Results
76-14-04: 76-14-04 LOCKHEED-CALIFORNIA COMPANY: Amendment 39-2668. Applies to Model L-1011-385 series airplanes, certificated in all categories. Compliance required as indicated. To prevent in-flight losses of the main landing gear fixed and hinged strut doors, the requirements of paragraphs (a) and (b) must be accomplished until the modification of paragraph (c) is performed. (a) Within the next 300 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless the modification of paragraph (c) is already accomplished, accomplish the following: (1) Modify the existing landing gear maximum extend speed placard in the airplane flight station to reduce the approved landing gear maximum extend speed (VLE) from 300 KIAS/0.85M to 250 KIAS/0.73M. (2) Amend the Limitations Section of the Lockheed L-1011 FAA Approved Airplane Flight Manual, LR 25925, as follows: "Landing Gear Operating Speed, VLO: Extension, 250 KIAS/O.73M Landing Gear Extended Speeds, VLE: 250 KIAS/0.73M The Landing Gear Operating Speed, VLO, and Landing Gear Extended Speed, VLE is 300 KIAS/O.85M when FAA-approved Lockheed Service Bulletins 093-52-010, 093-52-050, 093-52- 051, 093-52-074, and 093-52-078 are accomplished, as applicable." (3) Amend the Limitations Section of Appendix 7 of the Lockheed L-1011 FAA Approved Airplane Flight Manual, LR 25925, to add the following limitations: "Flights with landing gear extended in accordance with this Appendix are prohibited unless paragraphs (i) or (ii) or (iii), below, are accomplished: (i) FAA-approved Lockheed Service Bulletins, 093-52-010, 093-52- 050, 093-52-051, 093-52-074 and 093-52-078 are accomplished, as applicable. (ii) VMO is reduced to 250 KIAS, and an FAA-approved airspeed/Mach indicator with a maximum speed pointer set at 250 KIAS is installed, and the FAA- approved aural overspeed warning is reset for 250 KIAS. (iii) All main landing gear fixed and hinged strut doors are removed prior to flight." (b) Within the next 800 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, and at 800 hours' time in service intervals thereafter, perform visual integrity inspections of the main landing gear fixed and hinged strut doors in accordance with instructions of the L-1011 Maintenance Manual, Sections 32-12-02 and 32-12-03 dated June 23, 1976 or later FAA- approved revisions, and accomplish repairs and replacements as necessary. (c) Within the next 9000 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, modify the main landing gear fixed and hinged strut doors by incorporation of the following FA-approved Lockheed-California Company Service Bulletins, as applicable, or later FAA-approved revisions or equivalent modifications approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA, Western Region. Service Bulletin Date 093-52-010 June 12, 1972 093-52-050 May 27, 1975 093-52-051 December 7, 1973 093-52-074October 7, 1975 093-52-078 June 16, 1975 (d) The requirements of paragraphs (a) and (b) may be removed after the modification of paragraph (c) has been accomplished. Equivalent modifications and replacements may be approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA, Western Region. Airplanes may be flown to a base for the accomplishment of the modifications required by this AD, per FAR's 21.197 and 21.199, provided the requirements of paragraph (a) are observed. This amendment becomes effective July 14, 1976.
90-20-22: 90-20-22 BOEING: Amendment 39-6728. Docket No. 90-NM-44-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: Model 737 series airplanes, as listed in Alert Service Bulletin 737- 57A1197, dated December 21, 1989, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent fuel vapor leaks into the inboard fixed leading edge landing light cavities, resulting in fuel vapor ignition, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tWithin the next 180 days after the effective date of this AD, inspect the wings' inboard leading edge landing and runway turn-off/taxi light cavities for improper fuel vapor barrier sealing, in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-57A1197, dated December 21, 1989. If the sealing is found to be improperly applied, rework the vapor barrier sealing prior to further flight, in accordance with the service bulletin. \n\n\tB.\tWithin 10 days after the inspection required by paragraph A. of this AD, if configuration discrepancies are discovered, submit a report of findings to the Manager, Seattle Manufacturing District Office, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue S.W., Renton, Washington 98055-4056. \n\n\tC.\tAn alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. \n\n\tNOTE: The request should be submitted directly to the Manager, Seattle ACO, and a copy sent to the cognizant FAA Principal Inspector (PI). The PI will then forward comments or concurrence to the Seattle ACO. \n\n\tD.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Boeing CommercialAirplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue S.W., Renton, Washington 98055-4056. \n\n\tThis amendment (39-6728, AD 90-20-22) becomes effective on October 23, 1990.
