Results
98-24-17: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model DC-10-10, -30, and -40 series airplanes, that requires replacement of certain taper-lok attachments and forward trunnion bolts with new components that attach the left and right main landing gear (MLG) to each wing. This amendment is prompted by a report indicating that, due to overstrength of the forward trunnion bolt, an MLG broke away and ruptured a wing fuel tank while an airplane was being operated off the runway. The actions specified by this AD are intended to ensure that the MLG separates from the wing when it is subjected to unpredictable overloads during abnormal operations, and to prevent consequent primary structural damage to the airplane.
88-12-08: 88-12-08 GROB WERKE GMBH AND CO. KG (BURKHART GROB): Amendment 39-5915. Applies to the following models certificated in any category: G103 TWIN ASTIR, Serial Numbers 3000 through 3291. G103 TWIN II, Serial Numbers 3501 through 3878. G103A TWIN II ACRO, Serial Numbers 3501 through 3878 with supplement "K" in the number. Compliance is required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To prevent the tow-hook knob from dropping into the control stick boot during flight and obstructing control stick movement, accomplish the following: (a) If the guide-sleeve cut out is located at the bottom left hand (LH) corner of the instrument panel, as shown in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 of Grob Service Bulletin (SB) TM 315-32, within the next 10 hours time-in-service after the effective date of this AD, visually inspect the aft tow- hook knob in the area of the guide sleeve for wear, cracks or looseness of the tow-hook knob. (b) If wear, cracked sleeve or looseness is determined, before further flight, unless already accomplished, relocate the position of tow-hook knob in accordance with Instruction 2 in Grob SB TM 315-32, dated June 12, 1987. (c) If the inspection of (a) determines that no wear, crack or looseness of any part in the tow-hook knob exist, accomplish the relocation of the knob as indicated in (b) within the next 20 hours time-in-service after the effective date of this AD. (d) Upon request, an equivalent means of compliance with the requirements of this AD may be approved by the Manager, Brussels Aircraft Certification Office, AEU-100, Europe, Africa, and Middle East Office, FAA, c/o American Embassy, 15 Rue de la Loi B-1040 Brussels, Belgium, Telephone No. 513.38.30 ext. 2710 or the Manager, New York Aircraft Certification Office, Aircraft Certification Division, Federal Aviation Administration, New England Region, 181 South Franklin Avenue, Room 202, Valley Stream, New York 11581; telephone (516) 791- 6680. (e) Upon submission of substantiating data by an owner or operator through an FAA maintenance inspector, the Manager, Brussels Aircraft Certification Office or the Manager, New York Aircraft Certification Office, may adjust the compliance time specified in this AD. Grob SB TM 315-32, dated June 12, 1987, identified and described in this document, is incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1). All persons affected by this directive who have not already received this document from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Grob Systems, Inc., Aircraft Division, I-75 and Airport Drive, Bluffton, Ohio 45817. These documents may also be examined at the Office of the Regional Counsel, Federal Aviation Administration, New England Region, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, Massachusetts 01803, Room 311, Rules Docket 88-ANE-15, between the hours of 8:00 a.m. and 4:30 p.m., Monday thru Friday, except federal holidays. This amendment, 39-5915, becomes effective on June 9, 1988.
77-25-05: 77-25-05 ENSTROM: Amendment 39-3096. Applies to F28C and 280C helicopters certificated in all categories. Compliance required as indicated. (a) Prior to further flight, perform Enstrom Service Information Letter No. 0069 as required to provide a smooth running idle characteristic. Adjust the idle mixture in accordance with Enstrom Service Information Letter No. 0069 steps 4C thru 4G. With the idle mixture properly adjusted perform the following check: Turn the boost on and off. Any noticeable change in RPM is an indication of internal injector leakage. If this condition is observed remove the injector and return the injector to an authorized Bendix repair station. Replace with an airworthy injector and repeat the above check. (b) Prior to further flight incorporate the attached supplemental information in the appropriate RFM. Affix the placard as indicated and operate in accordance therewith. (c) Within the next three calendar months or 100 hours time in service, whichever occurs first, install Enstrom Kit 28-121015. The following limitations and procedures are effective immediately for all Enstrom Model F28C and 280C helicopters. Applicable rotorcraft flight manual pages are attached. NOTE: Compliance with the revised procedures outlined herein does not require a logbook entry. Flight manuals affected: F-28C (December 8, 1975; revised 12/21/76) 280C (December 8, 1975; revised 12/21/76) 280C (September 23, 1977, Report No. 28-AC-016) FLIGHT MANUAL INSERTION: LIMITATIONS: (To be added to all three FM's) FUEL MIXTURE SETTING: (Page FM-2-4) In addition to present RFM procedures add: Mixture must be leaned to at least 130 PPH at 36.5 in. MAP for all flight conditions except hover. If richer mixture required to maintain E.G.T. levels below 1650 degrees F practice autorotations are prohibited. PLACARDS: (Page FM-2-7) Add placard in view of pilot. "Lean to 130 PPH at 36.5 in. MAP in flight - see revised RFM" NORMAL PROCEDURES: F-28C normal engine starting procedure (Page FM-3-1). Add step 22 below. 