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2019-16-05: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all The Boeing Company Model 777 airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of uncommanded fore/aft movements of the Captain's and First Officer's seats. This AD requires an identification of the part number, and if applicable the serial number, of the Captain's and First Officer's seats, and applicable on-condition actions for affected seats. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2013-26-09: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Turbomeca S.A. ASTAZOU XIV B and XIV H engines. This AD was prompted by reports of cracks on the 2nd-stage turbine disk. This AD requires replacement of the 2nd-stage turbine disk. We are issuing this AD to prevent disk cracking, uncontained 2nd-stage turbine blade release, damage to the engine, and damage to the helicopter.
78-05-06: 78-05-06 GOODYEAR AEROSPACE CORPORATION: Amendment 39-3151 as amended by Amendment 39-3173 is further amended by Amendment 39-3249. Applies to Goodyear flexible fuel cells, construction type BTC-39 series manufactured between 1961 and 1971, installed on, but not necessarily limited to the following aircraft models, all series, manufactured between January 1961 and December 1973, or in which these fuel cells may have been installed as replacements after those dates. Beech - H18, 35-B33, 35-C33, E33 and F33; 35-C33A, E33A, and F33A; E33C and F33C; P35, S35, V35, V35-TC, V35A, V35A-TC, V35B and V35B-TC; 36 and A36; 45 (T34A), B45 and D45 (T34B); D50E, J50; 95-A55, 95-B55 and 95-B55A; 95-C55, 95-C55A, D55, D55A, E55 and E55A; 95-B55B (T42A); 56TC and A56TC; 58 and 58A; 60, A60 and B60; 65, A65 and A65-8200; 70; 65-80, 65-A80, 65-A80-8800 and 65-B80; 65-88; 65-90, 65-A90; B90; C90; E90; D95A and E95A; 99, 99A, A99A and B99; 100 and A100; and any other Beechcraft airplane models orserial numbers other than those listed above on which Goodyear BTC-39 construction fuel cells have been installed as spares replacements; Cessna - 180, 182, 185, 188 with wing tanks, 205, 206, 207, 210, 310, 320, 340, 401, 402, 411, 414, 421; Israel Aircraft (including Aero Commander/Rockwell International) 1121 and 1123; Piper - PA-25 and PA-31; Rockwell International General Aviation Division - All models prefixed by 500, 560, 680, 681, 685, 690 and 720. Compliance is required, as indicated, unless already accomplished. To prevent a hazard to the airplane due to fuel cell leakage caused by deterioration of the cell or cell nipples, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 25 hours time in service after the effective date of this A.D., or within the next 30 calendar days after the effective date of this A.D., whichever occurs first, check aircraft records and manufacturer's instructions. If aircraft records or manufacturer's service data confirm that no Goodyear construction BTC-39 series cells are installed, no further action is required, except entry in the aircraft maintenance records that this check has been accomplished. If any or all fuel cells installed are of the Goodyear BTC-39 construction series or are of unknown manufacturer or construction, conduct the checks, test and inspection specified in (b) and (c). NOTE: Information to assist in identifying BTC-39 fuel cells, and applicable aircraft serialization, may be found in the following service instructions, or later approved revisions: Beech Service Instruction Number 0895; Cessna Single Engine Service Letter SE78-10; Cessna Multi-Engine Service Letter ME78-7; Israel Aircraft Service Bulletins CJ-17 for Model 1121, and WW-20 for Model 1123; Piper Service Bulletin No. 591; and Rockwell General Aviation Division Service Bulletin No. 165. (b) Within the next 25 hours time in service after the effective date of this A.D.,or within the next 30 calendar days after the effective date of this A.D., whichever occurs first, fill the fuel tanks and perform a visual check of the exterior of the aircraft wings and/or fuselage for signs of fuel leakage. Fuel wetness or color dye stains may be noted, especially in the vicinity of vents and compartment drains. Fuel stains due to overfill are not considered leakage. The visual check required by this paragraph may be performed by the pilot. Notation in the aircraft records is required by FAR 91.173(a)(2)(v). (1) If signs of fuel leakage are observed, determine the leakage source. (2) If leakage source is other than fuel cells or fuel cell nipples, correct in accordance with aircraft manufacturer's instructions prior to further flight. (3) If leakage is from fuel cell or nipples, proceed with the inspection required in (c)(8) prior to further flight. (c) Within the next 100 hours time in service after the effective date of this A.D. or within the next 180 calendar days after the effective date of this A.D., whichever occurs first, determine whether the vent nipples and fuel cell material, including the material end fittings, above the normal fuel level are intact and secure by accomplishing the fuel system integrity test and inspection as required in accordance with the applicable manufacturer's service information listed in (a) above, or as prescribed below: (1) Position the airplane in an area of stable temperature, free from radiant heat and strong air currents, with the aircraft in approximately normal ground attitude, wings level. Install an adapter with a standpipe on the tank filler neck and another adapter and standpipe on the tank vent exit tube. The open ends of the two standpipes should terminate at approximately the same level, 12 to 14 inches above the highest part of the tank. The tank selector should be OFF. NOTE: Some aircraft incorporate a vent system that interconnects the vent outlets of two or more tanks. Since fuel or air may flow through the interconnects from one tank to another, this characteristic must be considered in conducting the integrity test for leakage. On such aircraft it will be acceptable to conduct the integrity pressure test simultaneously on the interconnected tanks instead of on each tank individually. CAUTION: Observe appropriate safety measures for handling fuel, fuel systems and fueled aircraft. (2) Fill tank and standpipe and inspect for evidence of fuel leakage. Allow one or two minutes for the fuel level to stabilize. CAUTION: Do not overpressurize tank as structural damage might occur. The 12-inch standpipe pressure specified will not exceed allowable limits for tank/fuel system pressure. Maintain the standpipe fuel level for not less than 15 minutes after fuel level stabilization occurs, unless fuel leakage is observed sooner. Fuel tank or system leakage may also be revealed by a reduction in the height of fuel in the standpipe. (3) If the standpipe fuel level remains stabilized for 15 minutes, and if there is no evidence of fuel leakage, the test may be discontinued for that tank. (4) Repeat the test of (c)(1) and (c)(2) for each tank that incorporates a cell of BTC-39 or a tank cell of unknown type construction. (5) If no leaks are observed, the test may be terminated. The fuel system should be returned to normal flight configuration, and the aircraft may be returned to service. Make notation in the aircraft records in accordance with FAR 91. (6) If there is evidence of fuel leakage, determine the source of the leak. (7) Repair fuel system leaks, other than fuel cell or nipple leaks, in accordance with the appropriate aircraft manufacturer's instructions. (8) If evidence of fuel cell or nipple leakage is observed, conduct the following inspection of each cell and all nipples for the source of the leak. (i) Drain fuel tanks and remove access covers or plates. (ii) After thorough purging of the tank interiors to remove fuel vapors, use explosion-proof light and mirror and visually inspect the interior and exterior (where accessible) of each cell suspected of leakage for cracking, peeling or other signs of deterioration. (iii) Inspect the tank retaining fasteners and determine that they are properly positioned and fastened. (iv) Inspect vent, drain and all nipples. These may be inspected by the fingernail test to give an indication of the condition of the nipple. The fingernail test consists of using the fingernail to attempt to scrape the compound off the nipple fitting. If the compound has not degraded, the fingernail will glide across the surface without damage to the compound. If an unsatisfactory condition exists, the fingernail will tend to dig into the compound. The deteriorated compound will have a consistency of either art gum or chewing gum. (v) Remove any fuel cell found leaking or with deteriorated nipples. BTC-39 series type cells which have been removed are not repairable, and must not be installed as a serviceable cell in an aircraft. Other type cell construction may be repaired in accordance with the applicable manufacturer's instructions by a person authorized in FAR Part 43. (vi) Install serviceable fuel cells, reconnect fuel cell and fuel system, and access covers, and functionally pressure check fuel system in accordance with aircraft manufacturer's service data or item (c). (d) Repeat the integrity pressure test and inspection required in (c) at intervals not to exceed 12 months until all BTC-39 type construction fuel cells or cells of unknown construction have been replaced. (e) An equivalent means of compliance with this A.D. is to comply with the aircraft manufacturer's instructions listed in (a), provided that the visual check is accomplished at the compliance time required in (b) and that the inspection and tests are conducted at the intervals specified by (c) and (d). Any other method must be approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, Federal Aviation Administration, Southern Region. (f) Upon request of the operator, an FAA maintenance inspector may adjust the inspection interval specified in (c) and the repetitive inspection interval specified in (d) of this A.D. to permit compliance at an established inspection period of the operator if the request contains substantiating data to justify the increase for that operator. The time for conducting the checks required by (a) and (b) may not be adjusted. Amendment 39-3151 became effective March 17, 1978. Amendment 39-3173 became effective April 10, 1978. This amendment 39-3249 becomes effective June 30, 1978.
