Results
2017-10-05: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus Model A300 series airplanes; and Model A300 B4-600, B4-600R, and F4-600R series airplanes, and Model A300 C4-605R Variant F airplanes (collectively called Model A300-600 series airplanes). This AD was prompted by reports indicating that on airplanes that received a certain repair following crack findings, cracks can re-initiate. This AD requires repetitive inspections of the center wing frame (FR) 40 lower outboard radius for cracking, and related investigative and corrective actions if necessary. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2011-03-07: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Prompted by an accident * * *, the FAA published Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR) 88, and the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) published Interim Policy INT/POL/25/12. The design review conducted by Fokker on the F28 in response to these regulations revealed that, in case of a lightning strike, an ignition source can develop in the wing tank vapour space during fuel transfer from bag tank CWT [center wing tank], if the electrical power for refuelling is not switched off after refuelling. Service experience has revealed situations where the power switch of the Fuelling Control Panel (FCP) appeared to be "ON'' with the access panel closed. The cam on the access panel that should operate the power switch, if forgotten by flight crew or maintenance staff, can pivot away during closing of the panel, which may result in the switch staying in the "ON'' position. This condition, if not corrected, could result in a wing fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the aeroplane. * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
98-07-19: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Systems (MDHS) Model 369F and 369FF helicopters, that requires removing the tail rotor control rod assembly (rod assembly) and replacing it with an airworthy rod assembly. This amendment is prompted by a failure of a rod assembly during a proof-load test conducted by the manufacturer. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent buckling of the rod assembly when subjected to ultimate jam loads, loss of tail rotor control, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
79-23-02: 79-23-02 BOEING: Amendment 39-3605. Applies to all Model 727 and 737 series airplanes with the "carry-all" interior. Compliance required as indicated. Accomplish the following: \n\n\tWithin the next 1,200 hours time-in-service or six (6) months after the effective date of this AD, whichever comes first, unless already accomplished, replace the straight orifice fittings on the Boeing part number 10-60513-18, -19, and -20 latch valves and manifold assemblies of the PSU with the redesigned barbed orifice fitting and O-ring in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 727-35-A18 dated July 6, 1979, or Boeing Service Bulletin 737-35-A1014 dated July 6, 1979, as applicable, and Puritan-Bennett Service Letter 210780-35-1 dated May 25, 1979, or later FAA-approved revisions. These passenger oxygen service unit manifolds are to be renumbered and functionally tested in accordance with the applicable service bulletin after the new barbed orifice fittings and O-rings have been installed. Thecompliance time prescribed above may be extended to 2,400 hours time-in-service or one (1) year after the effective date of this AD, whichever comes first, by limiting the operational altitude of the airplane to 25,000 feet. \n\tThe manufacturer's specifications and procedures identified and described in this directive are incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1). All persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Boeing Commercial Airplane Company, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. These documents may also be examined at FAA, Northwest Region, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington 98108. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective November 15, 1979.
2005-20-11: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Rolls-Royce Corporation (formerly Allison Engine Company, Allison Gas Turbine Division, and Detroit Diesel Allison) (RRC) Models 250-C28, - C28B, and -C28C turboshaft engines. This AD requires a onetime visual inspection of the seal joint in each passage between airfoils at the hub and shroud of third-stage turbine wheels, part number (P/N) 6899383. This AD results from reports of three failed third-stage turbine wheels and from the manufacturer's analysis of those failures. We are issuing this AD to prevent loss of power and uncommanded engine shutdown due to failure of the third-stage turbine wheel.