280C engine starting procedures, hot condition (Page FM-3-2). Add step 14 below. 280C hot engine restarting procedure (Page FM-3-3, Report No. 28-AC-016). Add step 15 below. Note engine idle RPM (with boost off) and turn fuel boost on. Any difference in RPM noted indicates leaky idle mixture plates (refer to Enstrom Service Letter No. 0069). Slowly lean engine with mixture control short of cutoff position. An increase of 50 RPM indicates idle mixture improperly set (refer to Enstrom Service Letter No. 0069). F-28C and 280C engine warm-up and ground check (Page FM-3-3). Change step 3 to below (no change required in Report No. 28-AC-016). 3. Check the magnetos using the following procedure: A) At flat collective pitch and 2900 RPM allow the E.G.T. to stabilize, with mixture in full rich position. B) Set the E.G.T. gauge cursor red needle to the stabilized indicated temperature. (This will be a reference temperature during the mag test.) C) Switch from both mags position to left mag position and note RPM drop and E.G.T. rise for five seconds. The maximum allowable RPM drop is 125 RPM. The maximum allowable E.G.T. rise is 100 degrees F. D) Return magneto switch to both allowing E.G.T. and RPM to stabilize and repeat check on the right mag position. E) The maximum permissible RPM differential between left and right magnetos is 50 RPM without engine roughness. A differential of greater than 50 RPM and or a drop in RPM greater than 125 RPM could indicate spark plug, spark plug lead wire, or magneto problems. F) An E.G.T. rise over 100 degrees F during operation on individual magneto indicates a magneto timing problem. F28C and 280C flight information (Page FM-3-4). Add special instructions below. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR MIXTURE LEANING IN FLIGHT: A) The mixture mustbe leaned to at least 130 PPH at 36.5 in. MAP. Do not exceed 1650 degrees F E.G.T. B) If mixture greater than 130 PPH is required to prevent exceeding E.G.T. of 1650 degrees F, practice autorotation/power chop are prohibited. C) With mixture leaned as prescribed in A) above, practice autorotations/power reductions are to be performed as follows; 1. Close throttle smoothly all the way to the closed position and hold on the stop, or: 2. Smoothly split needles and maintain engine RPM at 2000 or above. 3. Do not try to maintain throttle at intermediate positions between fully closed and 2000 engine RPM as this may cause inadvertent engine stoppage due to improper idle/mixture settings or faulty fuel servo. F28C and 280C engine cooling and shutdown procedure (FM-3-5) add: 5A. Note engine idle RPM (with boost off) and turn fuel boost on. Any difference in engine RPM noted indicates leaky idle mixture plates (refer to Enstrom Service Letter No. 0069). Slowly lean engine with mixture control short of cutoff position. An increase of 50 RPM indicates the idle mixture is improperly set (refer to Enstrom Service Letter No. 0069). The manufacturer's specifications and procedures identified in this directive are incorporated herein and made part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1). All persons affected by the directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer, may obtain copies upon request to Enstrom Helicopter Corporation, Menominee County Airport, P.O. Box 277, Menominee, Michigan 49858. These documents may also be examined at the Great Lakes Regional Office, 2300 East Devon Avenue, Des Plaines, Illinois 60018, and at FAA Headquarters, 800 Independence Avenue, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20591. A historical file on this airworthiness directive which includes incorporated material in full is maintained by the FAA at its headquarters in Washington, D.C., and the Great Lakes Region. This supersedesthe AD issued by airmail letter dated September 30, 1977, as amended by airmail letter dated October 25, 1977. This amendment becomes effective December 21, 1977, and was effective for all recipients of the airmail letter dated November 7, 1977, upon receipt thereof.
2013-11-10: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Cessna Aircraft Company (Cessna) (previously COLUMBIA or LANCAIR) Models LC40-550FG, LC41-550FG, and LC42-550FG airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports that during maximum braking, if the brakes lock up and a skid occurs, a severe oscillatory yawing motion or ``wheel walk'' may develop, which could result in further significant structural damage to the airplane. This AD requires insertions into the pilot's operating handbook (POH) and the airplane maintenance manuals (AMM) regarding proper use of the brakes and inspection of the aft fuselage. We are issuing this AD to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2010-13-06: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Model DC-10-10, DC-10-10F, and MD-10-10F airplanes. This AD requires a one-time high frequency eddy current inspection of fastener holes for cracks at the left and right side wing rear spar lower cap at station Xors=345, and other specified and corrective actions if necessary. This AD results from a report of three instances of Model DC-10-10F airplanes having fuel leaks in the wing rear spar lower cap at station Xors=345. We are issuing this AD to prevent cracks in the spar cap, which could lead to cracking of the lower wing skin, fuel leaks, and the inability of the structure to sustain limit load.