2025-06-11: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain ATR--GIE Avions de Transport R[eacute]gional Model ATR42-500 and ATR72-212A airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report of the possible use of improper material during the manufacturing of vertical stabilizer to horizontal stabilizer junction fittings. This AD requires inspections of affected parts, applicable repairs, and eventual replacement of certain affected parts, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2025-06-05: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Dassault Aviation Model FALCON 7X, FALCON 900EX, and FALCON 2000EX airplanes. This AD was prompted by reported occurrences of swelling of the lithium-polymer internal and external batteries of certain electronic display units (EDUs). This AD requires modifying certain EDUs and prohibits the installation of affected parts, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is proposed for incorporation by reference (IBR). The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
75-08-07: 75-08-07 ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL CORP., GENERAL AVIATION DIVISION: Amendment 39-2160. Applies to Model 690A airplanes, Serial Numbers 11100 through 11208. Compliance required within 25 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless otherwise accomplished. To minimize the possibility of bleed air line failure and resultant leakage, accomplish the following: Modify Model 690A airplanes in accordance with Rockwell International, General Aviation Division, Service Bulletin Number 147 dated November 27, 1974, except that the requirements of Paragraphs "s" and "u" may be ignored and the first item under "SUPPLY DATA" may be deleted, or later approved revision, or in accordance with an equivalent procedure approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, Flight Standards Division, Southwest Region, Federal Aviation Administration. This amendment becomes effective on April 10, 1975.
2013-11-15: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Eurocopter Deutschland GmbH (Eurocopter) Model BO-105A, BO-105C, BO- 105S, BO-105LS A-1, BO-105LS A-3, EC135 P1, EC135 P2, EC135 P2+, EC135 T1, EC135 T2, EC135 T2+, MBB-BK 117 A-1, MBB-BK 117 A-3, MBB-BK 117 A- 4, MBB-BK 117 B-1, MBB-BK 117 B-2, MBB-BK 117 C-1, and MBB-BK 117 C-2 helicopters with certain part-numbered cantilever assemblies, cyclic stick locking devices, or cyclic stick holder assemblies installed. This AD requires modifying and identifying the cyclic stick cantilever or lock. This AD was prompted by pilots inadvertently taking off with the cyclic locked. The actions of this AD are intended to prevent a pilot taking off with the cyclic in the locked position, which could result in loss of control of the helicopter.
2013-11-16: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Hawker Beechcraft Corporation (Type Certificate Previously Held by Raytheon Aircraft Company) Model BAe.125 Series 800A (including C-29A and U-125), and 800B airplanes; and Model Hawker 800 (including variant U-125A) and 800XP airplanes modified in accordance with a certain winglet supplemental type certificate. This AD requires revising the Limitations section of the airplane flight manual (AFM) and installing placards on the instrument panel. This AD was prompted by reports of several instances of severe vibration and wing/aileron oscillations. We are issuing this AD to prevent vibration and wing/aileron oscillations, which could cause structural damage or lead to divergent flutter, and result in loss of integrity of the wing, loss of control of the airplane, and in-flight breakup.
2013-12-02: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Engine Alliance GP7270 and GP7277 turbofan engines. This AD was prompted by damage to the high-pressure compressor (HPC) stage 7-9 spool caused by failure of the baffle plate feature on affected HPC stage 6 disks. This AD requires initial and repetitive borescope inspections of the baffle plate feature and removal from service of the HPC stage 6 disk if the plate is missing material. This AD also requires mandatory removal from service of these HPC stage 6 disks at the next HPC module exposure. We are issuing this AD to prevent failure of the HPC stage 7-9 spool, uncontained engine failure, and damage to the airplane.
2013-11-12: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Bombardier, Inc. Model BD-100-1A10 (Challenger 300) airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of failure of a screw cap or end cap of the hydraulic system accumulator while on the ground, which resulted in loss of use of that hydraulic system and high-energy impact damage to adjacent systems and structures. This AD would require inspecting for the correct serial number of a certain hydraulic system accumulator, and replacing affected hydraulic system accumulators with new or serviceable accumulators. We are issuing this AD to prevent failure of a screw cap or end cap and loss of the related hydraulic system, which could result in damage to airplane structure and consequent reduced controllability of the airplane.