2017-10-23: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus Model A321 series airplanes. This AD was prompted by a determination that cracks could develop on holes at certain fuselage frame locations. This AD requires repetitive inspections for cracking on holes at certain fuselage frame locations, and repairs if necessary. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2017-10-16: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 787-8 and 787-9 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report indicating that a portion of the sealant above the engine pylon between the wing skin and the vapor barrier might have been omitted. This AD requires an inspection for missing sealant in the seam on the outside and inside of the engine struts, and corrective actions if necessary. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2003-17-07 R1: The FAA is revising an existing airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to various transport category airplanes manufactured by McDonnell Douglas. We issued that AD to require a one-time test of the fire extinguishers for the engine and auxiliary power unit (APU), as applicable, to determine the capability of the Firex electrical circuits to fire discharge cartridges, and troubleshooting actions if necessary. This new AD removes certain transport category airplanes from the applicability of the existing AD. This AD results from reports indicating that fire extinguishers for the engine and auxiliary power unit had failed to discharge when commanded. We are issuing this AD to prevent failure of the fire extinguishers to fire discharge cartridges, which could result in the inability to put out a fire in an engine or in the APU. \n\nDATES: The effective date of this AD is September 24, 2003. \n\n\tOn September 24, 2003 (68 FR 50058, August 20, 2003), the Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of certain service bulletins listed in the AD.
80-13-08: 80-13-08 VARGA (Morrisey): Amendment 39-3808. Applies to Varga (Morrisey) Model 2150 and 2150A airplanes certificated in all categories. Compliance is required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To prevent possible reversal of throttle command, accomplish the following: (a) Within 50 hours' time in service from the effective date of this AD, or at the next annual inspection, whichever occurs sooner, install a throttle stop to limit the allowable throttle movement in accordance with Varga Service Letter SL 2150A-1 dated April 29, 1980. Adjust throttle linkage so that the crank arm does not come closer than 1/8 inch to the stop with the throttle in the most forward position. After installation, conduct engine ground power test to determine that full engine take off power is available. (b) Alternative inspections, modifications or other actions which provide an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA, Western Region. This amendment becomes effective June 27, 1980.
2009-01-07: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Bombardier Aerospace has completed a system safety review of the CL-600-2C10/CL-600-2D24 aircraft fuel system against new fuel tank safety standards, introduced in Chapter 525 of the Airworthiness Manual through Notice of Proposed Amendment (NPA) 2002-043. The identified non-compliances were assessed using Transport Canada Policy Letter No. 525-001 to determine if mandatory corrective action is required. This assessment showed that rupture of the fuel tank climb vent loop pipe or leakage from pipe couplings could result in fuel coming in contact with hot anti-ice ducts, creating potential fire on top of the centre fuel tank. * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
98-07-20: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to Eurocopter France Model AS 332C, L, and L1 helicopters that have not been modified in accordance with Eurocopter France Modifications 332A07-41.569 and 332A07-66.150. This action requires revisions to the Limitations section of the Rotorcraft Flight Manual (RFM) to prohibit flight into meteorological conditions that may produce lightning for helicopters that are not equipped with lightning-resistant tail rotor blades. A terminating action is provided in the AD by the installation of tail rotor blades having a lightning-resistant system. This amendment is prompted by the forced ditching of a Model AS 332 helicopter after experiencing a lightning strike. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent damage to the tail rotor blades that could result in loss of a tail rotor blade and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
61-25-02: 61-25-02 CONVAIR: Amdt. 373 Part 507 Federal Register November 29, 1961. Applies to All Model 22 (880) and Model 22M (880M) Aircraft. Compliance with paragraphs (a) and (b) required within 4,000 hours' time in service after effective date of this directive. Compliance with paragraph (c) is required on effective date of this directive. An inflight engine pod explosion occurred on a Model 22 airplane causing the loss of a nose cowl and portions of the side cowl panel doors. This incident has been attributed to an open starter bleed air supply valve causing continued rotation and subsequent overheating and disintegration of the air turbine starter. The following modifications and procedures are required to prevent the recurrence of this incident: (a) Provide a FAA approved cockpit indicating means by which it can be determined that each engine starter is de-energized. Approval of this item shall be processed through the FAA, Flight Standards Service, Engineeringand Manufacturing Branch, Western Region. (b) Concurrently with the incorporation of the modification described in paragraph (a), the Normal Procedures Section of the Models 22 and 22M FAA Approved Airplane Flight Manual, under that portion entitled "Engine Starting Procedure - Ground", shall be revised to include a provision that the flight crew determine that the cockpit indicating means required by paragraph (a) indicates that the starter is de-energized after each engine start. (c) Pending completion of the modifications required by paragraph (a) of this AD either install placard in the flight compartment on the pilot's start switch panel to read as follows: "Engine ground starts shall be made according to Convair Alert Service Bulletin No. 80-3", or revise the Normal Procedures Section of the Models 22 and 22M FAA Approved Airplane Flight Manual, under that portion entitled "Engine Starting Procedure - Ground", to provide for engine ground starts to be made according toConvair Alert Service Bulletin No. 80-3 or FAA Approved equivalent. This directive effective December 29, 1961.
