting and a catastrophic failure of the center wing.
96-13-03: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9 and C-9 (military) series airplanes, that currently requires the implementation of a program of structural inspections to detect and correct fatigue cracking in order to ensure the continued airworthiness of these airplanes as they approach the manufacturer's original fatigue design life goal. This amendment requires, among other things, revision of the existing program to require additional visual inspections of additional structure. This amendment is prompted by new data submitted by the manufacturer indicating that certain revisions to the program are necessary in order to increase the confidence level of the statistical program to ensure timely detection of cracks in various airplane structures. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent fatigue cracking that could compromise the structural integrity of these airplanes.
78-26-12: 78-26-12 CESSNA: Amendment 39-3382. Applies to Models 210G, H, J (Serial Number 21058819 through 21059199); 210M, N (Serial Numbers 21062274 through 21063025); T210G, H, J (Serial Number T210-0198 through T210-0454 and 21058140); T210M, N (Serial Numbers 21062274 through 21063025); and P210N (Serial Numbers P21000001 through P21000141) airplanes. COMPLIANCE: Required as indicated unless already accomplished. To detect binding of fuel quantity transmitter float arms and assure proper operation of the fuel quantity indicating system accomplish the following: A) On Models 210M, N and T210M, N (Serial Numbers 21062761 through 21063025) and P210N (Serial Numbers P21000063 through P21000141) airplanes, before next flight (except that the airplane may be flown to a location where this inspection may be accomplished, provided the pilot visually verifies through the fuel filler neck that adequate fuel is available to complete the flight), completely fill, then drain the leftand right fuel tanks with the engine inoperative and the airplane stationary in the level ground attitude. Observe the fuel quantity gauge during draining and upon completion of drainage, verify that the respective fuel quantity gauge indicates empty. Remove any Cessna P/N C668002-0101 or -0102 fuel quantity transmitter from which an erroneous fuel quantity reading is observed and check for binding of the float arm. Replace any fuel quantity transmitter found binding with an airworthy component. After replacement, check for fuel leaks and proper functioning of the fuel gauging system. B) For Models 210G, H, J, M (Serial Numbers 21058819 through 21059199 and 21062274 through 21062760), T210G, H, J, M (Serial Numbers T210-0198 through T210-0454, 21058140 and 21062274 through 21062760) and P210N (Serial Numbers P21000001 through P21000062) airplanes, before next flight, review the aircraft maintenance records to determine if a fuel quantity transmitter has been replaced since June7, 1978. 1. If a fuel quantity transmitter has not been replaced since June 7, 1978, make an entry in the aircraft maintenance records indicating that this Airworthiness Directive has been accomplished and the airplane may be returned to service. 2. If a fuel quantity transmitter has been replaced since June 7, 1978, comply with the requirements of Paragraph A). C) The review of the aircraft maintenance records required by Paragraph B) may be accomplished by the holder of a Pilot's Certificate issued under Part 61 of the Federal Aviation Regulations on any aircraft owned or operated by that person. D) Any equivalent method of compliance with this AD must be approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Central Region. Cessna Service Letter SE 78-69, dated November 15, 1978, or later approved revisions pertains to the subject matter of this AD. This amendment becomes effective on January 4, 1979, to all persons except those to whom it has already been made effective by an airmail letter from the FAA dated November 15, 1978.
2011-09-05: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD requires installing an auto shutoff feature for the center override/jettison fuel pumps, and installing power control circuitry for the center override/jettison and main jettison fuel pumps. This AD also requires installing new software in the electrical load management system (ELMS) electronics units in certain power management panels; installing airplane information management system 2 (AIMS-2) software in the AIMS-2 hardware; and making certain wiring changes. This AD was prompted by results from fuel system reviews conducted by the manufacturer. We are issuing this AD to prevent potential ignition sources inside fuel tanks, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.
96-12-27: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to AlliedSignal Inc. (formerly Textron Lycoming) LTS 101 series turboshaft and LTP 101 series turboprop engines, that requires removal from service of suspect disks for a one-time inspection of the disk tenon area of the gas generator turbine disk. This amendment is prompted by a report of a gas generator turbine disk tenon failure. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent total loss of engine power, inflight engine shutdown, and possible damage to the aircraft.
