Results
97-26-10: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Raytheon Model Hawker 1000 series airplanes, that requires modifying the aft core cowl nozzles of the engine nacelles. This amendment is prompted by a report indicating that the sealant on the core cowl nozzles may extend higher than the forward flange of the core cowl nozzles, which could result in contact between the cowl sealant surface and the lever of the engine mechanical over- speed control system. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent such contact, which could cause the over-speed system to function improperly and consequent engine structural failure.
2011-08-05: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: The ball screw nut assemblies of the first 70 Trimmable Horizontal Stabilizer Actuators (THSA) manufactured by Goodrich were fitted with an upper attachment gimbal having a thickness of 58 mm (2.28 in), which is different from the design of the final production standard. The gimbal installed on the subsequent THSAs (final production standard) is more robust, having a thickness of 70mm (2.76 in). During the fatigue life demonstration of the THSA upper attachment primary load path elements, only a gimbal having a thickness of 70mm (2.76 in) was used. Thereafter, no additional justification work to demonstrate the robustness of the upper attachment fitted with a gimbal of 58 mm was accomplished. In case of failure of this gimbal, the THSA upper attachment primary load path would be lost and the THSA upper attachment secondary load path would engage. Because the upper attachment secondary load path will only withstand the loads for a limited period of time, the condition where it would be engaged and not detected could lead to failure of the secondary load path, which would likely result in loss of control of the aeroplane. * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
73-12-06: 73-12-06 GRUMMAN: Amdt. 39-1657. Applies to Grumman Models G-21 and G-21A Type Airplanes (Army OA-9, Navy, JRF-1 through JRF-6B under TC654) certificated in all categories. Compliance required as indicated: 1. To prevent hazards in flight associated with the failure of the elevator torque tube assembly P/N 12755, rudder torque tube assembly P/N 12756, L.H. and R.H. rudder pedal torque tube assemblies P/N's 12757, 12758 and hinge support assembly P/N 12725, located below the cockpit floor, visually inspect these assemblies for cracks and corrosion within one month after the effective date of this A.D. unless already accomplished within the last eleven months and thereafter at intervals not to exceed twelve months in service from the last inspection. 2. On assemblies having 3000 hours or more time in service or exceeding 36 months in service, within one month's time in service after the effective date of this A.D. unless already accomplished within the last 23 monthsand thereafter at intervals of 2000 hours in service but not exceeding 24 months in service, remove and disassemble the elevator torque tube assembly P/N 12755, rudder torque tube assembly P/N 12756, the L.H. and R.H. rudder pedal torque tube assembly P/N's 12757 and 12758, and hinge support assembly P/N 12725. Inspect all parts for corrosion or cracks, using visual and dye penetrant or magnaflux inspection methods. 3. Before further flight, repair or replace corroded parts and replace cracked parts with new parts or with a used part inspected in accordance with this AD or with an equivalent part approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Southern Region, except that the aircraft may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197. 4. Upon submission of substantiating data by an owner or operator through an FAA Maintenance Inspector, the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Southern Region, may adjust the repetitive inspection interval specified in this AD. This AD supersedes AD 72-13-05. This amendment is effective June 14, 1973.