2001-04-16: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to General Electric Company (GE) CF6-50 series turbofan engines. That AD currently requires visual inspection of the stage 2 low pressure turbine (LPT) nozzle lock assemblies, and replacement of the borescope plug with a new design plug. This amendment is prompted by a report of an uncontained engine failure on an engine that had complied with the current AD. This amendment requires additional inspections and provides interim and terminating corrective actions. The actions specified in this AD are intended to detect cracked, loose or missing stage 2 LPT nozzle lock assembly studs that could lead to failure of the locks, nozzle segment rotation, LPT case machining, and subsequent uncontained failure of the engine. The actions also provide for modifications of nozzle lock assemblies if the nozzle lock studs are found cracked, loose, or missing.
2013-02-08: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Bombardier, Inc. Model CL-600-2B19 (Regional Jet Series 100 & 440) airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report that the safe life limit and inspection requirements for the horizontal stabilizer trim actuator (HSTA) attachment pins and trunnions were not listed in the Airworthiness Limitations Section of the maintenance program. This AD requires inspecting the trunnions and upper and lower pins for gouges, scratches, and corrosion, and replacing the trunnions if necessary; and adding serial numbers and new part numbers to certain trunnions, and upper and lower pins. This AD also requires revising the maintenance program to incorporate the information specified in certain temporary revisions of the limitations section. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct cracking, gouges, scratches, and corrosion of the HSTA attachment pins and trunnions, which could result in failure of these pins and trunnions and consequent disconnection of the horizontal stabilizer and subsequent loss of controllability of the airplane.
78-13-06: 78-13-06 PIPER AIRCRAFT CORPORATION: Amendment 39-3248. Applies to PA-31T type aircraft certificated in all categories, equipped with Cleveland main landing gear wheel assembly, Piper P/N 551775, Cleveland P/N 40-106. To detect cracks in the main landing gear wheel brakes, accomplish the following: (a) Prior to the next flight, visually check the weld joining the brake disc to the cup for circumferential cracks. If a crack is found, replace the disc with an airworthy part of the same P/N or with Cleveland brake disc, P/N 164-39F, before further flight. Check may be accomplished by the pilot. (b) Repeat paragraph (a) prior to each flight until Cleveland P/N 164-39F is installed. (c) Record results of each check in aircraft log or continuous inspection manual. This amendment is effective June 29, 1978.
2018-06-08: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 757-200 series airplanes. This AD was prompted by an evaluation by the design approval holder (DAH) indicating that the side panel-to-frame attachments and frames of the aft cargo compartment are subject to widespread fatigue damage (WFD). This AD requires an inspection of the side panel-to-frame attachments and frames to verify that certain modifications have been done, and applicable on-condition actions. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2004-12-05: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Model BAe 146 series airplanes, that requires repetitive detailed inspections of the inside of each air conditioning sound-attenuating duct, and corrective actions as necessary. This action is necessary to prevent impairment of the operational skills and abilities of the flightcrew caused by the inhalation of agents released from oil or oil breakdown products, which could result in reduced controllability of the airplane. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
2018-05-10: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Agusta S.p.A. (Agusta) Model AB412 and AB412 EP helicopters. This AD requires removing each shoulder harness seat belt comfort clip (comfort clip) and inspecting the seat belt shoulder harness. This AD is prompted by a report of a comfort clip interfering with the seat belt inertia reel. The actions of this AD are intended to prevent an unsafe condition on these helicopters.
2018-03-18: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Agusta S.p.A. (Agusta) Model AW189 helicopters. This AD requires inspecting and altering the emergency flotation system (EFS). This AD is prompted by a report of punctured EFS kits. The actions of this AD are intended to prevent an unsafe condition on these helicopters.
78-04-01: 78-04-01 BEECH: Amendment 39-3139. Applies to the following models and serial number airplanes, equipped with manually operated wing flaps, certificated in all categories: MODEL SERIAL NUMBERS 23, A23, A23A, B23, and C23 M-1 through M-1979 A23-19, 19A and B19 MB-1 through MB-866 A23-24 and A24 MA-1 through MA-368 A24R, B24R AND C24R MC-2 through MC-536 COMPLIANCE: Required a indicated unless already accomplished. To prevent failure of the wing flap control weld assembly and resulting possible unwanted in-flight retraction of the wing flaps, within the next 50 hours time-in-service after the effective date of this AD, accomplish the following in accordance with Beechcraft Service Instructions No. 0940 or later approved revisions: A) Remove flap control weld assembly and install Beech P/N 169-524024-85 flap control weld assembly. B) Any equivalent means of compliance with this AD must be approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Central Region. This amendment becomes effective on February 20, 1978.