68-01-06 R1: 68-01-06 R1 CANADAIR: Amendment 39-537 as amended by Amendment 39-5989. Applies to all Model CL-44D4 series airplanes, certificated in any category. Compliance required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. To prevent failure of the main landing gear during landing or takeoff due to cracks in the main landing gear bogie beam, accomplish the following: A. Within the next 20 landings after the effective date of this AD, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 20 landings, perform a visual inspection of the left and right main landing gear bogie beam, P/N 44-87574, for cracks, in accordance with paragraph 2.A.(1) of Canadair Service Bulletin 493-CL44, dated February 29, 1988. B. At intervals not to exceed 500 landings or 12 months, whichever occurs first, perform the inspection and modification, if necessary, in accordance with paragraphs 2.A.(2), 2.A.(3), 2.A.(4) and 2.A.(5) of Canadair Service Bulletin 493-CL44, dated February 29, 1988. C. Any structure found to be cracked as a result of the inspections required by paragraph A. or B., above, must be replaced, prior to further flight, with an airworthy part or an FAA-approved equivalent part. 1. Replacement parts must be inspected prior to installation, in accordance with paragraph 2.A.(3) of Canadair Service Bulletin 493-CL44, dated February 29, 1988. 2. Replacement parts must be repetitively inspected in accordance with paragraphs A. and B., above. D. An alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, New York Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, New England Region. E. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. All persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service document from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Canadair, LTD., Commercial Aircraft Technical Services, Box 6087, Station A, Montreal, Quebec H3C 3G9, Canada. This document may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or the FAA, New England Region, New York Aircraft Certification Office, 181 South Franklin Avenue, Room 202, Valley Stream, New York. This action amends AD 68-01-06, Amendment 39-537. This amendment, 39-5989, becomes effective September 5, 1988.
2011-09-08: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: This AD is prompted by a report from the manufacturer of finding cracks in rudder pedal assemblies at the quadrant attachment weld on early 750 XL aircraft. This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.
96-12-05: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to AlliedSignal, Inc. (formerly Textron Lycoming) LTS101 series turboshaft and LTP101 series turboprop engines, that requires identifying, removing, and replacing certain defective power turbine rotors. This amendment is prompted by reports of workmanship deficiencies on certain power turbine rotors that can reduce the published life limit of the disk. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent power turbine rotor failure, which could result in loss of engine power.
2011-08-12: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Surface defects were visually detected on the rudder of one Airbus A319 and one A321 in-service aeroplane. Investigation has determined that the defects reported on both rudders corresponded to areas that had been reworked in production. The investigation confirmed that the defects were the result of de-bonding between the skin and honeycomb core. Such reworks were also performed on some rudders fitted on A330-300 and A340-200/-300 aeroplanes. An extended de-bonding, if not detected and corrected, may degrade the structural integrity of the rudder. The loss of the rudder leads to degradation of the handling qualities and reduces the controllabilityof the aeroplane. * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
96-12-06: This amendment supersedes two existing airworthiness directives (AD's), applicable to Teledyne Continental Motors and Rolls-Royce, plc O-200 series reciprocating engines, that currently require resetting engine timing to 24o Before Top Center (BTC). This amendment returns to the 28o BTC engine timing for those engines equipped with improved cylinders that have strengthened heads. In addition, this amendment drops the TCM O-200C model which never went into production. This amendment is prompted by the availability of improved cylinders. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent possible cylinder cracking with subsequent loss of engine power.
2010-06-14: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: During 2004, an incident was reported involving uncontained multiple intermediate-pressure (IP) turbine blade release on a Trent 700 engine. The blade release was the result of an overspeed of the IP turbine rotor that was initiated by an internal fire in the high- pressure/intermediate-pressure (HP/IP) bearing chamber. Post- incident analysis and investigation has established that blockage of the HP/IP turbine bearing oil vent tube due to carbon deposits was a significant factor in the failure sequence. The Trent 800 has a similar type design standard to that of the Trent 700 and has also been found in service to be susceptible to carbon deposits in the oilvent tube. We are issuing this AD to prevent internal oil fires due to coking and carbon buildup in the HP/IP turbine bearing oil vent tube that could cause uncontained engine failure and damage to the airplane.