93-08-11: 93-08-11 DASSAULT AVIATION: Amendment 39-8558. Docket 92-NM-219-AD. Applicability: Model Mystere-Falcon 900 series airplanes; serial numbers 1 through 14, inclusive; certificated in any category. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. To prevent reduced structural integrity of the fuselage, accomplish the following: (a) For airplane having serial number 1: Prior to the accumulation of 3,750 total landings, or within 6 months after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later, modify the upper part of frame 30 in the stiffener area between stringers 7 and 8, in accordance with Dassault Aviation F900-93 Service Bulletin F900-53-14 and Appendix 1 to that service bulletin, both dated July 8, 1992. (b) For airplanes having serial numbers 2 through 14, inclusive: Modify the upper part of frame 30 in the stiffener area between stringers 7 and 8, in accordance with Dassault Aviation F900-93 Service Bulletin F900-53-14 and Appendix 1 to that service bulletin, both dated July 8, 1992; and at the later of the times specified in paragraphs (b)(1) and (b)(2) of this AD. (1) Prior to the accumulation of 3,750 total landings, or within 6 years since date of manufacture, whichever occurs first. (2) Within 6 months after the effective date of this AD. (c) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113. NOTE: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Standardization Branch, ANM-113. (d) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. (e) The modification shall be done in accordance with Dassault Aviation F900-93 Service Bulletin F900-53-14 and Appendix 1 to that service bulletin, both dated July 8, 1992. (NOTE: Appendix 1 contains pages 101 through 109.) This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from Falcon Jet Corporation, Customer Support Department, Teterboro Airport, Teterboro, New Jersey 07608. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC. (f) This amendment becomes effective on June 1, 1993.
98-24-21: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to Eurocopter France (ECF) Model AS 332C, AS 332L, AS 332L1, and AS 332L2 helicopters. This action requires inserting instructions into the Model AS 332C, AS 332L, AS 332L1, and AS 332L2 Rotorcraft Flight Manuals (RFMs) regarding actions to take if either the "OVSP 1" or "OVSP 2" amber warning light illuminates. This action also requires, for the Model AS 332C, AS 332L, and AS 332L1 helicopters, measuring the vibration levels of the engine-to-main gearbox (MGB) shaft, inspecting the torque on the MGB coupling bolts, and conducting an engine-to-MGB coupling 23,000 revolutions per minute (RPM) input check. This amendment is prompted by an accident involving a Model AS 332L1 helicopter in which the helicopter experienced an engine overspeed resulting in failure of both engines. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent failure of the rotor drive engine-to-MGB coupling, which, if undetected, could result in an engine overspeed leading to an uncontained engine turbine wheel burst and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
76-24-03: 76-24-03 PRATT & WHITNEY AIRCRAFT: Amendment 39-2776. Applies to all Pratt & Whitney Aircraft JT9D turbofan engines containing fan blades, part numbers 658931, 718431, 726221, 734721, 735831, 735841, 740421, 740431, 740441, 740521, 741131, 741141, 748231, 748321, 748931, 750621, 750631, 758031, 758181, 758191, 758221, 760631, 760641, 760721, 760731, 760831, 760841, 760941, 761041, 761121, 761131, and 761141. Compliance required as follows unless already accomplished. To preclude failure of fan blades due to fatigue originating from undetected foreign object damage, inspect the critical areas of the blades in accordance with the procedures given in PWA ASB 4573, dated March 26, 1976, or later FAA approved revision, as follows: 1. Visually inspect all fan blades within the next 600 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, and every 600 hours time in service thereafter. 2. Eddy current inspect all fan blades that have been previously damaged and blend repaired within the next 600 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD. 3. Eddy current inspect fan blades reworked per PWA Service Bulletins 4124 or 4262, without prior or subsequent damage or blend repairs, within the next 3500 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD. If foreign object damage with a depth of .005 inch or more is found in the critical area, blend and inspect in accordance with Option 1 or Option 2 procedures given in PWA ASB No. 4573, dated March 26, 1976, or later FAA approved revision. (NOTE: The AD does not change the present fan blade blend limits given in the JT9D engine manual.) Upon request of the operator, an FAA maintenance inspector, subject to prior approval of the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA New England Region, may adjust the repetitive inspection intervals specified in this AD to permit compliance at an established inspection period of the operator if the request contains substantiating data tojustify the increase for that operator. The manufacturer's specifications and procedures identified and described in this directive are incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1). All persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Pratt & Whitney Aircraft, Division of United Technologies Corporation, 400 Main Street, East Hartford, Connecticut 06108. These documents may also be examined at Federal Aviation Administration, New England Region, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, Massachusetts 01803, and at FAA headquarters, 800 Independence Avenue, S.W., Washington, D.C. A historical file on this AD which includes the incorporated material in full is maintained by the FAA at its headquarters in Washington, D.C., and at the New England Region. This amendment becomes effective December 30, 1976.