2021-11-51: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain International Aero Engines AG (IAE) V2522-A5, V2524-A5, V2527- A5, V2527E-A5, V2527M-A5, V2530-A5, and V2533-A5 model turbofan engines. This AD was prompted by a review of investigative findings from an event involving an uncontained failure of a high-pressure turbine (HPT) 1st-stage disk that resulted in high-energy debris penetrating the engine cowling. This AD requires an ultrasonic inspection (USI) of affected HPT 1st-stage disks and HPT 2nd-stage disks and, depending on the results of the USI, removal of the affected HPT 1st-stage and HPT 2nd-stage disks from service. The FAA previously sent an emergency AD to all known U.S. owners and operators of these engines and is now issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2004-06-01: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Dornier Model 328-100 series airplanes, that requires replacement of the existing main landing gear (MLG) leg assembly with a modified assembly. This action is necessary to prevent fatigue damage of the MLG leg, which could result in collapse of the MLG. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
2021-12-18: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus SAS Model A330-200, A330-200 Freighter, A330-300, A340-200, and A340-300 series airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report that the auxiliary power unit (APU) aft fuel pump printed circuit board (PCB) varnish had deteriorated; the varnish is one of the layers of protection against development of an ignition source. This AD requires replacing each affected APU aft fuel pump, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
68-10-02: 68-10-02\tBOEING: Amendment 39-595. Applies to Model 707 and 727 Series airplanes equipped with G. E. cargo door and escape hatch heater blankets P/N 8921165G1 through G7, Boeing P/N 10-60911-9 through -15, which have not been modified in accordance with General Electric Service Bulletin No. SB-2 dated October 4, 1967, including Modification No. 2 dated December 11, 1967. \n\n\tCompliance required within the next 100 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent fires in the cargo door and escape hatch heater blankets, accomplish the following: \n\n\t1.\tDeactivate the "Passenger Cabin Blanket Heater" switch on the flight engineer's panel and placard switch "Inoperative", and deactivate the "Main Cargo Door Heater" circuit breaker or breakers on the pilot's overhead circuit breaker panel. Secure the circuit breaker(s) in the "OFF" position to prevent inadvertent activation, and placard the breaker(s) "Inoperative". \n\n\t2.\tDeactivate the "Passenger Cabin Blanket Heater" switch on the flight engineer's panel and placard it "Inoperative" and deactivate the "Escape Hatch Heater" circuit breaker or breakers on the pilot's overhead circuit breaker panel. Secure the circuit breaker(s) in the "OFF" position to prevent inadvertent activation, and placard the circuit breaker(s) "Inoperative". \n\n\t3.\tThe heater blankets may be re-activated upon accomplishment of G.E. Service Bulletin No. SB-2 dated October 4, 1967, including Modification No. 2 dated December 11, 1967, or an equivalent approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, Western Region. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective May 11, 1968.
69-08-05: 69-08-05 BRITISH AIRCRAFT CORPORATION: Amdt. 39-749. Applies to Model BAC 1-11, 200 and 400 Series airplanes. Compliance required within the next 1500 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. To ensure that the shear pin which is installed within the Elevator Centralizing Spring Pots, Part Numbers AB34-A881, A3003, A3017, A3019, and A3021 remains effective, remove and disassemble the spring pots from the right and left elevators and modify in Accordance with BAC 1-11 Service Bulletin No. 27-A-PM 3536 or later ARB-approved issue, or FAA-approved equivalent. This amendment becomes effective May 11, 1969.
2004-06-02: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD); applicable to certain Airbus Model A319, A320, and A321 series airplanes; that requires replacing the lower guide rod fittings at the rear passenger doors with improved fittings. This action is necessary to prevent failure of a lower guide rod fitting, which could cause a rear passenger door to jam during opening, delaying an emergency evacuation and resulting in injury to passengers or crew members. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
2021-12-17: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain ATR-GIE Avions de Transport Regional Model ATR42-300, - 320, and -500 airplanes; and all Model ATR72-101, -102, -201, -202, - 211, -212, and -212A airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of defective seat tracks. This AD requires a detailed visual inspection of each affected part for deficiencies (sealant blockage and out of tolerance ligaments), and depending on findings, accomplishment of applicable corrective actions, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
71-16-02: 71-16-02 HAWKER-SIDDELEY AVIATION, LTD.: Amdt. 39-1251 as amended by Amendment 39-1329. Applies to Hawker-Siddeley Model DH-125 series 1A serial numbers 25013, 25104, 25016, 25018, 25021, 25022, 25026, 25027, 25030, 25031, 25034 through 25039, 25042, 25051 through 25053, 25057, and 25058; and series 1A-522 serial numbers 25017, 25020, 25023, 25029, 25032, 25033, 25043, 25046, 25047, 25060, 25064, 25065, 25066, 25068, 25070, 25073 through 25075, 25078, 25079, 25082 through 25084, 25086 through 25088, 25091, 25093, and 25095 airplanes. To prevent a hazardous drift in the Rotax voltage sensing unit, within the next 200 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, incorporate Rotax Modification No. SP.7172 by replacing the transistor T.1 in the Rotax Voltage Sensing Unit Type U.3624 or U.3624/1 with a new transistor in accordance with Hawker Siddeley Aviation, Ltd., 125 Series Aircraft Service Bulletin 24/124 (7355), dated July 9, 1970, or later ARB-approved issue or FAA-approved equivalent. Amendment 39-1251 became effective August 23, 1971. This Amendment 39-1329 becomes effective November 5, 1971.
