Aircraft-logs.com

Results
58-01-04: 58-01-04 HELIO: Applies to Model H-391B Aircraft, Serial Numbers 003 to 063 Inclusive. Several aileron-interceptor actuator bellcranks have been found to be cracked. Accordingly, the following inspection and replacement programs are required as indicated. Compliance required within the next 100 hours. Visually inspect the aileron-interceptor actuator bellcranks at the attachment of the control cables. Cracked bellcranks must be replaced. (Helio Service Bulletin No. 16 covers this subject.)
2021-25-02: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2014-16- 16, which applied to all Embraer S.A. Model ERJ 190-100 STD, -100 LR, - 100 ECJ, -100 IGW, -200 STD, -200 LR, and -200 IGW airplanes; and AD 2018-19-28, which applied to certain Embraer S.A. Model ERJ 190-100 STD, -100 LR, -100 ECJ, -100 IGW, -200 STD, -200 LR, and -200 IGW airplanes. AD 2014-16-16 required, for certain airplanes, retorquing and replacing the pylon lower link fittings, and for all airplanes, repetitive retorquing of those fittings. AD 2018-19-28 required modification of the attaching parts of the pylon lower link fittings. This AD continues to require those actions, and also requires application of a lower torque value, inspection of certain shear pins and replacement if necessary, and revised compliance times for the modification; as specified in an Ag[ecirc]ncia Nacional de Avia[ccedil][atilde]o Civil (ANAC) AD, which is incorporated by reference. This AD also prohibits the installation of affected parts. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2010-10-04: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Operators of DHC-8 400 Series aeroplanes have been reporting chafing of wires in the AC wire harnesses located along the lower wing shroud on either wing resulting in a loss of various system services. Chafed wires may lead to arcing, local overheating and AC generator failure. The AC generators provide power to the anti-icing heaters, including pitot/static heater, engine adapter heater, and propeller heater. Failure of both AC generators would result in the loss of these systems and poses a safety concern. * * * * * Loss of both AC generators could lead to unannunciated loss of heat to both engine inlets, which could lead to loss of power in bothengines during icing conditions. This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.
51-23-04: 51-23-04\tSIKORSKY: Applies to All Model S-51 Helicopters. \n\nCompliance required as indicated. \n\n1.\tCompliance required prior to next flight. \n\nInspect all main rotor link assemblies (P/N S510348) received from the manufacturer between June 1 and September 6, inclusive for location of the identification stamp "F". Links with the "F" metal-stamped in the critical area on the inner faces of the ears should be retired from service. Those with the "F" stamped on the outer faces or on noncritical areas of the inner faces of the ears should be polished locally with emery and crocus cloth to remove the "F" and the links may be returned to service. (See Figure 6.) \n\n\n\nAD 51-23-04 \n\n(Sikorsky Information Circular No. 175, dated September 7, 1951, covers this same subject.) \n\n2.\tMain rotor link assemblies (P/N S510348) shall be retired from service when a total flight time of 960 hours on the links has been accumulated. \n\n(Sikorsky Information Circular No. 122, Revision B, dated September 10, 1951, covers this same subject.)
89-07-08: 89-07-08 McDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-6177. \n\n\tApplicability: Model DC-9 and C-9 (Military) series airplanes, Fuselage 1 through 895, as listed in McDonnell Douglas DC-9 Service Bulletin 24-57, Revision 1, dated March 12, 1980, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required within 60 days after the effective date of this AD, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent the AC cross tie relay from shorting out internally and causing total loss of AC electrical power and to eliminate a potential source of fire ignition, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tInstall current limiters in the aircraft wiring at the AC cross tie relay in accordance with the accomplishment instructions of McDonnell Douglas DC-9 Service Bulletin 24-57, Revision 1, dated March 12, 1980. \n\n\tB.\tAn alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office,FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tNOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Avionics Inspector (PAI), who may add any comments and then send it to the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office. \n\n\tC.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes unpressurized to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to McDonnell Douglas Corporation, 3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846, Attention: Director of Publications, C1-LOO (54-60). These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or 3229 East Spring Street, Long Beach, California. \n\n\tThis amendment (39-6177, AD 89-07-08) becomes effective on April 17, 1989.
