Results
99-06-07: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all Short Brothers Model SD3-60 and SD3-60 SHERPA series airplanes, that requires repetitive inspections to detect corrosion and/or wear of the top and bottom shear decks of the left and right stub wings in the area of the forward pintle pin of the main landing gear (MLG), and repair, if necessary. This amendment is prompted by issuance of mandatory continuing airworthiness information by a foreign civil airworthiness authority. The actions specified by this AD are intended to detect and correct corrosion and/or wear of the top and bottom shear decks of the left and right stub wings in the area of the forward pintle pin of the MLG, which could result in failure of the MLG to extend or retract.
2013-17-05: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Bombardier, Inc. Model CL-600-2C10 (Regional Jet Series 700, 701, & 702) airplanes, Model CL-600-2D15 (Regional Jet Series 705) airplanes, Model CL-600-2D24 (Regional Jet Series 900) airplanes, and Model CL- 600-2E25 (Regional Jet Series 1000) airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of erratic pitch movement and oscillatory behaviors of the elevator control system. This AD requires repetitive replacement of the bellcrank supports on the inner rear spar of the horizontal stabilizer with new, improved bellcrank supports. We are issuing this AD to prevent erratic pitch movement and transient accelerations, which could result in a significant pitch upset, and injuries to passengers and flightcrew.
99-06-05: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to certain Pilatus Aircraft Ltd. (Pilatus) Models PC-12 and PC-12/45 airplanes. This AD requires removing the "Alternate Flap System" from the airplane flight controls and inserting a temporary revision that specifies this change in SECTION 2 - LIMITATIONS of the PC-12 Pilot's Operating Handbook. This AD is the result of mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the airworthiness authority for Switzerland. The actions specified by this AD are intended to preclude improper use of the "Alternate Flap System", which could result in flap asymmetry with consequent reduced or loss of control of the airplane.
83-02-51: 83-02-51 BELL HELICOPTER TEXTRON, INC: Amendment 39-4842. Applies to Bell Helicopter Textron Models 222 and 222B helicopters certified in all categories equipped with main rotor controls walking beam assembly Part Numbers 222-010-415-5 and -9. Note that the -5 assembly contains a -7 detail beam and the -9 assembly contains a -11 detail beam. Beam assemblies may be identified in the area of their serial numbers by their detail numbers instead of their assembly numbers. The -7 and -11 details are included in this AD. (Airworthiness Docket No. 83-ASW-6.) Compliance is required as indicated (unless already accomplished). To prevent failure of the walking beam, accomplish the following: (a) Before further flight, remove and inspect walking beam assemblies Serial Numbers VN07-1O7 through VN07-140, VN06-057, VN06-060, VN06-061, VNO6-065, VN06- 069, VN06-089 through VN06-092, VN06-095, VN06-096, VNO6-100, EA-004, and EA-008 as follows: (1) Remove all grease fittings from the walking beam. (2) Using a magnifying glass of at least 10-power magnification and a bright light, inspect each one of the threaded holes from which the grease fittings were removed for evidence of corrosion, trapped foreign material, or thread indentations caused by foreign material having been trapped between the grease fittings and the threads. Of special interest is the presence of shot-peening residue. This residue will have the appearance of small round balls similar to shotgun pellets. These balls may be as small as 0.012 inch in diameter and are difficult to see unless a magnifying glass and bright light are used. (3) If any of the above defects are present, remove the part from service and replace it with a serviceable part. (4) If no defects are found, reinstall the grease fittings with wet zinc chromate primer on the threads. (b) Before further flight and prior to the first flight of each day, conduct the following inspections of all walking beam assembly Part Numbers 222-010-415-5 and -9, regardless of serial number, with emphasis on the area around the grease fittings in the portion of the beams through which the drive links are attached by bolts part number 20-057-9-95D. Remove cracked parts from service before further flight and replace with serviceable parts. (c) Within 10 hours time in service following the effective date of this AD, and each 25 hours thereafter, conduct a dye penetrant inspection of a 2-inch diameter area around the grease fittings described in paragraph (b) above. The area shall be prepared for penetrant inspection by thorough cleaning using Stoddard solvent or equivalent. Do not use methyl-ethyl- ketone (MEK) or paint stripper. Remove cracked parts from service before further flight and replace with serviceable parts. NOTE: Bell Alert Service Bulletin (ASB) 222-83-18 is an equivalent means of compliance with paragraph (b) of this AD. The inspections required in paragraph (b) maybe performed with the parts installed on the helicopter. Any other equivalent means of compliance with this AD must be approved by the Manager, Helicopter Certification Branch, Federal Aviation Administration, Southwest Region. (d) The helicopter may be flown to a repair base for the above inspections under the provisions of FAR 21.197. This amendment becomes effective May 15, 1984, as to all persons except those to whom it was made immediately effective by telegraphic AD T83-O2-51 issued January 21, 1983, which contained this amendment.