2005-19-03: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD), which applies to all BAe Systems (Operations) Limited Model ATP airplanes. That AD currently requires revising the Airworthiness Limitations Section (ALS) of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness to incorporate life limits for certain items and inspections to detect fatigue cracking in certain structures. This new AD requires a revision to the ALS of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness to incorporate new inspections to detect fatigue cracking of certain significant structural items (SSIs) and to revise life limits for certain equipment and various components. This AD is prompted by a determination that existing inspection techniques are not adequate for certain SSIs and by the revision of certain life limits. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct fatigue cracking of certain structural elements, which could adversely affect the structural integrity of these airplanes.
2010-24-06: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an airworthiness authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as Subsequent to accidents involving Fuel Tank System explosions in flight * * * and on ground, * * * Special Federal Aviation Regulation 88 (SFAR88) * * * required a safety review of the aircraft Fuel Tank System * * *. * * * * * Fuel Airworthiness Limitations are items arising from a systems safety analysis that have been shown to have failure mode(s) associated with an `unsafe condition' * * *. These are identified in Failure Conditions for which an unacceptable probability of ignition risk could exist if specific tasks and/or practices are not performed in accordance with the manufacturers' requirements. * * * * * Weare issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
98-07-08: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to all IAI, Ltd., Model 1125 Westwind Astra and Astra SPX series airplanes. This action requires disabling of the baggage compartment electrical heating blankets. This amendment is prompted by issuance of mandatory continuing airworthiness information by a foreign civil airworthiness authority. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent overheating of the electrical heating blankets, and consequent increased risk of fire in the baggage compartment.
98-07-05: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Saab Model SAAB 2000 series airplanes, that requires replacement of the main landing gear (MLG) trunnion fittings with reinforced trunnion fittings. This amendment is prompted by the issuance of mandatory continuing airworthiness information by a foreign civil airworthiness authority. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent collapse of the MLG due to fatigue cracking of the MLG trunnion fittings.