2010-09-13: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Some digital engine control units (DECUs) used to control MAKILA 2A and MAKILA 2A1 engines have an ambient pressure (P0) sensor with a measurement accuracy that may be outside the range required for satisfactory functioning of the engines throughout the entire operating envelope. In certain extreme flight conditions, the lack of P0 measurement accuracy could potentially cause an engine flameout if the engine is operating on a replacement fuel. The issue is limited to a batch of 24 DECUs, of which 23 are known to be still in service. Since 01 January 2010, any such DECU returned to an approved repair centre has had its P0 sensor checked and replaced as necessary. We are issuing this AD to prevent an uncommanded engine in-flight shutdown which could result in a forced autorotation landing or accident.
85-21-01: 85-21-01 BOEING: Amendment 39-5148. Applies to all Model 737-300 series airplanes delivered prior to line position 1147, certificated in any category. Line position 1147 was delivered September 13, 1985. To detect loose cone bolts and interference between the engine and engine support strut at the forward engine mount, accomplish the following within 30 days after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished: \n\n\tA.\tVisually inspect for clearances between the engine and engine support strut in the vicinity of the forward engine mount as specified in Boeing Telegraphic Service Letter M- 7272-2396, dated September 12, 1985. \n\n\tB.\tIf the required clearance cannot be confirmed at any location specified in Boeing Telegraphic Service Letter M-7272-2396, dated September 12, 1985, lower the engine in accordance with Boeing Maintenance Manual Section 71-00-02, revised June 25, 1985, sufficiently to accomplish the following: \n\n\t\t1.\tDisassemble as required to inspect theforward cone bolts and forward mount cone bolt receptacles for pitting, galling, or wear and clearances in accordance with Boeing Maintenance Manual Section 71-21-00, revised October 25, 1984. \n\n\t\t2.\tPenetrant-inspect the cone bolt threads as specified in Boeing Telegraphic Service Letter M-7272-2396, dated September 12, 1985. \n\n\t\t3.\tRepair or replace any damaged cone bolts or cone bolt receptacles. \n\n\tC.\tEliminate interference detected in paragraph A., above, in accordance with procedures specified in Boeing Telegraphic Service Letter M-7272-2396, dated September 12, 1985. \n\n\tD.\tFollowing accomplishment of the above, reinstall the engine in accordance with instructions provided in Maintenance Manual Section 71-00-02, revised June 25, 1985, except that the cone bolts must be tightened to 1200-1400 inch-pounds of torque. \n\n\tE.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of inspections and/or modifications required by this AD. \n\n\tF.\tAlternate means of compliance which provide an acceptable level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this AD who have not already received copies of the service information cited herein may obtain copies upon request from the Boeing Commercial Airplane Company, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or the Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective October 21, 1985.
64-15-01: 64-15-01\tBOEING: Amdt. 756 Part 507 Federal Register July 3, 1964. Applies to All Models 707-300B and 707-300C Series Aircraft Listed in Boeing Service Bulletin No. 1962(R- 1). \n\tCompliance required as indicated. \n\tCracks have occurred in the flange of the left and right fillet flap drive support assembly, P/N's 65-22244-1 and -2. In each instance the crack originated in the lower inboard flange area of the subject assemblies. To correct this condition, accomplish the following: \n\t(a)\tWithin 30 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished within the last 100 hours' time in service, and thereafter at periods not to exceed 130 hours' time in service from the last inspection, visually inspect the upper and lower inboard and outboard flanges of the fillet flap drive screw support assemblies, P/N's 65-22244-1 and -2 for cracks. Parts found to be cracked shall be repaired before further flight in accordance with either paragraph (b), (c), or(d). \n\t(b)\tRepair cracks before further flight in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin No. 1962(R-1), Paragraph 3, Part II, "Repair Data", or later FAA approved revisions; or in a manner approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. \n\t(c)\tStop drill the crack(s) in the flange with 0.25 inch hole(s) and shim in accordance with step "D", Part II, of Service Bulletins Nos. 1962(R-1) and 1962(R-1)A, and do not remove the flange. (NOTE: In this case the flange would serve as the filler.) \n\t(d)\tIf the maximum total length of the crack or the series of cracks does not exceed 6 inches in the upper and lower outboard flanges and 2 inches in the upper and lower inboard flanges: \n\t\t(1)\tStop drill any crack or cracks with a 0.25 inch hole. \n\t\t(2)\tVisually inspect cracks daily which have been stop drilled, for growth or propagation beyond the stop drill hole. If any growth is noted, additional stop drilling is required with the total crack length including propagation not to exceed the limits specified above. If a crack or cracks are found which exceed these limits, they must be repaired before further flight in accordance with paragraph (b) or (c). \n\t\t(3)\tAccomplish a permanent repair in accordance with paragraph (b) or (c) within 125 hours' time in service after crack detection. \n\t(e)\tWhen a permanent repair of cracked flanges is accomplished in accordance with paragraph (b) or (c) or if the preventive modification of uncracked flanges in Part III of Service Bulletins NOs. 1962(R-1), 1962(R-1)A, or later FAA approved revisions is accomplished, the repetitive inspections specified in paragraph (a) may be discontinued. \n\t(f)\tUpon request of an operator, an FAA maintenance inspector, subject to prior approval of the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region, may adjust the repetitive inspection intervals specified in this AD to permit compliance at an established inspection period of the operator if the request contains substantiating data to justify the increase for such operator. \n\t(Boeing Service Bulletins Nos. 1962(R-1) and 1962(R-1)A cover this same subject.) \n\tThis directive effective July 8, 1964.
