Results
46-39-05: 46-39-05 DOUGLAS: (Was Mandatory Note 6 of AD-762-7.) Applies Only to C-54B and Other C-54 Series Airplanes Having the C-54B Fuel System. \n\n\tTo be accomplished not later than December 1, 1946. \n\n\tThe main fuel line supporting brackets at wing Stations 357, 378, and 399 are subject to vibration failure and are to be replaced with redesigned brackets. In addition, the United Carr clips at wing Station 378 are to be replaced by Adel clips. \n\n\t(Douglas Service Bulletin No. DC-4-5 covers this same subject.)
91-21-07: 91-21-07 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-8054. Docket No. 91-NM-104-AD. Supersedes AD 90-26-53 and AD 91-01-51. \n\n\tApplicability: Model DC-9 and DC-9-80 series airplanes, Model MD-88 airplanes, and C-9 (Military) airplanes; equipped with Primary Longitudinal Trim Relays (up and down), Leech (P/N) 9207-8333, -8333-1, -8968, -10101, -10296, and -10166; certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo eliminate overheating of primary longitudinal trim relays and the possibility of fire in the forward cargo compartment, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tFor Model DC-9 series airplanes (other than Model DC-9-80 series airplanes), and C-9 (military) airplanes: Within 17 days after February 27, 1991 (the effective date of Amendment 39-6894, AD 90-26-53; and Amendment 39-6894, AD 91-01-51), or prior to the accumulation of 8,000 flight hours on the subject relays, whichever occurs later, remove the relay cover and inspect theprimary longitudinal trim relays for evidence of contact degradation, arcing, carbon build-up, or other evidence of abnormal wear on the contacts; and perform a functional check of the system in accordance with McDonnell Douglas Alert Service Bulletin A27-316, dated December 22, 1990, or January 4, 1991. \n\n\t(b)\tFor Model DC-9-80 series airplanes and Model MD-88 airplanes: Within 30 days after February 27, 1991, or prior to the accumulation of 16,000 flight hours on the subject relays, whichever occurs later, remove the relay cover and inspect the primary longitudinal trim relays for evidence of contact degradation, arcing, carbon build-up, or other evidence of abnormal wear on the contacts; and perform a functional check of the system in accordance with McDonnell Douglas Alert Service Bulletin A27-316, dated December 22, 1990, or January 4, 1991. \n\n\t(c)\tIf damage is found during the inspections or functional tests required by paragraphs (a) and (b) of this AD, prior to further flight, remove and replace the relays in accordance with McDonnell Douglas Alert Service Bulletin A27-316, dated December 22, 1990, or January 4, 1991. \n\n\t(d)\tFor Model DC-9 series airplanes (other than Model DC-9-80 series airplanes) and C-9 (Military) airplanes: Within 90 days after the effective date of this AD or prior to the accumulation of 8,000 flight hours on the subject relays, whichever occurs later; and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 8,000 flight hours; remove and replace the primary longitudinal trim relays with new approved parts in accordance with McDonnell Douglas DC-9 Maintenance Manual, Chapter 27-40-4. This replacement constitutes terminating action for the inspection and functional test required by paragraph (a) of this AD. \n\n\t(e)\tFor Model DC-9-80 series airplanes and Model MD-88 airplanes: Within 90 days after the effective date of this AD, or prior to the accumulation of 16,000 flight hours on the subject relays, whichever occurs later; and thereafterat intervals not to exceed 16,000 flight hours; remove and replace the primary longitudinal trim relays with new approved parts in accordance with McDonnell Douglas MD-80 Maintenance Manual, Chapter 27-40-4. This replacement constitutes terminating action for the inspection and functional test required by paragraph (b) of this AD. \n\n\t(f)\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. \n\n\tNOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Los Angeles ACO. \n\n\t(g)\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with far 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\t(h)\tThe inspection and replacement requirements shall be done inaccordance with McDonnell Douglas Alert Service Bulletin A27-316, dated December 22, 1990, or January 4, 1991. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from McDonnell Douglas Corporation, 3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue S.W., Renton, Washington; or at the Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 3229 East Spring Street, Long Beach, California; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 1100 L Street N.W., Room 8401, Washington, D.C. \n\n\tAirworthiness Directive 91-21-07 supersedes AD 90-26-53, Amendment 39-6894; and AD 91-01-51, Amendment 39-6893. \n\n\tThis amendment (39-8054, AD 91-21-07) becomes effective on November 19, 1991.
2009-15-02: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: In-service experience has shown that a fracture of the gerotor pump of the A320 RAT [ram air turbine] may occur. This may lead to the non-operation of the RAT in case of an in-flight deployment. The Non-Deployment or Non-Pressurization of the RAT, associated with a double engine failure or a total loss of normal electrical power generation constitutes an unsafe condition. * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
69-25-01: 69-25-01\tBOEING: Amdt. 39-882. Applies to Model 727, 727C and 727-200 series airplanes. \n\tCompliance required within the next 2500 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. \n\tTo prevent malfunction of the generator control circuit caused by induced electrical interference, accomplish the following or an equivalent modification procedure and parts installation approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. \n\tWithin 2500 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, modify the generator control panels in accordance with Section II, Boeing Service Bulletin No. 24-47, dated March 3, 1969, or later FAA approved revisions. \n\tThis amendment becomes effective January 3, 1970.