50-43-01: 50-43-01 DOUGLAS: Applies to All Model DC-6 Aircraft. \n\n\tTo be accomplished on or before the next major inspection where facilities are available and in any event by December 15, 1950, unless already accomplished at last previous tire change, and thereafter at the regular major inspection nearest to 330 hours. This inspection period may be extended to tire replacement periods by the assigned CAA Agent when the airline's service experience indicates that a satisfactory level of safety is being maintained. \n\n\tRemove the tires from all Goodyear main wheels, Model L20HBMF, wheel assemblies 9540049 and 9540332, and thoroughly inspect by Zyglo or equivalent methods the critical areas of the wheel, such as: \n\n\t1.\tBrake drive flange area. \n\n\t2.\tTire bead radius of the fixed flange. \n\n\t3.\tTire bead seat radius of the demountable flange. \n\n\t4.\tRadius of the demountable flange step. \n\n\t5.\tThe flange returning ring groove in the wheel. \n\n\tIf cracks are found in any of the critical areas at one of these inspections, the wheel should be retired from service.
2025-06-09: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Embraer S.A. Model ERJ 190-300 and ERJ 190-400 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report of a MAU 3B failure which led to brake fault advisory messages followed by loss of normal braking that was undetected until the brakes were pressed by the pilots. This AD requires revising the existing airplane flight manual (AFM) to incorporate procedures associated with the failure of certain modular avionics units (MAUs), as specified in an Ag[ecirc]ncia Nacional de Avia[ccedil][atilde]o Civil (ANAC) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2013-11-05: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Bell Model 214B, 214B-1, and 214ST helicopters with a certain tail rotor hanger bearing (bearing) installed. This AD requires inspecting the bearing to determine whether an incorrectly manufactured seal material is installed on the bearing. This AD is prompted by a report that certain bearings were manufactured with an incorrect seal material that does not meet Bell specifications. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent loss of bearing grease, failure of the bearing, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
69-13-08: 69-13-08 BRITTEN-NORMAN LTD: Amdt. 39-791 applies to BN-2 and BN-2A Aircraft with fuel line P/N NB-57-439. Compliance required as indicated. (a) To prevent fuel leaks in the engine compartment, before the next flight and before each subsequent flight, inspect fuel line P/N NB-57-439 installed between the engine driven fuel pump and the carburetor for evidence of leakage in accordance with Britten-Norman Ltd. Service Bulletin BN-2/SB.11 Issue 2 dated February 24, 1969, or later ARB approved issue, or an FAA approved equivalent. (b) If during the inspection required by paragraph (a) of this AD evidence of leakage is found, replace P/N NB-57-439 with a serviceable part of the same part number, or with Dunlop P/N 6/W2/121/51/51/24.0 or 6/W2/121/51/51/15.5. (c) The repetitive inspections required by paragraph (a) of this AD may be discontinued when Dunlop P/N 6/W2/121/51/51/24.0 or 6/W2/121/51/51/15.5 has been installed in accordance with Britten-Norman Ltd. Service Bulletin BN-2/SB 11 Issue 2, dated February 24, 1969, or later ARB approved issue, or an FAA approved equivalent. This amendment becomes effective July 2, 1969.
91-07-14: 91-07-14 BOEING: Amendment 39-6952. Docket No. 90-NM-223-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: Model 737 series airplanes, as listed in Boeing Service Bulletin 737-25- 1266, dated July 26, 1990, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required within 120 days after the effective date of this AD, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent a high voltage electrical shock hazard to flight deck personnel, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tInstall a new magnetic standby compass liner in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 737-25-1266, dated July 26, 1990. \n\n\tB.\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. \n\n\tNOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Seattle ACO. \n\n\tC.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington. \n\n\tThis amendment (39-6952, AD 91-07-14) becomes effective on April 29, 1991.
2013-11-04: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 747-100, 747-100B, 747-100B SUD, 747-200B, 747-200F, 747-300, 747-400, 747-400D, 747-400F, 747SR, and 747SP series airplanes; Model 767-200, -300, -300F, and -400ER series airplanes; and Model 777-200, -200LR, -300, and -300ER series airplanes. This AD was prompted by operator or in-service reports of burned Boeing Material Specification (BMS) 8-39 urethane foam, and a report from the airplane manufacturer indicating that airplanes were assembled, throughout various areas of the airplane (including flight deck and cargo compartments), with seals made of BMS 8-39 urethane foam, a material with fire-retardant properties that deteriorate with age. This AD requires replacing certain seals made of BMS 8-39 urethane foam. We are issuing this AD to prevent the failure of urethane seals to maintain sufficient Halon concentrations in the cargo compartments to extinguish or contain fire or smoke, andto prevent penetration of fire or smoke in areas of the airplane that are difficult to access for fire and smoke detection or suppression.