98-21-09: This document publishes in the Federal Register an amendment adopting Airworthiness Directive (AD) 98-21-09, which was sent previously to all known U.S. owners and operators of Robinson Helicopter Company (RHC) Model R22 helicopters by individual letters. This AD requires installing fuel tank vent tube(s), with modified attachment to the mast tube, if not previously accomplished; installing a spring into the flexible tube leading to the main fuel tank; and installing a spring into the flexible tube leading to the auxiliary fuel tank, if an auxiliary fuel tank is installed. This amendment is prompted by an incident in which the flexible vent connecting the rigid vent tube to the main fuel tank kinked, resulting in fuel starvation and a hard landing after uncommanded engine shutdown. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent fuel starvation, loss of engine power, and a subsequent forced landing.
2022-11-04: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2020-26- 13, which applied to certain Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation (Sikorsky) Model S-92A helicopters. AD 2020-26-13 required establishing the life limit for certain part-numbered horizontal stabilizer root fittings FWD (forward root fittings) and certain part-numbered stabilizer strut fittings. AD 2020-26-13 also required repetitively inspecting certain parts, and depending on the inspection results, removing parts from service. Finally AD 2020-26-13 prohibited installing certain stabilizer assemblies on any helicopter. Since the FAA issued AD 2020-26-13, the manufacturer notified the FAA that due to an error in the service information, certain part numbers in AD 2020-26-13 are incorrect. Also, the FAA determined that additional inspections are required to address the unsafe condition. This AD retains certain requirements and the prohibition for installing certain stabilizer assemblies on any helicopter from AD 2020-26-13, corrects certain part numbers, and requires additional repetitive inspections. The actions of this AD are intended to address an unsafe condition on these products.
98-24-10: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to certain Stemme GmbH & Co. KG (Stemme) Model S10 sailplanes. This AD requires replacing the flap drive rocker, part number (P/N) 10SW-RMW, with a modified flap drive rocker. This AD is the result of mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the airworthiness authority for Germany. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent failure of the flap drive rocker caused by the design of the original part, which could result in loss of lateral control and wing flap control with consequent reduced and/or loss of sailplane control.
2013-11-14: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 777-200 and -300 series airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of hydraulic fluid contamination (including contamination caused by hydraulic fluid in its liquid, vapor, and/or solid (coked) form) found in the strut forward dry bay. This AD requires repetitive general visual inspections of the strut forward dry bay for the presence of hydraulic fluid, and related investigative and corrective actions (including checking drain lines for blockage due to hydraulic fluid coking, and cleaning or replacing drain lines to allow drainage) if necessary. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct hydraulic fluid contamination of the strut forward dry bay, which could result in hydrogen embrittlement of the titanium forward engine mount bulkhead fittings, and consequent inability of the fittings to carry engine loads, resulting in engine separation. Hydraulic embrittlement also could cause a through-crack formation across the fittings through which an engine fire could breach into the strut, resulting in an uncontained strut fire.
98-24-12: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to all Ursula Hanle (Hanle) Model H101 "Salto" sailplanes. This AD requires replacing the airbrake lever with one of improved design. This AD is the result of mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the airworthiness authority for Germany. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent the airbrake from deploying during high g maneuvers, which could result in an overstressing effect on the airframe with consequent reduced sailplane control.
98-24-07: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to certain EXTRA Flugzeugbau GmbH (EXTRA) Models EA-300, EA-300S, and EA-300L airplanes. This AD requires repetitively inspecting the rudder pedal for proper alignment, the safety control stop for wear and proper clearance, the rudder cables for elongation, and the rudder pedal footrest for cracks. This AD also requires correcting or replacing any discrepant part, as applicable. This AD is the result of mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the airworthiness authority for Germany. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent failure of the rudder pedal footrest caused by overloading the rudder pedal safety control stop, which could result in loss of directional control of the airplane.