70-26-01: 70-26-01 BOEING: Amdt. 39-1128 as amended by Amendment 39-1213. Applies to Model 747 Series Airplanes.\n \n\tCompliance required as indicated. \n\n\tTo prevent malfunctions resulting in unusable passenger evacuation slides and improve the overall reliability of the passenger evacuation system, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tWithin the next 300 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, inspect and/or modify the passenger evacuation system in accordance with the following Service Bulletins, or later FAA approved revisions, or equivalent inspections and/or modifications approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region: \n\n\tBoeing Service Bulletin 25-2031, Revision 1, dated March 20, 1970, Parts I and II; or in the alternative, Parts II and III. If Parts I and II only have been completed, accomplish Part III when the slide is again disturbed, e.g., repaired, inflated or repacked. \n\n\tBoeing Service Bulletin 25-2040, Revision 1, dated October 12, 1970. \n\tBoeing Service Bulletin 25-2046, dated May 18, 1970. \n\tBoeing Service Bulletin 25-2052, dated May 1, 1970, or Boeing Service Bulletin 25-2068, dated August 15, 1970. \n\tBoeing Service Bulletin 25-2070, dated July 13, 1970.\n \tBoeing Service Bulletin 25-2110, dated November 12, 1970. \n\tBoeing Service Bulletin 25-2137, dated November 18, 1970. \n\tBoeing Service Bulletin 57-2013, Revision 1, dated September 28, 1970. \n\n\t(b)\tWithin the next 2,000 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, modify the passenger evacuation system in accordance with the following Service Bulletins, or later FAA approved revisions, or equivalent modifications approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region: \n\n\tConsolidated Controls Corporation Service Bulletin 521002-1, dated July 9, 1970. \n\n\tB. F. Goodrich Service Bulletin 25-008, dated July 20, 1970, and B. F. Goodrich Service Bulletin 25-014, dated November 18, 1970. \n\n\t(c)\tWithin the next 500 hours' time in service after the effective date of this amendment to AD 70-26-01, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 500 hours' time in service from the last determination, until the guide arm elbow pin is modified in a manner approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region, adjust the torque of nut P/N 69B11101-1, - 2, or -3, located within the guide arm of the ten passenger cabin doors, to 125-150 inch-pounds, or equivalent procedures approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA western Region. \n\n\t(d)\tWithin the next 500 hours' time in service after the effective date of this amendment to AD 70-26-01, unless already accomplished, inspect the ten passenger cabin doors per Part I of Boeing Service Bulletin 25-2092, Revision 3, dated April 30, 1971 or later FAA approved revisions, or an equivalent inspection procedure approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. \n\n\t\t(1)\tIf this inspection per Part I establishes either that the overall distance between the stop tabs on the floor attachment fittings is within the limits of Figure 1, View AA, or that the overlap between the forward face of the slider barlock and forward floor attachment bracket is 0.25 inch or greater, no further action is required. \n\n\t\t(2)\tIf neither of the two conditions described in (d)(1), above, is established by the inspection per Part I of the Service Bulletin, accomplish the modifications described in Parts II or III of the Service Bulletin or later FAA approved revisions, within 500 hours' time in service from the effective date of this amendment to AD 70-26-01, unless already accomplished, or equivalent modification approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. \n\n\t\t(3)\tIf the operator elects to perform Part II, and thereafter the operator modifies, alters, repairs, or replaces a girt bar, a floor fitting, or floor fitting support, repeat Part I and, if necessary, Part II, prior to further flight or within 500 hours' time in service from the effective date of this amendment to AD 70-26-01, whichever occurs later. Alternately, the operator may elect to perform Part III at this time as terminating action. \n\n\t\t(4)\tIf the operator elects to perform Part III rather than Part II, as described in (d)(2), above, the Part III modification must be accomplished within 500 hours' time in service from the effective date of this amendment to AD 70-26-01. \n\n\t\t(5)\tIf the operator elects to perform Part II, per (d)(2), above, and further, if an adequate control procedure is approved by