79-22-01: 79-22-01 BELLANCA: Amendment 39-3596. Compliance is required within the next 30 days or 10 hours of aircraft time in service, whichever occurs first, after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. To prevent exhaust system cracking, accomplish the following on Bellanca Model 7ECA (S/N 985-74 thru 1319-79), 8KCAB (S/N 120-74 thru 550-79 equipped with Lycoming AEIO-360 series engine), and 8GCBC(S/N 1-74 thru 323-79) aircraft: 1. Remove the upper and lower engine cowling. 2. Inspect exhaust system with particular attention to the welded area between the riser tube and the exhaust flange, for cracks, fractures or evidence of exhaust leakage. Remove the heater shroud and inspect the muffler body for cracks, fractures or evidence of exhaust leakage. If any exhaust system component is cracked or otherwise damaged, remove the exhaust system and repair/replace damaged parts in accordance with FAA Advisory Circular 43.13-1A. 3. Loosen exhaust port studnuts several turns; check bead clamps for tightness such that the clamps cannot rotate on the exhaust system with hand pressure. The riser flanges (1) must have equal spacing to the exhaust port pad at both studs (a small amount of flange bow is acceptable), (2) must be free to move up and down on the exhaust port studs without binding and (3) must all contact the exhaust port pads together. 4. If any of the alignment checks are unsatisfactory, determine the cause for the misalignment and repair or replace the part as required. 5. Assemble exhaust system and install on engine with loose exhaust port stud nuts and bead clamp bolts. Torque exhaust port stud nuts to the correct value. Tighten bead clamp bolts until clamps secure risers to exhaust system but allow clamps to rotate with hand pressure; the bead clamps should not be rigidly clamped to the tubes but should be able to rotate on the tubes with moderate hand pressure on the clamp assembly. NOTE: Torque all exhaust port stud nuts evenly and tighten bead clamp bolts evenly to insure uniform loads within the exhaust system parts; torquing bolts individually can cause very large stresses. 6. Inspect exhaust system for proper clearance between ducts, wiring, controls, etc. before reinstallation of the cowling. Install lower cowling and inspect for proper clearance between exhaust outlet and cowl. 7. Reinstall the lower and upper engine cowling. Bellanca Service Letter Number C-138 covers this same subject. Any equivalent method of compliance with this AD must be approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Great Lakes Engine.. This amendment becomes effective October 29, 1979.
98-06-25: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to Fairchild Aircraft Inc. (Fairchild) Models SA226-AT, SA226-TC, SA227-AC, and SA227-AT airplanes. This action would require inspecting the cargo door lower belt frames at the cargo latch receptacles for cracks in the belt frames, repairing any cracks, and reinforcing the cargo door lower belt frames by installing doublers. The AD is the result of a decompression incident during flight caused by fatigue at the bottom of the cargo door on a Fairchild Model SA226-TC. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent the failure of the cargo door in flight, which could cause decompression injuries to passengers and substantial structural damage to the airplane.
2017-10-22: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 737-600, -700, -700C, -800, and -900 series airplanes. This AD was prompted by an evaluation by the design approval holder (DAH) indicating that the web lap splices in the aft pressure bulkhead are subject to widespread fatigue damage (WFD). This AD requires repetitive inspections of the web lap splices in the aft pressure bulkhead for cracking of the fastener holes, and repair if necessary. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2017-09-02: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Airbus Helicopters Deutschland GmbH Helicopters (Airbus Helicopters) Model MBB-BK 117 C-2 and MBB-BK 117 D-2 helicopters. This AD requires installing rivets to the air inlet cover rings (rings). This AD was prompted by reports of rings detaching. The actions of this AD are intended to prevent the unsafe condition on these products.