90-02-05: 90-02-05 GULFSTREAM: Amendment 39-6472. Docket No. 89-NM-177-AD. Applicability: All Model G-II (G-1159), G-III (G-1159A), G-IIB (G-1159B) and certain G-IV, Serial Numbers 1000 through 1092, series airplanes, certificated in any category. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. To prevent an airplane taking off in an unsafe takeoff configuration, accomplish the following: A. For all Model G-II (G-1159) and G-IIB (G-1159B) series airplanes: Within 25 hours time- in-service after the effective date of this AD, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 150 hours time-in- service, perform an operational check of the takeoff warning system, and repair, if necessary, in accordance with Gulfstream Aerospace Customer Bulletin Number 388, Amendment 1, dated August 15, 1989. If the system does not function properly, it must be repaired prior to further flight, in accordance with the Customer Bulletin. B. For all Model G-III (G-1159A) series airplanes: Within 25 hours time-in-service after the effective date of this AD, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 150 hours time-in-service, perform an operational check of the takeoff warning system, in accordance with Gulfstream Customer Bulletin Number 106, dated May 1, 1989. If the system does not function properly, it must be repaired prior to further flight, in accordance with the Customer Bulletin. C. For Model G-IV series airplanes, Serial Numbers 1000 through 1092: Within 25 hours time-in-service after the effective date of this AD, perform an operational check and modification of the takeoff range warning indication switches, in accordance with Gulfstream Aircraft Service Change Number 122, dated May 31, 1989. A functional check must be repeated at intervals not to exceed 150 hours time- in-service. If the system does not function properly, it must be repaired prior to further flight, in accordance with the Service Change. D. An alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Atlanta Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Small Airplane Directorate. NOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI) or Principal Avionics Inspector (PAI), who will either concur or comment, and then send it to the Manager, Atlanta Aircraft Certification Office. E. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. All persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation, P.O. Box 2206, M/S D-10, Savannah, Georgia 31402-9980. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or at the FAA, Small Airplane Directorate, Atlanta Aircraft Certification Office, 1669 Phoenix Parkway, Suite 210C, Atlanta, Georgia. This amendment (39-6472, AD 90-02-05) becomes effective on February 13, 1990.
2013-12-03: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Rolls-Royce Deutschland Ltd & Co KG (RRD) BR700-725A1-12 turbofan engines with fuel pump tube part number FW64852 installed. This AD requires removal of the affected fuel pump tube and its replacement with a part eligible for installation. This AD was prompted by the discovery that cracks have occurred in the affected fuel pump tube between the fuel metering unit and the main fuel pump. We are issuing this AD to prevent loss of fuel supply to the engine, which could result in in-flight engine shutdown of one or more engines, loss of thrust control and damage to the airplane.
84-17-51: 84-17-51 R1 ALLISON GAS TURBINE DIVISION GENERAL MOTORS CORP. (ALLISON, formerly DETROIT DIESEL ALLISON): Amendment 39-4963. Applies to Allison Model 250-C30 and 250-C30S engines having 100 hours or less time in service since gas producer turbine rotor assembly repair or disassembly and installed in Sikorsky S76A helicopters certified in all categories. Compliance is required as indicated unless already accomplished. To prevent abnormal rub of the second stage turbine nozzle interstage seal which could result in an overspeed burst of the first stage turbine wheel, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 50 hours time in service after August 31, 1984, inspect the second stage turbine nozzle interstage seal for rub in accordance with Allison Commercial Engine Alert Bulletin CEB-A-72-3127 dated September 14, 1984, or Revision 1 dated November 15, 1984, or FAA-approved equivalent. NOTE: Prior to September 14, 1984, evidence of rub evaluated by the engine manufacturer anddetermined suitable for continued use in service is equivalent to compliance with the above bulletins. (b) Components exhibiting signs of abnormal rub as defined in paragraph (a) above must be replaced with serviceable components prior to return to service. The repair or replacement as necessary, with additional assembly, alignment, and test procedures are to be performed in accordance with the following: (1) Repair/Replacement, Additional Assembly, and Alignment Procedures. (i) Allison Commercial Engine Alert Bulletin CEB-A-72-3127 dated September 14, 1984, or Revision 1 dated November 15, 1984, or FAA approved equivalent. (ii) Prior to September 14, 1984, compliance with Allison message THO-1977W-RMG-84 dated August 18, 1984, is acceptable. (2) Second Stage Nozzle Interstage Seal (29-34 Labyrinth Seal) Clearance. (i) Allison Commercial Engine Alert Bulletin CEB-A-72-3131 dated November 15, 1984, or Allison message THO-2111W-RMG-84 dated September 21, 1984,or FAA approved equivalent. (ii) Prior to November 15, 1984, compliance with Allison Commercial Engine Alert Bulletin CEB-A-72-3127 dated September 14, 1984, or Allison message THO-1977W-RMG-84 dated August 18, 1984, is acceptable. (3) Test Stand Requirements for Model 250-C30 and -C30S Engines that Have Undergone The Gas Producer Turbine Special Inspection on the Second Stage Turbine Nozzle. (i) Allison Distributor Information Letter 250 DIL 223 dated October 1, 1984, or FAA approved equivalent. (ii) Prior to October 31, 1984, compliance with Allison message THO-1979W-RMG-84 dated August 22, 1984, as revised by THO-2032W-RTM-84 (Revision No. 1) dated September 11, 1984, is acceptable. (c) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate helicopters to a base for accomplishment of this AD. (d) Upon request, an equivalent means of compliance with the requirements of this AD may be approved by the Manager, Chicago AircraftCertification Office, FAA, 2300 East Devon Avenue, Des Plaines, Illinois 60018. NOTE: Gas producer turbine rotor assembly repair or disassembly includes replacement of any gas producer turbine rotor assembly from the total turbine assembly, or maintenance/repair performed on the gas producer turbine rotor assembly associated bearings/seals/parts starting with the No. 7 bearing and ending with the No. 8 bearing oil sump cover. Compliance with AD 83-22-05 (Allison CEB A-72-3108) does not constitute gas producer turbine rotor assembly repair or disassembly provided no corrective action as outlined above is accomplished as a result of the inspection/cleaning. The manufacturer's specifications and procedures identified and described in this directive are incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1). All persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Allison Gas Turbine Division, General Motors Corporation, P.O. Box 420, Indianapolis, Indiana 46206-0420. These documents also may be examined at the Office of the Regional Counsel, FAA, ATTN: Rules Docket No. 84-ANE-13, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, Massachusetts 01803, weekdays, except federal holidays, between 8:00 a.m. and 4:30 p.m. This amendment becomes effective December 26, 1984, to all persons except those persons to whom it was made immediately effective by telegraphic AD T84-17-51, issued August 31, 1984.
