Results
2022-09-17: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Scheibe-Aircraft-GmbH Model SF 25 C gliders. This AD was prompted by mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI identifies the unsafe condition as severe corrosion on the inner surface of the control stick tube. This AD requires inspecting the left-hand (LH) and right-hand (RH) control sticks for corrosion and, if corrosion is found, replacing the affected control stick. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2004-16-14: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Thales Avionics TA/RA VSI-TCAS indicators, installed on but not limited to certain transport category airplanes equipped with TCAS II change 7 computers (ACAS II), that requires a revision to the airplane flight manual (AFM) to advise the flightcrew to follow the audio annunciation when an RA fail message is triggered during a multi-aircraft encounter. This action also requires modification of the software for the TA/RA VSI-TCAS indicator, which would terminate the requirement for the AFM revision. This action is necessary to prevent the TA/RA VSI-TCAS indicator from displaying a conflicting "RA FAIL" message during a multi-aircraft encounter, which could result in the flightcrew ignoring the correct aural command and traffic display information if the flightcrew believes the TCAS II computer has malfunctioned, and consequently lead to a mid-air collision with other aircraft. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
2022-09-07: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2019-11-05 for certain Bell Helicopter Textron Canada Limited (now Bell Textron Canada Limited) Model 429 helicopters. AD 2019-11-05 required inspecting the tail rotor (TR) pitch link assemblies, and replacing certain pitch link bearings. This AD was prompted by a report of a worn pitch link, and the FAA's determination that all TR pitch link assemblies are affected by the unsafe condition. This AD continues to require the actions specified in AD 2019-11-05, and revises the applicability and requires inspections of certain other TR pitch link assemblies. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
96-19-03: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all McDonnell Douglas Model DC-10 and MD-11 series airplanes and KC-10A (military) airplanes, that requires repetitive inspections to detect corrosion or failure of the steel Hi-Lok fasteners at the inboard flap inboard track, and replacement of corroded/failed steel Hi-Lok fasteners with inconel Hi-Lok fasteners. This amendment also provides for termination of the repetitive inspections by replacing all of the steel Hi-Lok fasteners with inconel Hi-Lok fasteners. This amendment is prompted by reports of failed and/or corroded steel fasteners found in the inboard flap inboard track due to stress corrosion. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent such stress corrosion, which could result in binding of the flap and inability of the flap to extend or retract; this situation may lead to asymmetric flap deployment and subsequent reduced controllability of the airplane during flight.
47-49-06: 47-49-06 LOCKHEED: (Was Mandatory Note 39 of AD-763-3.) Applies to Model 49 Serials 2076 to 2088, Inclusive. Compliance required not later than next No. 3 inspection (or not later than next 150 hours for non-air-carrier operations). The rear oil pressure gage operational placard on the flight engineer's panel, LAC P/N 296770, must be removed or replaced with new placard, LAC P/N 296995 or equivalent. (LAC Service Bulletin 49/SB-245 covers this same subject.)
2004-16-10: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 767-200 and -300 series airplanes equipped with off-wing escape slides, that requires an inspection of the door-opening actuators for the off-wing slide compartment on the right and left sides of the airplane to determine the actuator cartridge serial number, and corrective actions, if necessary. This action is necessary to prevent the door-opening actuators for the off- wing slide compartment from not firing, which could cause the door to open improperly and prevent the deployment of the off-wing escape slide, leading to the loss of an evacuation route. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
71-08-05: 71-08-05 FAIRCHILD-HILLER: Amdt. 39-1183 as amended by Amendment 39-1204 is further amended by Amendment 39-1315. Applies to all FH-227 and F-27 airplanes certificated in all categories. Compliance required as indicated. To detect cracks in FH-227 and F-27 Main Landing Gear Drag Strut Assemblies P/N 2.00259.002 Issue 2 and Issue 3, having 5000 hours' time or more accomplish the following: a) Within the next 100 hours after the effective date of this AD unless already accomplished within the past 1100 hours and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 1200 hours: 1) Inspect the end fittings of Drag Strut Assembly P/N 2.00259.002 Issue 2 and Issue 3 at the taper dowel holes using a penetrant flaw detection method in conjunction with a glass of at least 10 power or an equivalent method approved by the FAA. 2) Replace cracked parts before further flight, except that the airplane may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a base where the replacement can beperformed. 3) Upon request with substantiating data submitted through an FAA maintenance inspector, the compliance times specified in this AD may be increased by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Eastern Region. Equivalent inspections, and parts must be approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Eastern Region. 4) Report the results of the initial inspection findings required by this AD to the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Eastern Region (reporting approved by the Bureau of the Budget under B.O.B. No. 04-R0174). Amendment 39-1183 was effective April 16, 1971. Amendment 39-1204 was effective May 11, 1971. This Amendment 39-1315 is effective October 14, 1971.