73-23-06: 73-23-06 BEECH: Amdt. 39-1745. Applies to all Models A23-19, 19A, M19A and B19 (S/Ns MB-1 thru MB-557); and all Models 23, B23, and C23 (S/Ns M-1 thru M-554, M-1095 thru M-1415, M-1419, M-1423, M-1439 and M-1447) airplanes, having the vernier-type throttle control. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To prevent throttle control actuating cable failure and loss of proper adjustment of the throttle control system, within 100 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, accomplish the following: A) Inspect the throttle control cable in accordance with the following procedures: 1. Remove the engine cowling, disconnect the throttle control cable from the carburetor throttle arm, and remove the carburetor from the engine. 2. Move the throttle control through its full travel several times and check by feel for binding or roughness. 3. Lock the cockpit throttle control in the full forward position and apply approximately 50 lbs. pressure at the throttle cable rod end in a direction to force the control cable back into the housing. While this pressure is applied, mark the throttle control cable at the end of the housing. 4. Apply a pulling force of approximately 50 lbs. to the cable rod end and while this force is applied place another mark on the throttle control cable at the end of the housing. 5. If the throttle lock gives under either loading condition specified in Paragraphs A(3) and A(4) or if binding or roughness is evident during operation of the throttle control or if the distance between the marks made on the control cable in accordance with Paragraphs A(3) and A(4) is .25 inch or more, prior to further flight, replace the throttle control assembly with an airworthy assembly. B) Replace the carburetor throttle shaft and stop arm assembly and throttle lever with either Marvel Schebler P/Ns 13-1521 and 12-B57 respectively and Marvel Schebler P/N 81- 311 nut if a MarvelSchebler Model MA-3-SPA carburetor is installed on the engine or Marvel Schebler P/Ns 13-1526 and 12-B56 respectively and Marvel Schebler P/N 81-311 nut if a Marvel Schebler Model HA-6 carburetor is installed on the engine. NOTE: The Marvel Schebler carburetor modifications should be accomplished in accordance with instructions contained in the current Marvel Schebler Overhaul Manual. C) Reinstall the carburetor and rig the throttle control cable to the throttle arm leaving a 1/16 inch cushion in the full throttle position as shown in Section 3 of Beechcraft Models 19, 23, and 24 Series Shop Manual, tighten Marvel Schebler P/N 81-311 nut to 25/60 in. lbs. torque and safety with a cotter pin. D) Any equivalent methods of compliance with this AD must be approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Central Region. Beechcraft Service Instructions No. 0589-159 or later FAA-approved revisions covers this subject. This amendment becomes effectiveNovember 19, 1973.
2013-15-13: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all The Boeing Company Model 757 airplanes. This AD was prompted by two in- service occurrences on Model 737-400 airplanes of total loss of boost pump pressure of the fuel feed system, followed by loss of fuel system suction feed capability on one engine, and in-flight shutdown of the engine. This AD requires repetitive operational tests of the engine fuel suction feed of the fuel system, and corrective actions if necessary. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct loss of the engine fuel suction feed capability of the fuel system, which, in the event of total loss of the fuel boost pumps, could result in dual engine flameout, inability to restart the engines, and consequent forced landing of the airplane.
2010-14-05: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Seven cases of on-ground hydraulic accumulator screw cap or end cap failure have been experienced on CL-600-2B19 (CRJ) aircraft, resulting in loss of the associated hydraulic system and high-energy impact damage to adjacent systems and structure. * * * * * * * * A detailed analysis of the systems and structure in the potential line of trajectory of a failed screw cap/end cap for each accumulator * * * has been conducted. It has been identified that the worst case scenario would be failure of one of the brake accumulator screw caps/end caps, resulting in impact damage causing loss of both hydraulic systems No. 2 and No. 3, with consequent loss of both braking and nose wheel steering and the potential for a runway excursion [resulting in damage to the airplane and hazards to persons or property on the ground]. * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
97-05-03 R1: This amendment revises Airworthiness Directive (AD) 97-05-03, which currently requires inserting a limitation into the Operations Limitation Section of the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) or Flight Manual Supplement for all owners/operators of aircraft equipped with an AlliedSignal Avionics, Inc. (AlliedSignal) Models GNS-XLS or GNS-XL global positioning systems (GPS) flight management system. The limitation specifies prohibiting the use of these AlliedSignal GPS units on previously published non-precision approaches. This AD is the result of AlliedSignal issuing service information that specifies procedures for accomplishing hardware and software modifications to the affected flight management systems. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) determined that accomplishment of the actions of the service bulletins should be considered as an alternative method of compliance to the actions of AD 97-05-03. This AD retains the actions of AD 97-05-03, and incorporates the servicebulletins into the AD, as an alternative method of compliance to the existing AD. The actions specified by this AD are intended to continue to prevent deviation from an intended flight path during a non-precision approach to an airport caused by inaccurate information from the GPS flight management system.