2013-10-07: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus Model A300 B4-601, B4-603, B4-620, B4-605R, and B4-622R airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report that the door frame shells of passenger doors 2 and 4 may not have sufficient structural strength to enable the airplane to operate safely. This AD requires reinforcing the door frame shells of passenger doors 2 and 4 on both sides of the fuselage. We are issuing this AD to prevent structural failure of the door frame shells, which could result in in-flight decompression of the airplane and consequent injury to passengers.
2025-06-12: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 777-200, -200LR, -300, -300ER, and 777F series airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report indicating that an airplane experienced a glideslope (G/S) beam anomaly during an instrument landing system (ILS) approach, which resulted in a higher- than-expected descent rate during the final segment of an ILS approach. The flightcrew might follow misleading flight director (F/D) guidance after disconnecting the autopilot, without reference to the other available information and flight deck indications. This AD requires installing new autopilot flight director computer (AFDC) operational program software (OPS) and doing a software configuration check. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
74-23-04: 74-23-04 BELLANCA: Amendment 39-2001 as amended by Amendment 39-2111. Applies to Bellanca Models 8KCAB aircraft S/N's 4-71 thru 159-74. To detect evidence of fatigue cracks and/or distortion of rib flanges, accomplish the following before further flight: A. Visually inspect the wing ribs for evidence of fatigue cracks and/or distortion of the rib flanges as follows: 1. Remove fabric from each of four doped-on round reinforcing rings located on lower surface of each wing adjacent to front spar. Use a sharp knife. 2. Using a flashlight (and mirror as necessary) inspect all ribs beginning at first rib outboard of fuel tank and each other rib outboard, to and including last outboard full rib, for general condition. 3. Examine particularly the area approximately 2" aft of front spar (just aft of rib reinforcing gusset) on rib top flange for evidence of cracks, distortion, and fabric holdown rivet looseness. B. If, as a result of inspection per ParagraphA, cracks, distortion or fabric rivet looseness are found in any of the inspected ribs, repair and reinforce all 30 ribs, 15 ribs per wing, per Bellanca Kit No. 243. Equivalent repairs are to be approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, Great Lakes Region, before further flight. A special flight permit per FAR 21.197 may be issued after accomplishment of Paragraph A to allow repairs in accordance with this Airworthiness Directive. C. If, as a result of inspection per Paragraph A, no evidence of any cracks, distortion or fabric rivet looseness is found, repeat the required inspection after every 25 hours of flight. D. The inspection required by Service Letter #113 may be discontinued after installation of Bellanca Kit No. 243. Amendment 39-2001 was effective November 7, 1974. The telegraphic inspection portion was effective August 20, 1974; for all recipients of the air mail letter of August 20, 1974, which is contained in this amendment. This amendment 39-2111 becomes effective March 6, 1975.
2000-05-03: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Airbus A300-600 and A310 series airplanes, that requires repetitive high frequency eddy current (HFEC) inspections to detect cracking of the inner flange of fuselage frame FR73A, between beams 5 and 7, and corrective actions, if necessary. This amendment is prompted by issuance of mandatory continuing airworthiness information by a foreign civil airworthiness authority. The actions specified by this AD are intended to detect and correct fatigue cracking of the inner flange of fuselage frame FR73A, which could result in reduced structural integrity of the fuselage.
2013-10-03: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus Model A330-200 and -300 series airplanes; and Model A340-200, -300, -500, and -600 series airplanes. That AD currently requires a one-time detailed inspection of both main landing gear (MLG) bogie beams in the region of the bogie stop pad for detection of deformation and damage, and corrective actions if necessary. This new AD adds Model A330-200 Freighter series airplanes to the applicability. For certain airplanes, this new AD also adds repetitive inspections for damage and corrosion of the sliding piston sub-assembly, with new related investigative and corrective actions. This AD was prompted by reports of corroded bogie stop pads, including some with cracking. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct deformation or damage under the bogie stop pad of both MLG bogie beams, which could result in a damaged bogie beam and consequent detachment of the beam from the airplane or collapse of the MLG anddeparture of the airplane from the runway.