78-21-03: 78-21-03 PIPER AIRCRAFT CORPORATION: Amendment 39-3316. Applies to Model PA-34-200T, serial numbers 34-7570001 through 34-7870207, certificated in all categories. \n\n\tCompliance is required within the next ten hours' time in service after the effective date of this A.D. unless already accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent a fuel leak, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tOn serial numbers 34-7570001 through 34-7870194, accomplish the following: \n\n\t\t(1)\tRemove the right and left engine nacelle aft hatch assemblies. \n\n\t\t(2)\tIn the right engine aft nacelle compartment, inspect the fuel inlet line to the boost pump at the mixture control cable for evidence of chafing. \n\n\t\t\t(i)\tIf chafing is evident, replace the fuel line with the approved fuel line, Piper Part Number 95153-145. Install protective sleeves, Piper Part Numbers 63882-73 and 63882-83, or equivalent fuel resistant flexible sleeves on the fuel inlet line and the mixture control cable. Secure the sleeves in place with tie raps, Piper Part Number 488-702 or equivalent fuel resistant devices (see Figure No. 1). Leak check the fuel line using normal maintenance procedures. \n\n\t\t\t(ii)\tIf no chafing is evident, remove existing clamps or Koroseal tie (if installed) and install protective sleeves, Piper Part Number 63882-73 and 63882-83, or equivalent fuel resistant flexible sleeves on the fuel inlet line and the mixture control cable. Secure the sleeves in place with tie raps, Piper Part Number 488-702, or equivalent fuel resistant devices (see Figure No. 1). \n\n\n\n\n\t\t(3)\tIn the left engine aft nacelle compartment, inspect the fuel inlet line to the boost pump at the propeller governor control cable for evidence of chafing. \n\n\t\t\t(i)\tIf chafing is evident, replace the fuel line with the approved fuel line, Piper Part Number 95153-144. Secure the fuel line to the control cable as shown in Figure No. 2. Leak check the fuel line using normal maintenance procedures. \n\n\t\t\t(ii)\tIf no chafing is evident, unless already accomplished, secure the fuel line to the control cable as shown in Figure No. 2. \n\n\n\n\t\t(4)\tReplace the right and left engine nacelle aft hatch assemblies and make appropriate maintenance record entry. \n\n\t(b)\tOn serial numbers 34-7870195 through 34-7870207, accomplish the following: \n\n\t\t(1)\tRemove the right engine nacelle aft hatch assembly. \n\n\t\t(2)\tInspect the fuel inlet line to the boost pump at the mixture control cable for evidence of chafing. \n\n\t\t\t(i)\tIf chafing is evident, replace the fuel line with the approved fuel line, Piper Part Number 95153-145. Install protective sleeves, Piper Part Number 63882-73 and 63882-83, or equivalent fuel resistant flexible sleeves on the fuel inlet line and the mixture control cable. Secure the sleeves in place with tie raps, Piper Part Number 488-702 or equivalent fuel resistant devices (see Figure No. 1). Leak check the fuel line using normal maintenance procedures. \n\n\t\t\t(ii)\tIf no chafing is evident, remove existing clamps or Koroseal tie (if installed) and install protective sleeves, Piper Part Number 63882-73 and 63882-83, or equivalent fuel resistant flexible sleeves on the fuel inlet line and the mixture control cable. Secure the sleeves in place with tie raps, Piper Part Number 488-702, or equivalent fuel resistant devices, (see Figure No. 1). \n\n\t\t(3)\tReplace the right nacelle aft hatch assembly and make appropriate maintenance record entry. \n\n\t(c)\tAn alternate method of compliance may be approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, Federal Aviation Administration, Southern Region. \n\n\t(Piper Service Bulletin 596A, dated September 11, 1978, pertains to this same subject.) \n\n\tThis supersedes Amendment 39-3222, 43 FR 22341, AD 78-11-04. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective October 26, 1978.