79-10-14 R1: 79-10-14 R1 CESSNA: Amendment 39-3475 as amended by Amendment 39-5901. Applies to the following Models and serial numbered airplanes, certificated in any category. SERIES SERIAL NUMBERS 140A 15200 through 15724 150 617, 628, 649, 17001 through 17999, 59001 through 59018; 15059019 through 15077005 A150 15064970, A1500001 through A1500609 170 609, 18729 through 27169 172 610, 612, 615, 622, 625, 630, 638, 28000 through 29999, 36000 through 36999, 46001 through 47746, 17247747 through 17265684 175 619, 28700A, 55001 through 56777, 17556778 through 17557119 P172D P17257120 through P17257188 R172 P17257189, R1720001 through R1720617 177 661, 17700001 through 17701471, 17701473 through 17701597 180 604, 624, 645, 30000 through 32999, 50001 through 50911, 18050912 through 18052202 182 613, 631, 634, 33000 through 34999, 51001 through 53007, 18253008 through 18260638 185/A185 632, 185-0001 through 185-1599, 18501600 through 18501896 188/A188 With wing tanks; Serials; 653, 188-0446 through 188-0572, 18800573 through 18800762 205 641, 205-0001 through 205-0577 206 206-0001 through 206-0275 U206/TU206 U206-0276 through U206-1444, U20601445 through U20601666 P206/TP206 P206-0001 through P206-0603, P20600604 through P20600647 207/T207 20700001 through 20700203 210/T210 616, 618, 57001 through 57575, 21057576 through 21059361, T210-0001 through T210-0454 336 336-0001 through 336-0195 337/T337 337-0001 through 337-1193, 33701194 through 33701405 M337B 337-0001 and up Compliance: Required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To provide an alternate source of fuel tank venting in case of fuel tank vent obstruction by foreign material and/or sticking of the fuel vent valve, within the next 100 hours time-in-service after the effective date of this AD, accomplish the following: (A) Install applicable vented fuel cap(s) with related adapters and fuel servicing placards in accordance with Cessna Service LetterSE77-6 dated March 4, 1977; or as an alternative for fuel bladder equipped airplanes, Cessna Service Kit SK182-85 dated September 21, 1984, or modify existing fuel tank caps in accordance with STC SA728NW, SA3318NW or SA2967SW and for 336 and 337/T337 Series airplanes, in accordance with Cessna Service Letter ME78-47 (Rev. 1) dated February 12, 1979. NOTE 1: On those airplanes having two fuel tank caps in each fuel tank, only one vented cap is required in each tank. A vented cap must be installed in the outboard filler opening of each tank. (B) The modification required by this AD may be accomplished by those owner/operators authorized to perform preventive maintenance under FAR 43 provided only installation of a different fuel tank cap is necessary. The person accomplishing this modification must make an entry in the aircraft maintenance record indicating compliance with this AD; i.e., "AD 79-10-14 complied with by installing replacement fuel filler cap; Cessna P/Nthis date Signature and Certificate Number." (C) An equivalent means of compliance with this AD may be used if approved by the Manager, Aircraft Certification Office, Federal Aviation Administration, 1801 Airport Road, Room 100, Mid-Continent Airport, Wichita, Kansas 67209. All persons affected by this directive may obtain copies of the document(s) referred to herein upon request to Cessna Aircraft Company, Customer Service, P.O. Box 1521, Wichita, Kansas 67201; or may examine the document(s) referred to herein at the Federal Aviation Administration, Office of the Regional Counsel, Room 1558, 601 East 12th Street, Kansas City, Missouri 64106. NOTE 2: Supplemental Type Certificates SA728NW and SA3318NW are held by Mr. Dennis H. Ward, Venting Engineering, 5420 A Street, Tacoma, Washington 98408, Phone (206) 474-6458. Supplemental Type Certificate SA2967SW is held by Mr. Charles M. Seibel, Flight Bonus Inc., P.O. Box 665, Hurst, Texas 76053, Phone (817) 265-1650. This amendment revises AD 79-10-14, Amendment 39-3475, effective May 29, 1979, which superseded AD 78-26-09, Amendment 39-3379. This Amendment 39-5901 becomes effective on May 30, 1988.
2013-16-13: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Eurocopter Deutschland GmbH (ECD) Model BO-105A, BO-105C, BO-105S, BO- 105LS A-1, BO-105LS A-3, MBB-BK 117 A-1, MBB-BK 117 A-3, MBB-BK 117 A- 4, MBB-BK 117 B-1, MBB-BK-117 B-2, and MBB-BK 117 C-1 helicopters to require inspections for corrosion or thread damage to each tail rotor balance weight (weight) and each tail rotor control lever (lever). This AD was prompted by a European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD and a Transport Canada Civil Aviation (TCCA) AD, both issued based on a report that corrosion was detected on a weight in the area of the attachment thread on a model BO-105 helicopter. The actions of this AD are intended to detect corrosion and thread damage in the threaded area of the weight and lever, and to prevent failure of a weight or lever, separation of tail rotor parts, severe vibration, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.