2021-12-16: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Airbus Helicopters Deutschland GmbH (AHD) Model MBB-BK117 C-2 and MBB- BK117 D-2 helicopters. This AD was prompted by a report of increased control force in the collective axis. This AD requires repetitive visual inspections of the main rotor actuator (MRA), as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2004-06-03: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Airbus Model A319, A320, and A321 series airplanes, that requires checking the identification plate on the ram air turbine (RAT) actuator and re-identifying the actuator or replacing the actuator with one which has been cleaned and tested by its manufacturer. This action is necessary to prevent jamming of the RAT actuator in an emergency which requires deployment of the RAT, and consequent loss of hydraulic and electrical power in the airplane. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
2021-13-01: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Leonardo S.p.a. (Type Certificate previously held by Agusta S.p.A.) Model AB139 and AW139 helicopters and Leonardo S.p.a. (Type Certificate previously held by AgustaWestland S.p.A.) Model AW189 helicopters. This AD was prompted by reports of missing lock wire and loose fasteners. This AD requires a one-time inspection of the main rotor (M/R) slip ring and depending on the outcome, removing the M/R slip ring from service, removing screws and washers from service, applying torque, installing lock wire, and re-identifying the M/R slip ring. This AD also prohibits the installation of certain M/R slip rings. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
76-22-07: 76-22-07 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS CORPORATION: Amendment 39-2759. Applies to McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9 series airplane, certificated in all categories, having American Safety Flight Systems, Inc. seat belt Model 444657 and 444660 installed on the flight attendant's seat located on the aft pressure bulkhead door. \n\n\tCompliance required within the next 1200 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD unless already accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent possible injury to the occupant of the aft flight attendant's seat, accomplish either of the following: \n\n\t(a)\tInstall a placard on the flight attendant's seat, located on the aft pressure bulkhead door which reads: \n\n\t\t"DO NOT OCCUPY", or \n\n\t(b)\tReplace the bungee cord at the aft flight attendant's seat located on the aft pressure bulkhead door in accordance with McDonnell Douglas Service Bulletin 25-210, October 8, 1976, later FAA approved revisions, or in a manner approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA,Western Region. \n\n\tNOTE: The subject seat belts were installed at a particular time during factory production and may also have been installed in the field in accordance with Service Bulletin 25-147. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective December 10, 1976.
97-23-16: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 777-200 series airplanes, that requires replacement of certain overhead electronics units (OEU) of the passenger address and entertainment communication systems with modified OEU's. This amendment is prompted by reports of smoke coming from the overhead panels near the passenger reading lights, which was caused by overheating of the transformers located in the OEU's. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent overheating of the transformers, which potentially could cause a fire in the transformer assembly and/or electronic components located in the OEU and could cause smoke to enter the passenger cabin.
95-22-10: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Airbus Model A320 series airplanes. This action requires replacement of the rear pintle pin of both main landing gears (MLG) with an improved pintle pin assembly. This amendment is prompted by the results of fatigue testing, which demonstrated that fatigue cracking can occur in the heads of these pintle pins. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent the initiation and propagation of such fatigue cracking, which could lead to the failure of the pintle pins and consequent collapse of the MLG.
2021-13-21: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Leonardo S.p.a. Model AB139, AW139, and AW189 helicopters. This AD was prompted by a report of the in-flight failure of one of the three stainless steel external rings bonded to the main rotor swashplate boot. This AD requires repetitive inspections of these stainless steel external rings for corrosion, cracks, and the condition of the adhesive that bonds the rings to the main rotor swashplate boot, and corrective action if necessary, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
76-08-06: 76-08-06 BRANTLY: Amendment 39-2584. Applies to Model 305 helicopters certificated in all categories. Compliance required as indicated after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. (a) Prior to further flight after January 18, 1968, remove Brantly torsion strap assemblies, P/N C0976-1 or P/N D2225-1, and replace with Brantly torsion strap assemblies, P/N D2225-3, in accordance with Brantly service kit, SK 305-67-5, dated December 15, 1967, Drawing D8001, Revision A, or later FAA approved revision, and Brantly Maintenance and Overhaul Instructions, revised December 18, 1967. Thereafter, replacement parts of the same numbers must be removed and replaced prior to accumulating 400 hours' time in service or sooner if Brantly clevis bearing, P/N ESJ 74837 or P/N 36NBC2048YZP, does not meet the conditions specified in paragraph (c) of this AD. (b) Prior to further flight after January 18, 1968, remove Brantly main rotor hub clevis bearings, P/N ESJ 74837, and replace with unused Brantly serialized bearings, P/N ESJ 74837 or 36NBC2048YZP, in accordance with