98-24-05: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to certain HOAC-Austria (HOAC) Model DV-20 airplanes equipped with ROTAX 912 A3 engines. This AD requires replacing the engine electronic modules. This AD is the result of mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the airworthiness authority for Austria. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent electromagnetic interference (EMI) on the engine electronic module, which could cause the airplane engine to stop due to the interruption of the airplane s ignition system and result in loss of control of the airplane.
98-24-08: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to all Burkhart Grob Luft-und Raumfahrt (Grob) Models G115, G115A, G115B, G115C, G115C2, G115D, and G115D2 airplanes. This AD requires inspecting the area of the elevator trim tab hinges for cracks and a secure fit, and repairing any elevator trim tab hinges with cracks or where a proper secure fit is not found. This AD is the result of mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the airworthiness authority for Germany. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent structural damage of the trim tab hinges caused by cracks, which could result in trim tab failure with consequent loss of control of the airplane.
77-01-08: 77-01-08 ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL: Amendment 39-2805. Applies to Model 112 airplanes (Serial Numbers 3 through 470) certificated in all categories. Compliance required as indicated. To prevent engine failure due to loss of engine oil from failure of the engine oil pressure tube assembly, accomplish the following: a. As a part of each preflight check, after the effective date of this airworthiness directive, conduct a visual check of the P/N 46320-1 copper oil pressure tube assembly for cracks and oil leakage, particularly in the areas where the copper tube and its fittings attach. If any cracks or leakage are detected, remove and replace such assembly as described in paragraph c below before further flight. b. Within the next ten hours' time in service after the effective date of this airworthiness directive and thereafter at intervals not to exceed ten hours' time in service, accomplish the following: (1) Remove the upper engine cowling. (2) Clean the copper oil pressure tube assembly, P/N 46320-1, with an oil soluble solvent. (3) Start and operate the engine until it is warm enough to respond smoothly to throttle changes (monitor oil temperature and cylinder head temperature gauges to maintain temperatures within limits), then stop the engine. (4) Check the copper oil pressure tube assembly, P/N 46320-1, for cracks, chaffing, or any signs of oil leakage. (5) If any of the conditions in step 4 above are detected, remove and replace such assembly as described in paragraph c below before further flight. (6) Part I(1)(b) of Rockwell International Service Bulletin No. SB-112-46 dated November 2, 1976, refers to this same subject. A pilot may perform the requirements of items a and b above pursuant to the provisions of FAR 43.3(h). NOTE: For the requirements regarding the listing of compliance and method of compliance with paragraphs a and b of this AD in the aircraft permanent maintenance record, see FAR 91.173. c. Within 50 hours' time in service after the effective date of this airworthiness directive, remove the P/N 46320-1 copper oil pressure tube assembly, the P/N 46080-1 elbow, the AN919-0 reducer, and the P/N 46136-47 hose assembly and replace them with P/N 46136-63 hose assembly and P/N 46080-3 elbow in accordance with Part II of Rockwell Commander Service Bulletin No. SB-112-46 dated November 2, 1976, or later FAA DOA approved revision. Previous compliance with Rockwell Commander Service Letter No. SL-112-26, June 3, 1976, satisfies this airworthiness directive. d. The checks required by paragraphs a and b of this airworthiness directive are no longer required after paragraph c of this airworthiness directive is accomplished. e. The manufacturer's specifications and procedures identified and described in this directive are incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1). All persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Customer Service Department, Avenue, Bethany, Oklahoma 73008. These documents may also be examined at the Office of the Regional Counsel, Southwest Region, FAA, 4400 Blue Mound Road, Fort Worth, Texas, and at FAA Headquarters, 800 Independence Avenue, S.W., Washington, D.C. A historical file on this AD which includes the incorporated material in full is maintained by the FAA at its headquarters in Washington, D.C., and at the Southwest Region Office in Fort Worth, Texas. f. Any alternate equivalent method of compliance with this airworthiness directive must be approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, Flight Standards Division, Southwest Region, Federal Aviation Administration. This amendment becomes effective on January 14, 1977.