2007-16-10: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for TCM IO-550-N, TSIO-520-BE, TSIO-550-A, TSIO-550-B, TSIO-550-C, TSIO-550-E, and TSIO-550-G reciprocating engines. This AD requires removing before further flight, certain Kelly Aerospace Power Systems turbochargers, part number (P/N) 466304-0003, listed by serial number in this AD. This AD results from four incidents of the turbine rotor separating from the shaft of the turbocharger. We are issuing this AD to prevent the turbine rotor from separating from the shaft of the turbocharger due to a machining defect in the turbocharger compressor. This condition could result in full engine power loss, loss of engine lubricant, or smoke in the airplane cabin.
2004-16-09: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all Model 747 series airplanes, that requires repetitive detailed inspections of the aft pressure bulkhead for indications of "oil cans" and previous oil can repairs, and corrective actions, if necessary. An oil can is an area on a pressure dome web that moves when pushed from the forward side. This action is necessary to detect and correct the propagation of fatigue cracks in the vicinity of oil cans on the web of the aft pressure bulkhead, which could result in rapid decompression and overpressurization of the tail section, and consequent loss of control of the airplane. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
95-15-08: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all British Aerospace Model Viscount 744, 754D, and 810 airplanes, that requires an inspection to detect corrosion of the tailplane assemblies, and correction of discrepancies. This amendment is prompted by a report of corrosion on the main spar top and bottom forward boom of the tailplane assemblies and reports of cracking in the upper root joint attachment fitting. The actions specified by this AD are intended to detect and prevent such cracking or corrosion of the main spar forward booms or the upper root joint attachment fitting, which consequently could lead to the failure of the tailplane assemblies; this condition could result in reduced controllability of the airplane.
78-08-12: 78-08-12 PIPER AIRCRAFT CORPORATION: Amendment 39-3194. Applies to Piper Aircraft Corporation Model PA-31T certificated in all categories. To provide additional information on flap system operation, insert the following CAUTION or Piper PA-31T, Revision 12 of December 27, 1977, in the FAA Approved Airplane Flight Manual, Piper Report 1740 or Revision 4, dated December 9, 1977, to the Pilot's Operating Handbook, Piper Report 2048. CAUTION When selecting an "Approach" flap position and the selector is inadvertently moved beyond the "Approach" detent, the selector must be returned to its original position and then back to "Approach" in order to reprogram the selector. Returning the selector to the "Approach" detent without re-programming will return the flaps to their original position. This amendment is effective April 26, 1978.
2007-16-01: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Enstrom Helicopter Corporation (Enstrom) Model F-28, F-28A, F-28C, F- 28C-2, F-28C-2R, F-28F, F-28F-R, 280, 280C, 280F, 280FX, TH-28, 480, and 480B helicopters. This action requires a visual check to determine if a certain serial-numbered main rotor blade retention pin (retention pin) is installed, and removing and replacing any affected retention pin with an airworthy retention pin. This amendment is prompted by a report from the manufacturer that some retention pins were not manufactured in accordance with specifications cited on the engineering drawing. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent failure of a retention pin, separation of a main rotor blade from the helicopter, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
78-01-02: 78-01-02 PIPER: Amendment 39-3107. Applies to Piper Models PA-31 and PA-31-325 Serial Nos. 31-7612001 thru 31-7612080, 31-7612082 thru 31-7612091, 31-7612096, 31-7612099, 31-7612101, 31-7612102, 31-7612104, 31-7612105, 31-7612107 and 31-7612108, PA-31-350 Serial Nos. 31-7652001 thru 31-7652015, 31-7652017 thru 31-7652162, and 31-7652164 thru 31-7652170 certificated in all categories. To prevent adverse stability or handling qualities due to incorrect tension in the elevator bungee, accomplish the following within the next 25 hours in service after the effective date of this Airworthiness Directive unless already accomplished. (a) Inspect the elevator bungee spring for correct tension, (30 lb. + 1 lb. for model PA-31 and 37 lb. + 1, -0 for models PA-31-325 and PA-31-350). (b) If the tension is not correct, before further flight alter the link in accordance with the "Instructions" section of Piper Service Bulletin No. 549 dated February 16, 1977, or equivalent approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Eastern Region. (c) Upon submission of substantiating data through an FAA Maintenance Inspector, the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Eastern Region may adjust the compliance time specified above. This amendment is effective January 3, 1978.
2001-04-12: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Eurocopter France Model EC120B helicopters. This action requires visually checking the engine to main gearbox coupling tube assembly (tube) for a crack and replacing any cracked tube. This amendment is prompted by a report of a crack detected on a tube. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent a tube failure, loss of engine drive, and a subsequent forced landing.