2022-09-01: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Bombardier, Inc., Model CL-600-1A11 (600), CL-600-2A12 (601), and CL-600-2B16 (601-3A, 601-3R, and 604 Variants) airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report of smoke in the aft cabin during a maintenance activity, which an investigation determined was caused by a faulty drain line ribbon heater. This AD requires a general visual inspection of all affected potable water-line ribbon heater installations and corrective actions and other specified actions. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2004-16-01: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus Model A330, A340-200, and A340-300 series airplanes. This AD requires repetitive inspections for cracking of the chromed area of the left and right piston rods for the main landing gear (MLG) retraction actuators, and related investigative and corrective actions if necessary. This AD is prompted by reports of the piston rods for the MLG retraction actuators rupturing during flight. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct corrosion pitting and cracking of the piston rods for the MLG retraction actuators, which could result in rupture of a piston rod, non-damped extension of the MLG, high loads on the fully extended MLG, and consequent reduced structural integrity of the MLG.
99-15-08: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 747-200 and -300 series airplanes, that currently requires various inspections and functional tests to detect discrepancies of the thrust reverser control and indication system, and correction of any discrepancy found. This amendment reduces the repetitive interval for one certain functional test. This amendment is prompted by reports indicating that several center drive units (CDU) were returned to the manufacturer of the CDU's because of low holding torque of the CDU cone brake. The actions specified by this AD are intended to ensure the integrity of the fail safe features of the thrust reverser system by preventing possible failure modes in the thrust reverser control system that can result in inadvertent deployment of a thrust reverser during flight.
99-15-13: This amendment supersedes Airworthiness Directive (AD) 98-09-09, which currently requires replacing the internal cooling air fan with a fan that incorporates a white impeller on all Alexander Schleicher Segelflugzeugbau (Alexander Schleicher) Model ASH 26E sailplanes. This AD requires inspecting the internal cooling air fan for damage, and replacing any fan that does not incorporate a black impeller with a fan that incorporates a black impeller either immediately or at a certain time period, depending on the results of the inspection. This AD is the result of mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the airworthiness authority for Germany. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent failure of the internal cooling system air fan caused by a certain design configuration of the impeller, which could cause the engine to overheat with possible engine failure.
2022-08-05: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 737-800 series airplanes. This AD was prompted by the determination that insufficient sealing may allow water to enter the lower lobe electronic equipment (EE) bay through the main deck floor structure at the rigid cargo barrier (RCB), which could cause damage to EE bay line replacement units (LRUs) in the E5 rack. This AD requires detailed inspections for the presence and condition of sealant at certain locations and applicable on-condition actions. This AD also requires replacing the moisture barrier tape at a certain location, replacing the weather seal at a certain location, and installing seat track fillers. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
70-12-01: 70-12-01 GENERAL DYNAMICS: Amdt. 39-1000. Applies to all Model 340 and 440 Series airplanes including those modified in accordance with STC SA4-1100 or STC SA1096WE. Compliance required as indicated. Within the next 50 hours time in service, after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished within the last 450 hours time in service, visually inspect MLG beam webs P/N 340-1650551-7, -8, -53 and -54 for crack indications in the upper flange radius area by dye penetrant inspection procedures, in accordance with General Dynamics 640-(340D) Service Bulletin No. 57-3, dated April 17, 1970, or later FAA approved revision, or an equivalent inspection procedure approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. (a) If no cracks are found, repeat the inspection procedure outlined above at intervals not to exceed 500 hours time in service from the last inspection. (b) If cracks are found as a result of any of the inspections outlined above, accomplish one of the following before further flight: (1) If MLG beam web cracking exceeds seven inches total length and/or extends more than two inches forward or aft of the 340-8510109 MLG trunnion fitting, the beam web must be replaced. (2) If MLG beam web cracking is less than 2.75 inches long and oriented in a wing chordwise direction along the web flange bend radius, either: (i) Stop drill the crack in accordance with Section 2(B)(3) of S.B. 57-3 or an equivalent rework approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region, and reinspect for further crack propagation at intervals not to exceed 50 hours time in service until the beam is reinforced per (3) below or replaced per (1) above, or (ii) Replace the beam web. (3) If cracks are between 2.75 inches and 7.00 inches in length and do not extend more than two inches forward or aft of the 340-8510109 MLG trunnion fitting, either replace the beam web or stop drill and reinforce the beam web per Section 2(B)(4) of S.B. 57-3 or an equivalent rework approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. If the beam web is stop drilled and reinforced, it must be reinspected for further crack propagation at intervals not to exceed 500 hours time in service or until the beam web is replaced. (c) Cracks propagating beyond a stop drill hole may be restop drilled providing the crack length remains within the limits outlined above. (d) Normal inspection intervals may be resumed when the beam web is replaced. This amendment becomes effective June 4, 1970.