91-11-13: 91-11-13 LOCKHEED AERONAUTICAL SYSTEMS COMPANY-GEORGIA: Amendment 39-7011. Docket No. 91-NM-106-AD. Applicability: Model 1329-23A, -23D, and -23E (JetStar) series airplanes, Serial Numbers 5001 through 5162; and 1329-25 (JetStar II) series airplanes, Serial Numbers 5201 through 5240; certificated in any category. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. To prevent failure of the empennage pivot fitting assembly, loss of the empennage, and subsequent reduction of controllability of the airplane, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 10 hours time-in-service, or within 20 days after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs first, perform an eddy current inspection of the JE24 series empennage pivot fitting assemblies to detect cracks, in accordance with Revision 1 of Lockheed Alert Service Bulletins A329II-55-3 (for Model 1329-25) and A329-299 (for Models 1329-23A, - 23D, and -23E), both dated April 12, 1991, as applicable.Repeat this inspection thereafter at intervals not to exceed 300 hours time-in-service. (b) If cracks are found as a result of the eddy current inspections required by paragraph (a) of this AD, prior to further flight, replace the JE24 series empennage pivot fitting, or repair the fitting in a manner approved by the Manager, Atlanta Aircraft Certification Office. After replacement or repair, continue to perform the repetitive eddy current inspections required by paragraph (a) of this AD. (c) Within 7 days after the initial inspection required by paragraph (a) of this AD, submit a report of the inspection results, positive or negative, to the Manager, Atlanta Aircraft Certification Office, 1669 Phoenix Parkway, Suite 210C, Atlanta, Georgia 30349, telefax (404) 991-3606. NOTE: Negative results of the repetitive inspections need not be reported. (d) Within the next 10 hours time-in-service, or within 20 days after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs first, perform a visual inspection of all fasteners attaching the pivot fitting assembly to the vertical stabilizer rear beam caps to detect loose, missing, or broken fasteners, or improper countersinks, in accordance with Revision 1 of Lockheed Alert Service Bulletins A329II-55-3 (for Models 1329-25) and A329-299 (for Model 1329-23A, -23D, and - 23E), both dated April 12, 1991, as applicable. Repeat this inspection thereafter at intervals not to exceed 300 hours time-in-service. (e) If loose, missing, or broken fasteners, or improper countersinks, where applicable, are found as a result of the visual inspection required by paragraph (d) of this AD, prior to further flight, repair or replace defective or missing fasteners in accordance with Revision 1 of Lockheed Alert Service Bulletins A329II-55-3 (for Models 1329-25) and A329-299 (for Model 1329-23A, -23D, and -23E), both dated April 12, 1991, as applicable. (f) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Atlanta Aircraft Certification Office, ACE-115A, FAA, Small Airplane Directorate. NOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Atlanta Aircraft Certification Office, ACE-115A. (g) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. The inspection and repairs shall be done in accordance with Revision 1 of Lockheed Alert Service Bulletins A329II-55-3 (for Model 1329-25) and A329-299 (for Models 1329-23A, -23D, and -23E), both dated April 12, 1991, as applicable. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from Lockheed Aeronautical Systems Company-Georgia,Attn: Commercial and Customer Support, Dept. 73-05, Zone 0199, 86 South Cobb Drive, Marietta, Georgia 30063. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue S.W., Renton, Washington; or at the FAA, Small Airplane Directorate, Atlanta Aircraft Certification Office, 1669 Phoenix Parkway, Suite 210C, Atlanta, Georgia; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 1100 L Street N.W., Room 8401, Washington, D.C. This amendment (39-7011, AD 91-11-13) becomes effective on June 24, 1991.
90-12-03: 90-12-03 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS HELICOPTER COMPANY (MDHC): Amendment 39-6618. Docket No. 90-ASW-21. Applicability: Model 369D, E, F, and FF helicopter, certificated in any category. Compliance is required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To prevent tail rotor malfunction, which could result in loss of control and possible loss of the helicopter, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 10 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, check the tail rotor swashplate bearing assembly to determine the color (green, yellow, or black) of the bearing seal, P/N 369D21832. The check required by this paragraph may be performed by a pilot. The bearing seal can be observed by looking into the outboard end of the T/R swashplate bearing assembly. If necessary, clean the face of the bearing seal so that the color can be determined. NOTE: Part I of MDHC Service Information Notice DN-167, EN-58, and FN-46 pertains to this one-time check. (b) Ifthe bearings have green or yellow seals, record the seal color in the logbook together with the record of compliance with this AD, and no further action is required. (c) For bearings with black seals which have a serial number in the range of 059150- 0001 through 059150-0692, or 059150-0734 through 059150-0742, or which have unidentified serial numbers, conduct the following inspections within the next 10 hours' time in service, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 10 hours' time in service from the last inspection until the bearing is replaced: (1) Disconnect the outboard end of the bellcrank. (2) Disconnect