53-20-01: 53-20-01 MARTIN: Applies to All Models 202 and 202A Airplanes With Hamilton Standard Reversing Propeller Installations In Which the Reverse Feature is Not Used, and In Which the Normal Reverse Pitch Stop Ring Has Been Relocated to Act Essentially as a Low Pitch Stop. Compliance required as indicated. With the reverse pitch stop ring relocated to act as a low pitch stop, and with inadvertent energization of the reverse solenoid valve, the stop ring will fail under the extreme loads resulting from high oil pressure surge plus the high blade twisting moments attendant to rapid pitch change toward low pitch. This failure will result in the jamming of the pitch changing mechanism, or an inadvertent propeller reversal. To preclude any hazardous incidents, modification of the internal mechanism of the propeller dome, or modification of the propeller control system is necessary. Accomplish items I, II, and III. I. Comply with AD 52-15-02. A. Item I of AD 52-15-02 isto be accomplished by means of a progressive modification program to be submitted to and approved by the FAA. The program shall begin no later than November 1, 1953, and shall be completed no later than August 1, 1954. B. Item III shall be instituted when reversing is reactivated. II. Modify the internal mechanism of the propeller dome. The modifications include removal of the normal low pitch stops, and incorporation of a dump valve which opens just above the normal low pitch position to maintain oil pressure of 50 to 100 p.s.i. on the decrease pitch side of the piston. A. Replace the present oil transfer housing 70451 or 77828 with engine shaft extension assembly 70300. B. Remove the present low pitch stop lever assembly 71042, 71676 or 76149 from the propeller entirely. C. Replace the present piston sleeve 68425 with a new piston sleeve 72259 and snap ring 67698. Since the piston sleeve is pressed into the piston, the internal diameter of the sleevemust be machined after assembly. D. Purchase Orders for the above parts must be submitted to Hamilton Standard by November 1, 1953. E. Hamilton Standard Service Bulletin No. 264 covers this same subject. F. Compliance required prior to November 1, 1954. III. Modify the propeller control system. A. At the A or unfeathering relays in the propeller relay control box, disconnect the wires that run through the nose junction box and into the reversing control boxes (Hamilton Standard P/N 72400) to connect the A relays with the throttle microswitches. (1) Either physically remove the full run of these wires from the A relay terminal to the nose junction box terminal strip, or (2) Physically remove the portion from the A relays to the pin connector in the propeller control relay box, and disconnect these wires from the mating pin in the external portion of the pin connector. Insulate the exposed ends of these wires, and secure them from movement in such manner as to preclude their becoming grounded or contacting any terminals. B. Modify the reverse solenoid circuit wiring from the reverse solenoids to the terminal on the A relays by providing continuous wires physically isolated from all other circuits. C. Comply with item I.C. of AD 52-15-02. D. Revise the reversing solenoid circuits to comply with Hamilton Standard Service Bulletin No. 236, Ref. 955. E. Provide positive mechanical stops for both throttle levers so they cannot be moved into the reverse range. (1) Item 2, of NWA Mechanical Order No. 479, dated November 21, 1950, is considered acceptable to accomplish this. (2) Comply with items 3 and 4 of NWA Mechanical Order No. 479, dated November 21, 1950. F. Items III.A, B, C, D, and E of AD 53-20-01 are to be accomplished by April 1, 1954. G. No later than November 1, 1953, all operating instructions regarding unfeathering procedures shall specify that the following practicesare to be observed, and shall indicate that the reason is to guard against jamming the pitch changing mechanism or possible inadvertent reversal during the unfeathering operation: (1) If unfeathering is being accomplished at night the wing illumination lights or landing lights are to be used to permit observation of propeller operation. (2) The propeller is to be watched during unfeathering and the button is to be released when rotation starts. (This should normally be in 1 or 2 seconds.) (3) The tachometer is not to be used as a guide for determining when unfeathering is to be terminated.
2013-11-01: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Iniziative Industriali Italiane S.p.A. Models Sky Arrow 650 TC, Sky Arrow 650 TCN, Sky Arrow 650TCS, and Sky Arrow 650TCNS airplanes. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as improper installation of the spherical bearing on the central hinge lever and a crack on the weld length of the horizontal tail/elevator plane hinge assembly. We are issuing this AD to require actions to address the unsafe condition on these products.