79-01-01: 79-01-01 BEECH: Amendment 39-3386. Applies to the following models and serial number airplanes, certificated in all categories, except those that have previously complied with AD 74-13-02: MODELS SERIAL NUMBERS ITEM NUMBERS (Refers to Items in Table I) F33A CE-447 through CE-684 (1), (2) F33A CE-372 (2) F33C CJ-31 through CJ-128 (1), (2) G33 CD-1292 through CD-1304 (1), (2) 35-C33 CD-970 (1), (2) 35-C33, 35-C33A CD-1066 & CE-62 (2) 35-B33 CD-700 (2) V35B D-9478 through D-9480, D-9482 through D-9531, D-9533 through D-9536 and D-9539 through D-9968 (1) A36 E-323 (2) A36 E-441 through E-954 (1), (2) D55 & D55A TE-485, TE-615, TE-703 and TE-710 (2) E55 & E55A TE-790, TE-911 (2) E55 & E55A TE-905, TE-923 through TE-937, TE-939, TE-940, TE-942, and TE-943 through TE-1084 (1), (2) 56TC TG-78 and TG-83 (2) 58 & 58A TH-49, TH-77, TH-114, TH-180, TH-217, TH-324 (2) 58 & 58A TH-145, TH-340 and TH-343 through TH-779(1), (2) 58P & 58PA TJ-2 through TJ-97 (1), (2) 58TC & 58TCA TK-1 through TK-37 (1), (2) 65-B80 LD-441 through LD-511 (1), (3), (5), (6), (7) 70 LB-31 through LB-35 (1), (3), (5), (6), (7) B90 & C90 LJ-500 through LJ-706 (1), (3), (5), (6), (7) E90 LW-1 through LW-209 (1), (3), (5), (6), (7) 95-A55 TC-241 (1) 95-B55 & 95-B55A TC-661 and TC-1510 (2) 95-B55 & 95-B55A TC-1570 through TC-2011 (1), (2) 95-C55 & 95-C55A TE-271 (2) 95-C55 & 95-C55A TE-415 (1) 99, 99A, A99A, B99 U-134 through U-164 (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7) 100 & A100 B-61 through B-178, B-180 through B-204 and B-206 through B-231 (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7) B100 BE-1 through BE-19 (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7) 200 BB-2 through BB-185, & BB-187 through BB-199 (3), (4), (8), (9), (10) COMPLIANCE: Required as indicated unless already accomplished. To assure continued structural integrity of certain screws in the airplane control system, in accordance with instructions set forth herein and in Beechcraft Service Instructions No. 0629- 150, Revision II or later approved revisions, accomplish the following: A) Within 100 hours time-in-service after the effective date of this AD: For affected models and serial numbers, determine those Item Numbers applicable thereto by referring to the column above entitled "Item Numbers". Next, determine the number, type and location of screws by referring to Table I of this AD (see below). Replace each screw at the specified location except that an existing screw need not be replaced if inspection shows that the head has at least one raised or depressed "X" mark. Replace the screws one at a time at the hinge brackets to retain original alignment of the bracket. B) Any equivalent means of compliance with this AD must be approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Central Region. TABLE I Item 1. Two AN502-10-10 screws securing each hinge bracket at leading edge of rudder or ruddervator. Item 2. Two AN502-10-10 screws securing each hinge bracket at leading edge of elevator. Item 3. Two AN502-10-12 screws securing elevator control cables to forward bellcrank under pilot's compartment left floorboard. Item 4. Two AN503-8-8 screws securing elevator control cables to aft bellcrank in fuselage tail section. Item 5. Two AN503-8-10 screws securing rudder control cables to forward bellcrank under pilot's compartment floorboard aft of left rudder pedals. Item 6. Two AN503-8-6 screws securing rudder control cables to aft bellcrank in the fuselage tail section. Item 7. Two AN503-8-6 screws securing aileron control cables to bellcrank under floorboard just forward of the rear spar. Item 8. Two AN503-8-8 screws securing rudder control cables to forward bellcrank under pilot's compartment floorboard aft of left rudder pedals. Item 9. Two AN503-8-8 screws securing rudder control cables to the aft quadrant assembly in the fuselage tail section. Item 10. Two AN503-8-8 screws securing aileron control cables to bellcrank under floorboard just forward of the rear spar. This AD supersedes AD 74-13-02, Amendment 39-1874 (39 FR 20784). NOTE: Scheduling accomplishment of this Airworthiness Directive simultaneously with accomplishment of Airworthiness Directive No. 78-22-05 will result in a savings of man-hours. This amendment becomes effective January 8, 1979.
63-22-01: 63-22-01 GRUMMAN: Amdt. 632 Part 507 Federal Register October 25, 1963. Applies to Model G-164 Aircraft Serial Numbers 1 through 220. Compliance required within the next 100 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. To prevent damage to fuel and oil lines from spray pump fan blades, rivet two 0.063 inch thick 2024-T3 aluminum alloy sheets approximately 6 inches wide by 18 and 28 inches long each, to the left and right lower accessory cowl panels using at least 10 and 16 AD 4 type rivets respectively. Center the plate's long dimension opposite the spray pump fan blade arc. (Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation Model G-164 Service Bulletin No. 23, dated June 17, 1963, pertains to this same subject and also lists the availability of Grumman armor plates P/N's A1624-111 and -113.) This directive effective October 25, 1963.