2022-08-10: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2020-12-07 for certain Hamilton Sundstrand Corporation (Hamilton Sundstrand) 54H model propellers. AD 2020-12-07 required initial and repetitive eddy current inspections (ECI) of certain propeller blades and replacement of the propeller blades that fail the inspection. This AD was prompted by a report of the separation of a 54H60 model propeller blade installed on a United States Marine Corps Reserve (USMCR) KC-130T airplane during a flight in July 2017. This AD requires initial and repetitive ECI of all propeller blades installed on Hamilton Sundstrand 54H60 propeller hubs and replacement of any propeller blade that fails inspection. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2004-15-21: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Agusta S.p.A. (Agusta) Model A109K2 helicopters. This action requires dye-penetrant inspecting the tail rotor trunnion (trunnion) assembly for a crack at specified intervals, replacing any cracked trunnion with an airworthy trunnion, and reporting any failed trunnion. This amendment is prompted by the report of an accident involving a tail rotor hub and blade assembly separating from the helicopter due to fatigue failure of the trunnion. The cause for the crack in the trunnion has not been determined and is still under investigation. This condition, if not detected, could result in failure of the trunnion, loss of the tail rotor hub and blade assembly, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
2022-08-13: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Pratt & Whitney Canada Corp. (P&WC) PT6A-34, -34B, -34AG, -114, and - 114A model turboprop engines. This AD was prompted by several reports of low-time fractures of compressor turbine (CT) blades resulting in loss of power or in-flight shutdown (IFSD) of the engine. This AD requires replacement of certain CT vanes. This AD also requires removal from service of certain CT blades when these blades have been operated with certain CT vanes. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2004-15-22: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the specified Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation (Sikorsky) model helicopters that requires installing a Number 5 bearing chip detector in each engine, installing an on-board chip detector annunciation system, and revising the Rotorcraft Flight Manual (RFM) to add procedures for crew response to an on-board chip detector annunciation. This amendment is prompted by reports of the failure of the engine's Number 5 bearing that resulted in erratic movement of the high-speed engine-to-transmission shaft (shaft), oil leakage, an in-flight fire and an emergency landing. The actions specified by this AD are intended to detect an impending engine bearing (bearing) failure, which, if undetected and not addressed by appropriate crew action, may result in oil leakage, severing of the shaft housing, an uncontained in-flight fire, and a subsequent emergency landing.
48-10-02: 48-10-02 BELL: Applies to Models 47B Series and 47D. Compliance required by April 1, 1948. As a precautionary measure, remove main wood rotor blades and inspect area between the outboard edge of face plates and inboard edge of fiberglass cover, and also the extreme butt end for wood checks or cracks. When inspection is completed, the extent of check, cracks and wood condition found should be reported to the manufacturer who has provided forms for this purpose in his Service Bulletin. Report also if inspection results reveal no checks or cracks. Upon completion of inspection and prior to flight the cracks should be filled with Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co. 3M adhesive filler No. EC612. After the filler has dried, five brush coats of Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co. adhesive sealer No. EC498 should be applied to the inspected area. If no checks or cracks are present, only the five brush coats of sealer must be applied. (Bell Service Bulletin No.47C47, revised March 4, 1948, contains more detailed information on this subject.)
2013-02-11: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus Model A310-203 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report of an analysis that demonstrated a reduced fatigue life for the side link bolts, center sway link bolts, and thrust link bolts on the forward engine mounts. This AD requires repetitive replacement of those bolts. We are issuing this AD to prevent deterioration of the structural integrity of the bolts, which could result in possible damage to an engine or wing.