Brantly service kit, SK 305-67-5, dated December 15, 1967, Drawing D8001, Revision A, or later FAA approved revision, and Brantly Maintenance and Overhaul Instructions revised December 18, 1967. Bearings with the same part number must be used in the hub clevis. The clevis bearings must be hand packed with special lubricant and lubricated daily in accordance with Brantly Maintenance and Overhaul Instructions, revised December 18, 1967. (c) Thereafter, at intervals not to exceed 50 hours' time in service from the last inspection, accomplish the following: (1) Remove the clevis bearings from the hub assembly in accordance with the Brantly Maintenance and Overhaul Instructions, revised December 18, 1967, or in accordance with FAA approved equivalent procedures. (2) Inspect each clevis bearing for deterioration or roughness as follows: (i) Clean each bearing and inspect the grease residue for metallic particles. Maintain the bearing races indexing as removed from the clevis. (ii) Load each bearing by hand and rotate the bearing a few degrees, back and forth, to detect bearing roughness. (3) Remove the clevis bearings from further service if metallic particles were found in the grease residue or if the bearing has any roughness. The associated torsion strap assembly must be removed from further service also. (4) If the clevis bearings are not rough and have no metallic particles in the residue, the clevis bearings may be installed but must be rotated 180 degrees from the index mark per Brantly Maintenance and Overhaul Instructions, revised December 18, 1967, or per FAA approved equivalent procedures. (5) After rotation of the clevis bearing and after an additional 50 hours' time in service (100 hours' total time in service), the clevis bearing must be inspected, retired from service, and replaced with a clevis bearing serialized and manufactured in accordance with the type design. If replaced by a used Brantly serialized clevis bearing, the total accumulated service life must not exceed the service life limitations specified above. (d) Compliance with applicable parts of AD 68-01-07 is equivalent to compliance with the same applicable parts of this AD. (Brantly Helicopter Service Letter No. 103 dated February 10, 1976, pertains to use of the alternate clevis bearing.) This supersedes Amendment 39-541 (33 F.R. 626), AD 68-01-07 that superseded Amendment 39-435 (32 F.R. 8708), AD 67-19-01. This amendment becomes effective on receipt of the mailed amendment and is effective to all other persons on May 25, 1976.
67-18-02: 67-18-02 BOEING: Amdt. No. 39-424, Part 39, Federal Register May 27, 1967. Applies to Boeing Model 707 and 720 Series airplanes. \n\n\tCompliance required as indicated.\n \n\tTo prevent fires in the water and electrical galley supply boxes due to water seepage, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tWithin the next 300 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD and thereafter, within periods not to exceed 300 hours' time in service from the last inspection, visually inspect each water and electrical galley supply box for water entrapment at the electrical connectors located therein.\n \n\t(b)\tIf water is found trapped at an electrical connector, water traps, including but not limited to tubing, clamps, bushings or boots, must be removed or modified in accordance with a method approved by an FAA Air Carrier Maintenance Inspector. \n\n\t(c)\tWithin the next 3,000 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD unless already accomplished, modify the water and electrical galley supply box in accordance with the "Accomplishment Instructions" of Boeing Service Bulletin 2428 or FAA-approved revision, or in accordance with a method approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA, Western Region. \n\n\t(d)\tThe inspections required by paragraph (a) may be discontinued when the modification required by paragraph (c) is accomplished. \n\n\t(e)\tUpon request of the operator, an FAA Air Carrier Maintenance Inspector, subject to prior approval of the Regional Director, FAA, Western Region, may adjust the repetitive inspection intervals specified in this AD to permit compliance at an established inspection period of the operator if the request contains substantiating data to justify the increase for that operator. \n\n\tThis directive effective June 26, 1967.
2004-05-25: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas airplane models, that requires inspection of the captain's and first officer's seat locking pins for minimum engagement with the detent holes in the seat tracks; inspection of the seat lockpins for excessive wear; and corrective actions, if necessary. This action is necessary to prevent uncommanded seat movement during takeoff and/or landing, which could result in interference with the operation of the airplane and consequent temporary loss of control of the airplane. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
2011-07-09: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Service experience has shown that a case of FADEC channel B manifold air pressure (MAP) sensor hose permeability is not always recognized as fault by the FADEC. The MAP value measured by the sensor may be lower than the actual pressure value in the engine manifold, and limits the amount of fuel injected into the combustion chamber and thus the available power of the engine. A change in FADEC software version 2.91 will change the logic in failure detection and in switching to channel B (no automatic switch to channel B if MAP difference between channel A and B is detected and lower MAP is at channel B). In addition, previous software versions allow--under certain conditions and on DA 42 aircraft only--the initiation of a FADEC self test during flight that causes an engine in-flight shutdown. We are issuing this AD to prevent engine in-flight shutdown or power loss, possibly resulting in reduced control of the airplane.