2009-14-06: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD), which applies to all Boeing Model 777 airplanes. That AD currently requires, for the drive mechanism of the horizontal stabilizer, repetitive detailed inspections for discrepancies, repetitive lubrication of the ballnut and ballscrew, repetitive measurements of the freeplay between the ballnut and the ballscrew, and corrective action if necessary. This new AD revises the compliance times of the existing AD. This AD results from a report of extensive corrosion of a ballscrew in the drive mechanism of the horizontal stabilizer on a Boeing Model 757 airplane, which is similar in design to the ballscrew on Model 777 airplanes. We are issuing this AD to prevent an undetected failure of the primary load path for the ballscrew in the drive mechanism of the horizontal stabilizer and subsequent wear and failure of the secondary load path, which could lead to loss of control of the horizontal stabilizer and consequent lossof control of the airplane.
98-26-21: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 727 series airplanes that have been converted from a passenger to a cargo-carrying ("freighter") configuration, that requires limiting the payload on the main cargo deck by revising the Limitations Sections of all Airplane Flight Manuals (AFM), AFM Supplements, and Airplane Weight and Balance Supplements for these airplanes. This amendment also provides for the submission of data and analyses that substantiate the strength of the main cargo deck, or modification of the main cargo deck, as optional terminating action for these payload restrictions. This amendment is prompted by the FAA's determination that under certain conditions unreinforced floor structure of the main cargo deck is not strong enough to enable the airplane to safely carry the maximum payload that is currently allowed in this area. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent failure of the floor structure, which could lead to loss of the airplane.
2002-14-05: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11 airplanes, that currently requires repetitive general visual inspections of the power feeder cables, terminal strip, fuseholder, and fuses of the galley load control unit (GLCU) within the No. 3 bay electrical power center to detect damage; and corrective actions, if necessary. This amendment requires replacement of the electrical wiring of the galley in the electrical power center in bays 1, 2, and 3 with larger gage cable assemblies, which terminates the repetitive inspections. This amendment also expands the applicability of the existing AD to include two additional airplanes. This action is necessary to prevent damage to the wire assembly terminal lugs and overheating of the power feeder cables on the No. 3 and 4 GLCU, which could result in smoke and fire in the center accessory compartment. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition. \n\n\tThe incorporation by reference of certain other publications, as listed in the regulations, was approved previously by the Director of the Federal Register as of January 4, 2000 (64 FR 71001, December 20, 1999).
2008-06-20 R1: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above that would revise an existing AD. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Subsequent to accidents involving Fuel Tank System explosions in flight * * * and on ground, * * * Special Federal Aviation Regulation 88 (SFAR88) * * * required a safety review of the aircraft Fuel Tank System * * *. * * * * * Fuel Airworthiness Limitations are items arising from a systems safety analysis that have been shown to have failure mode(s) associated with an `unsafe condition' * * *. These are identified in Failure Conditions for which an unacceptable probability of ignition risk could exist if specific tasks and/or practices are not performed in accordance with the manufacturers' requirements. This ADrequires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI. DATES: This AD becomes effective December 8, 2009. On April 23, 2008 (73 FR 14661, March 19, 2008), the Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the AD. We must receive comments on this AD by January 7, 2010.
2009-12-51: This document publishes in the Federal Register an amendment adopting emergency airworthiness directive (AD) 2009-12-51 that was sent previously to all known U.S. owners and operators of Turbomeca S.A. Arriel 1A1, 1A2, 1B, 1C, 1C1, 1C2, 1D, 1D1, 1E2, 1K1, 1S, and 1S1 turboshaft engines. This AD requires initial and repetitive visual inspections of certain reduction gearboxes (module M05) for oil leakage, repair if leaking, and repair of all affected modules as terminating action to the repetitive inspections. This AD results from reports of oil leaks from certain reduction gearbox (module M05) front casings. The engine manufacturer reported that the lubrication duct plug was not properly bonded/glued in place. We are issuing this AD to prevent uncommanded in-flight engine shutdown, possible engine fire, and an emergency autorotation landing.
94-22-06: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Bombardier Model CL-600-2B19 series airplanes, that requires modification of the stall protection system (SPS) input wiring; a revision to the FAA-approved Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) to specify that a pre-flight check of the slip/skid indications must be conducted prior to engine start; and modification of the stall protection computer (SPC) to accept restored dual attitude and heading reference system (AHRS) input. This amendment is prompted by a report that the AHRS could send conflicting input to the SPC on the airplane. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent the loss of stall warning protection on the airplanes.