2013-09-08: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all The Boeing Company Model 737-300, -400, and -500 series airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of two in-service occurrences on Model 737-400 airplanes of total loss of boost pump pressure of the fuel feed system, followed by loss of fuel system suction feed capability on one engine, and in-flight shutdown of the engine. This AD requires repetitive operational tests of the engine fuel suction feed of the fuel system, and corrective actions if necessary. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct loss of the engine fuel suction feed capability of the fuel system, which, in the event of total loss of the fuel boost pumps, could result in dual engine flameout, inability to restart the engines, and consequent forced landing of the airplane.
80-12-12: 80-12-12 GOVERNMENT AIRCRAFT FACTORIES (GAF): Amendment 39-3798. Applies to Models N22B (Serial Nos. N22B-5 and up) and N24A (Serial Nos. N24A-42 and up), certificated in all categories, which have had a replacement trim tab hinge, P/N MS 20001-4, installed. Compliance required as indicated. To prevent loss of horizontal stabilizer trim tab, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 25 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, visually inspect and modify, as necessary, the attachment of the right-hand and left-hand trim tab hinge to horizontal stabilizer in accordance with GAF Nomad Alert Service Bulletin ANMD-27-16, dated February 12, 1980, or an FAA-approved equivalent. (b) Aircraft may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 and FAR 21.199 to a location where the modification can be accomplished. (c) For purposes of complying with this AD, an FAA-approved equivalent must be approved by the Chief, Engineeringand Manufacturing District Office, FAA, Pacific-Asia Region, Honolulu, Hawaii. NOTE: All persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer, may obtain copies upon request from the Government Aircraft Factories, 226 Lorimer Street, Port Melbourne, 3207 Vic., Australia. These documents may also be examined at the FAA, Engineering and Manufacturing District Office, 300 Ala Moana Blvd., Room 7321, Honolulu, Hawaii, 96850, and Rules Docket, Room 916, FAA, 800 Independence Avenue, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20591. This amendment becomes effective June 26, 1980.
2000-07-15: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11 series airplanes, that requires a one-time detailed visual inspection of the electrical connections to detect corrosion; repair, if necessary; and installation of new circuit breakers and associated wiring. This amendment is prompted by a report that the ratings of certain circuit breakers of a certain video entertainment system exceed the ratings of their associated electrical connector contacts. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent a disparity between the ratings of certain circuit breakers and their associated electrical connector contacts, which could damage the electrical connector contacts and cause possible arcing and heat damage to the electrical connector.
91-07-03: 91-07-03 LOCKHEED AERONAUTICAL SYSTEMS COMPANY: Amendment 39-6944. Docket No. 91-NM-17-AD. Applicability: All Model L-1011 series airplanes, certificated in any category. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. To prevent structural failure of the aft pressure bulkhead, accomplish the following: A. Except as provided in paragraph B. of this AD, within 30 days after the effective date of this AD, unless previously accomplished within the last 60 days, inspect the gore panels of the aft pressure bulkhead around the entire perimeter of the 1503618-145 (LH) and 1503618-143 (RH) reinforcing doublers, in accordance with Section 2. of the Accomplishment Instructions of Lockheed Service Bulletin 093-53-263, dated February 27, 1991. B. For airplanes on which inspections of the aft pressure bulkhead have been accomplished in accordance with Lockheed Service Wire PSC/90-531176-OW, dated December 21, 1990, prior to the effective date of this AD: The remaining inspections required by paragraph A. of this AD may be deferred for a period not to exceed 3,000 landings following the effective date of this AD. C. If cracks are found, prior to further flight, repair in accordance with a method approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. D. An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Los Angeles ACO, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. NOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Los Angeles ACO. E. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. All persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service information from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Lockheed Aeronautical Systems Company, 86 South Cobb Drive, Marietta, Georgia 30063, Attention: Commercial Order Administration, Dept 65-11, Building B-95, Zone 0577. This information may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue S.W., Renton, Washington; or at the Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 3229 East Spring Street, Long Beach, California. This amendment (39-6944, AD 91-07-03) becomes effective on April 3, 1991.
2025-05-09: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus Helicopters Model SA330J helicopters. This AD was prompted by the determination that new or more restrictive airworthiness limitations are necessary. This AD requires revising the existing maintenance records by incorporating new or more restrictive airworthiness limitations, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.