2007-15-07: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Boeing Model 747-100, 747-100B, 747-200B, 747-200C, 747-200F, 747-300, 747SR, and 747SP series airplanes. This AD requires repetitive high frequency eddy current inspections for cracks of the fuselage skin at stringer 5 left and right between stations 340 and 350, and corrective actions if necessary. This AD results from reports of fatigue cracks in the fuselage skin near stringer 5 between stations 340 and 350. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct fatigue cracking of the fuselage skin near stringer 5. Cracks in this area could join together and result in in-flight depressurization of the airplane.
77-21-03: 77-21-03 PIPER: Amendment 39-3056. Applies to Model PA-36-285, Serial Nos. 36-7360001 through 36-7760003 certificated in all categories. To prevent hazards in flight associated with rudder spar cracks, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 50 hours in service from the effective date of this AD unless previously accomplished within the past 50 hours in service and at intervals not to exceed 100 hours in service from the last inspection, inspect the rudder spar at hinge attachment points for cracks using a magnifying glass of at least ten power. (b) If cracks exist replace the rudder assembly with a new rudder assembly Piper Part No. 98125-04 or equivalent. (c) Upon the incorporation of rudder assembly, Piper Part No. 98125-04 or equivalent, compliance with the requirements of this AD may be dispensed with. (d) Equivalent inspection and repairs must be approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Eastern Region. (e) Upon submission of substantiating data by an owner or operator through an FAA Maintenance Inspector, the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Eastern Region may adjust the inspection intervals specified in this AD. (Piper Service Bulletin No. 518 refers to this subject.) This amendment is effective October 18, 1977.
2001-04-08: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to certain Boeing Model 737-600, -700, -800, and -700C series airplanes. This action requires initial and repetitive inspections of the elevator tab assembly to detect any damage or discrepancy; and corrective actions, if necessary. This action is necessary to prevent excessive in-flight vibrations of the elevator tab, which could lead to loss of the elevator tab and reduced controllability of the airplane. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
2019-16-15: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Pratt & Whitney (PW) PW1519G, PW1521G, PW1521GA, PW1524G, PW1525G, PW1521G-3, PW1524G-3, PW1525G-3, PW1919G, PW1921G, PW1922G, PW1923G, and PW1923G-A model turbofan engines. This AD was prompted by corrosion found on the high-pressure compressor (HPC) front hub, which could result in certain HPC front hubs cracking before reaching their published life limit. This AD requires revisions to the Airworthiness Limitations Section (ALS) of the manufacturer's Instructions for Continued Airworthiness (ICA) and air carrier's approved Continued Airworthiness Maintenance Programs (CAMP) to incorporate new or more restrictive airworthiness limitations. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2018-05-08: We are superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2013-19-12 for GA 8 Airvan (Pty) Ltd Models GA8 and GA8-TC320 airplanes. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and address an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as the fuel system integral sump tank not meeting FAA regulations. We are issuing this AD to require actions to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2007-15-04: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to certain Boeing Model 737-800 series airplanes. The existing AD currently requires inspecting flight spoilers to determine spoiler position after every landing and after any rejected takeoff maneuver. For airplanes on which any flight spoiler is found in the up position with the speedbrake handle in the down position, the existing AD requires replacing the flight spoiler actuator with a flight spoiler actuator having a certain part number. The existing AD also requires an operational test of the speedbrake control system after any maintenance actions that operate the spoiler system, and replacement of the flight spoiler actuator if necessary. The existing AD also provides for optional terminating action for those requirements. This new AD requires the previously optional terminating action. This AD results from a report of seven flight spoiler actuator jams on Model 737-800 airplanes equipped for short field performance (SFP). The cause of the failure has been identified as interference within the actuator main control valve. We are issuing this AD to prevent operation with defective flight spoiler actuators, which could result in a flight spoiler actuator hardover, and could cause the flight spoiler surface to jam in the fully extended position. Two or more hardover failures of the flight spoiler surfaces in the up direction on the same wing, if undetected prior to takeoff, can cause significant roll and consequent loss of control of the airplane. \n\nDATES: This AD becomes effective August 8, 2007. \n\n\tThe Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of a certain publication listed in the AD as of August 8, 2007. \n\tOn May 7, 2007 (72 FR 21083, April 30, 2007), the Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of a certain publication listed in the AD. \n\n\tWe must receive any comments on this AD by September 24, 2007.