the dust boot from the inboard end of the pitch assembly. This will allow rotation of the tail rotor swashplate housing. (3) While applying a down load on top of the housing by hand, slowly rotate the pitch control housing to verify smoothness of operation. The bearing must rotate smoothly and without roughness to be acceptable. A slight feeling of grit in the grease, with smooth areas in between, is considered acceptable for an additional 10 hours' time in service. If the gritty feeling is continuous, replace the bearings. (4) If the roughness is beyond that allowed in paragraph (c)(3) or if the gritty feeling is continuous, replace the tail rotor swashplate bearing with an airworthy bearing before further flight. (5) Install and lockwire the dust boot on the inboard end of the pitch control housing. (6) Service the tail rotor swashplate pivot bearing assembly with an acceptable grease as specified in the Handbook of Maintenance Instructions. (7) Reconnect the bellcrank to the outboard end of the pitch control assembly as specified in the Handbook of Maintenance Instructions. (8) If an acceptable black seal bearing (i.e., a bearing having a serial number exclusive of the specified unacceptable ranges) is installed or has been installed as a replacement, apply a white paint dot on the outside face ofthe housing and record this action in the helicopter log book. (9) Record compliance in the helicopter log book, together with the serial number of the newly installed bearing. NOTE: Part II of MDHC Service Information Notice DN-167, En-58, and FN-46 pertains to this inspection procedure. (d) Replace any bearings with black seals which have any serial number in the range of 059150-0001 through 059150-0692 or 059150-0734 through 059150-0742, or which have unidentified serial numbers as follows: (1) For bearings which have 290 or more hours' time in service on the effective date of this AD, replace the bearing with an airworthy part within the next 10 hours' time in service. (2) For bearings which have less than 290 hours' time in service on the effective date of this AD, replace the bearing with an airworthy part before the accumulation of 300 hours' time in service. (e) Prior to the installation of new or replacement bearing sets, P/N 369D21832; pitch control assemblies, P/N 369D21800 or 369D21820 series; or tail rotor assemblies, P/N 369D21600 or 369D21610 series, determine the color of the swashplate bearing seal and record in the logbook. If a bearing set has a black seal, install only parts that are verified to have serial numbers other than those listed in paragraph (c). (f) In accordance with FAR Sections 21.197 and 21.199, the helicopter may be flown to a base where compliance with this AD may be accomplished. (g) An alternate method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time which provides an equivalent level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, 3229 E. Spring Street, Long Beach, California. This amendment (39-6618, AD 90-12-03) becomes effective on June 22, 1990.
2011-08-02: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: [T]he Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has published Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR) 88, and the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) has published Interim Policy INT/POL/25/ 12. The design review conducted by Fokker Services on the Fokker 50 and Fokker 60 in response to these regulations revealed that, if chafing occurs between the Fuel Quantity Probe (FQP) and the probe wiring, with additional factors, this may result in an ignition source in the wing tank vapour space. This condition, if not corrected, in combination with flammable fuel vapours, could result in a wing fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the aeroplane. ThisAD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.
66-06-03: 66-06-03 LYCOMING: Amdt. 39-708. Applies to Model IO-360-A1A Engines with Serial Numbers 101-51 through 1231-51A, and All Engines Remanufactured by Lycoming Prior to December 1, 1964. Compliance required as indicated. To prevent further failures of connecting rod assemblies, P/N 74503 and P/N 74308, accomplish the following: (a) Replace connecting rod assemblies P/N 74503 and P/N 74308 with 200 or more hours' time in service on the effective date of this AD with connecting rod assembly P/N 75059 within the next 50 hours' time in service in accordance with Lycoming Service Bulletin No. 302 or later FAA-approved revision. (b) Replace connecting rod assemblies P/N 74503 and P/N 74308 with less than 200 hours' time in service on the effective date of this AD with connecting rod assembly P/N 75059 before the accumulation of 250 hours' time in service in accordance with Lycoming Service Bulletin No. 302 or later FAA-approved revision. Effective March 13, 1966.Revised January 16, 1969.
96-12-24: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to all Lockheed Model L-1011-385 series airplanes. This action requires inspections to detect cracking and other discrepancies of certain web-to-cap fasteners of the rear spar between inner wing stations (IWS) 310 and 343, and of the web area around those fasteners; and various follow-on actions. This AD also provides for an optional modification which, if accomplished, will defer the initiation of the inspections for a certain period of time. This amendment is prompted by a report of fatigue cracking in the web of the rear spar of the wing. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent such fatigue cracking, which could result in failure of the rear spar of the wing and consequent fuel spillage.