2021-12-13: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 737-8 and 737-9 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report that during refueling of the right main tank, if there is a failure of the automatic shutoff system, the refueling panel does not provide the required indication that the automatic shutoff has failed. This AD requires installing a new fuel quantity processor unit (FQPU) and doing an FQPU software check. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
81-02-04: 81-02-04 COSTRUZIONI AERONAUTICHE GIOVANNI AGUSTA (CAGA): Amendment 39-4014. Applies to Models A109 and A109A series helicopters, certificated in all categories. Compliance required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To prevent loss of the main rotor blade pitch control, accomplish the following: (a) Before further flight, hand correct the CAGA manuals referenced in paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) by changing the torque value from "500 to 560 Kg, 434 to 486 inch/pound" to "311 to 345 Kg, 275 to 300 inch/pound." (1) CAGA A109/A109A overhaul manual (all change dates), Chapter 65-10- 01, page 240, paragraph 8, subparagraph (e); (2) CAGA A109/A109A maintenance manual (all change dates), Chapter 65-10-03, page 201, paragraph 3; and (3) Retain the hand corrected pages in both manuals until revised replacement pages are available from CAGA. (b) Within the next 25 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD - (1) Remove the mainrotor pitch horn trunion assembly; (2) Permanently remove from service, nut P/N MS 17825-7, and replace with a new nut of the same part number; and (3) Using a 5X magnifying glass, visually inspect the threaded area of P/N 109-0101-09-1, for deformation, distortion, or damage. (c) If as a result of the inspection of the trunion assembly required in paragraph (b)(3) of this AD, no deformation, distortion, damage, or defect is found. (1) Reinstall the main rotor pitch horn trunion assembly in accordance with CAGA A109/A109A overhaul manual, chapter 65.10.01, or an FAA-approved equivalent, using the torque values listed in paragraph (a) of this AD; or (2) Reinstall the main rotor pitch horn trunnion assembly in accordance with CAGA A109/A109A maintenance manual, or an FAA-approved equivalent, using the revised torque values listed in paragraph (a) of this AD; (3) During reinstallation of the main rotor pitch horn trunion assembly, check to insure that there is 0.10 to 0.20 millimeter play between the trunion shoulder and the bearing inner race; and (4) Return the serviceable trunion assembly to service. (d) If as a result of the inspection of the trunion assembly required in paragraph (b)(3) of this AD, deformation, distortion, damage, or defect indicating overtorque is found - (1) Remove the trunion assembly from service; (2) Replace with a new or serviceable trunion assembly of the same part number; and (3) Reinstall the main rotor pitch horn trunion assembly and torque in accordance with paragraph (c)(1) or (c)(2) of this AD. (e) Report defects found to the Chief, Aircraft Certification Staff, Europe, Africa and Middle East Office, c/o American Embassy, Brussels, Belgium. (Reporting approved by the Office of Management and Budget under OMB No. 04-R0174.) (f) If an equivalent means of compliance is used in complying with this AD, that equivalent must be approved by the Chief, Aircraft Certification Staff, AEU-100, Europe, Africa, and Middle East Office, FAA, c/o American Embassy, Brussels, Belgium. NOTE: Costruzioni Aeronautiche Giovanni Agusta Service Engineering Department messages LD/7/1815 and LD/7/1845, both dated April 22, 1980, refer to this subject. This amendment becomes effective January 5, 1981, as to all persons except those persons to whom it was made immediately effective by telegraphic AD T80EU-22, issued May 1, 1980, which contained this amendment.
96-07-09: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to Boeing Model 747-400, 757, and 767 series airplanes, that requires a revision to the Airplane Flight Manual that advises flight crews to monitor the engine indication and crew alerting system (EICAS) for "status" level messages pertaining to impending engine fuel filter bypass. This amendment also requires the installation of upgraded EICAS computers that provide "advisory" level messages to indicate such bypass conditions. This amendment is prompted by a finding that EICAS computers currently installed on these airplanes do not provide an appropriate indication to the flight crew of an impending engine fuel filter bypass condition. The actions specified by this AD are intended to ensure that the flight crew is appropriately aware of conditions involving a severely contaminated airplane fuel system and the associated increased potential for engine power loss.