2017-09-05: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Airbus Helicopters Model AS332C, AS332C1, AS332L, AS332L1, AS332L2, and EC225LP helicopters. This AD requires repetitively checking screws in the emergency flotation gear. This AD is prompted by a report that a screw ruptured on a Model AS332 helicopter's emergency flotation gear. These actions are intended to correct an unsafe condition on these products.
83-25-02: 83-25-02 HILLER AVIATION: Amendment 39-4784. Applies to Models UH-12D, UH-12E, UH12E 4 Place, H-23F, and OH-23G series helicopters equipped with main rotor blades P/N 53200-03, serial numbers 038 through 286, certificated in any category. Hiller Model UH-12 series helicopters converted to turbine power by STC SH177WE or SK178WE are affected by this AD. Compliance is required as indicated (unless already accomplished). To prevent possible main rotor blade failure due to the delamination of the main rotor blade root doublers or skin bond separation, accomplish the following: (a) Prior to further flight after the effective date of this AD, and prior to each subsequent flight, visually check the main rotor blade root doubler area for evidence of delamination. This check includes all doublers on the leading edge and trailing edge surfaces, upper and lower, from the fork attachment plate to the tip of the outboard doubler. Delamination will be evidenced by a lifting of the doubler edges and/or cracks in the painted surface. (b) If the check indicates delamination, prior to further flight, replace the blade with a like serviceable part or consult the Manager, Western Aircraft Certification Office, for instructions and disposition of the blade. Descriptive data regarding the extent of the delamination must be made available to the FAA. (c) The check required by paragraph (a) of this AD may be performed by the pilot, provided his logbook is endorsed by a properly rated mechanic stating that the pilot has been trained to conduct the check. (d) Within the next 50 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 50 hours time in service from the last inspection, inspect the main rotor blade root doubler area for evidence of delamination in accordance with paragraph 2.B of Hiller Aviation Service Letter 51-3A, Revision 1, dated October 17, 1983, or an equivalent as noted in paragraph (i).If delamination is found, comply with paragraph (b). (e) Within the next 100 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 100 hours time in service from the last inspection, inspect main rotor blades for evidence of skin bond separation in accordance with paragraph 2.A of Hiller Aviation Service Bulletin UH-12-51-7, Revision 1, dated October 3, 1983, or an equivalent as noted in paragraph (i). NOTE: The main rotor blade bond separation occurred on the blade tip leading edge and extended a distance of approximately 2 feet. (f) If the main rotor blade inspection indicates skin bond separation, prior to further flight, replace blade with a like serviceable part or consult the Manager, Western Aircraft Certification Office, for instructions and disposition of the blade. Descriptive data regarding the extent of the skin bond separation must be made available to the FAA. (g) Mark all rejected blades "UNAIRWORTHY"on the blade upper and lower surface at the approximate mid span with lettering at least 2 inches high, and using a metal stamp, impress "UNAIRWORTHY" on the data plate. (h) All checks and inspections are to be recorded in aircraft maintenance records. (i) Alternative inspections, modifications, or other actions which provide an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Western Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, P.O. Box 92007, Worldway Postal Center, Los Angeles, California 90009. This supersedes Amendment 39-3897 (45 FR 56331), as amended by Amendment 39- 3935 (45 FR 65997), AD 80-18-01 R1. This amendment becomes effective December 29, 1983.
2017-09-07: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Airbus Helicopters Deutschland GmbH (Airbus Helicopters) Model MBB-BK117 C-2 helicopters. This AD requires inspecting the pilot collective wiring harness and was prompted by a report that the heat-shrinkable sleeve prevented the twist grip on the collective from being fully engaged during a flight test. The actions of this AD are intended to prevent an unsafe condition on these products.