2008-08-13: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Due to the recalculation of loads for the Multi Role Transporter and Tanker (MRTT) aircraft, it has been found that a structural reinforcement at the aft section of the fuselage (FR (frame) 87- FR91) is required for A300-600 aircraft and A310 aircraft with a Trim Tank installed. * * * * * * * The unsafe condition is the potential loss of structural integrity in the aft section of the fuselage between FR87 through FR91, inclusive, during extreme rolling and vertical maneuver combinations. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2010-07-02: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to certain Honeywell Primus II RNZ-850( )/-851( ) integrated navigation units (INUs). As one alternative for compliance, the existing AD provides for a one-time inspection to determine whether a certain modification has been installed on the Honeywell Primus II NV-850 navigation receiver module (NRM), which is part of the INU. In lieu of accomplishing this inspection, and for aircraft found to have an affected NRM, that AD provides for revising the aircraft flight manual to include new limitations for instrument landing system approaches. That AD also requires an inspection to determine whether certain other modifications have been done on the NRM; and doing related investigative, corrective, and other specified actions, as applicable; as well as further modifications to address additional anomalies. This AD extends the compliance time for a certain inspection and associated actions. This AD also revises the applicability to include additional affected INUs. This AD results from reports indicating that erroneous localizer and glideslope indications have occurred on certain aircraft equipped with the subject INUs. We are issuing this AD to ensure that the flightcrew has accurate localizer and glideslope deviation indications. An erroneous localizer or glideslope deviation indication could lead to the aircraft making an approach off the localizer, which could result in impact with an obstacle or terrain.
96-12-04: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Superior Air Parts, Inc. Parts Manufacturer Approval (PMA) pistons installed on Teledyne Continental Motors O-470 series reciprocating engines, that requires removal from service of certain pistons. This amendment is prompted by piston failures. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent piston failure, which can result in engine power loss, engine failure and loss of the aircraft.
96-12-17: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Beech (Raytheon) Model BAe 125 series 800A and 1000A, and Model Hawker 800 and 1000 airplanes, that requires an inspection to determine if the diode soldered connections are clean and functionally sound. This amendment also requires remake of the soldered connection and replacement of the diode with a new diode, if necessary. This amendment is prompted by reports of imperfect soldered connections in the engine starting and battery emergency control circuit. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent incorrect fault displays in the cockpit and intermittent fault symptoms in the engine starting and battery emergency control circuits, as a result of imperfect soldered connections.
2011-07-12: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: * * * [T]he Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has published Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR) 88, and the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) has published Interim Policy INT/POL/25/ 12. The review conducted by Fokker Services on the Fokker 50 and Fokker 60 type design, in response to these regulations, revealed that the clearance between parts of the main landing gear (MLG) and the fuel pipes may be insufficient. This condition, if not detected and corrected, could lead to chafing, possibly resulting in fuel leakage and, in combination with other factors, a fuel fire. This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.
2011-08-06: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD requires removing certain power turbine rotors from service using a specific drawdown schedule. This AD was prompted by reports of fatigue cracks in the airfoil of the power turbine blades. We are issuing this AD to prevent fracture of the power turbine blade airfoil, which could result in sudden loss of engine power and prevent continued safe flight or safe landing.
96-12-08: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to Twin Commander Aircraft Corporation (Twin Commander) 500, 680, and 690 series airplanes that do not have a nose landing gear drag link bolt with the manufacturer s serial number, manufacture date, and the last three digits of the drawing number, 055, on the bolt head. This action requires replacing the nose landing gear (NLG) drag link bolt with one that has been manufactured with the proper heat treatment. This action was prompted by the failure of an improperly heat treated NLG drag link bolt causing collapse of the nose landing gear on a certain Twin Commander Model 690B airplane while taxiing. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent the NLG from collapsing, which if not corrected, could result in loss of the airplane.
96-12-11: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all Canadair Model CL-215-1A10 series airplanes. This action requires repetitive inspections to detect discrepancies of the microswitches fitted at the water door actuator, and replacement of any discrepant microswitch. This action also requires a terminating action for the repetitive inspections. This amendment is prompted by a report indicating that the water doors on one airplane opened inadvertently during flight, due to corrosion of the microswitches fitted to the water door actuator. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent such uncommanded opening of the water doors, especially at high speed during a takeoff run, a water pick-up run, or a landing run, which could cause damage to the airplane.
2011-07-13: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD requires an inspection of the elevator spar for cracks and, if any crack is found, either replacement with a serviceable elevator spar that is found free of cracks or repair/ modification with an FAA-approved method. This AD also requires reporting to the FAA the results of the inspection. This AD was prompted by reports of a total of nine elevator spar cracks across seven of the affected airplanes, including a crack of 2.35 inches just below the outboard hinge of the right-hand elevator. We are issuing this AD to prevent structural failure of the elevator spar due to such cracking, which could result in separation of the elevator from the airplane with consequent loss of control.