74-07-03: 74-07-03 DOWTY ROTOL: Amendment 39-1803 as amended by Amendment 39-2110. Applies to Dowty Rotol type (c)R 209/4-40-4.5/2, (c)R 245/4-40-4.5/13, and (c)R 259/4-40- 4.5/17 propellers installed on, but not necessarily limited to, Nihon Model YS-11 and YS-11A Series airplanes and Convair Models 600(240D), 640(340D), and 640(440D) Series airplanes equipped with Rolls-Royce Dart Model 542 Series engines. Compliance is required as indicated. To prevent possible propeller failure resulting from cracking of full width case hardened rollers in the bottom (C.F.) race of the propeller blade bearings, accomplish the following: (a) For propellers having blade bearing assemblies that incorporate Modification No. (c) VP2416 (SB61-509) or Modification No. (c) VP2677 (SB61-709) having sets of rollers P/N's 601026724 or 601026940, comply with paragraphs (b) and (c). (1) Before further flight, after each report of significant propeller induced vibration in flight, except that theairplane may be flown in accordance with FAR Section 21.197 to a base where the repair can be performed; and (2) If initial compliance is not required by paragraph (a)(1), within the next 600 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD or before the accumulation of 2,000 hours' time in service on blade bearing bottom (C.F.) race rollers, whichever occurs later. (b) Replace sets of rollers specified in paragraph (a) in accordance with Dowty Rotol Service Bulletin No. 61-542-8, Revision 2, dated December 20, 1972, for type (c)R 209/4-40- 4.5/2 propellers; Dowty Rotol Service Bulletin No. 61-542-9, dated June 21, 1973, for type (c)R 245/4-40-4.5/13 and (c)R 259/4-40-4.5/17 propellers; (1) With new parts of the same part number and thereafter continue to replace sets of rollers specified in paragraph (a) in accordance with subparagraph (a)(1) and at intervals not to exceed 2,000 hours' time in service on blade bearing bottom (C.F.) race rollers, and comply with paragraph (c) at each replacement; or (2) With through hardened sets of rollers which incorporate Modification No. (c) VP2762 (SB61-771) or Modification No. (c) VP2814 (SB61-795). (c) At each set of roller replacement required by paragraphs (a) and (b), determine the number of broken rollers and the preload in each bearing assembly in accordance with Dowty Rotol Service Bulletin No. 61-542-8, Revision 2, dated December 20, 1972 for type (c)R 209/4- 40-4.5/2 propellers; Dowty Rotol Service Bulletin No. 61-542-9, dated June 21, 1973, for type (c)R 245/4-40-4.5/13 and (c)R 259/4-40-4.5/17 propellers; or an FAA-approved equivalent. If ten or more rollers are found to be broken or if the preload is found to be less than .0035 inches, before further flight, remove the associated propeller blade, blade retaining bolt, and bearing assembly from service, mark them in a manner that will prevent their further use, and replace them with serviceable parts of the same part numberor FAA-approved equivalents. (d) The replacement of sets of rollers required by paragraphs (a) and (b) and the inspections required by paragraph (c) may be discontinued when through hardened sets of rollers which incorporate Modification No. (c) VP2762 (SB-771) or Modification No. (c) VP2814 (SB61-795) are installed in accordance with Dowty Rotol Service Bulletin No. 61-542-8, Revision 2, dated December 20, 1972, for type (c)R 209/4-40-4.5/2 propellers; Dowty Rotol Service Bulletin No. 61-542-9, dated June 21, 1973, for type (c)R 245/4-40-4.5/13 and (c)R 259/4-40-4.5/17 propellers; or an FAA-approved equivalent. Amendment 39-1803 became effective April 19, 1974. This amendment 39-2110 is effective March 27, 1975.
98-24-06: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to all Dornier-Werke G.m.b.H. (Dornier) Model Do 27 Q-6 airplanes. This AD requires repetitively inspecting the rivets that attach the forward stabilizer attach fitting to the airplane fuselage for looseness, and replacing any loose rivets. This AD is the result of mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the airworthiness authority for Germany. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent the stabilizer from detaching at the forward stabilizer attach flanges because of loose rivets, which could result in reduced or loss of control of the airplane.
98-24-13: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to Eurocopter Model MBB-BK117 A-1, A-3, A-4, B-1, B-2, and C-1 helicopters, that currently requires initial and repetitive inspections of both surfaces of the tail boom vertical fin (vertical fin) spar, the skin, and the left-hand and right-hand frame sheets for cracks or loose rivets. That AD also requires repairing certain cracks, if found, and repairing and reporting those loose rivets and certain other cracks, if found. This amendment requires the same inspections, repairs, and reporting as the existing AD, but changes the reference to the service bulletin and prohibits the use of blind rivets for the vertical fin spar repair. This amendment is prompted by an accident that occurred on April 15, 1997, resulting in one fatality. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent failure of the vertical fin and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.