an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, Part III must be accomplished within 9000 hours' time in service after the effective date of this amendment to AD 70-26-01. This control procedure must assure that Part I and, if necessary, Part II are accomplished before further flight if the girt bar, a floor fitting, or the floor fitting support is modified, altered, repair or replaced. This control procedure may be discontinued when Part III is accomplished. Part III, whenever accomplished, constitutes terminating action. \n\n\t(e)\tWithin the next 2000 hours' time in service after the effective date of this amendment to AD 70-26-01, unless already accomplished, modify the passenger evacuation system in accordance with the following service bulletins, or later FAA approved revisions, or equivalent modifications approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region: \n\n\tBoeing Service Bulletin 52-2022, dated October 1, 1970. \n\tBoeing Service Bulletin 52-2024, Rev. 1, dated March 5,1971.\n \tBoeing Service Bulletin 52-2043, dated December 15, 1970. \n\n\t(f)\tWithin the next 3000 hours' time in service after the effective date of this amendment to AD 70-26-01, unless already accomplished, modify the passenger evacuation system in accordance with the following service bulletins, or later FAA approved revisions, or equivalent modifications approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region: \n\n\tBoeing Service Bulletin 25-2133, dated January 26, 1971. \n\tB. F. Goodrich Service Bulletin 25-018, dated January 22, 1971. \n\n\t(g)\tWithin the next 5000 hours' time in service after the effective date of this amendment to AD 70-26-01, unless already accomplished, modify the passenger evacuation system in accordance with the following service bulletin, or later FAA approved revisions, or equivalent modifications approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region: \n\n\tB. F. Goodrich Service Bulletin 25-016, dated December 1, 1970. \n\tAmendment 39-1128 became effective December 18, 1970. \n\tThis Amendment 39-1213 becomes effective May 18, 1971.
88-04-01: 88-04-01 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-5845. Applies to McDonnell Douglas Model DC-6, -6A, -6B, R6D, and C-118A series airplanes, certificated in any category. Compliance required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo detect cracks and prevent failure of the vertical stabilizer rear spar attach fittings, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tWithin the next 3 months after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished within the last 9 months, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed one year or before further flight, whichever occurs later, inspect the vertical stabilizer rear spar attach fittings, front and rear, right and left, in accordance with Douglas DC-6 Service Bulletin 723, dated May 27, 1957, or later revisions approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, After each inspection, apply LPS-3 corrosion inhibiting oil, or equivalent, to each fitting. \n\n\tB.\tIf a crack is found, accomplish the following: \n\n\t\t1.\tReplace the fitting(s) before further flight for each of the following conditions: \n\n\t\t\ta.\ta crack is found that matches the description in paragraph 1. of Douglas DC-6 Service Bulletin 723, dated May 27, 1957, or later revisions approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region; \n\n\t\t\tb.\tmore than 1 fitting per airplane is cracked; \n\n\t\t\tc.\tthe crack is chordwise. \n\n\t\t2.\tReplace the fitting within the next 3 months after the crack is found, or before further flight, whichever occurs later, if the crack matches the description of paragraph 2. of Douglas DC-6 Service Bulletin 723, dated May 27, 1957, or later revisions approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tC.\tAlternate means of compliance which provide an acceptable level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tD.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a base to comply with the repair requirement of this AD when approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service information from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to McDonnell Douglas Corporation, 3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846, Attention: Director of Publications, C1-L00 (54-60). These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or the Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 4344 Donald Douglas Drive, Long Beach, California. \n\n\tThis Amendment becomes effective March 21, 1988.