2022-08-08: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus SAS Model A318 series airplanes; Model A319-111, -112, - 113, -114, -115, -131, -132, and -133 airplanes; Model A320-211, -212, -214, -216, -231, -232, and -233 airplanes; and Model A321-111, -112, - 131, -211, -212, -213, -231, and -232 airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports that, during inspections accomplished as specified in certain airworthiness limitation items (ALIs), cracks were detected in the double joggle areas at frame (FR) 16 and FR20 in the nose forward fuselage. This AD requires repetitive special detailed inspections of certain areas and applicable on-condition actions, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2004-15-03: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for General Electric Company (GE) CF34-3A1 and -3B1 series turbofan engines with certain serial numbers (SNs) of stage 5 low pressure turbine (LPT) disks, part number (P/N) 6078T92P01, and or certain SNs of stage 6 LPT disks, P/N 6089T89P01. This AD requires initial and repetitive visual and eddy current inspections of those disks. This AD also allows as optional terminating action to the repetitive inspections, replacement of those SN disks. This AD also requires replacement of certain stage 5 and stage 6 LPT disks. This AD results from a report of a stage 5 LPT disk that failed due to cracking from low-cycle-fatigue (LCF) during factory testing. We are issuing this AD to prevent LCF failure of stage 5 LPT disks and stage 6 LPT disks, which could lead to uncontained engine failure.
49-38-02: 49-38-02 DOUGLAS: Applies to All Models C-54 and DC-4 Aircraft. \n\n\tTo be accomplished at every 9,000 hours total airplane flight time. \n\n\tIn those cases where the present bolts have or will have accumulated more than 9,000 hours time prior to the next regular overhaul period, the first replacement time may be extended, at the discretion of the CAA Inspector, to coincide with a regular overhaul period but in no case should the adjustment time exceed 1,500 hours accumulated after January 26, 1948. Thereafter the bolt replacement shall be at the 9,000- or 18,000-hour period, whichever is applicable. \n\n\tReplace the following bolts: Fuselage to Center Wing Attachment; Outer Wing to Center Wing Attachment; Vertical Stabilizer Attachment to Fuselage Tail, Station 953; Engine Mount to Fire Wall Attachment; Horizontal Stabilizer to Fuselage Tail Assembly Attachment. \n\n\tThe 9,000-hour period may be extended to 18,000 hours when studs 4105725-1 and -2 in outer wing attachment have been replaced with special studs Nos. 4357723-1 and -2 having letter "R" stamped on thread end and bolts in all other attachments listed are replaced with NAS bolts with threads rolled after heat treatment. \n\n\tThe bolt part numbers and the number of bolts required are shown on pages 4 and 5 of the Douglas Service Magazine of August 1947. Bolts removed from the airplane are to be scrapped and are not to be used again. \n\n\t(Douglas Service Letter No. 66, Supplement No. 2, dated July 18, 1951, covers this same subject relative to wing alignment at Station 421.) \n\n\tThis supersedes AD 48-04-03.
2013-01-07: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Turbomeca S.A. Arriel 2D turboshaft engines. This AD was prompted by a low fuel pressure event caused by deterioration and a loss of the low- pressure drive function within the hydro-mechanical metering unit (HMU). This AD requires replacing the HMU at a reduced life. We are issuing this AD to prevent an uncommanded in-flight shutdown of the engine, and possible loss of the helicopter.
2022-07-15: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus SAS Model A318, A319, A320, and A321 series airplanes. This AD was prompted by the detection of several channel failures on a newly developed braking and steering control unit (BSCU). This AD requires replacing affected BSCUs and revising the operator's existing FAA- approved minimum equipment list (MEL), as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. This AD also limits the installation of affected parts. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2004-15-18: The FAA supersedes Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2003-24-13, which applies to certain Cessna Aircraft Company (Cessna) Models 172R, 172S, 182S, 182T, T182T, 206H, and T206H airplanes that are equipped with a certain Honeywell KAP 140 autopilot computer system installed on the center instrument control panel near the throttle. AD 2003-24-13 currently requires you to install an update to the operating software of certain KAP 140 autopilot computer system, change the unit's part number, and change the software modification identification tab. This AD is the result of the FAA inadvertently omitting four affected Honeywell KAP 140 autopilot computer system part numbers and an affected airplane serial number from the applicability section of AD 2003-24-13. This AD retains the actions required in AD 2003-24-13, corrects the applicability section, and incorporates a revised installation bulletin issued by Honeywell.